A Sumner County jury convicted the defendant, Steven Lamont Anderson, of unlawful possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony involving violence and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an agreed-upon sentence of twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Sumner
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Fredrick Munn W2022-00675-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Lammey, Jr.
Fredrick Munn, Defendant, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original three-year sentence in
confinement. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a
new revocation hearing.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Marlon Jackson W2022-01288-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Lammey, Jr.
The Defendant, Marlon Jackson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his three-year
probationary sentence for attempted possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell
or deliver. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation after determining that he
materially violated his probation sentence for engaging in criminal activity and being
charged with new offenses. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation because the evidence to support the violation was
“inconclusive, contradictory, and based upon unreliable hearsay.” After review, we
conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant violated the
terms of his probation sentence.
Defendant, Mark Eric Howard, was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, a
Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree
murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Petitioner’s original and untimely petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed on the merits because all his claims were either waived or previously determined. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a second petition alleging that the statute of limitations for his first petition should have been tolled due to his then mental incompetency. The post-conviction court dismissed the second petition, finding that the Petitioner was not mentally incompetent. On appeal, we conclude that, because the Petitioner’s first petition was resolved on the merits, any second or subsequent petition is barred, and any issue regarding the timely filing of the first petition is immaterial. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The Defendant, Kristopher Johnson, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury
of two counts of facilitation of first degree felony murder, a Class A felony; two counts of
criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class
B felony; tampering with evidence, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C
felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403 (2018)
(facilitation), 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder),
39-13-212(a) (2018) (criminally negligent homicide), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated
robbery), 39-16-503 (2018) (tampering with evidence), 39-14-403 (2018) (repealed and
replaced by § 39-13-1003) (aggravated burglary), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently
amended) (aggravated assault). The court merged the criminally negligent homicide
convictions with the facilitation of first degree felony murder convictions. The court
sentenced the Defendant, a Range II offender, to thirty years for each of the counts of the
facilitation of first degree felony murder, eighteen years at 85% for each of the counts of
aggravated robbery, ten years for tampering with evidence, ten years for aggravated
burglary, and ten years for aggravated assault. The court imposed partially consecutive
sentencing, with an effective sentence of seventy years. On appeal, the Defendant contends
that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for the homicide and robbery
offenses, (2) the court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s
street gang affiliation, (3) he was denied his fundamental right to cross-examine two
witnesses, (4) the court erred in ruling that a witness’s statement was hearsay, (5) the court
erred in determining that no violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615 regarding
sequestration of witnesses occurred, (6) cumulative trial errors require reversal, and (7) the
court erred in its application of a sentencing enhancement factor. We affirm the judgments
of the trial court.
The Defendant, Charles Hollon, has been charged with second degree murder through the
delivery of fentanyl pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-210(a)(3). In
this interlocutory appeal, the issue is whether the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant knew the substance being unlawfully distributed or delivered was
fentanyl or carfentanil. In a proposed jury instruction, the trial court held that it did, but
we respectfully disagree. Instead, we hold that the State may satisfy this element by
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (i) the defendant disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the substance delivered to the user was fentanyl or carfentanil; and
(ii) the defendant’s disregard of that risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
defendant’s standpoint. Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the trial court’s order and
remand the case for further proceedings.
The Defendant, Harrison Alexander Mason, was convicted in the Fayette County Circuit
Court of three counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one
count of solicitation of a minor and received an effective sentence of fifty-seven years in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error
by failing to exclude statements made by the victim during her forensic interviews pursuant
to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); that the trial court committed plain error by giving
a “vague” curative instruction and waiting until the final jury charge to give the instruction;
and that the trial court’s errors require reversal of the convictions under the cumulative
error doctrine. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court.
The defendant, Quincy M. Gordon, entered an open plea to one count of forgery, and based
on his prior Michigan convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range III,
career offender to six years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On
appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III, career
offender based on his out-of-state convictions. Following our review, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
The Petitioner-Appellant, Chad V. Hughes, entered a guilty plea to exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a class C felony, and theft of property less than $1000, a class A misdemeanor.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Petitioner received a suspended sentence of five years’ probation for the conviction of exploitation of a minor by electronic means and time served for the theft conviction. As part of the special conditions of probation, the Petitioner was subject to the requirements of the sex offender registry and required to have no contact with his ex-wife, his step-daughter-victim, or his biological daughter without a juvenile/divorce court order. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to pursue a bond reduction, in failing to conduct a pre-trial investigation, in failing to retain a digital forensic examiner, and in failing to advise the Petitioner of the legal implications that pleading guilty to exploitation of a minor by electronic means would have on his dependency and neglect case. Based on trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon our review, we affirm.
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Roderick Turner, was convicted in the Dyer County
Circuit Court of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of
convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years for each aggravated assault
conviction and four years for the convicted felon in possession of a handgun conviction
and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of
thirty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his aggravated assault convictions and
that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court. We remand for the entry of corrected judgments in counts
one and two to reflect that the Defendant’s convictions for misdemeanor assault were
merged into the aggravated assault convictions involving the same victims.
