Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This appeal arises from an action for default on a promissory note. Approximately eight and a half years after the debtors stopped making monthly payments under an installment note, the creditor filed suit for missed monthly payments going back six years from the date of the filing of the complaint, as well as for future installments and the final payment that were to become due under the terms of the note. The debtors asserted that the debt, or some portion thereof, was time-barred. As a result, the debtors raised the statute of limitations as a defense and filed a counterclaim, alleging that the creditor violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by seeking a judgment on a time-barred debt. The creditor moved for summary judgment on all issues. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the amounts that the creditor sought are not barred by the statute of limitations and that the undisputed material facts established the creditor’s claim against the debtor as a matter of law. This appeal followed. We affirm. 

This appeal involves a non-judicial foreclosure by Brandywine Homeowners’ Association (the HOA) for non-payment of assessments due to the HOA by former property owner, plaintiff Michael McKenzie. It is undisputed that there was no irregularity in the recording, notice or foreclosure of the HOA’s lien on the property. Plaintiff argues that the foreclosure sale price, $4,445.90, is shockingly low in light of the trial court’s finding that the property was worth about $100,000. Plaintiff does not allege, nor did the trial court find, any “misconduct, fraud, or unfairness on the part of the [HOA] that caused or contributed to an inadequate price.” Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tenn. 1984). The trial court granted the HOA summary judgment, refusing plaintiff’s request to set aside the foreclosure on equitable grounds. Because the Supreme Court in Holt held that the “lone infirmity” of a “conscience shocking inadequate price . . . will no longer justify voiding a foreclosure sale,” id., we are compelled to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this child-custody dispute, father filed a petition for legitimation and to establish a parenting plan. Father was subsequently determined to be the biological father of the minor child M.K. After mother took the child to excessive medical visits, made unsubstantiated claims that the child suffers from ailments and had her treated for the same, and accused father of physically and sexually abusing the child, the trial court ordered mother to undergo a mental-health evaluation. Mother was subsequently diagnosed with Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another, formerly known as Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy. After a bench trial, the court held that it is in the child’s best interest for father to be designated the primary residential parent of M.K. Mother’s parenting time was limited to eleven hours of supervised visitation a week. Mother appeals. We affirm.

When the defendant failed to answer a petition for declaratory judgment, the plaintiff sought and obtained a default judgment.  The defendant moved to set aside the default judgment, arguing that it never received the motion for default judgment nor notice of the hearing date on the motion.  The trial court denied the defendant the requested relief, finding that the defendant’s failure to answer the petition until months after entry of the default judgment was willful.  Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

This appeal follows the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award. Insofar as this appeal relates to Dreamaker Properties, LLC, we must dismiss the appeal because the company is not represented by counsel and has therefore failed to validly participate and properly raise any issues for our review on appeal. With regard to the remaining appellant, who is proceeding pro se, we affirm the trial court’s judgment because his raised issue lacks merit. As we understand his argument, the appellant maintains that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award because he was never a party to an agreement to arbitrate. As the record transmitted to us on appeal confirms, however, an “Agreed Order” was entered in this case directing that the case be ordered to arbitration. Moreover, the record reveals that, prior to the actual arbitration, the contesting appellant entered into an “Agreement to Arbitrate” regarding “any and all disputes.”

This is a divorce case. Husband filed for divorce after 20 years of marriage. Following a three-day trial, the trial court determined Wife could not be rehabilitated and ordered Husband to pay $9,700 per month in alimony in futuro. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to consider Wife’s earning capacity in setting Husband’s alimony obligation. Accordingly, we modify Husband’s alimony obligation by the amount of Wife’s earning capacity as determined by the trial court. Affirmed as modified.

This is an appeal from a final order entered in a conservatorship proceeding. There was no court reporter present for the final hearing in the case. The Trial Court concluded, following a hearing on the parties’ competing Statements of the Evidence, that it could not resolve the parties’ differences regarding what transpired at the final hearing for purposes of appeal and, therefore, granted a new trial. As a result, there is no longer a final judgment in the proceedings below and this Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of T.N. (mother) with respect to her child M.N. The court also granted a petition for adoption by stepmother A.N. Because the court did not “make[] specific findings of fact and conclusions of law,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) (Supp. 2018), we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate order.

This appeal involves the dismissal of a case based on mootness. The City of Lakeland and its Industrial Development Board passed various resolutions for the purpose of funding the construction of a new high school. Plaintiffs—a group of citizens of Lakeland—sued, arguing that the city lacked the statutory authority for the financing transaction. After Congress enacted the federal Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the financing transaction increased in cost, and Lakeland and the Industrial Development Board repealed the resolutions. Thereafter, upon Lakeland’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims as moot. We affirm.

This appeal arises from an action filed by a healthcare management company against a county for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The dispute centered on a financially distressed hospital, which the county wanted to purchase and lease to the healthcare company to manage. Thus, the county, the hospital, and the healthcare management company entered into a Letter of Intent to accomplish this goal. The Letter of Intent provided that the healthcare management company would loan funds to the owner of the hospital to keep the hospital operating while the county negotiated the asset purchase agreement. If the purchase of the hospital closed by the agreed-upon deadline, the county agreed to repay the healthcare management company for the amount loaned; however, if the purchase of the hospital did not close by the deadline, the county was not obligated to repay the loans to the hospital. After the asset purchase agreement did not close by the deadline set in the Letter of Intent, the county purchased the hospital and awarded the contract to manage the hospital to a company owned by the county’s attorneys and refused to pay the healthcare management company the more than $1.2 million it loaned the hospital. Thereafter, the healthcare management company filed this action against the county for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In its answer, the county denied breaching the contract because of the failure of the condition precedent, that the purchase of the hospital close by the agreed-upon deadline. Thereafter, the county filed a motion for summary judgment on the same ground and also moved to summarily dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because the Letter of Intent, which was an enforceable contract, precluded the claim. The healthcare management company responded by presenting evidence indicating that the county failed to act in good faith to close on the purchase of the hospital by the deadline in order to avoid its obligations to the healthcare management company. It also contended that its claim of unjust enrichment should not be dismissed unless the court determined that the Letter of Intent was an enforceable contract. The trial court summarily dismissed both claims on the finding the evidence was not sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to either claim. Having determined that the evidence was sufficient, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This case involves an effort to admit a lost will to probate. In the proceedings below, the trial court held that the lost will should be accepted for probate. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.