TRINITY CLARK, ET AL. v. LANCE BAKER
This appeal concerns Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e), an ethics rule requiring that a division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm be agreed to by the client in writing. Trinity Clark (“Clark”) entered into a retainer agreement with attorney Troy Jones (“Jones”) on a 1/3 contingency fee. Jones brought Clark’s matter to attorney Lance Baker (“Baker”), who was not in a firm with Jones. Clark later entered an agreement with Baker on a 45% contingency fee. The Clark-Baker agreement provided, in writing, that Baker could associate other attorneys on the case, but that Clark’s overall fee obligation would not increase. The agreement neither identified any other attorneys nor specified how fees would be divided between them. After Clark’s case settled, Clark sued Baker in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”), alleging Baker’s fee was unreasonable. Jones joined the lawsuit, arguing he was entitled to a share of the fees (“Plaintiffs,” Jones and Clark collectively). Baker filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court denied Baker’s motion, finding that both the Clark-Jones agreement and the Clark-Baker agreement were invalid for noncompliance with Rule 1.5(e). This interlocutory appeal followed. We find the Clark-Jones agreement invalid. However, with respect to the Clark-Baker agreement, we find that the entire arrangement and Clark’s assent thereto satisfied Rule 1.5(e). We reverse on this issue and find that the Clark-Baker agreement is not invalid for failure of compliance with Rule 1.5(e). We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cayla C.
The mother of the minor child at issue appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that four grounds for termination had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the minor child’s best interest. Although we vacate the finding that the ground of persistence of conditions was established, we affirm the finding that three grounds for termination have been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the minor child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Annie Douglas v. Geraldine Latimer et al.
Thirty-one days after entry of the trial court’s final order, Appellants filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rules 59.02 and 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02, requesting that the court consider their untimely Rule 59 Motion due to their attorney’s excusable neglect or mistake. The basis for the alleged excusable neglect was Appellants’ counsel’s admitted calendaring error, which resulted in counsel filing the Rule 59 Motion one day late. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Appellants’ Rule 60.02 Motion, determining that the circumstances did not constitute excusable neglect. Upon review of the parties’ briefs and record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Sanders, as next of kin to Terry Lee Sanders, deceased v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
The appellant has filed a late notice of appeal together with a request to waive the late filing. Because the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, we deny the request to waive the late filing and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Cannistra v. William Charles Brown
This matter involves an ongoing dispute between a landlord and a tenant in Pulaski, Tennessee. Following a detainer action in General Sessions Court over unpaid rent, the tenant, representing himself, filed the present case against the landlord, alleging numerous causes of action. The trial court dismissed all the tenant’s claims against the landlord, finding that the tenant erred in failing to join his claims in the original detainer action. The tenant, still representing himself on appeal, challenged the trial court’s dismissal of his claims. Due to the deficiencies in his brief, we conclude that he has waived consideration of any issues on appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Philip L. Lozano, III v. Charlotte R. Sappo et al.
A property owner sued his neighbors, claiming that he acquired title to a part of their land by adverse possession or, in the alternative, that he held a prescriptive easement. He asserted additional causes of action against one of the neighbors, including private nuisance, trespass to land, and forcible entry and detainer. The neighbors sought dismissal of the action via Tennessee Rule of Procedure 12.02(6) motions. The trial court dismissed the claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-110(a). It dismissed all other claims except for private nuisance based on deficiencies in the complaint. We vacate the dismissal of the prescriptive easement claim because facts warranting application of the statutory bar do not clearly appear on the face of the complaint. Because the appellant waived review of all other issues, we otherwise affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alton Earl Ingram v. Lisa Marie Glode
The appellant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a recusal motion pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. However, the trial judge has presented this case to the presiding judge of his district, pursuant to local rule, for another judge to hear the matter by interchange. Thus, we determine that the appellant’s Rule 10B appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Bryant, III v. State of Tennessee
State employee received proton beam radiation therapy for prostate cancer. Insurance company denied authorization of the treatment as “investigational” and not “medically necessary” pursuant to the insurance plan and its medical policy. After exhausting administrative remedies, the employee submitted an appeal to the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging breach of contract. The Claims Commission found that the treatment was not a covered expense, granting summary judgment in favor of the State. We now affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
SUSAN OAKES, ET AL. v. MARK A. FOX, M.D., ET AL.
