Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that a material change in circumstance occurred affecting the best interests of the child and that the child’s best interests were furthered by naming Father primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. 

In this post-divorce action involving the father’s petition to modify the parties’ existing permanent parenting plan and the mother’s subsequent counter-petition, the trial court increased the father’s co-parenting time by ten days during the summer, for a total of 130 parenting days per year, and granted the mother sole decision-making authority with respect to the children’s education and extracurricular activities. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling in all respects.

The Notice of Appeal in this case indicates on its face that the appellant is appealing from a decision entered on May 22, 2018. However, there is no final judgment in the proceedings below entered on May 22, 2018, or any other date. Because the case remains pending in the Chancery Court, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A trust beneficiary sued co-trustees for breach of their fiduciary duties and for procuring the creation of two trusts through undue influence. The trustees moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Following the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trust beneficiary moved to amend his complaint. Prior to ruling on the motion to amend, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Subsequently, the trial court denied the motion to amend. On appeal, the trust beneficiary asserts the trial court abused its discretion by not granting his post-hearing motion to amend. The trust beneficiary also argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint. We conclude the court did not err in denying his motion to amend. We further conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata.

Father appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights to two of his children. We conclude that DCS did not provide Father with a reasonable amount of time to comply with the permanency plan requirements and the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to terminate his rights on this ground. Further, we conclude that the juvenile court’s order fails to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k)’s requirement that the court make specific factual findings, which precludes our review of the remaining grounds and the best-interests determination. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for entry of an order that complies with subsection 113(k).

After a jury awarded a terminated employee compensatory damages for a county’s violation of the Public Employee Political Freedom Act (“PEPFA”), the trial court awarded equitable damages. On appeal, the county argues that the trial court erred in excluding the findings of a neutral committee appointed by the mayor. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the findings as hearsay. As to the county’s assertion that the trial court erred in awarding damages related to the employee’s termination because the verdict form did not ask the jury to make a finding that her termination resulted from the PEPFA violation, we conclude that the county waived this issue by failing to raise it before the jury returned its verdict. We reject the county’s challenges to the amount of back pay awarded to the employee. Furthermore, we find that the trial court did not err in awarding front pay, or in declining to include benefits in the front pay award. The employee asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that she failed to mitigate her damages, and we agree that the county failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue of mitigation of damages. On the sole issue of mitigation of damages, we reverse the trial court’s decision. 

This matter involves a dispute between record owners of adjacent lots. Plaintiffs claim ownership of both lots. Defendant claims ownership of one lot and a shed situated on the other lot. Each sought compensation for damages and loss of use of their respective personal and real property during the dispute. The trial court held that each side owned the lot to which it was the record owner and that the shed was on plaintiffs’ lot. It held that both sides failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue of damages. Accordingly, the court declined to award damages. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit over the construction of a house. Wardley Homes, LLC (“Wardley Homes”), owned by James A. Wardley, II, and Teresa Smith Wardley (“the Wardleys”), contracted with Michael C. Johnson and Deborah A. Johnson (“the Johnsons”) to build the Johnsons’ house. A dispute arose over payment, and Wardley Homes sued the Johnsons in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”). The Johnsons, in turn, filed a counterclaim against Wardley Homes. The Johnsons later attempted to bring the Wardleys into the case individually under a theory of piercing the corporate veil. The record contains no order relating to whether the Wardleys were brought into this suit. Despite there being no order in the record bringing them into this suit, the Wardleys filed a motion for partial summary judgment relating to their individual liability. The Trial Court at a hearing apparently orally granted the Wardleys’ motion, although the record contains no order to that effect either. The Johnsons later filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief, which the Trial Court denied. Wardley Homes and the Johnsons settled their dispute. The Johnsons appeal to this Court with respect to their effort to bring the Wardleys into the case individually. The absence of key orders precludes our review. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment, to the extent it exists, as it relates to partial summary judgment and remand for the Trial Court to (1) enter an order on the Johnsons’ motion to bring in the Wardleys, and if granted, (2) enter an order on the Wardleys’ motion for partial summary judgment that states the legal grounds and complies with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We otherwise affirm the Trial Court.

The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of J.E.R. (mother) and R.A.R. (father) with respect to their three children, T.E.R., M.A.R., and T.Z.R. The trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported three grounds for terminating mother and father’s parental rights: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions. By the same quantum of proof, the court determined that termination is in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights. We affirm.

Father appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for modification of the court’s order adopting a permanent parenting plan in a previous custody action. Subsequent to Father’s filing of this appeal, he filed a similar or identical petition for modification in the original custody action, and the trial court is scheduled to hear that petition prior to the adjudication of this appeal. We have, therefore, determined that this appeal is moot.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint filed against the Shelby County Retirement Board and a labor union for breach of contract for an administrative decision by the Shelby County Retirement Board, which denied the plaintiff’s request for a pension benefit as a former employee of the Shelby County Health Department. The retirement board and the union filed separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The chancery court granted both motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the plaintiff’s complaint was a petition for writ of certiorari, which the plaintiff did not file within the sixty-day statute of limitation. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a personal injury lawsuit. Thomas Sutherland (“Plaintiff”) sued MP & T Hotels, LLC (“the Hotel”) in the Circuit Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries after encountering noxious fumes in his hotel room. The Hotel raised the affirmative defense of comparative fault against Charles Stewart d/b/a Stewart and Son Termite and Pest Control (“Stewart”), who days before Plaintiff’s stay had sprayed insecticides in several of the Hotel’s rooms in keeping with a contract with the Hotel. Plaintiff thereafter sued Stewart as well. Plaintiff died during this case, and his son (“Substitute Plaintiff”) was substituted.1 For having to defend himself in this action, Stewart contends he is entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses from the Hotel under a theory of implied indemnity. The Trial Court denied the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment. Stewart appeals. Because the order appealed from is not a final judgment, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal.