Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This appeal arises from a premises liability action filed by Bonnie S. Bodine (“Plaintiff”) against an incorrect defendant. After learning that she had sued the wrong defendant, Plaintiff waited over four months to file a “Motion to Correct Misnomer,” requesting that she be permitted to “replace” the correct defendant in the action. This motion was not heard until five months later, after the defendant asked the trial court to place the case on the docket for both Plaintiff’s motion and the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to correct misnomer and subsequent motion to alter or amend, citing Plaintiff’s “extreme lack of due diligence.” Plaintiff appeals. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

An employee sought a reasonable accommodation from her employer when she began experiencing increased difficulties with her debilitating rheumatoid arthritis. The employer was unable to provide a reasonable accommodation and, after concluding that the employee’s disability rendered her physically unable to perform the essential functions of her job, the employer removed the employee from her position and placed her on paid sick leave. The employee then resigned and sued the employer for discriminatory discharge under the Tennessee Disability Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer after determining that the employee was not qualified for the position and that the employee did not suffer an adverse employment action due to her voluntary resignation. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves a denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Specifically, a former employee contends that there existed good cause as to why he resigned from his employment such that he should be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. The Commissioner’s Designee found that no good cause existed as to why the employee terminated his employment and therefore determined that he was not entitled to benefits. The employee then filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court thereafter affirmed the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision. On appeal, we conclude that there is substantial and material evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, and therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Because appellant did not timely file a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B recusal appeal and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an appeal from a governmental tort liability case in which the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant governmental entity on the basis that it retained its immunity.  Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.  Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the trial court failed to consider their expert affidavit.  On appeal, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Philip James Burt, stated that appellant was appealing the judgment entered on September 13, 2021. As the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiff—a citizen of the City of Manchester, Tennessee, who was “the next highest vote getter” for Alderman, but not elected in the most recent election—contends he is entitled to fill a mid-term vacancy on the Board of Aldermen. The dispute arose when the City’s Board of Aldermen announced it was accepting applications to fill the vacant seat on the Board. In the Complaint that followed, the plaintiff asked the court to declare the proper procedure for filling a mid-term Board vacancy under the City’s Charter. The trial court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), explaining that the Complaint failed to state a claim because the unambiguous language in the Charter did not entitle the plaintiff to the vacant seat. The court also ruled the plaintiff did not have standing “as a citizen.” On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court should have declared the rights of the parties instead of dismissing the declaratory judgment action under Rule 12.02(6) and asserts that he had standing as the “next highest vote getter” in the last election. While motions to dismiss “are rarely appropriate in declaratory judgment actions,” Cannon Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Wade, 178 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted), the plaintiff has not shown that he was prejudiced by the decision. This is because, after thoroughly analyzing the City’s Charter in the context of the facts stated in the Complaint, the court concluded that the Charter was unambiguous and provided no circumstance in which the “next highest vote getter” from the previous election would be entitled to fill a mid-term vacancy. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter judgment holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to fill the vacancy on the Board of Alderman under Article IV, §6(c) by virtue of the fact that he was the next highest vote getter at the election preceding the occurrence of a vacancy.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for White County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Hope H. (“Mother”) to her minor son Zian L. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on three grounds and finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, all by the standard of clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals, arguing that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest determination. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

This extraordinary appeal arises from an alleged biological father’s complaint for “emergency custody,” injunctive relief, and to set child support, filed in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The chancery court immediately entered a restraining order requiring that the child either remain in Shelby County or be returned to Shelby County in the event she had been removed. It also entered a temporary injunction requiring the mother to place the child in the custody of the alleged father pending further orders. Counsel for the mother filed a notice of limited appearance and a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of service of process, and failure to state a claim. The mother submitted affidavits and other proof in support of her position that she and the child were residents of California and had not been present in the State of Tennessee when the complaint was filed or since, so there was no basis for asserting temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-219. She also argued that the alleged father had no right to custody of the child because he had never obtained an order establishing paternity. At a hearing, the chancellor orally denied the mother’s motion to dismiss. The mother filed an application for an extraordinary appeal to this Court pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and requested a stay of the trial court proceedings. The alleged father then filed an amended complaint. On the same date, this Court stayed the proceedings in the trial court and directed the mother to obtain the entry of a written order memorializing the chancellor’s oral ruling. Thereafter, the chancery court entered a lengthy written order denying the mother’s motion to dismiss on all grounds asserted. This Court granted the mother’s application for an extraordinary appeal and framed the single issue as whether the alleged father had standing to file the complaint for emergency custody, for injunctive relief, and to set child support in Shelby County Chancery Court. We now vacate the trial court’s orders exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction, reverse in part the order denying the motion to dismiss, and remand for further proceedings.

To avoid foreclosure, a homeowner and her daughter made a deal to sell their home. The purchasers paid off the mortgage and, after acquiring title, leased the home back to the daughter with an option to purchase. When the daughter failed to make timely lease payments, the purchasers sued for possession of the home. The (former) homeowner filed her own suit, alleging that the transaction was an equitable mortgage subject to rescission under the Federal Truth in Lending Act. She also alleged that the transaction violated Tennessee’s Foreclosure-Related Rescue Services Act. Following a trial, the court agreed that the transaction created an equitable mortgage that violated the Truth in Lending Act. So, under the federal act, the court rescinded the transaction and awarded damages and attorney’s fees. The court dismissed the claims under the Foreclosure-Related Rescue Services Act after determining it was inapplicable. On appeal, we conclude that the Foreclosure-Related Rescue Services Act, rather than the Truth in Lending Act, applied. We affirm the trial court’s rescission of the transaction under the state act. We reverse the awards under the Truth in Lending Act.