This is a healthcare liability action against a surgeon and the hospital where the surgeon practiced. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm. John W. McClarty, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. Michael Swiney, C.J., and Kristi M. Davis, J., joined. Ira M. Long, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, and William Cameron, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Susan Oakes and Randy Oakes. Rachel Park Hurt, Devin P. Lyon, and Raymond Grant Lewallen, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mark A. Fox, M.D. and Covenant Medical Group, Inc. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bradford H.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to one of her five children. After a five-day termination trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that two grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We vacate one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC et al. v. Town of Nolensville
This appeal concerns individual liability in the context of a limited liability company. John Olderman (“Olderman”) and Christopher Smith (“Smith”) are manager members of CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC, and Oldsmith Group, LLC (“Oldsmith,” collectively). Oldsmith asked the Town of Nolensville (“the Town”) to rezone certain property so it could develop residential units on the property. This development would increase traffic at a nearby intersection. At a hearing before the Nolensville Board of Mayor and Aldermen (“the BOMA”), Smith said that Oldsmith could help pay to improve the intersection. The Town subsequently rezoned the property. Oldsmith later declined to pay what the Town said it owed, asserting it never agreed to pay so much. In response, the Town refused to issue building permits. Oldsmith sued the Town in the Circuit Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”). The Town filed a counterclaim and a motion to join Smith and Olderman. The Town alleged that Smith and Olderman fraudulently and negligently misrepresented what Oldsmith was willing to pay. The Trial Court denied the motion, ruling that the Town could obtain complete relief without Smith and Olderman. The Trial Court also ruled that Smith and Olderman could not be held individually liable based on these allegations. The Town appeals. We hold that the Town alleged nothing actionable against Olderman; that the Town sufficiently alleged promissory fraud against Smith; that Smith’s status as manager member of an LLC does not insulate him from liability for his own acts or omissions; and that the Trial Court’s denial of joinder as to Smith was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the denial of joinder as to Olderman. Otherwise, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis N. Etheredge et al. v. Estate of Doris Etheredge
This is the second appeal arising from this declaratory judgment action. The defendant died during the pendency of this action. After a suggestion of the defendant’s death was filed with the trial court, the defendant’s probate estate was substituted as the defendant. More than one year after the defendant’s death, the defendant’s estate filed a motion to dismiss on the ground the plaintiffs failed to properly revive the action against the defendant’s estate as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-320. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action on the ground the plaintiffs did not follow the procedures of Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-320 because they filed “neither an order of revivor nor the complaint [from] this case in the Decedent’s probate proceeding, In re Estate of Doris Etheredge, Putnam Co. Probate Court No. 20739 at any time, much less within one (1) year of the Decedent’s date of death.” We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
MARY WALKER TOWERS (CHA) v. INDUGU "JABBO" JAMEEL ABDUL-HAKIM
A tenant was evicted by a housing authority for failure to permit access to his unit and failure to pay rent. The tenant appealed. Because the tenant’s pro se brief has severe deficiencies under the Rules of Appellate Procedure and because we are unable to determine the nature of the error asserted by the tenant, the appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight Mitchell v. State Farm Insurance Company et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a doctor as time barred and for failure to comply with the Health Care Liability Act. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Appellate Court within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KATALEYA F.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his young daughter. The trial court found that the ground of failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Skyler M.
