Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Sisters filed counter-complaints related to the enforcement of a written contract. The trial court ruled that the contract was missing an essential term and therefore could not be enforced. The trial court, however, awarded the plaintiff a judgment in quantum meruit. We affirm.

After purchasing an automobile from the defendant, the plaintiff brought suit in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County, alleging fraud and deception. The defendant filed a counterclaim for breach of contract. The general sessions court dismissed both parties’ claims and the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. The case was dormant for nearly six months. Eventually, the plaintiff moved to set a trial date with the circuit court. In response, the defendant moved to dismiss the case under Rule 20(b) of the Davidson County Local Rules of Court. The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff’s subsequent motion to set aside. The plaintiff appealed. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to set aside and remand.

I agree with the analysis and result of the majority opinion.  I write separately to address one troubling issue—the Trial Court’s findings regarding Wife’s spending $2,000 per month on food for herself and her two teenagers.

In this appeal, we conclude that the original legal controversy was extinguished as moot prior to the trial court’s entry of judgment. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order as advisory and dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns a general sessions warrant for unpaid dues owed to the plaintiff homeowner’s association.  The general sessions court dismissed the action based upon a settlement agreement.  The plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, which ultimately entered an agreed order of dismissal during the pendency of this appeal.  We dismiss the appeal.  

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); (2) abandonment by failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(1); (3) abandonment by failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(1); and (4) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14).  Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).  Because Appellees did not plead the ground of persistence of conditions and because the threshold requirements for that ground are not met, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of persistence of conditions.  We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Buyers filed this breach of contract action alleging that the seller failed to timely complete construction of their custom home. Buyers also sought damages for conversion based on the seller’s failure to return fixtures and other items purchased by the buyers for use in the construction. The seller maintained that construction was complete, as that term was defined in the parties’ agreement. In its counterclaim for breach of contract, the seller alleged that the buyers committed the first material breach by refusing to finalize the purchase. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers had committed the first material breach by refusing to close the purchase after the seller had completed performance. The court dismissed the buyers’ claims and awarded the seller damages and attorney’s fees. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings with respect to the parties’ breach of contract claims. But we conclude that the court erred in dismissing the buyers’ conversion claim. All the elements of a conversion claim were established at trial. So we reverse the dismissal of the conversion claim and remand for a determination of damages on that claim. Otherwise, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The matter in controversy concerns an attorney’s fee lien and abstract of suit filed and recorded by the wife’s former counsel following the entry of the divorce decree. In pertinent part, the decree required the husband to pay the entire equity in jointly owned real property to the wife contemporaneous with the wife quitclaiming her interest in the property to the husband; however, the husband died prior to the conveyance or the payment. Thereafter, the wife’s former counsel filed a motion to perfect and enforce its attorney’s lien on the property, and the court granted the motion. The administrator of the husband’s estate filed a motion to release the attorney’s lien, and the court ruled that the lien was valid and enforceable because neither party performed their respective obligations under the divorce decree. The administrator for the husband’s estate then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend on the grounds (1) there was no legal basis for allowing the wife’s attorneys to file a charging lien against property awarded to the husband and (2) the lien was not valid because the attorneys based the lien on the wrong section of the statute. The court denied the Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend, and this appeal followed. The singular issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 59.04 motion. Because the administrator’s motion was not based on a change in controlling law, previously unavailable evidence, or a clear error of law, see In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. Therefore, we affirm.

Following a dispute that spanned several years, the parties, David Manor and Brett Woodroof, filed countervailing petitions for orders of protection in the Metropolitan General Sessions Court for Nashville and Davidson County (“general sessions court”). After separate hearings, the general sessions court granted each petitioner an order of protection. In turn, each party appealed the order of protection entered against him to the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a hearing with a special master presiding, the trial court entered orders continuing the cases. During a subsequent hearing, the special master announced from the bench that both petitions were being dismissed and that each party would be responsible for his respective attorney’s fees. The trial court entered separate written orders dismissing each petition. Mr. Manor subsequently filed an objection to the dismissal of his petition, averring that the trial court had made an oral finding that Mr. Woodroof had stalked Mr. Manor, which, according to Mr. Manor, led to the continuation of his order of protection against Mr. Woodroof. Mr. Manor argued that the court’s action constituted an “extension” of the order of protection, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 (2017), thereby entitling him to an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the trial court confirmed the findings of the special master and declined to award attorney’s fees. Upon its consideration of several motions, the trial court conducted a hearing and remanded the matter to the special master for “a finding and Order” concerning the issue of attorney’s fees. Upon remand, the special master denied an award of attorney’s fees to Mr. Manor, and the trial court subsequently confirmed the order. Mr. Manor timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Two homeowners filed suit against a metropolitan government challenging a metropolitan code provision that prevented them from serving customers at their home-based businesses. The trial court granted summary judgment to the metropolitan government. After the homeowners filed this appeal, the metropolitan council repealed the challenged code provision and enacted a new provision allowing certain home-based businesses to serve up to six clients a day. We have determined that, in light of the metropolitan government’s enactment of the new ordinance, this appeal is moot.      

The trial court terminated a father’s parental rights to his daughter based upon two statutory grounds: persistence of conditions and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the child. We reverse the trial court’s decision as to the first ground, but affirm as to the second. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

This is an appeal from post-divorce litigation between parents. The only issues raised on appeal relate to the awards of attorney’s fees and guardian ad litem fees. Due to inconsistencies and a lack of findings in the final order, we vacate and remand for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.