COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Michelle Miller v. Carlos Durand
E2024-00889-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Suzanne Cook

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. Michelle Miller, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

Carter Court of Appeals

In Re Keira F. et al.
M2023-01184-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two of her children based on three statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Logan F.
M2023-01280-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Caleb Bayless

This appeal concerns a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination existed: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) incarceration under a ten-year sentence; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

Maury Court of Appeals

In Re Bentley E.
W2023-00846-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Appellant/Father appeals the
trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to
provide more than token support and failure to exercise more than token visitation. Father
also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the
child’s best interest. Because Father met his burden to show that his failure to provide
support and to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights and granting Appellees’ petition for adoption.

Obion Court of Appeals

Jack Scott v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
M2023-00422-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

The Tennessee Department of Transportation terminated a preferred service employee. Following the Step I and Step II appeals, the Board of Appeals upheld the termination. The employee petitioned for judicial review in the trial court. The trial court initially affirmed the Board of Appeals’ decision. The trial court then granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals. We reverse the trial court’s order.

Trousdale Court of Appeals

In Re Bentley E. - Dissent
W2023-00846-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

The Majority Opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence that Father abandoned the Child by failing to either visit or support
him in the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(1) (stating that “abandonment” by the parent is a ground for termination of
parental rights); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (offering several definitions of the
term “abandonment,” including failure to visit or support the child in the four consecutive
months preceding the filing of the termination petition, as alleged in this case). Because I
conclude that Tennessee law compels the opposite conclusions, I must respectfully dissent
from the Majority Opinion.

Obion Court of Appeals

Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al.
M2023-00345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda J. McClendon

The Appellant previously entered into a workers’ compensation settlement agreement with the Appellee herein, Southern Energy Company, Inc., following serious injuries he received in an incident that had occurred at the latter’s biodiesel plant. Years later, the Appellant also attempted to recover against the Appellee in tort for the incident in the Davidson County Circuit Court. After the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee, the Appellant appealed to this Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Michael Dinovo, Jr. et al. v. Kenneth Binkley et al. (Dissenting)
M2023-00345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda J. McClendon

I agree with the majority that Mr. DiNovo failed to cite the record in the argument section of his brief in violation of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7), which requires appropriate references to the record in the argument section itself. I also agree with the majority that violations of Rule 27 may result in the dismissal of an appeal. Where I respectfully divide from my colleagues is that I do not agree that effectively dismissing Mr. DiNovo’s appeal is the appropriate response to the violation of Rule 27 under the circumstances of this case. I would instead consider Mr. DiNovo’s appeal on the merits; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Michael Vitellaro v. Donna Goodall
M2023-00246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Collins

The Plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling through a plastic, debris-covered skylight embedded in the roof of the Defendant’s shop building. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant homeowner, alleging that the debris-covered skylight constituted a dangerous condition and that the Defendant failed to warn of its existence prior to the accident. After the Plaintiff did not call the Defendant as a witness and rested his case in chief, the Defendant sought a directed verdict, arguing that the Plaintiff could not establish that the Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition. The trial court agreed and granted the Defendant’s motion. Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict. We remand for further proceedings.

Wilson Court of Appeals

Craig Charles Et Al. v. Raymond Keith McCrary Et Al.
E2023-00608-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Lauderback

Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him liable for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. We affirm the jury verdict, but reverse, in part, the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under the parties’ contract. We also award the plaintiffs their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code section 27 1-122.

Washington Court of Appeals

In Re Tad F.
E2023-01626-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy G. Elrod

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

Anderson Court of Appeals

Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
E2023-01438-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for an order of protection filed by the appellant
husband. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the order of protection but reverse the trial court’s award of
attorney fees to the respondent wife.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

Jamie M. Cooper v. Bradley Cooper
W2023-00555-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Vicki Hodge Hoover

In this divorce action, the trial court, inter alia, denied Husband any contact with the parties’ children until he follows all recommendations from a complete psychiatric evaluation and granted Wife a lifetime restraining order. Husband now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision to limit Husband’s parenting time pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-406. We vacate the lifetime restraining order and remand for the trial court to enter a more specific order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.02.

Henry Court of Appeals

Angel Marie White v. Jennifer C. Goodfred, D.O. ET AL.
W2023-01225-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Felicia Corbin Johnson

This appeal specifically concerns health care liability claims arising from medical treatment that occurred in 2011 and 2012. After complaints were filed in 2019, the defendants at issue in this appeal sought to have the claims related to the 2011 and 2012 treatment dismissed. The trial court thereafter entered an order dismissing such claims, holding that they were barred by the three-year statute of repose. Although the plaintiff now appeals, her appellate brief is significantly noncompliant with applicable briefing requirements. In light of these briefing deficiencies, we hold that the plaintiff has waived any issues raised and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Robert Howard v. Monica Howard
E2024-00897-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Cook

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B section 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

In Re Silva F.
E2023-00704-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ronald Thurman

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found three grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding either that a ground for termination was established or that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Cumberland Court of Appeals

Tori Shannon (Barnes) Cole v. Skin RN Aesthetics, LLC Et Al.
M2022-01555-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kelvin D. Jones

An employer called the police after finding company property in an employee’s purse.  The employee was arrested and charged with felony theft of property.  She was later acquitted.  After the acquittal, the employee sued her former employer for malicious prosecution.  A jury found the employer liable for malicious continuation of the criminal proceedings.  Because there is material evidence in the record to support the jury verdict, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Henry's Florist, Inc. v. Heather R. Knott
M2023-00650-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda J. McClendon

This case involves a disputed easement. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to conclude that an easement existed in its favor. Appellant filed a counter complaint requesting a declaratory judgment that no easement existed and requesting an injunction prohibiting Appellee from using the disputed easement. On Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that an easement existed in favor of Appellee, and it denied the relief Appellant sought. Thereafter, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s counter complaint. We agree that an easement exists, and we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. Because the summary judgment order granted relief in Appellee’s favor, Appellant’s request for relief in the counter complaint was denied on the merits, rendering the counter complaint moot. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order on the motion to dismiss.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Estate of Susan Ballard ET AL. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty CO.
W2022-01702-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Blake Neill

This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim filed by an insured in relation to a homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court initially denied, having determined that there were issues of material fact in dispute. Upon the filing of a renewed motion for summary judgment accompanied by two affidavits from an employee of the insurer that offered interpretations of the evidence in dispute, the trial court granted the insurer’s motion, determining that the affidavits resolved the factual disputes. Because we conclude that there are disputed issues of material fact such that summary judgment should not have been granted, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

Tipton Court of Appeals

Mazahir Hamadani v. Meshreky Meshreky
M2023-01161-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clifton David Briley

A landlord obtained a judgment from a General Sessions Court against his tenant for back rent and other damages. The tenant appealed, and the Circuit Court reduced the damages award. The landlord appeals to this court. The landlord, who is pro se, disregards the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in his filings. His filings render his argument indiscernible. The landlord also failed to provide a record that fully and accurately depicts the underlying proceedings. Because the landlord’s deviations from the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure prevent this court from providing meaningful appellate review, we dismiss his appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Nashville Church of Christ, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Central Church of Christ v. Amy Grant Gill and Andrew M. Burton, as co-administrators of the Estate of A.M. Burton, et al.
M2022-00823-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by a church. The church had purchased property in 1925 pursuant to a deed providing that if the property ceased to be used for the purposes and objects described in the deed, it would “revert” to the estate of an individual who was then serving as a trustee of the church. In 2019, an attorney informed the church that he represented several individuals who were heirs of said trustee and were concerned that the property was not being used in a manner consistent with the deed. Thus, the church filed the instant complaint and sought a declaration that the restriction in the deed was no longer valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, it had not violated the restriction by utilizing the property in a manner inconsistent with the deed. The parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issues surrounding the validity of the deed restriction. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the restriction remained enforceable. Thus, the trial court noted that the remaining issue to be decided was whether the church had adhered to the applicable restriction. The church filed a motion asking the trial court to either certify its partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 or grant it permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. Before this motion was heard, however, an agreed order was entered certifying the trial court’s partial summary judgment order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02. The church appealed. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss the appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Gary Viles Motors, LLC v. Shawna M. Chance
E2023-01319-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard B. Armstrong

This is an appeal from a jury verdict wherein the jury found that the defendant had met the burden to prove her
counterclaims for breach of contract or conversion and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court entered an order relative to the remaining motions; however, the order
failed to dispose of two of the defendant’s counterclaims that had not been presented to the jury. Because these
two claims remain outstanding, there is no final judgment entered by the trial court, and this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case to the trial
court for further action.

Knox Court of Appeals

Alyssia Arnold et al. v. Jay Witt
M2023-00803-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Wyatt Burk

This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Alyssia Arnold and Donavan Levenhagen (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ half-siblings. The respondent moved to dismiss Appellants’ petition for visitation due to a lack of standing. The Lincoln County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted the motion to dismiss. Appellants appealed to the Lincoln County Circuit Court (“circuit court”), which also granted a motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lincoln Court of Appeals

In Re Bentley R.
W2023-01665-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Steven W. Maroney

The Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of River M. (“Mother”) to her son, Bentley R. (“the Child”). Mother appeals, challenging the Trial Court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Madison Court of Appeals

Linda R. Kerley v. George Olin Kerley
E2022-01206-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce in which the trial court determined that the assets accumulated
by the parties during their fifty-eight-year marriage were all marital property and were worth approximately
$2,000,000.00 in total. Following a hearing wherein the parties testified regarding the values of the individual
assets, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce, assigning values and dividing the marital assets into two
tables, awarding approximately forty-seven percent of the assets to the wife and approximately fifty-three
percent of the assets to the husband. The trial court also awarded to the wife “transitional alimony” of
$1,000.00 per month for five years as well as her reasonable attorney’s fees. The husband has appealed from
the final decree, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in the distribution of assets because it did not make
sufficient findings in the record or allocate proper weight to the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 36-4-121(c) and (2) the trial court erred in granting temporary alimony to the wife based upon her financial
need. In her reply brief, the wife seeks an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. Based on our review, we
determine that the final decree contains insufficient findings of fact regarding the distribution of marital assets
and the award of alimony because the trial court failed to delineate its analysis of the required statutory factors
as to either award. Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the trial court’s final decree and remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Bledsoe Court of Appeals