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| Peggy Mallicoat v. C. R. Daniels, Inc.
03S01-9708-CH-00100
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking reconsideration of her industrial disability under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). She had previously entered into a court-approved settlement agreement that awarded her 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because she failed to prove any increase in her disability. The plaintiff appeals and raises the following issue: "Did the trial court err in its refusal to reopen and reexamine the vocational disability of the Plaintiff/Appellant pursuant to T.C.A. _ 5-6-421 [sic] when its refusal was based solely on the fact that there was no additional medical testimony in support of such claim of further disability." We affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND The plaintiff, age 46 at the time of trial, left high school in the twelfth grade and had no vocational training. Her employment history includes working in furniture factories, working as a cook and waitress in restaurants, and working on a farm. In February 1993, the plaintiff began working for the defendant in the stenciling department. In a short time, she was transferred to working on an upright sewing machine, which required her to stand on one foot while pressing a pedal with the other foot during the length of her eight hour shift. The plaintiff testified that she injured her back while working for the defendant on September 1, 1993. She said she bent over to pick up a hamper, which weighed 15 to 2 pounds, felt and heard a "pop" in her back, and could not straighten up. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/06/98 | |
| Cecil Hanner v. Ruan Trans. Corp.
03S01-9709-CH-00118
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge found the plaintiff was 1 percent disabled and awarded judgment for 4 weeks at $355.97 per week. The trial judge fixed the time for temporary disability from November 1, 1994 through March 2, 1995, plus he awarded an additional eight weeks of temporary total disability beyond this period. The defendant says the trial court erred in awarding 1 percent temporary total disability and in fixing the time of temporary disability. The plaintiff is 47 years old with a high school education. His employment history includes working for McDonald's as a night manager after high school and working part-time for his brother as a carpenter. The plaintiff has worked most of his adult life as a truck driver. On August 22, 1993, the plaintiff was involved in a single vehicle tractor trailer truck accident in which his truck fell 23 feet down the side of Monteagle Mountain and burned. He escaped and climbed back up to the road, where he was found unconscious. The emergency room examination showed a shoulder injury, possible closed head injury, and a headache. The plaintiff was hospitalized. The plaintiff testified he had seizures at home after the accident. A co- worker, Walter H. Zorn, testified he visited the plaintiff at home and saw him have a seizure. Another co-worker, Elroy Bailey, testified he saw a marked change in the plaintiff after the injury, such as headaches, no energy, and a "spirit broken." 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Howell N. Peoples, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/06/98 | |
| Thomas Huggins v. Royal Insurance Company
01S01-9708-CH-00178
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/01/98 | |
| Martha M. Eden v. Employers Ins. of Wasau Mutual Co., et al .
01S01-9710-CV-00210
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell |
Trousdale County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/01/98 | |
| Gallatin Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Rosie L. Harris
01S01-9710-CV-00238
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell |
Sumner County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/01/98 | |
| Jerry J. Roberts v. George Beeler, Etc., et al.
01S01-9710-CH-00216
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Chancellor |
Davidson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/01/98 | |
| Sammy Moore v. A. O. Smith
02S01-9709-CH-00082
Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. George R. Ellis, |
Moore County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| Victor A. Wynn v. Perma-Fix and The Travelers Insurance Company
02S01-9711-CV-00099
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court found the plaintiff suffered from a heart attack and resulting disablement which arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant. Further, the trial court found the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled as a result of this work injury. The defendants appeal and present the following issue: "I. The issue for determination of this Court is whether or not the evidence in this cause preponderates against the findings of the trial court that Plaintiff sustained an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment resulting in a permanent and total disability." The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The evidence in this case was presented by the plaintiff, who testified in person, and three other witnesses who testified likewise. These other witnesses were the plaintiff's wife and Pat Townsend and Claude Hunt, both co-workers who testified that the plaintiff suffered pain in his chest on September 2, 1994 while at work. The plaintiff also presented the depositions of Dr. Bennett Rudorfer and Dr. Grady L. Saxton. The defendant's proof consisted of the deposition of Patricio A. Ilabaca and the testimony of Tammy Boggs, whose official capacity with the defendant is not shown. Boggs introduced a packet of medical records from the plaintiff's personnel 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. John R. Mccarroll, |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| James W. Smith v. Wilson Co. Concrete
01S01-9712-CR-00278
