Mahdieh Shabanian v. Seyed Mohammad Hadi Hosseini
We do not reach the substantive issues because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel T.
This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Humphreys County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tabitha P. (“Mother”) and Cody T. (“Father”) to their minor child Gabriel T. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Mother and Father appeal, arguing mainly that DCS failed to assist or communicate with them. The Juvenile Court determined that Mother and Father were not credible witnesses, a determination we leave undisturbed. We find that each ground for termination found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Deena Brell v. Deniece Thomas, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al.
This is an appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits. The issue presented is whether, under Tennessee’s unemployment statutes, an employee who gives her employer notice of her resignation as of a certain date and is terminated by the employer prior to the effective resignation date is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee voluntarily quit. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision denying benefits. Based upon the plain language of the relevant statutory provision, we conclude that the employee’s actions do not constitute a voluntary decision to quit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kendin L.
Rhonda L. (“Mother”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for the City of Bristol (“the Juvenile Court”) to modify a parenting plan granting Mark K. (“Father”) sole custody of Kendin L. (“the Child”) and Mother at least four days of parenting time each month.1 Father filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking the suspension of Mother’s parenting time based upon Mother’s persistent inappropriate behavior and psychological evaluation results. The Juvenile Court entered an ex parte order granting the motion for injunctive relief. After trial, the Juvenile Court dismissed Mother’s petition for her failure to prosecute and ordered that the suspension of Mother’s parenting time remain in full effect until Mother engaged in therapy and treatment for her personality disorder. Mother appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Wayne Long v. Candice O'Brien Beasley et al.
This is a defamation action filed by a plaintiff police officer against two defendants concerning allegedly defamatory comments the defendants posted on Facebook about the officer. The defendants, citizens of Ashland City, where the plaintiff had served as a police officer for several years, filed a petition to dismiss the defamation action pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, determining that the officer had successfully established a prima facie case of defamation against each defendant and that the defendants had not met their burden to establish a valid defense. The defendants appealed the denial, arguing that the officer, a public official, had not met the heightened standard of proof necessary to establish that either of them had acted with actual malice when posting their comments to Facebook. During the pendency of this appeal, the officer attempted to nonsuit the underlying defamation lawsuit and moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Upon review, we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the officer’s voluntary nonsuit, and therefore we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal. We further determine, upon our de novo review of the record, that the trial court should have granted the defendants’ TPPA petition and dismissed the defamation lawsuit, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-20-105(b), because the officer failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that either defendant had acted with actual malice when posting the Facebook comments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Austin v. Angela Kay Plese
This appeal arises from a lawsuit over defamation and false light invasion of privacy. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Manoucheka Thermitus v. Schiller Jerome
Appellant, Schiller Jerome, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on September 3, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stevy Ellis, et al. v. Snookums Steakhouse, LLC, et al.
The patron of a restaurant sued the business and its owner when she was injured attempting to sit on a bench outside the business. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the patron failed to demonstrate the existence of a dangerous or defective condition. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Merritt v. Home Town Disposal, LLC
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Ellen Lee v. Deanna Lynn Peavy
After an unfavorable judgment in a detainer action for real property in general sessions court, the Plaintiff sought relief in Davidson County Circuit Court. Two and a half years later, after numerous resettings, the court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dale Muhlenberg v. Neva Muhlenberg
This is an appeal from an order entered on January 2, 2025. The appellant filed her notice of appeal on February 24, 2025, together with a motion requesting an extension of time within which to file the appeal. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the motion for extension and dismiss the appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Jolene Renee Scholl v. Michael Ray Scholl
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on December 10, 2024. The appellant filed his notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk on March 3, 2025, together with a Motion to Accept Late Filing. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the Motion to Accept Late Filing and dismiss the appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Malcom Gary
This appeal arises from the denial of line of duty disability benefits to the appellee by a pension board. The denial went before an administrative law judge who reversed the decision of the pension board and determined the appellee was entitled to benefits. The appellant filed a petition for judicial review in the chancery court, which affirmed the ruling of the administrative law judge. This appeal followed. Because the record does not contain evidence showing that the board entered a final determination, we are without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Lawson v. Judge Randy Kennedy Et Al.
