Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

In June 2015, a Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Becky Jo Burlison, of two counts of aggravated rape of a child, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. Later, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for new trial on grounds that she had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Prior to the new trial, the Defendant provided notice that she intended to offer expert testimony of her diminished capacity at the time of the offenses. The State moved to exclude the testimony, arguing that the testimony was not admissible because it did not satisfy the requirements established in State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997). Following a hearing, the trial court denied the State’s motion and deemed the testimony admissible. The trial court and this court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion to exclude expert testimony regarding the Defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offenses, reiterating the claim that the evidence does not satisfy the requirements for admission. Because we agree that the proffered evidence does not satisfy the requirements for admission established by Hall and its progeny, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Kayla Danielle Skillern, was convicted by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury of the sale of 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-434 (2018). She received a sentence of ten and one-half years’ confinement. On appeal, she contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying her motions for a judgment of acquittal, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting video evidence depicting the Defendant arguing with her codefendant in front of a child. We affirm the Defendant’s conviction but remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment.

The defendant, Adarion C. Morris, appeals the 48-year sentence imposed following the revocation of his community corrections placement, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose the new sentence and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the revocation of the defendant’s community corrections placement and the sentences imposed following the resentencing.

Petitioner, Danny Santarone, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues (1) that he was wrongfully convicted based on the fruits of an unconstitutional search and (2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Petitioner, Petr Pompa, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: 1) raise in the motion for new trial the admissibility of opinion testimony from a school resource officer; 2) raise in the motion for new trial the admissibility of character testimony provided by a school counselor; and 3) object to the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument. Following a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A McNairy County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Dana Ray Davison, of attempted voluntary manslaughter; employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony; employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; felony reckless endangerment; possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense; criminal trespass of a habitation; and the intentional killing of an animal. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony and ordered that the Appellant serve a total effective twenty-year sentence for all of the convictions. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(h)(2), the twenty-year sentence included a mandatory ten-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent for employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony while having a prior felony conviction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the sentencing provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 violate the principles of due process because they lack definiteness and specificity. The State contends that the trial court erred by not sentencing the Appellant for both convictions of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony before merging the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Barry Leon Ferguson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective the assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Antonio Richardson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner also challenges the constitutionality of Rule 13 of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules, claiming the post-conviction court erred in its adherence to the same. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition and the post-conviction court’s application of Rule 13.

The petitioner, Donald Peden, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of attempted first degree murder and theft of property valued at $500 or less, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Because the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel also represented the petitioner on direct appeal, we remand to the post-conviction court to determine whether the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily agrees to waive post-conviction counsel’s conflict of interest.

The petitioner, Hubert Glenn Sexton, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, in which the petitioner challenged his conviction for two counts of first degree murder, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we conclude the petitioner was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury and received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate the petitioner’s convictions, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

I concur with the majority’s conclusions to reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and to remand this case for consideration of whether due process requires tolling of the one-year statute of limitations and, if so, whether the Petitioner is entitled to
post-conviction relief. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief.