Kyuhwan Hwang v. Jerry Quezada Arita, et al.
The trial court dismissed this case without prejudice after determining that the plaintiff failed to properly respond to the defendant’s discovery requests for over a year despite multiple extensions. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
JAMES ANDREW FISHER v. HAILEY ANN DAVIS
A mother appeals from the trial court’s decision regarding custody of her two minor children. However, because the mother filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge on which he failed to rule before entering a final order on the merits of the case, the judgment of the trial court must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
DR. DAVID BRUCE COFFEY v. BUCKEYE HOME HEALTH CENTER, INC.
In the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”), Dr. David Bruce Coffey filed a complaint alleging that Buckeye Home Health Center, Inc. (“Buckeye”) breached its lease agreement with Dr. Coffey by failing to obtain fire insurance coverage on its leased portion of Dr. Coffey’s building. The building burned down during Buckeye’s tenancy. Buckeye filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was impossible to obtain fire insurance coverage for only a portion of the building as required by the lease. The Trial Court granted Buckeye’s motion. Dr. Coffey appealed. Upon our review, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact and reverse the Trial Court’s order dismissing Dr. Coffey’s complaint. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
ELEVATION OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, LLC v. CITY OF PIGEON FORGE, TENNESSEE
The plaintiff, Elevation Outdoor Advertising, LLC (“Elevation”), submitted six applications for billboard sign permits to the defendant, the City of Pigeon Forge, Tennessee (“the City”), and all six were denied by the City’s Planning Commission. In this action, Elevation sought a judgment (1) declaring the City’s former sign regulation ordinance and temporary moratorium on sign permits void and unenforceable, (2) declaring the City’s new sign regulation ordinance inapplicable, and (3) compelling the City by injunction or writ of mandamus to issue permits for Elevation’s proposed signs. Upon the City’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Elevation’s complaint with prejudice. The trial court determined that the proper relief for Elevation would have been via common law certiorari review, for which Elevation had not met the procedural requirements of timeliness and filing under oath. Elevation has appealed. Upon careful review, we determine that Elevation’s complaint properly stated a claim for declaratory judgment rather than writ of certiorari. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Elevation’s complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Court of Appeals | ||
BENJAMIN MCCURRY v. AGNESS MCCURRY
This appeal arises from an order of protection issued against the appellant/defendant, Agness McCurry, in Washington County Circuit Court case 42482. Although the defendant raises numerous issues and the record contains numerous documents that pertain to other cases filed in the general sessions and circuit court of Washington County, as well as federal court, in which defendant sued almost every judge in Washington County, this opinion is limited to Washington County Circuit Court case 42482. The defendant contends the order of protection was issued in violation of Tennessee law, constitutional due process, and judicial conduct standards. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
JOHN SCHMEECKLE v. HAMILTON COUNTY, TN ET AL.
Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time limit for filing his notice of appeal. As such, Appellant’s notice of appeal is untimely, and the appeal is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Heatley et al. v. Estate of David G. Gaither et al.
Appellants have filed three related lawsuits against appellee and other entities. Here, appellants claim a continuing nuisance stemming from the alleged discharge, onto appellants’ property, of e. coli-contaminated wastewater from a dismantled septic system, which previously serviced appellee’s property. In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the appellees on appellants’ claim of trespass based on our finding of an existing easement appurtenant for the septic system. As relevant here, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on appellants’ claim of nuisance, and they appeal. Because appellants have failed to meet their burden of proof, at the summary judgment stage, to show that there is leaching of contaminated wastewater onto their property, they have failed to establish the existence of the nuisance averred in their complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of appellee’s motion for summary judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Marie Bailey v. Daniel Michael Bailey
Father and Mother divorced. In ruling upon various matters contested by the parties, the trial court evenly divided Father’s pension without determining whether a portion was separate property, awarded Mother rehabilitative alimony, and named Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appeals, asserting error as to all three determinations. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to treat the pre-marriage portion of the pension as separate property. As for the trial court’s alimony award and primary residential parent decision, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the trial court’s order regarding the classification and division of assets, alimony, and primary residential status and remand. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Cory Randolph Cox v. Rebecca Lynne Thumm Cox
In this post-divorce action, the father sought a reduction of his child support obligation because he had recently lost his employment and two of the parties’ three minor children had become emancipated. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court removed the parties’ two emancipated children from the child support worksheet but increased the father’s child support payment upon finding that the father was willfully unemployed and imputing to him a salary commensurate with his previous wages. In calculating the father’s new child support obligation, the trial court considered the father’s recent tax information, his frequent job changes, his residential arrangements, his long-term failure to exercise his full weekend parenting time with the children, and the cost of his leisure travel. The trial court also imputed the proscribed statutory salary amount to the mother, who was not employed at the time of trial. Although both parties appeared pro se at the trial, the trial court entered an order granting the mother’s request for attorney’s fees without including an explanation of how the court determined the reasonableness of the fees. The father has appealed. Despite his pro se status before this Court, the father seeks attorney’s fees on appeal, claiming that an out-of-state attorney prepared his appellate briefs. Upon thorough review, we deny the father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal because the attorney who allegedly prepared the father’s briefs did not sign the briefs or otherwise file an appearance with this Court as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother and remand that issue to the trial court for a written order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
ROHIT UPPAL v. NEERA UPPAL
A self-represented defendant in a divorce case moved to recuse the trial judge. After the trial judge denied the motion, this accelerated interlocutory appeal followed. Because the motion for recusal failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the denial of the motion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Gladys Claire Bowen v. Michael W. Nelson, M.D., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of her proffered expert for failure to comply with the locality rule. Plaintiff also appeals the grant of summary of judgment based on the exclusion of that expert. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, we affirm that ruling. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment as the excluded testimony was the only evidence offered regarding the applicable standard of care. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Payne v. Shelby County, Tennessee et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s award of damages to the plaintiff after a bench trial in an auto accident case. The trial court declined to award the plaintiff all of the damages she sought because it concluded that her most significant injury, a torn rotator cuff, was not caused by the auto accident at issue. The plaintiff then filed a motion to recuse and to set aside the judgment due to a friendship between the trial judge’s son and counsel for the defendant, but the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Hutson Boone v. Paul Dale Boone
The main issues in this post-divorce appeal concern the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. In addition to the post-divorce proceedings, the husband filed a declaratory judgment petition to determine the amount he owed the wife under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”). The husband and the wife then engaged in protracted litigation to determine the amount owed. The husband later amended the declaratory judgment petition to include a request to modify alimony. The parties resolved the declaratory judgment petition by providing the trial court with an amount upon which they agreed. The husband then voluntarily nonsuited the petition to modify alimony. Both parties sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the MDA. The trial court determined that the husband was the successful party in the declaratory judgment action and that there was no successful party in the request to modify alimony. The court declined to award either party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, asserting that she was the successful party in both actions and that the court should have awarded her attorney’s fees to her. The wife also challenged discovery sanctions entered against her. First, we determine that the declaratory judgment action did not fall under the fee provision of the parties’ MDA. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the husband to be the successful party in that action; we affirm the portion of the order declining to award either party attorney’s fees. Next, based upon a recent decision of our Supreme Court, we determine that the wife was the successful party in the petition to modify alimony and reverse the trial court’s decision to the contrary. We affirm the imposition of discovery sanctions. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristen Alice Rowe v. Calvin Albert Rowe, III
Following a bench trial in this divorce action, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court entered a permanent parenting plan order, designating the wife as the primary residential parent to the parties’ four minor children and granting the husband 144 days of annual residential co-parenting time. In what the court found to be an equitable division of the marital estate, it awarded to the wife $303,260.00 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of the marital residence and her marital share of the husband’s military retirement. The husband received $274,097.10 in marital assets, which included the equity in and possession of an unimproved parcel of real property. The court directed that the wife would be responsible for the mortgage owed on the marital residence but also directed that the wife would not be required to refinance the mortgage debt until the youngest child had reached the age of eighteen years. Finding the wife to be the economically disadvantaged spouse and expressly finding that she was not voluntarily underemployed, the court awarded to her $5,000.00 monthly in transitional alimony for a period of six years, to be offset by her share of the husband’s military retirement benefits upon his retirement. However, the court specified that “[t]he amount of $5,000.00 is a global amount which shall include the child support obligation owed by [the husband].” Based on the child support guidelines, the court ordered the husband to pay $1,992.00 monthly in child support. The court further awarded to the wife $10,127.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment with the minor modification of an added provision stating that the wife will indemnify and hold the husband harmless for the mortgage debt on the marital residence until it is paid in full or refinanced. We also award to the wife her reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
HG Jones, LLC v. Jordan Howell et al.
At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System v. Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration et al.
A hospital system filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking invalidation of two TennCare State Plan Amendments on the basis that they violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-108. The two State Plan Amendments set forth reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court declared that the TennCare State Plan Amendments were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JANINE M LAMOTHE ET AL. v. DEER HILL VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION INC.
Deer Hill Village Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) appeals from the order of the Chancery Court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs Janine M. Lamothe and Matthew T. Davenport (hereinafter “Appellees”). The underlying controversy is a request from Appellees, who own a condominium in Deer Hill Village, to inspect the HOA’s corporate records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-66-102 et seq. After subsequent filings from both parties, including multiple motions to enlarge time for discovery from the HOA, the Chancery Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The HOA timely appealed to this Court. Having determined that the Chancery Court failed to state the legal and factual grounds on which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the order at issue and remand for entry of an order that complies with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority v. Division of TennCare et al.
A hospital system that was the aggrieved party in this contested case before The Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration sought judicial review of the agency’s decision upholding the validity of two TennCare rules. The two rules regulate reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court reversed the agency’s decision and held that the two rules were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David L. Richman Et Al. v. Joshua Debity Et Al.
This is the parties’ second appeal before this Court in the above-styled case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After this Court’s mandate issued, however, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. The defendants opposed the notice, but the trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The defendants again appealed to this Court. Because the plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary nonsuit was untimely, and because the trial court’s action exceeds the scope of our instructions on remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and again remand this case to the trial court for entry of a sufficient order. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE EMORY S.
In this parental termination case, the father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, Emory S. The trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Based on these findings, the court terminated the father’s parental rights. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ferguson Enterprises, LLC v. Norris Bros. Excavating, LLC et al.
A contractor purchased construction materials from a supplier and then failed to pay for the materials. The supplier brought suit to recover payment and later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the supplier’s motion. Finding no error, we affirm and remand the matter to calculate the supplier’s appellate attorney’s fees. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE, EX. REL. STACY PAZ v. BRET PROCISE
The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Mother, brought suit against Father for retroactive and prospective child support. The trial court deviated from the Child Support Guidelines in setting Father’s retroactive child support, and he appeals. Because the trial court failed to make necessary findings of facts and conclusions of law to support its deviation from the guidelines, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. The trial court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rinyah J.
In the Juvenile Court for Shelby County ("the Juvenile Court"), the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Rickey J. ("Father") and Anionetta J. ("Mother") to their child, Rinyah J. ("the Child"), who was born drug-exposed. After trial, the Juvenile Court found that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody 9f the Child and that Mother had committed severe child abuse. It further found that termination of their parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Mother and Father appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dustin Keith Gamble v. Madison Darlene Gamble
This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The mother appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to properly apply the statutory best interest factors when making its parenting plan determination. Because of the lack of findings in the final decree, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel H. Rader IV ex rel. Estate of Christine Joy Koczwara v. John Beasley
This is an action for abuse or neglect, exploitation, or theft of money or property of Christine Joy Koczwara during her life, as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 71- 6-120(b) of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The complaint seeks to recover assets as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant failed to file a timely responsive pleading to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment on the issue of liability. Prior to the trial on damages, the defendant moved to set aside the default judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. The claimed excuse was based on the contention that the defendant was the named executor and sole beneficiary under a purported 2020 will. The trial court rejected that argument because there was no pending will contest and the defendant had not filed a petition to admit the purported will to probate. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside upon the finding that the defendant’s failure to file a responsive pleading was willful. After a trial on damages, the court invalidated a quitclaim deed, ordered the return of personal property, and awarded $48,500 in compensatory damages and $97,000 in punitive damages against the defendant. The court also ordered the sale of the decedent’s real property. This appeal followed. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals |
