Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This appeal arises out of a divorce action in which the wife requested alimony. Following a trial, the trial court awarded the wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido to assist her in paying for health insurance premiums and attorney’s fees, respectively. On appeal, the husband claims the wife had no need for such support; rather, the trial court used the alimony awards as a means to punish the husband for his infidelity. We find that, while the trial court considered the husband’s fault in making its decision, it did so in conjunction with other relevant factors in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i), including the wife’s financial need, her relative earning potential, her contributions to the marriage, and the parties’ standard of living. Having determined that the trial court applied the correct legal principles, made factual findings supported by the evidence in the record, and reached a decision within the range of acceptable dispositions, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Appellant, who is the former spouse of the Appellee, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for “Rule 60” relief seeking residential time with the Appellee’s child. There is no dispute that the Appellant has been excluded as the father of the child based upon DNA testing he requested. Discerning no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm its judgment.

This case involves a divorce that was granted in January, 2019. As a part of their divorce, the parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement which was thereafter incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Subsequently, the Appellant filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Appellee was in noncompliance with his obligations under the marital dissolution agreement and requested, among other relief, attorney’s fees for having to file the petition. The trial court found that while the Appellee had been noncompliant with the marital dissolution agreement, the noncompliance was not willful and therefore concluded that the Appellant was not entitled to attorney’s fees. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s decision to not award the Appellant her attorney’s fees and additionally award the Appellant her attorney’s fees on appeal.

This is an appeal of a case seeking judicial determination of child support. Because the appellant, Donald R. Wright (“Appellant”) attempted to raise an issue regarding a separate case, which was not timely appealed, and all issues with regard to the instant case were waived, we dismiss this appeal

This suit involves an injury sustained by a minor at a track and field tryout at the middle school he attended. The minor’s mother brought suit individually and on behalf of her minor child against the county school system and the school board for the minor’s injuries and subsequent medical expenses. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $200,000 in compensatory damages. The defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decisions and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Chancery Court for Henderson County terminated the parental rights of a mother to two minor children based upon two statutory grounds: persistence of conditions and a ten-year prison sentence while the children were under the age of eight years old. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of persistence of conditions was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm, however, the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of the mother’s parental rights based upon her current prison sentence. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the best interests of both children.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellants Mother and Stepfather appeal the trial court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interest. Appellee Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he abandoned the Child by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. Upon review, we conclude that Father abandoned the Child by willful failure to visit and support. Because the record supports the conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, we reverse the trial court as to this issue, and we remand for entry of an order terminating Father’s parental rights.

In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the court’s failure to grant a continuance, the child support and alimony obligation imposed, and certain provisions of the parenting plan prohibiting contact with his children and revoking the parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(3)(B). This proceeding also involved allegations of a conspiracy to defraud Wife of funds resulting from a sale of marital property in Gaza during the pendency of the divorce by Husband, his brother, and his brother’s wife; those nonspousal parties challenge the court’s jurisdiction over them and over the property in Gaza, as well as the court’s valuation of that property. They also challenge the court’s rulings that they engaged in a civil conspiracy and whether the judgment imposed against them is supported by the pleadings and the evidence. Upon our review of the issues raised, we discern no reversible error in the rulings of the court and accordingly affirm it in all respects.

This is an action to set aside a quitclaim deed. The sole issue on appeal is whether the grantor delivered the deed to the grantee with the intention that it be an effective conveyance. After the grantor signed a quitclaim deed transferring title to a 42-acre tract to the grantee, the grantor’s mother, the grantee took possession of the deed. Later that day, the deed was placed in a lockbox maintained for the grantee’s benefit but co-owned by the grantor and her sister. Approximately three years later, while the deed remained in the lockbox, the grantor died. Shortly thereafter, the mother instructed the surviving daughter to bring the deed to her, which she did, and the mother recorded the deed. Upon learning of the recording of the deed, the grantor’s husband and children commenced this action to set aside the deed for failure of delivery arguing the deed remained in the grantor’s possession and control from the time she executed it until her death. Following a bench trial, the court found that the grantor delivered the deed to her mother with the intention that it be an effective conveyance and held that the conveyance was valid. We affirm. 

This appeal arises out of a boundary dispute. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the plaintiffs established the boundary line based on an oral boundary agreement between the parties’ predecessors in interest. On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the trial court’s finding that the parties to the oral boundary agreement were uncertain of the location of the original boundary at the time they entered into the agreement. The defendant also takes issue with the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs’ deed was not void for champerty based on the court’s conclusion that the remnants of the fence the defendant relied on to establish the property line met none of the requirements of adverse possession. After reviewing the evidence presented at the trial, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner Angela Y. brought this action to terminate the parental rights of Melissa V. (“Mother”) to her child John A. (“Child”). Petitioner is the sister of Child’s father. Petitioner has had custody and taken care of the Child since April 25, 2017, when the Child was a little over one year old. The trial court terminated Mother’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support Child. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned Child by willfully failing to visit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

In this matter involving the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two minor children, who were eight and seven years of age, respectively, at the time of trial, the trial court determined that there were three statutory grounds supporting termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and (3) persistence of the conditions leading to the Children’s removal. The trial court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.