A mother sought the recusal of the juvenile court judge overseeing a custody case involving her minor child. After the judge denied two recusal motions, the mother filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court. The circuit court determined that it lacked authority to issue the writ of mandamus and dismissed the petition. The mother appealed. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. v. Ryan B. Pickens Et Al.
In this healthcare liability action, the trial court excluded the plaintiff’s proffered expert witness after concluding that the witness failed to satisfy the competency requirements in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(b). Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tatum M. Campbell v. T.C. Restaurant Group, LLC et al.
The Plaintiff sued a musician and the establishment where he performed for negligence after the Plaintiff climbed on stage and sustained a concussion as a result of a fall from the stage while being escorted therefrom. The jury found that the Defendants were not at fault. On appeal, the Plaintiff claims reversible error because of defense counsel’s statement during opening argument that Plaintiff hoped to be a “lottery lawsuit winner” and error in admitting evidence of medical leave benefits Plaintiff obtained from her work. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kelly et al. v. Thomas A. Stewart
Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash Plaintiffs’ post-judgment subpoena for financial records he alleges are statutorily exempt from the subpoena process. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment and that no good cause exists to waive the finality requirement. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we grant Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this appeal. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Southern Roofing & Renovations, LLC v. Aron Austin, et al.
In this case that began as a breach of contract action, the defendant property owner attempts to appeal from two cases that were not consolidated in the trial court but resulted in the entry of a single order in favor of the plaintiff roofing company. Because the order appealed from did not adjudicate all of the claims of all of the parties, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Trevania Dudley Henderson v. Robert Dwayne Johnson et al.
This appeal involves a property dispute between the decedent’s husband and the decedent’s only daughter, who is a child born of a prior marriage. The chancery court concluded that the husband had no interest in the property under the decedent’s will, as the property had instead passed directly to the daughter, not the decedent, under the terms of the grandmother’s will. Additionally, the chancery court concluded that any claim by the husband was also barred by an earlier settlement agreement reached by the parties. Under the terms of that settlement agreement, the chancery court also awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the daughter. The husband appeals. We affirm |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Williams Rose et al. v. Patrick M. Malone
Grandparents brought a criminal contempt petition against Father for alleged violations of a grandparent visitation order. After a bench trial, the trial court found the father guilty on all 23 counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him to the maximum sentence of 10 days per count to be served consecutively. Of the 230 days, 140 days were suspended, with a sentence of 90 days of actual confinement. Father raises multiple challenges on appeal to every count and also challenges the sentences imposed. We affirm 11 of the counts, reverse 12 of the counts, and remand for resentencing. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael C. Murphy v. Melissa Ann Blalock
This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a will contest for failure to prosecute. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Natae'ya M. Et Al.
The parental rights of Chasity H.1 (“Mother”) were terminated by the Knox County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on January 22, 2024. Mother appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lagina Scott v. Shelby County Board of Education, et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of a tenured teacher. The trial court determined that the school district terminated the teacher without legal cause and ordered that she be reinstated with backpay but denied her request for attorney’s fees. Finding that the teacher waived any issue pertaining to whether the school board followed the procedural requirements of the Teacher Tenure Act, and that she engaged in conduct which constituted two of the three charges levied, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cedrik C. et al.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also concluded the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Because clear and convincing evidence supports that at least one of the termination grounds exists and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System v. UnitedHealthcare Plan of the River Valley, Inc. d/b/a/ AmeriChoice
An out-of-network hospital sued a TennCare managed care organization (“MCO”), seeking additional payment for healthcare services rendered to the MCO’s members. The MCO moved for summary judgment on the hospital’s claims for payment for post-stabilization services provided to both existing and retroactive members. With respect to the existing members, the MCO argued that the hospital could not show that the MCO had a legal obligation to pay for the post-stabilization services at issue. So the hospital could not establish that the MCO was unjustly enriched. The trial court agreed and summarily dismissed these claims. It also certified the dismissal as final. We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |