In Re Lucas S.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The father appeals the judgment of the trial court that terminated his parental rights to his minor child based on abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
STACIE SMITH v. GARY MEEK
This appeal arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute between Appellant Stacie Smith and Appellee Gary Meek. In response to a plumbing issue in her rented home, Ms. Smith sought injunctive relief from the Knox County General Sessions Court requiring Mr. Meek to make certain repairs to the home. The General Sessions Court granted the requested injunction, which Mr. Meek appealed to the Knox County Circuit Court. Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Meek and dismissed Ms. Smith’s complaint. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Annajoel Sullivan v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
Following an alleged failure to properly assess whether a driver was impaired as part of an investigation of a car crash, the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security fired a probationary employee trooper. The trooper filed suit, claiming that the Department actually fired her because of her age, sex, and national origin. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department. The trooper appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Samson K. Orusa et al. v. First National Bank of America
Homeowners sought to void the foreclosure sale of their home, asserting that the bank did not advertise the sale as required. The trial court granted the bank summary judgment, concluding that the bank was not properly served and that the foreclosure had been properly advertised. The homeowners appeal. We affirm based on failure of service of process. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT A. MARTIN ET AL. v. ROBERT E. MARTIN ET AL.
Robert A. Martin (“Father”) and Donna Saas (“Daughter”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”), seeking the removal of Robert E. Martin (“Son”) as trustee of the Martin Irrevocable Trust (“the Trust”) and making claims of breach of fiduciary duty and conversion of assets against Son and his wife, Karen Martin (“Son’s Wife”) (collectively, with Son, “Defendants”). The Trial Court struck Defendants’ defenses and denials in their answer given their failure to provide an accounting of the Trust’s assets despite the Trial Court’s orders to do so. After a hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded Daughter half of the asset that was supposed to have been put in the Trust, half of the funds that Son had converted from Father’s accounts, attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and lost wages. Defendants appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jackie Mansfield Broyles v. Calvin C. Herrin, Jr., individually and d/b/a Hickory Creek Barbecue et al.
After slipping and falling on accumulated snow and ice at a restaurant, a man filed a premises liability lawsuit against the owner of the restaurant. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owner based on its finding that the owner owed no duty to protect the man from accumulated snow and ice because the incident occurred during an ongoing winter storm. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KENNA R., ET AL.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hawkins County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Rikiya P. (“Mother”) to her minor children Annabelle, Jasmine, and Liam (“the Children,” collectively), as well as the parental rights of Daniel R. (“Father”) to Liam.1 The Children had been removed from Mother and Father’s custody because Mother starved and beat Kenna, Father’s daughter by another mother.2 Father was aware of the abuse but failed to protect Kenna. The Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Mother and Father appeal. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of severe child abuse was proven against Mother and Father by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, as did the Juvenile Court, that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as being in the best interest of the Children. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
ESTATE OF MARTHA HARRISON BANE v. JOHN BANE
In this declaratory judgment action, the trial court denied the appellant’s motions, filed one year after a decision from this Court affirming the trial court’s final judgment, seeking to intervene as a party in the lawsuit and to “correct” the trial court’s previous order. The trial court also awarded sanctions to the opposing party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The appellant timely appealed these rulings. Following our thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to intervene as untimely. However, we vacate the trial court’s award of Rule 11 sanctions and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to make the appropriate findings concerning its adjudication of the Rule 11 motion, including the ability to hold a hearing, if necessary, regarding the factual analysis required by Rule 11. The appellant’s other issues are pretermitted due to his status as a non-party. We decline to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to the appellee, and we further decline to impose sanctions against the appellee’s counsel for representations made during oral argument. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mykeena C. et al.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their two shared children. We conclude the trial court properly found that the Department of Children’s Services proved by clear and convincing evidence at least one ground for termination as to each parent and that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination of parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
BIOBELE GEORGEWILL V. CMH HOMES, INC.
The plaintiff seeks recusal of the trial judge pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. The trial judge denied the plaintiff’s sixth motion to recuse. The plaintiff’s Rule 10B petition fails to comply with the rule, and the grounds for recusal offered are without merit. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Development, LLC v. Maverick General Contractors, LLC et al.
A Tennessee residential homebuilder alleged that a Floridian general contractor and its principal fraudulently disguised the painting of fencing at the principal’s personal residence as a legitimate business expense on a fraudulent invoice submitted to and paid by the Tennessee company. The company brought a tort suit in Tennessee. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We conclude that the homebuilder’s allegations and the Defendants’ contacts with Tennessee are sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction, and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not violate the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Krystopher C. et al.
In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to their two minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and mother have each appealed and have proceeded pro se upon waiving their rights to appointed counsel. Having determined that clear and convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of the statutory abandonment ground of failure to support as to the mother, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to this ground as to the mother. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Celeste Lachapelle as the beneficiary of the will of James Russell Pace v. Blanchard E. Tual, et al.
Appellant sued the law firm that prepared a will on behalf of her fiancé for professional negligence after an out-of-state will contest resulted in the invalidation of the will. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim accrued when she was forced to respond to the will contest and not when the will was actually held to be invalid. Thus, Appellant’s action was filed after the one-year limitations period had expired, and the trial court granted summary judgment for the law firm. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
CHARLES J. BEARD ET AL. v. WILLIAM ODOM ET AL.