Daniel Benson Taylor, Petitioner, appeals from the dismissal of his Renewed Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“the Renewed Petition”). Because the Renewed Petition does not
comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-21-
107(a) and (b)(1), (3), and (4), we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
The Petitioner, Justus G. Onyiego, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
two counts of aggravated rape based on alternative theories. The trial court sentenced the
Petitioner to seventeen years for each conviction and merged the convictions. This court
affirmed the convictions, and the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The
post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, granted relief, and ordered a new trial
for both counts based on trial counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on any lesserincluded
offenses. The State appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court erred by
granting relief, and the Petitioner cross-appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court
erred by denying relief on his various other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that
the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants relief, and that the post-conviction
court erred by denying his requests for funding for an investigator and a DNA expert.
Based on the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the postconviction
court’s granting relief for the Petitioner’s conviction of aggravated rape causing
bodily injury and reinstate his conviction for that offense. The judgment of the postconviction
court is affirmed in all other respects, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The petitioner, Adolphus Lebron Hollingsworth, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The petitioner, Jose Lemanuel Hall, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.
The defendant, Crystal Ann Michael, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of theft of property under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to sixty days in jail. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Defendant, Jimmie Elwood Shelton, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his
probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. While on
probation, the Defendant was again charged with multiple additional crimes. After a
hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the
remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to
confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Defendant, Kayla Nicole Pauze was convicted by a jury of reckless homicide and
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective ten-year sentence
in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length,
range, and manner of her sentences. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs
and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The Defendant, William Riley Gaul, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury
of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, stalking, tampering
with evidence, and theft of property valued over $500. After merging the felony murder
conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant
to an effective term of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The
Defendant raises twelve issues on appeal, which we have condensed and reordered as
follows: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
especially aggravated stalking count of the presentment; (2) whether the trial court erred
by not sequestering the jury and by allowing the trial to be livestreamed by the media outlet
Law and Crime; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting a Snapchat message between
the Defendant and the victim; (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to
present character evidence in the form of testimony that the Defendant was controlling,
manipulative, and possessive in his relationship with the victim; (5) whether the Defendant
was denied his right to a fair trial by the State’s introduction of his use of the video game
“Call of Duty” and the related evidence that the game included “wall banging,” or killing
individuals by shooting through the walls of a building; (6) whether the trial court erred in
allowing Bobby Jones, Jr., to testify as an expert and to offer trajectory evidence; (7)
whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s
uncharged criminal conduct relating to the theft charge; (8) whether the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the convictions for first degree murder, felony murder, stalking,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and theft of property
valued over $500; (9) whether the jury returned mutually exclusive and patchwork verdicts;
and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the various alleged errors deprived the Defendant
of his right to a fair trial. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s felony
theft conviction in count three must be modified to a Class A misdemeanor and a sentence
of eleven months, twenty-nine days pursuant to the savings statute. The Defendant’s
remaining convictions are affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for an amended
judgment in count three.
The Petitioner, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On
appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his
claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner
argues that counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to argue to the trial court that the
indictment was inconsistent with the charged jury instructions, (2) failing to utilize
impeachment evidence through the use of expert witnesses, (3) failing to properly
investigate the case, (4) failing to hire a private investigator and medical expert to review
physical or DNA evidence, and (5) failing to utilize the victim’s psychological records to
impeach the victim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The Defendant, Tedrick Dawne Hughes, was convicted of possession of more than onehalf
gram of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of more than one-half gram of
marijuana with intent to deliver, tampering with evidence, and simple possession of
methamphetamine, for which he received an effective five-year sentence of confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions for possession of more than one-half gram of marijuana with intent to sell,
possession of more than one-half gram of marijuana with intent to deliver, and tampering
with evidence. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Defendant, Kellye Rhea Crabtree, appeals from the trial court’s sentencing and restitution orders connected with her guilty-pleaded convictions for theft over $60,000, theft over $1,000, and official misconduct, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing; finding that she was a professional criminal; denying probation or an alternative sentence; ordering the maximum in-range sentence; and imposing restitution in an ex parte order filed after the sentencing hearing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court regarding consecutive sentencing and the manner of service. However, we reverse the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for a full restitution hearing.
As relevant to this appeal, the Defendant, David Ray Duncan, was convicted by a jury of
the offense of unlawfully possessing a controlled substance while present in a penal
institution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. He also argues that the trial court should have excluded
evidence produced after the deadline established by the court’s scheduling order, and he
challenges the propriety of his effective twelve-year sentence. We affirm the Defendant’s
conviction, but we respectfully remand the case for resentencing in accordance with Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-11-211.
The Defendant, Brian Keith Medley, was found guilty of sexual battery and
domestic assault. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum of four years as a Range II,
multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and that the maximum sentence was excessive. We respectfully affirm the
judgments of the trial court.
The Defendant, Katherine E. Pilley, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (c)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended)
(simple possession of methamphetamine). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to
eleven months, twenty-nine days suspended to probation after thirty days in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law, challenging the trial court’s
denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the
Defendant’s car. Because the certified question is overly broad as it fails to identify the
scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction
to consider this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
