Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of severe abuse by the mother and that termination was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother challenges whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s best interest determinations. In weighing the statutory best-interest factors, she contends the trial court did not properly consider her completion of permanency plan requirements and nearly fifteen months of drug-free tests. The mother also complains that she was denied contact with her children by court order shortly after their removal and, despite her progress, was thwarted in her efforts to reestablish contact. We affirm.

Property owners sued lessees for possession and back rent. Lessees counterclaimed, alleging anticipatory breach, fraud, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in conjunction with a purchase option. Property owners moved for summary judgment on their claim for possession, arguing that lessees never exercised their option to purchase. In response, lessees asserted anticipatory breach. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to property owners. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the remaining counterclaims. On appeal, lessees challenge both decisions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.
 

This appeal arises from a school bullying lawsuit. Doug Zukowski and Aimee Zukowski filed suit in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) on behalf of their son Taylor Alexander Zukowski (“Alex,” who later joined the suit in his own right after turning 18) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) against the Hamilton County Department of Education (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs alleged that Alex was bullied while a student at Chattanooga’s Center for Creative Arts (“CCA”), a public fine arts magnet school, and that Defendant breached its duty of care to protect Alex. Plaintiffs appeal, raising a number of issues. We find that the record does not contain the requisite clear and convincing evidence necessary to overturn the Trial Court’s credibility determinations. We also find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Defendant’s employees responded appropriately when Alex reported to them that he was bullied. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Following a judgment in their favor in a personal injury action, the defendants were granted an award of discretionary costs in the amount of $3,499.81. Appellant appeals, raising several arguments in opposition to the costs awarded. Because many of Appellant’s arguments were not properly raised in the trial court, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the remaining issues, we affirm.

Plaintiff Joseph Riccardi brought this action for negligent construction of his residence against Carl Little Construction Company (“Defendant”), builder of the residence, and the Bridgewater Condominiums Property Owners Association (“Bridgewater POA”). He alleged that Defendant negligently built the residence on non-compacted fill dirt, causing structural and cosmetic damages to the residence. Plaintiff alleged that Bridgewater POA was contractually responsible for repairs to the exterior of the residence. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant based on its finding that the statutes of limitation and repose had run. The court held that Bridgewater POA was liable for repairs to the porches and patios of the property, but not the foundation or the cracks in the interior. We vacate summary judgment against Defendant, finding that Plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to establish genuine issues of material fact regarding when Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and whether Defendant fraudulently concealed the defects in the residence. We affirm the judgment against Bridgewater POA.

The issues on appeal arise from a personal injury action commenced by two tenants of an apartment complex against the owner of the complex and the property management company. The complaint alleged that one of the plaintiffs fell through an inadequately supported floor vent in the master bedroom of their apartment. The plaintiffs asserted that the management company should have discovered the defective condition while conducting maintenance and repairs on the apartment. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint after finding the undisputed facts showed the defect was concealed and the management company had no duty to test the vent’s structural integrity. Prior to entry of a final judgment, the plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint based on negligence per se against only the management company. The plaintiffs asserted that a local building code established a minimum live load for apartment floors. The court dismissed the amended complaint after finding the building code did not apply. We affirm.

In this parental rights termination case, the trial court ruled that DCS proved five grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children: mental incompetence, persistence of conditions, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the children. The trial court also ruled that termination of Mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s rulings as to the grounds of mental incompetence and abandonment by failure to support. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that termination of Mother’s rights is in the children’s best interests.

This case involves a motion by the defendants to enforce an alleged “walkaway settlement” agreement. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs—through their former attorney— agreed to a binding settlement agreement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The trial court’s decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

The defendant appealed to circuit court following a judgment against it in general sessions court. The plaintiff filed no notice of appeal, but amended its complaint to allege an additional claim. The plaintiff later filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking an award of attorney’s fees. Eventually, the defendant dismissed its appeal and asked that the general sessions court judgment be affirmed. The trial court affirmed the previous judgment from the general sessions court, but also granted the plaintiff an additional judgment for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. The defendant appeals the award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees, but affirm the award of discretionary costs.

This appeal arises from a healthcare liability action wherein the plaintiff initially sued the doctor, the hospital, and two other defendants. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice against all defendants except for the doctor. The doctor subsequently filed an answer to the complaint, stating that the action should be dismissed under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the hospital, a governmental hospital entity and the doctor’s employer, was not a party to the action. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend,” seeking to set aside the Trial Court’s order of dismissal in order to withdraw his voluntary dismissal of the hospital as a party. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, determining that the voluntary dismissal order was a final order and that the plaintiff knew about the doctor’s employment with the hospital prior to the voluntary dismissal. We determine that the Trial Court erred by treating the plaintiff’s motion as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion, instead of a motion to revise pursuant to Rule 54.02, and further hold that the Trial Court erred by denying the plaintiff’s motion to revise the non-final order of voluntary dismissal.

In this action for conversion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who is her brother, unilaterally surrendered an annuity fund that had been titled jointly in their names, received a check for the proceeds, endorsed her signature without her permission, and deposited the proceeds in a bank account to which the plaintiff had no access. Upon the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in which he asserted that the plaintiff had been an owner of the annuity in name only and that the three-year statute of limitations had expired well before she filed the complaint, the trial court found that the plaintiff was a titled co-owner of the annuity and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled by the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the cause of action from the plaintiff. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant had fraudulently concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff and that he had committed conversion of the plaintiff’s one-half interest in the check representing the annuity proceeds. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of one-half of the annuity proceeds plus pre-judgment interest calculated from the date of the check’s endorsement. The defendant has appealed. Having discerned a minor mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the amount to reduce it by $90.00, affirming the trial court’s award to the plaintiff in the amount of $59,674.22 rather than $59,764.22. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

This appeal stems from a dismissal pursuant to Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Suit was filed against Appellant’s treating physician, among other defendants, for health care liability involving Appellant’s birth. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that, because the physician was an employee of a governmental entity at the time of the incident, Appellant was required by statute to name the physician’s employing governmental entity as a party defendant. Because Appellant failed to do so, the lawsuit against the treating physician could not proceed. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.