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In January, 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment that the plaintiff was totally and permanently vocationally disabled, with benefits awarded accordingly. The plaintiff returned to the trial court complaining that the judgment was not being satisfied in a timely way. He alleged that the accrued benefits were not paid timely, and that his "weekly checks" were sporadic. To correct this problem he filed a motion to require the defendant to pay the entire judgment or, alternatively, "that the Court determine the interest as the parties were in dispute as to the amount and the method by which it should be figured." The trial court ordered the defendant to pay interest calculated on the entire amount of the judgment, i.e., on the unaccrued portion of the judgment. The defendant appeals, insisting that interest cannot be assessed on installments not due. We agree, since the precise issue has heretofore been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(h) provides in part: (h)(1) If the judgment or decree of a court is appealed pursuant to subsection (e), interest on the judgment or decree shall be computed from the date that the judgment or decree is entered at an annual rate of interest five (5) percentage points above the average prime loan rate for the most recent week for which such an average rate has been published by the board of governors of the federal reserve system on the total judgment awarded by the supreme court. (2) Total judgment awarded is computed by the total number of weeks multiplied by the benefit rate without any reduction. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. O. Bond, |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| Doris Barnes v. Cigna Insurance Company
02S01-9710-CV-00087
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court held the plaintiff had sustained a 4 percent permanent partial disability to the right arm1 and a 3 percent permanent partial disability to the left arm as a result of a gradually occurring injury which arose in the course of and in the scope of her employment with Martin Marietta Ordnance Systems, Inc. ("Martin Marietta"). The defendant, Cigna Insurance Company, appeals and raises the following issue about the award to the left arm: "1) Whether the trial court's award of 3% permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity was contrary to the weight of the evidence given the 6.35% anatomical impairment awarded by the evaluating physician and the zero percent (%) anatomical impairment awarded by the treating physician?" We find the award of 3 percent to the plaintiff's left arm was not contrary to the weight of the evidence and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Julian P. Guinn, |
Carroll County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| Ingram Book Co. v. Stacey Fitzgerald
01S01-9712-CV-00268
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Ingram Book Company, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that (1) the employee's injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) the award is not barred by the last injury rule and (3) the claimant retains a twelve percent vocational disability award. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Twenty-eight-year-old Stacey Fitzgerald was hired as an executive secretary by Ingram Book Company in September of 1994. Between late February and mid March, she told her supervisor, Terry Cook, she was experiencing right arm pain and requested an ergonomic keyboard. In early June, 1995, a non-work related back injury caused Ms. Fitzgerald to take a temporary leave of absence. Upon her return to work in late August, she requested a part-time position to aid her recovery. Due to continued pain in her right arm, Ingram Book Company sent Ms. Fitzgerald to the Baptist Occupational Medicine facility on or about October 23, 1995. There, she was treated with anti-inflammatorymedicine, a wrist splint, and an elbow band. In November, 1995, Ms. Fitzgerald missed several days of work due to strep throat, a death in the family, and hospitalization for pneumonia. Ingram Book Company terminated her employment during her hospital stay. Following her termination, Ms. Fitzgerald was referred to Dr. Arthur Cushman, whom she saw twice. He concluded Ms. Fitzgerald had a zero percent anatomical impairment rating and assigned no permanent restrictions. Ingram Book Company then arranged for her to receive treatment from Dr. William Jekot. On January 17, 1996, Dr. Jekot diagnosed Ms. Fitzgerald as having mild cubital tunnel syndrome and tendinitis of the right elbow. During March of 1996, Ms. Fitzgerald obtained employment with the Daily News Journal running a newspaper route. However, she quit three months later claiming her preexisting condition caused problems in executing her duties. On May 21, 1997, Dr. Jekot requested a reevaluation visit with Ms. Fitzgerald to prepare for his deposition. Dr. Jekot diagnosed chronic 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| Dianna Skelton v. Robert Shaw Controls
01S01-9710-CC-00229
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded Dianna Skelton ["employee"] workers' compensation benefits based on one-hundred percent permanent, total disability. Robertshaw Controls Company ["employer"] appeals, challenging the extent of employee's disability, the admissibility of the opinion of a clinical psychologist as to permanency of employee's disability, and the failure of the trial court to apply the multiplier caps set forth in T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(1). For the reasons herein stated, we modify the award to find 6 percent permanent vocational disability and, as modified, affirm the judgment of the trial court. I Mrs. Skelton had been employed as a factory laborer at Robertshaw for six years when, on September 4, 1992, she sustained a work-related injury to her lower back while lifting parts weighing about 3 pounds and placing them in an overhead bin. She timely reported the injury to Robertshaw and saw Dr. Bowden Smith, an approved physician, for treatment. Dr. Smith gave her epidural steroid blocks and heat treatments and took her off work for 2-1/2 weeks, then ordered lighter work in the Transition Room from September 22, 1992 until October 6, 1992, when she was released to return to full work. She continued to experience back pain, complained to Robertshaw, and then saw another approved physician, Dr. Larry Laughlin, who ordered X-rays and prescribed physical therapy. She continued to complain of pain. On November 2, 1992, she saw Dr. Robert Weiss, neurosurgeon, also an approved 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. J. O. Bond, |
Smith County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| James Ed Linkous, Jr. v. Federated Rural Electric
01S01-9709-CH-00191
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, Reliance Insurance Company, insists (1) the chancellor erred in applying the successive or "last injurious injury" rule and (2) the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Linkous, is in his late thirties with a high school education, a few junior college courses, apprenticeship training as a journeyman lineman and twenty years' experience as a lineman. On September 13, 1993, he fell from a bucket truck and was injured. After conservative treatment and work hardening, he returned to work in April of 1994 with no permanent medical impairment or restrictions. He performed the same duties as before the accident, until July of 1994, when he suffered a second injury at work. The second injury was surgically treated and the claimant has again returned to his same duties, but with restrictions and a permanent impairment rating. The primary dispute before the trial court was whether disability and medical benefits should be the responsibility of the insurer at the time of the first or second injury, a factual dispute. The trial judge invoked the successive injury rule, long recognized in Tennessee, and sometimes referred to as the last injurious injury rule. Because both issues involve questions of fact, our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1987). As to the first issue, Reliance Insurance Company, the insurer in July of 1994 argues that it should not be subjected to liability because the July 1994 injury was merely an onset of increased pain resulting from the first injury, citing Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 811 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1991) as authority. In that case, the trial court found that plaintiff's condition was due to a general arthritic condition predating his employment at Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and that, although his employment may have aggravated his preexisting condition by increasing his pain, there was no connecting industrial injury or accident that might be considered the triggering incident producing an acceleration of his condition. That finding was supported by expert medical evidence. The medical proof in the present case is quite different. The doctor who 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart, |
Marion County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/29/98 | |
| Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.
01S01-9706-CV-00188
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against Epsco, Inc. ("Epsco") and later Hughes Parker Industries, Inc. ("Hughes Parker")1, alleging that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of developing carpal tunnel syndrome in the course of his employment. The trial court dismissed the suit against Hughes Parker and found that Epsco was not prejudiced by the plaintiff giving notice of his injury on April 3, 1996. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 4 percent permanent partial disability to both arms and seven weeks of temporary total disability. Epsco appeals and presents the following issues: 1. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice. 2. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 3. The permanent partial impairment award is excessive. 4. There is no basis for an award of temporary total disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff timely notified and filed suit against Epsco, we modify the judgment of the trial court to find that the plaintiff can recover 2 percent permanent partial disability to each upper extremity, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. 1 There is no issue raised concerning the dismissal of Hughes Parker in this case. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, |
Lawrence County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/98 | |
| Kevin Curtis v. Grundy Co. Sheriff's Dept., et al .
01S01-9607-CH-00131
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Grundy County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/98 | |
| Charlotte Hull v. Emro Marketing Company
01S01-9709-CH-00201
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident on February 23, 1995 and was entitled to an award of 22 percent permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole ( $14,8. for permanent partial disability and $96. for temporary total disability payable in a lump sum), medical expenses incurred after March 9, 1995, and future medical treatment caused by the injury. The trial court ruled that Emro Marketing Company ("Emro") was liable for the award because it was the employer at the time of the most recent injury that bore a causal relation to the plaintiff's incapacity. Emro raises the following issues: 1. Whether the Chancellor erred in finding the subsequent employer liable under the last injurious injury rule when the subsequent injury was not suffered in the scope of the employee's employment with the subsequent employer. 2. Whether the Chancellor erred in applying the last injurious injury rule when the employee's initial injury was the strongest causal link to the disability of the employee, who had not fully recovered from her initial injury? The plaintiff contends the trial court properly found Emro liable, but says if it is not then Kwik Sak, Inc. ("Kwik Sak") and Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") are liable. Kwik Sak and Reliance say that Emro is liable as found, but if it is not then the plaintiff has not appealed from the action of the trial judge dismissing them as defendants. We find the trial judge erred in applying the repetitive injury rule and/or the last injurious injury rule in this case and find Kwik Sak and Reliance were the insurers at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Don R. Ash, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/24/98 | |
| Wm. Fletcher v. WaUSAu Ins. Co.
03S01-9708-CH-00096
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff, William Fletcher, 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and other statutory benefits against defendant, Wausau Insurance Company, and defendant-employer, Tanknology Corporation International. The claim was dismissed as to defendant, National Surety Corporation, and there has been no appeal from the order of dismissal. Defendant Wausau has appealed insisting (1) it was not the employer's insurer in Tennessee and therefore not subject to being sued in Tennessee, (2) that T.C.A. _ 5-6-115 has no application to the case as plaintiff's contract for hire was not made in Tennessee nor was the employment principally localized within Tennessee, and (3) the action in Tennessee should be barred under the doctrine of election of remedies. Plaintiff began employment with Tanknology during January 199 as a result of a contract for hire in Texas. He was employed as a tester and traveled with a mobilized unit conducting tests on underground storage tanks for major oil companies. He was assigned to the southeast region and this territory covered seven states including Tennessee. He testified he traveled in his work about seventy-five percent of the time and he spent about 3% of his time working in Tennessee. On March 26, 1991, he sustained a back injury while working in Asheville, North Carolina. He saw Dr. Rick Longie on March 28, 1991 in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He later was treated by Dr. Alvin Spunt in Harriman, Tennessee, because Dr. Spunt was closer to his residence in Kingston, Tennessee, where he and his family were living. Dr. Longie, a chiropractor, testified by deposition and stated his office received permission from plaintiff's employer in Houston, Texas to treat plaintiff and that Wausau Insurance Company, Houston, Texas, was identified as the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. He forwarded claims to the insurance 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/18/98 | |
| Bobby Lee Powers v. Aetna Casualty
03S01-9707-CH-00085
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found plaintiff, Bobby Lee Powers, to be 1% disabled and awarded benefits for a period of 4 weeks pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-242. The judgment recited plaintiff was "found to have a 1 percent permanent, partial disability." Defendant insurance carrier, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, was held liable for 8% of the award and the remaining 2% was allocated to the Second Injury Fund. The insurance carrier has appealed insisting plaintiff was found to be totally disabled and that the award of benefits should be paid until plaintiff becomes 65 years of age pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-27(4)(A)(I). This would result in payments being made for 262 weeks since plaintiff reached his maximum medical improvement on July 9, 1996. Aetna also argues the trial court was in error in making the 8% allocation to it as the court failed to take into account a previous award of workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. The Second Injury Fund also contends the award should be computed under T.C.A. _ 5-6-27 rather than the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-242. The state fund insists the allocation of 2% of the award to it was proper since an earlier workers' compensation award paid to the plaintiff was never approved by a court. Plaintiff was injured while working for Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. on December 1, 1994. He was 58 years old when injured and 6 years of age at the time of trial. He completed the 4th grade and began working at age 13 years. He testified he could not read or write but could change money. His work experience is mostly in the construction industry. On the day of his last injury, he was operating a bulldozer and was backing up when he suddenly struck a large rock. This caused a whiplash injury to his neck and back and the force was strong enough to break the neck rest on the bulldozer. He continued to work with a lot of pain and medication until November, 1995. He has not worked anywhere since this time. Plaintiff has suffered a number of health problems prior to this last work- related injury. In 1966 he injured his back with another employer and was 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frank V. Williams, III, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/18/98 | |
| Charles O. Wright v. Miller Transporters, Etc .
02S01-9704-CV-00039
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had failed to show that injuries he received on November 2, 199 arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case thereto for further proceedings.
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. George H. Brown, Jr., |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/16/98 | |
| Randall Wayne Myers v. Royal Insurance Co.
01S01-9710-CH-00227
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Chancellor |
Wayne County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/08/98 | |
| George Elliott v. City of Clarksville
01S01-9710-CV-00222
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Montgomery County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/08/98 | |
| Clayton Homes, Inc. v. Albert D. Bowling
03S01-9708-CH-00120
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has resulted from a ruling of the trial court that the employee's attorney was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees from medical expenses recovered in the case. At the trial below, the claim for compensation benefits was contested on all issues except for a stipulation regarding the employee's compensation rate and an agreement that the sum of $582.25 had been paid in temporary total disability benefits. The employer denied the herniated cervical discs were caused by the employee's work activities and contended if there were an injury, it was of a minor nature. After a contested hearing, the trial court found against the employer, Clayton Homes, Inc., on these issues. The Chancellor announced his decision on March 11, 1997 at a hearing where he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 8, 1997, the employee filed a motion to be awarded discretionary costs and a separate motion seeking a 2% award of attorney's fees on the amount of medical expenses allowed in the case. A final judgment was entered on May 13, 1997, which provided for (1) an award of 15% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, (2) an award of $6,77.6 for additional temporary total disability benefits, (3) directing all accrued permanent partial benefits in the sum of $17,2.8 be paid in a lump sum, and (4) directing the employee to pay all necessary and reasonable medical expenses. In connection with the payment of medical expenses, the judgment stated: "That this sum shall be paid in the registry of the Court and after it has been determined as to the amount, that the attorney for the defendant is awarded a lien of the recovery herein for his attorney's fees of 2% for the recovery of this disputed medical." claytonh.wc 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Chester S. Rainwater, Jr. |
Clay County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/08/98 | |
| Linda Shank v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc .
01S01-9709-CH-00189
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant Wal-Mart, alleging she was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of a back injury and sinus injury sustained in the course of her employment. The trial court found the plaintiff's sinus injury was not compensable1 but the plaintiff's back injury was compensable, awarding her 38 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, temporary total disability benefits, and unpaid medical benefits for the services of Dr. Rex Arendall. The defendant appeals and presents the following issues: "I. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-12(a)(5) and the facts of this case, the proof at trial preponderates against the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's back injury was causally related to the accident she reported of April 26, 1994. II. The trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff's back injury was subject to the six (6) times multiplier in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b) rather than the two and one-half (2 _) times multiplier in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a)(1). III. The medical care of Dr. Rex Arendall was unauthorized and should not have been awarded by the trial court. IV. The trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence release from work slips provided to defendant by the plaintiff and which were included in and became a part of her personnel file." We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 The plaintiff did not appeal the decision of the trial court with respect to her sinus injury. Therefore, the sinus injury will only be discussed for a clear understanding of her back injury. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/08/98 | |
| Hon. Frank v. Williams, Iii,
03S01-9706-CH-00062
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed suit in 1989 for work-related injury to his left hand and alleged a related psychiatric disability. By final judgment entered September 5, 1991, the trial court awarded accrued and future medical and psychiatric benefits and permanent partial disability to his hand but found he had failed to prove any permanent psychiatric disability. The judgment was not appealed. On January 2, 1995, plaintiff filed this suit alleging that (1) under T.C.A. _ 5-6-231 he was entitled to modification of the 1991 final judgment due to increased psychiatric impairment, or (2) in the alternative, he was entitled to benefits for a new accidental [psychiatric] injury which occurred on September 2, 1994. The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to prove that he gave timely notice to the employer of a new work-related accident, had failed to prove a new compensable injury, and was barred from reopening the prior case for modification of the award owing to the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations, since the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in that case was never appealed. The plaintiff appeals, insisting that notice of a new injury was provided to the defendant in a letter to the employer from his doctor and by comments made by the plaintiff at work, and that a particular stressful incident at work was a sufficient mental stimulus to constitute a new psychiatric injury. Defendant insists the trial judge correctly decided those issues and correctly held that the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in 1991 was not subject 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/01/98 | |
| Jimmy Elliott v. Jackie Evans Trucking, Inc.
03S01-9709-CV-00108
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged and testified that on April 7, 1995 he jumped from a truck bed approximately four feet to the ground, twisting his left leg in the process. Sharp pain and swelling immediately occurred and he received emergency room treatment. Seven days later Dr. Robert Beasly, an orthopedic surgeon, performed a meniscectomy for a torn medial meniscus, followed by a left patellectomy and valgus osteomy with metal plate emplacement. The defendant responded that the plaintiff's knee problem pre-existed the alleged injury, and that the torn meniscus was of many years duration. The trial court found that the injury occurred as alleged, and awarded benefits based on "4 percent impairment to the lower body; 16 percent to the body as a whole," later amended to a finding of 1 percent leg impairment with benefits calculated on that basis. Both parties appealed; the plaintiff complains of the refusal of the trial judge to find whole body disability with resultant benefits, and the defendant complains that the finding of the trial court is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Although there is evidence that the plaintiff's knee problem pre-existed his alleged injury, and that it was not job-related, there is evidence accredited 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Carroll L. Ross, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 06/01/98 |