In Re Heavenly M.
In this parental termination case, the mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, Heavenly M. The trial court found that four grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s finding that four grounds were properly pled and proven: the grounds of abandonment for failure to support, abandonment for failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. We also affirm the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Patterson v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security et al.
An administrative law judge entered an order of default against Appellant for failing to appear at a resetting of his contested case hearing on a civil asset forfeiture. On appeal, the Commissioner’s Designee for the Department of Safety and Homeland Security affirmed the administrative law judge’s entry of default, denying Appellant’s request to set aside the same order. Appellant appealed the Commissioner Designee’s decision to the Chancery Court, raising that the administrative officials lacked authority to default his case because they did not swear an oath of office commensurate with that sworn by judicial branch judges of the Tennessee state judiciary. The Chancery Court affirmed the administrative officials’ decisions. Appellant appealed to this court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Clarke v. State of Tennessee
State employee Insured received radiation treatment for tongue cancer. Insurance Company denied authorization of the treatment as “investigational” and not “medically necessary” pursuant to the insurance plan and its medical policy. After two direct appeals of the denial to the insurance claim administrator, Insured appealed to the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Claims Commission found that the treatment was investigational under the plain language of both the plan and the policy and thus not a covered expense. As the denial of coverage did not amount to a breach of contract, the Claims Commission granted Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
James Elton Gillies et al. v. Rebecca Noelle Mitchell Gillies
Father was held in criminal contempt for withholding visitation from Grandmother. The trial court found 28 counts of contempt and imposed a sentence of 280 days. The trial court also revoked the suspension of a prior 100-day sentence and ordered that sentence to be served consecutively to the 280 days. We conclude that because the visitation was withheld while an order of protection prohibiting contact between the child and Grandmother was in place, the trial court’s findings and the evidence presented are insufficient to support a finding that Father acted willfully. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of contempt and the revocation of the suspended sentence. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
William Joseph Robinette Et Al. v. Tina Robinette Et Al.
William Joseph Robinette and his daughters, Delores Reynolds and Jody Stewart, (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Sullivan County Chancery Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking a declaration of their rights as the lawful owners of Fuller Enterprises, LLC against the right of ownership by Tina Robinette (“Widow”), the widow of Mr. Robinette’s son and Ms. Reynolds and Ms. Stewart’s brother, Will Robinette (“Decedent”). Plaintiffs later added Decedent’s estate and Fuller Asphalt Material, LLC, as additional defendants (collectively with Widow, “Defendants”). Widow filed abusive civil action (“ACA”) motions against Plaintiffs, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Marcelle Antonio Tatum v. Leslie D. Tatum (Henderson)
This appeal arises out of a divorce action filed by the appellee/husband. Following a course of inaction by the appellant/wife, the trial court granted a final decree of divorce by default in favor of the husband. The wife filed multiple motions seeking to have the trial court alter or amend the final decree. The trial court ultimately granted in part, and denied in part, wife’s post-judgment motions. The appellant appeals the ultimate judgment of the trial court. Having determined that the appellant’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of briefing in this Court, we conclude that her issues purportedly raised on appeal are waived. The appeal is dismissed. Additionally, the appellee requests his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to find this appeal frivolous and further decline to award appellee his attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
People First Auto Sales, LLC, et al. v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
A business sought a special use permit from the City of Memphis to operate a used car lot. At a meeting of the city council, the council voted to remand the business’s application back to the local land use control board. At the next meeting, the council reconsidered the application and denied it. The business filed a writ of certiorari challenging the denial, alleging due process violations and stating that the council failed to follow its rules of procedure. The trial court found that no due process right applied and that the council had properly followed its rules of procedure. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Connor A.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (5) persistence of conditions; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. Because the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services does not defend the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home or substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, we reverse as to those grounds. And because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings that returning the child to Mother would pose a likelihood of substantial harm, we vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. Otherwise, we affirm the decision of the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental rights. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Aveille on behalf of E.A. v. Bobby Moore
This appeal concerns the entry of an order of protection. The alleged victim’s father filed the initiating petition based upon an allegation of stalking. We vacate the entry of the order of protection, finding no evidence to sustain the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Formby Holmes v. George David Holmes
This appeal arises from a divorce. The former husband challenges the classification and division of the marital estate. Because the husband failed to comply with our procedural rules, we deem his issues waived and dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Allen, individually and surviving spouse and next-of-kin of Donald A. Allen, Deceased et al. v. Benjamin Dehner, M.D. et al.
A husband and wife commenced this health care liability action by filing a complaint against a medical doctor and his practice. Along with their complaint, the couple filed a “Certificate of Good Faith” as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which requires certification that an expert has reviewed the available medical records “for the incident or incidents at issue” and that the expert believed there was “a good faith basis to maintain the action consistent with the requirements of § 29-26-115.” The original complaint alleged that the defendants caused severe permanent and physical injuries when they failed to properly diagnose and treat the husband’s cancer. After the husband died, the wife filed an amended complaint that alleged that the defendants’ negligence also caused the husband’s death. But the wife did not file a new certificate of good faith. For this reason, the defendants sought dismissal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(c). The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed. The issue is whether § 29-26-122(a) requires plaintiffs to file a new certificate of good faith with an amended complaint that alleges a new injury based on already-alleged negligent acts by existing defendants. In Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, 469 S.W.3d 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) we held that a new certificate is required when adding new defendants to existing claims. And in Estate of Vickers v. Diversicare Leasing Corp., No. M2021-00894-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 2111850 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 2022), we held that a new certificate is required when adding new allegations of negligence against existing defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that a new certificate is required when adding an injury based on existing claims against existing defendants. For this and other reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Justin M. Finch v. 28th Judicial District IV-D Child Support Agency, et al.
The trial court dismissed the appellant’s petition on a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Allen, individually and surviving spouse and next-of-kin of Donald A. Allen, Deceased et al. v. Benjamin Dehner, M.D. et al. (concurring in part/dissenting in part)
In considering this appeal, the majority thoughtfully moves through the labyrinthian requirements of Tennessee health care liability actions. While the majority’s analysis presents a well-considered direction to go, I cannot follow their route for its full course. Holding onto statutory language that hopefully serves the role of the thread used by Theseus in navigating out of the labyrinth, 1 I believe that the proper way back through the maze follows that statutory thread along a different path. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ina Grace Jacobi v. VendEngine Inc.
Ina Grace Jacobi sued VendEngine, Inc. (“VendEngine”), alleging that she was wrongfully arrested due to VendEngine’s negligent design and operation of an inmate messaging system. The trial court determined that the gravamen of Ms. Jacobi’s claim was for malicious prosecution and granted summary judgment to VendEngine after concluding she failed to prove the elements of that claim. Ms. Jacobi appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Nehad Abdelnabi v. Fatma Adel Sekik
This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a petition for civil contempt for failure to comply with orders regarding the division of marital assets and awards of spousal and child support against the husband and his relatives, who held an interest in the properties at issue. We affirm the trial court’s grant of orders of civil contempt against all parties. We also conclude that this appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thompson School Road Neighborhood Association Et Al. v. Knox County, Tennessee, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action regarding a decision of the Knox County Commission to amend zoning for the subject property. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Glenya Cole-Jackson v. Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco
This is an appeal from a directed verdict in a personal injury lawsuit. Glenya Cole-Jackson (“Plaintiff”) sued Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) over an incident in which she was hit by a shopping cart pulled by one of Defendant’s employees. The case went before a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Trial Court granted the motion, finding that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the shopping cart incident caused her injuries. Plaintiff appeals. Contrary to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff’s brief fails to cite the record. In addition, the record contains no transcript or statement of evidence of the trial, hence we have no basis for determining that the Trial Court erred. We find that Plaintiff has waived her issues. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brendan Todd Negron v. Andrew Nicholas Roach
Petitioner’s ex-wife became romantically involved with the Respondent. The Petitioner sought an order of protection for himself and his children against the Respondent, asserting that the Respondent stalked him and his children. The Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he had only ever been near the Petitioner for the legitimate purpose of protecting Petitioner’s ex-wife and children from Petitioner, who has a troubling history of violence and who allegedly continued to emotionally harm the children during their online visitation. The General Sessions Court concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove stalking and declined to grant an order of protection. Petitioner advanced the petition to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court also refused to grant an order of protection and found that the Petitioner made knowingly false allegations at the time of filing his order of protection petition. Accordingly, the Circuit Court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Respondent. The Petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Katherine Poling Robeson v. Travis Wilson Robeson
In this divorce action the husband appeals the classification of two substantial assets as marital property, each of which he contends are separate property because they were gifted to him by his father. The husband also challenges the trial court’s determination of his income for purposes of child support and alimony. On different grounds, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for child support purposes. The wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido based upon its finding that her fees had been paid out of marital assets pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 and that an award of alimony in solido would constitute “double dipping.” She further seeks an award of her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for purposes of child support and alimony. Moreover, we affirm the classification of the 7.6-acre parcel with the cabin as marital property but reverse the classification of the husband’s partnership interest in Berry’s Chapel Ventures, LLC, as marital property and remand with instructions to classify it as Husband’s separate property. We further find that the appreciation in the value of the husband’s interest during the marriage is his separate property. Resultingly, on remand, the trial court is to reconsider the equitable division of the marital estate and enter judgment accordingly. Because of significant changes in the marital estate, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand with instructions to reconsider this award upon settling the marital estate and to enter judgment accordingly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, albeit on different grounds. Each party shall be responsible for their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adams v. Lacandra Kendrick, et al.
Pro se Appellant, Michael Adams, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on November 1, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Garramone v. Dr. Joe Curtsinger
A petitioner obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection in general sessions court. The respondent counter-petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). After a hearing, the general sessions court denied the respondent’s petition, but it also declined to extend the temporary protective order and dismissed the underlying petition for lack of proof. The respondent appealed the decision on “attorney’s fees” to circuit court. After a de novo review, the circuit court determined that the respondent was not entitled to attorney’s fees under either the order of protection statute or the TPPA. In this appeal, the respondent challenges denial of his request for attorney’s fees under the TPPA. Because the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the general sessions court’s order denying the petition to dismiss under the TPPA, we vacate in part and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Thompson ET AL. v. Stormy W. Moody ET AL.
Following an automobile accident, Appellant filed a complaint for negligence and personal injuries against appellees, the at-fault driver and her husband. Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant’s claims should be dismissed because she settled with appellees’ insurance carrier and released her claims against them prior to filing suit. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Because there are disputes of material facts concerning whether appellant agreed to settle and release her claims, we reverse. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Carlos Durand v. Michelle Miller
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Troy L. Rouzer v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
This appeal concerns whether a railroad employee’s negligence claim brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. (“FELA”) is precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq. (“FRSA”). Troy L. Rouzer (“Plaintiff”), a locomotive engineer, sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) under FELA for injuries he sustained in a collision. Plaintiff alleged insufficient training. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that FRSA precludes Plaintiff’s FELA claim. Defendant argued that national uniformity in safety rules requires this result. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appeals. We hold, inter alia, that in view of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014), exemplified in its statement that “[w]hen two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation of the other[,]” id. at 115, Plaintiff’s FELA claim is not precluded by FRSA as both federal statutes complement one another toward the goal of rail safety. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Virginia Curtis Ex Rel. Bruce Allen Curtis v. Tiffany L. Sharp Et Al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a health care liability action. The plaintiff’s husband passed away after a complication that occurred during a medical procedure. The plaintiff provided pre-suit notice of her claim to five health care providers but ultimately filed suit against only three of the providers. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her initial action, but then she re-filed it within a year. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed suit, alleging that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) due to limiting language included in HIPAA authorizations she had provided to the defendants. The trial court also found that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4), which requires plaintiffs to file certain documentation with their complaint. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4) but did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |