Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

In this certiorari review of a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Appellants challenge the Board’s grant, as authorized by ordinance and state and federal law, of an accommodation from the zoning requirements applicable to property owned by a church, on which it sought to build 22 micro-homes to house the homeless. Appellants argue that the development should be subject to the zoning laws and procedures because the development would be constructed, owned, and operated by a lessee of the property that was not a religious institution or assembly or otherwise exercising religion and, consequently, applying the zoning laws to the development would not adversely affect the church’s exercise of religion. The Appellants also argue that the project did not meet the standards for the accommodation set by the state and federal laws. The trial court upheld the decision of the Board. Upon our review, we conclude that material evidence supports the Board’s decision and that the decision is not contrary to law, and is not arbitrary or capricious; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court reinstated its previous ruling that had been reversed on appeal because a “change in the controlling law” occurred that justified departure from the law of the case doctrine. Because we conclude that no change in controlling law occurred to allow the trial court to avoid application of the law of the case doctrine, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings before a different trial judge.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce proceeding wherein the wife filed a petition requesting that the trial court hold the husband in civil contempt due to his noncompliance with the alimony provision in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and enter a judgment in favor of the wife representing the alimony arrearage and statutory interest. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the wife’s petition without entering a monetary judgment against the husband, upon finding that although the husband had violated the alimony provision of the MDA, his failure to pay was not willful. The trial court also denied the wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Having determined that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding, we conclude that the husband’s failure to comply with the alimony provision was willful. Upon further determination that the trial court erred in dismissing the wife’s petition for civil contempt and a monetary award, we reverse.

A general sessions court issued orders of protection for a mother and her child against the mother’s ex-husband, who was the child’s father. Thirty-six days after the final order was entered, the father filed suit in chancery court, essentially seeking to enroll the mother’s and the father’s Texas divorce decree and to appeal the orders of protection. On the mother’s motion, the chancery court dismissed the suit in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The mother then moved to alter or amend, seeking an award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs incurred in defending the action. The chancery court granted the motion and awarded the mother attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, the father challenges only the award of attorney’s fees. We conclude that the court did possess subject matter jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees. But because the father was not permitted to put on proof concerning the reasonableness of the fees incurred by the mother, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees.

Paul McMillin (“Plaintiff”) appeals the April 11, 2018 order of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) finding Plaintiff in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and awarding $19,983.94 in sanctions to be paid to the attorney for Realty Executives Associates, Inc. and Tammy Garber (“Defendants”). Plaintiff raises issues regarding the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants and the Trial Court’s grant of sanctions. We find and hold that Plaintiff waived his issues with regard to the grant of summary judgment. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding Plaintiff in violation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and awarding sanctions. We, therefore, affirm.

homeowner and a contractor entered into a contract requiring the contractor to repair damage to the homeowner’s house caused by a kitchen fire. The repairs to be performed were those covered by the homeowner’s insurance policy as outlined in a detailed estimate of repair work. After the contractor abandoned the project, the homeowner hired another contractor to complete the work and sued the original contractor for breach of contract. We affirm the decision of the trial court to the extent of the court’s determination that the contractor breached the contract by his undue delay and poor workmanship. We have concluded, however, that the trial court’s decision fails to adequately explain the award of damages or to dispose of the contractor’s counterclaim. Therefore, we vacate the damages award and remand for more specific findings regarding the basis for the damages award and a disposition of the counterclaim.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, arising from an appeal filed by the plaintiff to the Monroe County Circuit Court (“trial court”) from a judgment of the Monroe County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”), granting the defendants immediate possession of certain contested property located in Madisonville, Tennessee. The plaintiff challenges both the January 8, 2019 trial court order, which denied his initial and supplemental motions seeking judicial recusal of the trial court judge, and the subsequent order, which denied his motion to alter or amend the January 8, 2019 order. Having carefully reviewed the petition for recusal appeal (“the Petition”), together with the challenged orders, we conclude that the Petition was not timely filed and accordingly dismiss this appeal.

The pro se appellant, a state inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Averring that correction facility officials had wrongfully withheld back pay due to him for thirty-seven days of work he missed in his prison employment program pending his ultimately successful appeal of a disciplinary action, the petitioner requested that the trial court direct prison officials to tender $1,475.37 in back pay plus interest. The prison officials, represented by the Tennessee Attorney General’s office, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the petitioner had waived this action in the trial court by previously filing a claim with the Division of Claims Administration (now known as the Division of Claims and Risk Management) and that the petitioner was not entitled to back pay under the applicable program procedures. In an order entered upon the pleadings, the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s action upon finding that the applicable procedures did not entitle the petitioner to back pay. The petitioner then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied. The petitioner has appealed. Having determined that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action, we vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this case.   

This is a case arising out of the Teacher Tenure Act. A tenured middle school teacher sought review of a decision of the board of education upholding his termination for inefficiency, incompetence, and neglect of duty. The chancery court affirmed the board’s decision, sustaining the teacher’s termination. Teacher appealed to this Court. We reverse the chancery court’s findings with respect to neglect of duty. However, we affirm the chancery court’s findings with respect to inefficiency and incompetence, and thereby affirm the teacher’s termination.

This appeal arises from a re-filed health care liability action brought by the wife of a hospital patient, individually and on behalf of her now-deceased husband, against the hospital. In the first action, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on the 120-day extension to the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, which also required the plaintiffs to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization to potential defendants. The complaint asserted that one of the hospital’s doctors and four of its nurses were negligent in treating the husband in the hospital’s emergency department on July 26, 2009, and that the hospital was vicariously liable. The doctor and nurses, but not Saint Francis, successfully moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with § 121. On interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of § 121’s pre-suit notice requirement. This court affirmed the trial court’s determinations that § 121 was constitutional, was not preempted by HIPAA, and did not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Accordingly, this court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the doctor and nurses. Because the claims against the hospital remained, we remanded the case for further proceedings. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the first complaint against the hospital in April 2016. Eight months later, the plaintiffs sent the hospital a new pre-suit notice and medical authorization. Sixty-four days after that, the plaintiffs filed their second complaint against the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, asserting the second complaint was timebarred because the plaintiffs failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization in the first action and, thus, the 120-day extension was not available and the original complaint was time-barred. The plaintiffs responded by asserting that a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization is unnecessary to obtain the 120-day extension and challenging the constitutionality of § 121, including a challenge based on the right to privacy in medical information. The trial court found that § 121 requires a HIPAAcompliant medical authorization before the 120-day extension applies, the law of the case doctrine barred the plaintiffs from re-litigating all constitutional challenges except that based on the right of privacy, and the right to privacy was not implicated. Based on these findings, the trial court dismissed the second complaint as time-barred. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The plaintiff, a health club member, seeks damages from the health club based on its alleged failure to protect him from sexual assaults in the locker room by another club member. The complaint alleges that the health club “knew who the assailant was, and was aware that [the assailant] had engaged in such actions many times prior to” assaulting the plaintiff. The health club denied liability insisting it had no prior knowledge of sexual assaults by the assailant or anyone else. It also contended the claims were barred by the exculpatory provision in its membership agreement, which released the club from liability for injuries “resulting from” the plaintiff’s “use of [the] facilities.” The trial court found the exculpatory provision was unambiguous and summarily dismissed the claims. Thereafter, and while this matter was on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court revised the standards by which the enforceability of an exculpatory agreement should be determined. See Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist Rehabilitation Hospital, LP, 565 S.W.3d 260 (Tenn. 2018). We have determined that the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence that the health club knew or should have known of prior assaults by the assailant or anyone else. Because there is no genuine dispute of fact, the health club is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the issue regarding the enforceability of the exculpatory clause is moot. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment, albeit on other grounds than found by the trial court, and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.