This appeal arises from the purchase of a residential home. The plaintiff homebuyers asserted claims against the defendant sellers for intentional or negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act (“TRPDA”). The plaintiffs’ claims were based solely on the defendants’ TRPDA disclosure statement, which said there were no known defects in the home’s floor structure. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims on the basis that the plaintiffs knew or should have known about the alleged defects because the plaintiffs had every opportunity to discover the defects and were made aware of the defects by their own observations and inspection reports. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they reasonably relied on the defendants’ misrepresentation. But the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment to establish that they actually or reasonably relied on the disclosure statement. For this reason, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Xingkui Guo v. State of Tennessee
Professor appeals from the Tennessee Claims Commission’s Rule 41.02(2) involuntary dismissal of his breach of contract action against Tennessee State University. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Kelly M. Et Al. v. Agness M.
Because no final order has been entered in the underlying trial court proceedings, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Ridgeview Partners, LLC d/b/a Ravelle at Ridgeview v. Michelle Okoreeh-Baah Keister
In this unlawful detainer action, the landlord obtained judgment in the general sessions court against a tenant for failure to pay rent. The tenant, who remained in possession of the subject property, appealed the judgment to the circuit court without posting a bond for possession as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-18-130(b)(2)(A). In the absence of a bond, the landlord sought immediate possession of the property. The tenant moved to proceed on appeal without a bond, arguing that the affidavit of indigency she had filed with the general sessions court sufficed in lieu of a surety bond for her appeal. The circuit court ordered the tenant to either surrender possession of the property or post a possession bond. After the tenant failed to surrender possession or post a bond, the circuit court issued a writ of possession in favor of the landlord, which the landlord executed shortly thereafter. Having regained possession of the property, the landlord filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01. The trial court accordingly entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The tenant has appealed the dismissal to this Court, arguing that because she had filed an affidavit of indigency in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-103, she should have been permitted to retain possession of the property pending resolution of her appeal to the circuit court without posting a bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Turley v. John Mendez
The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice, and he appeals. Due to the deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we do not reach the substantive issues. Appeal dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This emergency conservatorship action was litigated along with an action to establish a permanent conservatorship. The trial court’s judgments in both actions have been appealed. Because the appeal in the permanent conservatorship action has resolved the issues raised in this appeal, we dismiss the appeal as moot. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalynn (Victor) Addis v. Ryan Keith Addis
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding in which the trial court adopted the wife’s marital property division and the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan, found the husband willfully unemployed and imputed his income at $252,850.50 per year for child support purposes, and awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, and a judgment in the amount of $43,407.50 for attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm in part and vacate in part. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Susan Davis Malone
This is a conservatorship action. Appellants are attorneys who prepared estate planning documents for Susan Davis Malone in 2014 and 2018. Ms. Malone’s 2018 documents included a durable power of attorney and power of attorney for healthcare (“DPOAs”) in favor of Appellants. In that 2018 healthcare DPOA, Ms. Malone appointed Appellants to serve as her conservator should the need arise. In 2021, Ms. Malone suffered a disabling healthcare event, and Appellants provided for her care pursuant to the 2018 documents. In 2022, Ms. Malone purportedly revoked the 2018 DPOAs and executed DPOAs in favor of her daughter, Appellee Lisa Malone Jackson. Appellants filed a petition to be appointed conservator; Ms. Jackson filed a counter-petition. The proceedings in the trial court initially focused on whether Ms. Malone had the capacity to revoke the 2018 DPOAs and to execute the 2022 DPOAs. During the proceedings, Appellants filed two motions to recuse the trial judge. The trial court denied both motions. On appeal, this Court affirmed. While Appellants’ second motion to recuse was pending, the trial court found good cause to hold an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the competing conservatorship petitions. Attorneys did not participate in the hearing, and the trial court appointed a neutral interim conservator. Shortly after it denied Appellants’ second motion to recuse, the trial court determined that an additional hearing was not necessary. The trial court found that the 2022 documents were valid and concluded without an evidentiary hearing that it was in Ms. Malone’s best interest to appoint Appellees to serve as co-conservators. Upon review of the record, we determine that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Additionally, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the guardian ad litem. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Sue Speranza v. Scott Michael Speranza
In this divorce case, Appellant/Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce. Although Wife and Appellee/Husband tendered proposed final decrees and orally announced their consent to be divorced and to divide the marital estate, they did not file a written property-settlement agreement. In her Rule 59.04 motion, Wife asserts, inter alia, that the parties did not come to an agreement concerning the division of two marital assets, i.e. stock in Husband’s company, and funds held by the trial court Clerk. In the absence of such agreement, Wife contends that the trial court erred in entering its final decree and in the division of the disputed assets. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Korey DeJuan Dupree
This appeal arises from a probate matter in which the trial court, inter alia, granted by default a motion for substitution of the original personal representative. The original personal representative filed a motion to vacate the default order and later filed a “Verified Petition for Temporary Restraining Order without Notice” to prevent the disbursement of funds received from a related wrongful death suit. While the motion and petition were pending, the successor personal representative petitioned to close the estate and discharge personal representative, which the trial court granted. The original personal representative appeals, contending that it was error to grant the substitution of personal representative by default due to a lack of proper notice and hearing. After a review of the record, we find that there has been no adjudication of the motion to vacate the order removing the original personal representative or the petition for temporary restraining order. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is not final, and we must dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Genash, LLC v. Rose Legacy, LLC as successor in interest to Agnoletti Properties, LLC
In this commercial lease dispute, the tenant sued the landlord for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement, and the landlord counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, concluding that the landlord breached the lease. The matter then proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict on a list of issues, including damages on the tenant’s breach of contract claim, the landlord’s defenses to the breach of contract claim, the tenant’s fraudulent inducement claim, and the landlord’s breach of contract claim against the tenant. The jury found in favor of the tenant on both of its claims against the landlord but only awarded damages on the breach of contract claim. The jury concluded that the landlord had not proven its breach of contract claim. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AZALAYA J.
This action involves the termination of the parents’ parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination as applied to each parent. The court found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
