Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the father, William K. (“Father”), to his minor child, Amynn K. (“the Child”), who was four years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2013 to Father and Amanda S. (“Mother”). In April 2013, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on June 24, 2013, adjudicating the Child dependent and neglected due to Mother’s abandonment of the Child at the hospital following his birth. On August 23, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father had (1) abandoned the Child through conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child prior to Father’s incarceration, (2) failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of and financial responsibility for the Child. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals the reduction of his parenting time. Because he has failed to include a transcript or statement of the evidence in accordance with Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we presume that the evidentiary record supports the trial Court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Father’s rights to his son were terminated based upon his stipulation that the Department of Children’s Services could prove that grounds to terminate existed and upon the Court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. Upon our review, we conclude that Father’s stipulation that the evidence satisfied the statutory grounds for termination was a nullity. We also conclude that the trial court’s order does not contain adequate factual findings with respect to the grounds for termination to provide for a meaningful review. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the court and remand the case.

In this divorce action presenting issues concerning the classification and distribution of the parties’ assets, the trial court determined that an oil and gas investment purchased during the marriage was the wife’s separate property, as was her engagement ring. The trial court fashioned an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property and debts and denied the wife’s claim for alimony. In doing so, the trial court excluded any consideration of assets formerly owned by the parties that were held by a trust at the time of trial. The husband has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of A.D.G. to her children, K.O. and K.G. Because the court did not “make[] specific findings of fact and conclusions of law,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) (2017), we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate order.

This appeal arises out of a suit to enforce restrictive covenants. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent their neighbors from operating a commercial horse facility. After a hearing, the court permanently enjoined Defendants from using or allowing their property to be used for a commercial horse operation and from constructing any additional buildings before they built a residence on the property. The trial court also ruled that Defendants did not have to remove or relocate the already-constructed “run-in shed” at this time, but that once a residence is built, the shed must be removed or moved to the rear of the residence. Defendants appeal. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment enjoining Defendants from conducting a commercial horse operation; in all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Over ten years after entry of a judgment, the judgment creditors filed a motion for scire facias to revive the judgment. The trial court denied the motion based on a determination that expiration of the statute of limitations deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the judgment creditors argue that their motion was timely because the debtor revived the debt by agreeing that the debt was nondischargeable in bankruptcy. We conclude that the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction but that revival does not apply. So we affirm as modified.

This action involves a long-term ground lease in which the defendant lessee paid for and maintained an insurance policy on the property for its benefit. The defendant surrendered the premises after the motel facility constructed on the land was destroyed by a wildfire before the expiration of the lease. The plaintiff lessor filed suit, seeking an equitable lien on the policy and its proceeds, a constructive trust against the insurance rights and recovery, a claim on the policy as a third-party beneficiary, and injunctive relief. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm.

A passenger on a Jackson Transit Authority bus was arrested as a result of an altercation with the driver; the arrest led to the passenger’s parole being revoked and his resulting incarceration. The passenger brought suit, asserting claims for slander and libel under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and Tennessee Public Protection Act against the Transit Authority and certain of its employees, and the Mayor and various employees of the City of Jackson. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed. Upon our review, we have determined that the complaint fails to allege causes of action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act and the Public Protection Act, and that the causes of action asserted against the individual defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case.

This is a case of healthcare liability and wrongful death. After the decedent’s death at a Tullahoma hospital, his surviving spouse filed suit seeking damages for his injuries and death. The case was eventually tried before a jury, and a verdict was returned in favor of the Plaintiff. Although the jury determined that the total damages were $300,000, the trial court suggested an additur of over $1,000,000. An amended final judgment was subsequently entered after the trial court determined that the Defendant had accepted the additur under protest. Because we are of the opinion that the trial court’s additur destroyed the jury’s verdict, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

Appellant, a member of First Baptist Church of Humboldt, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the church, its pastor, and chairman of the deacons. Appellant challenged the vote to change the name of the church to “The Church at Sugar Creek.” Finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine acted as a jurisdictional bar, the trial court granted summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal involves a premises liability suit filed by a customer of a Goodwill store after the customer sat on an item of furniture that was for sale and it collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodwill, finding no genuine issue of material fact and concluding that Goodwill did not create or have actual or constructive knowledge of any alleged defect. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.