Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Defendant, Bobby D. Dewalt, pled guilty to three counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine as a Range II, Multiple Offender in case number 10598 and was sentenced by the trial court to twelve years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence. At the same time, Defendant’s probation was revoked in case number 9783, for which Defendant was on probation at the time of his guilty plea. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence.

The defendant, Willie Lee Wilson, Jr., appeals his Haywood County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, and evading arrest, arguing that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued at $1,000 or less relevant to a handgun, that conviction is vacated, and the charge is dismissed. The defendant’s other convictions are affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted Willie Lewis, Petitioner, of second degree murder. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and Petitioner appealed. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court made insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for this court to review its decision. Additionally, Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s representation during the sentencing phase was deficient for failing to ensure that Petitioner participated in the preparation of the presentence report. Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by this deficiency because trial counsel did not present any mitigating circumstances to the trial court and Petitioner received the maximum sentence within the applicable range. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the
post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Eddie Medlock, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (the Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -313 (2018). The postconviction DNA court denied relief on the basis that DNA analysis of evidentiary items requested by the Petitioner had been performed previously and that the Petitioner’s request regarding various forms of scientific analysis of other items was not cognizable under the Act. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction DNA court.

On April 2, 2018, the Defendant, Brandon Garrard, was found guilty of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a park and conspiring to introduce contraband into a penal facility. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, career offender to concurrent terms of 60 years for the delivery charge and 12 years for the conspiracy charge. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the delivery charge based on the jury verdict form and that the trial court erred in imposing a 60-year sentence. The State concedes that the Defendant was improperly sentenced. After thorough review, we remand for resentencing and affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other aspects.

Defendant, Ricky Jordan, was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years of age and was sentenced to serve eleven years at 100 percent. On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it did not exclude evidence of other incidents of sexual contact between Defendant and the victim that occurred during the time period set forth in the indictment and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Eddie Readus, appeals the length of his effective sentence following a resentencing hearing that was granted by the trial court in response to Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 36.1). The State responds that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim for relief in his Rule 36.1 motion, and therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the motion, rather than granting a new sentencing hearing. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting relief pursuant to Rule 36.1, vacate the amended judgment as to the Class C felony conviction, and reinstate the original judgment.

The Defendant, David Keith Walker, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at $500 or less, burglary, vandalism, and two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that he is a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing pursuant to the statutory considerations outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Emmanuel Deshawn Bowley, of conspiracy to distribute more than 300 grams of cocaine, possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, simple possession of marijuana, attempted possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, and attempted possession of illegal drug paraphernalia. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress based on an invalid wiretap; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence seized from a co-defendant; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

After a bench trial, the Appellant, Katrina Lynette Brown, was found guilty of driving under the influence, violating the implied consent law, possessing .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, possessing .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and a brake light violation. The trial court merged the cocaine possession counts and imposed a total effective sentence of ten years, which was suspended to probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain her conviction of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Quentin Love, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate burglary, felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate theft, felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate robbery, especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, unlawful possession of a weapon by a person having been convicted of a felony involving the use of force, and unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted of a felony drug offense. Defendant proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the State’s proof, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to especially aggravated robbery and reduced the charge to attempted especially aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions into a single count of felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate burglary. The trial court also merged the unlawful possession of a weapon convictions into a single count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for his felony murder conviction. Defendant received concurrent sentences of 20 years each for his especially aggravated burglary and attempted especially aggravated robbery convictions, to be served concurrently with his life sentence. Defendant was also sentenced to ten years for his unlawful possession of a weapon conviction and ten years for his employment of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to his life sentence, for a total effective sentence of life plus 20 years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends: 1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial; 2) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; and 3) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of judgments in counts 2, 3, and 8, pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W. 360 (Tenn. 2015), as well as entry of an amended judgment in count 6 to accurately reflect the offense for which Defendant was convicted. 

After a bifurcated jury trial, Defendant, Daron Hall, was found guilty of three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, one count of aggravated assault, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant received an effective sentence of twentyfive years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals to this Court arguing: (1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the 911 tapes into evidence; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. After a review, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 tapes into evidence, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. However, we remand the matter to the trial court for correction of the judgment forms to reflect the sentences as imposed by the trial court at the sentencing hearing.