Mother appeals the trial court’s findings that (1) termination of Mother’s parental rights is supported by the grounds of persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Patricia L. Capelli
This appeal arises from a long-standing conservatorship, which was created in 1981. The primary issues pertain to the fees the conservator is entitled to receive for the various services she renders in administering the estate of the conservatorship and services the conservator renders as one of the caretakers for the ward, Patricia L. Capelli (hereinafter “Ms. Capelli”). Following an evidentiary hearing on the conservator’s fee applications for services rendered, the trial court bifurcated the conservator’s rate of compensation for caregiving as distinguished from management of the conservatorship. The court reduced the hourly rate of compensation for caregiving services to $25 per hour while allowing the conservator to be compensated at the rate of $115 per hour for services rendered in the management of the conservatorship, the rate the court had previously authorized for all services. The court also reduced the total hours claimed for both types of services. The court then ruled that, going forward, the conservator’s rate of compensation for any services would be $25 per hour. This appeal followed. We affirm the bifurcation of the rate of compensation for service previously rendered. However, finding this to be a complex conservatorship case, we modify the fee schedule going forward and hold that the conservator shall be paid the previously authorized rate of $115 per hour for services rendered in the management of the conservatorship but affirm the rate of compensation of $25 per hour for caregiving services rendered by the conservator. We also modify the trial court’s decision to disallow blocks of time for the caregiving services billed by the conservator. Further, we find that the conservatorship shall pay the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the conservator in this appeal but not the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Joseph Capelli. We also remand for the court to consider the applicable law and relevant facts regarding the construction of a pool on Ms. Capelli’s property. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Harvey ET AL v. City of Memphis ET AL
This interlocutory recusal appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal filed by the plaintiffs in the underlying action. The plaintiffs timely filed their petition for recusal appeal in this Court pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Upon thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal. We deny as moot the plaintiffs’ request for a stay. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
KATHRYN CLAIRE ADAMS v. CHARLENE S. FIELDS
This case concerns a dispute between a decedent’s daughter, acting in her capacity as the executrix of her father’s estate, and her father’s paramour. The Chancery Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”) found that the father’s paramour, the defendant, had exerted undue influence on him and converted approximately $241,000 from his accounts for her own benefit prior to his death. The defendant appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
THE WEATHERBY GROUP, LLC v. HERITAGE TRUST COMPANY
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff concedes that the order in the previous action filed in circuit court satisfied the first three of the four elements of the doctrine of res judicata but denied that the prior action had been adjudicated on the merits. As for the fourth element, the chancery court ruled that the judgment in the circuit court action constituted an adjudication on the merits because the dismissal was “with prejudice.” On this basis the chancery court dismissed the action at bar. The plaintiff appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
MILLARD EARL KITZMILLER v. ROY KITZMILLER
This is a dispute between two brothers concerning the current ownership of real property their father owned at the time of his death. The plaintiff, contending the brothers are tenants in common because their father died intestate and they are his only heirs, seeks to partition the real property formerly owned by their father. The defendant contends he is the sole owner because he had an oral agreement with his father pursuant to which he would be bequeathed the property upon his father’s death in exchange for moving to his father’s property to work the farm and care for his father, which he claims to have done in reliance on the agreement. Thus, the defendant asserted a counterclaim by which he seeks specific performance of the oral agreement, a declaration that he is the sole owner of the property, and dismissal of the partition petition. Relying on the theories of equitable estoppel/estoppel in pais, the defendant also contends that the plaintiff may not assert a defense based on the statute of frauds, Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-2-101(a)(4). The trial court found that the defendant failed to establish a contract to make a will or devise property, and it also held that the alleged oral agreement was too vague to be enforced, that the defendant failed to fulfill his obligations under the agreement, and the agreement was unenforceable based on the statute of frauds. Thus, the court ruled that the parties jointly own the property as tenants in common, dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim and designated the order as a final judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE LACIE F.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to support and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Howard Jefferson Atkins v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Rogers v. Frank Strada et al.
This is an action for declaratory judgment filed by an inmate to correct his sentence expiration date. The inmate was sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder, and his sentence was governed by the release eligibility provision in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-501(h)(1). The State agreed that § 40-35-501(h)(1) entitled the inmate to apply credits for good behavior and program performance to reduce his parole eligibility date, but the parties disagreed on whether the inmate could also apply his credits to reduce the length of his sentence, to advance his sentence expiration date. The trial court entered judgment for the inmate. The court reasoned that the sentence credit statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-236, applies to all inmates unless otherwise specified and that the General Assembly had not specifically prohibited the application of credits to the expiration date of life sentences for first-degree murder. We agree with the trial court and affirm its judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Toni S.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that the Department of Children’s Services failed to meet its burden of proof as to any of the statutory grounds set out in its petition to terminate appellee/mother’s parental rights to the minor child. Although unnecessary in view of its determination that there were no grounds for termination, the trial court undertook a best interest analysis and found that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate mother’s rights. Because the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings as to either grounds or best interest, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for entry of an order terminating appellee/mother’s parental rights |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
