Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

In this wrongful dismissal case, Sonya Brooks (“Brooks”) sued her former employer Roane County and county officials Ron Woody and Gloria Wright (“Defendants”). In a March 9, 2017 order, the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Brooks’ lawsuit against Defendants with prejudice. The Trial Court reserved taxation of costs for a later date. Brooks filed a notice of appeal on January 10, 2018. Defendants argue that Brooks’ appeal was filed untimely. Brooks contends that the March 9, 2017 order was not final and appealable because it reserved the issue of costs. We hold that, in keeping with longstanding Tennessee case law, taxation of costs is incidental and not a factor in determining whether a judgment is final. As Brooks’ notice of appeal was not filed timely, we are constrained to dismiss her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A motor vehicle accident on the roadway abutting a truck stop resulted in the death of the plaintiff’s husband. The driver of the vehicle turning left into the truck stop was using the entrance meant for semi-trailer trucks and had a limited view of oncoming traffic due to a hill that crested a short distance ahead. The plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the truck stop owners and operators, asserting they created a hazardous condition by failing to place visible signage on their property directing passenger vehicles to the appropriate entrance. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending they owed no duty to the traveling public because the collision occurred on a municipal road, not on their property. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment, holding that a balancing test is required to determine whether the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff’s husband and that dismissing the complaint is premature at this stage of the proceedings.

I concur in the affirmance of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County’s denial of the petition of Dr. Kerry Douglas Friesen for modification of his alimony obligation and the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Beverley Joy Friesen. I write separately to address the authority under which the trial court awarded attorney’s fees.

This opinion is being filed contemporaneously with our opinion in Minyard v. Lucas, No. E2017-02261-COA-R3-CV.1 Each case involves a post-divorce custody dispute between Laura Nicole Lucas (mother) and one of her two ex-husbands. In the present case, Bradley James Cox (father) filed a petition in the trial court for ex parte emergency relief and modification of the permanent parenting plan. Nearly two years later, mother filed a motion to dismiss all orders resulting from father’s petition as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother argued that father’s petition included allegations of dependency and neglect, which implicated the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied mother’s motion. Mother appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A trial court terminated a father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of conditions. The father appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that it was not in the child’s best interest for his rights to be terminated. We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating the father’s rights based on persistence of conditions because the child was not removed from the father’s home by an order of the court, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) requires. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

After the plaintiff’s father was killed by an armed security guard, she filed a wrongful death action against the security guard’s employer. The complaint alleged both vicarious and direct liability and sought an award of compensatory and punitive damages. The employer maintained that the guard acted in self-defense. After the first trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. But the trial court ordered a new trial based on errors in the calculation of damages. A second jury verdict apportioned the greater proportion of fault to the decedent, resulting in a defense judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court made numerous errors in the conduct of the second trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error. So we affirm.  

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

An inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed this action to challenge the confiscation and destruction of his property and the decision of the prison grievance board concerning said property. The respondents denied the allegations. The trial court dismissed the petition as to all respondents. We affirm.

Declaratory judgment action in which lessee of real property on which it had constructed a retirement facility sought a declaration (1) of its right pursuant to the lease agreement to obtain a mortgage loan insured by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to finance repairs and improvements to the facility and (2) absent an express right, a declaration that what it asserted was a “settlement agreement” with the lessor gave it that right. After considering the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the lessor’s motion. Lessee appeals; we affirm the judgment.

Having pursued relief under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Jacob Davis filed a petition for a declaratory order with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC” or “the Department”) to challenge the Department’s interpretation of the statutes regarding release after a sentence of life, and the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i). Upon receiving an unsatisfactory response, Davis then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court against the TDOC and the Tennessee Attorney General (collectively, “the State”) about the calculation of his sentence, including his eligibility for release and the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501. The chancery court ruled against him and he appealed. The Court of Appeals finds, based on rules of statutory interpretation, Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106 (Tenn. 2006), and a number of cases from the Court of Criminal Appeals, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(i) establishes the legal release date for someone sentenced to life. The court also finds that the statute is constitutional. The chancery court is affirmed.

This case involves a claim of unjust enrichment following the execution and partial performance of a contract for the sale of a laundry and dry cleaning business. On December 21, 2012, the parties executed a contract, selling the business in exchange for $100,000.00. The buyers tendered $50,000.00 at the time of the contract’s execution and simultaneously tendered a promissory note to the seller for the remaining $50,000.00 with a pre-arranged payment plan. The contract contained a provision stating that it was conditioned on the buyers’ ability to obtain a satisfactory commercial lease from the owner of the building where the business was located. The buyers took possession of the business and began making payments pursuant to the promissory note. However, the buyers were unable to enter into a written or long-term lease with the building owner. The buyers ceased making payments on the promissory note after nine months. In November 2013, the buyers began contacting the seller, requesting a return of the down payment and money paid on the promissory note in exchange for the business. In June 2014, the buyers filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the contract of sale was void due to an unsatisfied condition. The seller filed an answer and countercomplaint requesting enforcement of the contract and promissory note, including the enforcement of a vendor’s lien held on the business equipment. On December 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing the buyers’ complaint and granting the seller’s requested relief pursuant to the contract and promissory note. The buyers have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.