Guy A. Cobb v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Guy A. Cobb, appeals the McMinn County Criminal Court’s denial of his |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Lawrence Darrell Patton
Lawrence Darrell Patton, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement following the revocation of his probation. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in partially denying his Rule 36 motion seeking pretrial jail credits. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the revocation of Defendant’s probation and the trial court’s award of pretrial jail credits. We reverse the trial court’s judgment requiring Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement and remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christian Sanderson
Defendant, Christian Sanderson, pled guilty in two separate cases to four counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. As part of the negotiated agreement, Defendant agreed to a five- to six-year sentence of incarceration on each count, with the trial court to determine whether to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve four consecutive six-year sentences, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering complete consecutive sentencing. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KENYON DEMARIO REYNOLDS
The Defendant, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals from the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily ordering a corrected judgment instead of holding a new sentencing hearing to resentence him to a legal sentence. Because the Defendant fails to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacquiz McBee v. State of Tennessee
A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, of first-degree murder, and |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Tyrone Flanigan
The Defendant, Maurice Tyrone Flanigan, filed a pro se pleading seeking to “correct” his six-year sentence for robbery, asserting that it had expired. The trial court treated the filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directed that the Defendant be brought before the court for a hearing. At that hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant’s sentence had expired and entered a release order based on its understanding that the district attorney general did not dispute that conclusion. The State now appeals through the Attorney General and Reporter, contending that it was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the trial court granted habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we agree that the Attorney General and Reporter is the only party who is statutorily authorized to appear and represent the State’s interests in a habeas corpus proceeding. Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the trial court’s order granting relief and remand for further proceedings so that the Attorney General may present the State’s arguments in the first instance. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Leroy Littleton, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Leroy Littleton, III, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely filed. Primarily, he argues that his petition was timely because it was filed during the “grace period” within which he had the opportunity to seek a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. He also alleges tolling exceptions to the limitations period based upon (1) his actual innocence and (2) attorney misconduct. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Elvis Presley
In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks this court to review the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for new trial. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jabriel Linzy v. State of Tennessee
In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jabriel Linzy, of first-degree murder, |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Morris
The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the indictment |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Benson
The defendant, Raymond Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide and convicted felon in possession of a handgun for which he received an effective sentence of four years suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless homicide and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather Fisher
A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant, Heather Fisher, of possession with intent to |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby V. Summers
The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rickey Benson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rickey Benson, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD EUGENE FOX, II
Defendant, Ronald Eugene Fox, II, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and initiating a false report. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his first degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue, and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Armon Yusef Pazouki v. State of Tennessee
In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Armon Yusef Pazouki v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlikka Jordan
The Defendant, Marlikka Jordan, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, for which she is serving an effective fifteen-year sentence in confinement. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2025) (subsequently amended) (aggravated child abuse and neglect). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s injuries observed on or about August 1, 2020, and that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Benjamin Hartshaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Benjamin Hartshaw, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zachary Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Zachary Thompson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he failed to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Austin Drummond
This matter is before the Court upon the Defendant’s application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s order transferring the Defendant to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) for safekeeping prior to trial. The Defendant argues that the trial court lacked statutory authorization to transfer a pretrial detainee to TDOC custody or, alternatively, that the facts of this case do not support such a transfer. The State has filed a response in opposition, arguing that the trial court has not so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review. We conclude that extraordinary review is “necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a)(2). Therefore, we hereby GRANT the Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. However, further briefing and argument are not required. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keion Lamonte Jemison
Defendant, Keion Lamonte Jemison, appeals from his convictions for reckless homicide, aggravated assault resulting in death, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence, for which he is serving an effective twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him for Class B felony possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence, arguing that aggravated assault by recklessness is not included in the statutory definition of a “crime of violence.” We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Jack Reprogal
Billy Jack Reprogal, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of his community-based alternative to incarceration (“community corrections”) sentence. Following a hearing, the court ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Defendant claims the trial court erred because it failed to properly consider the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and Defendant when it sentenced him. Discerning no error, we affir |
Humphreys | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank E. Fankam
Defendant, Frank E. Fankam, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of rape. A petit jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years with one year to be served in confinement and nine years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) it was plain error for the trial court to allow into evidence text messages between Defendant and the victim; 2) the State impermissibly delayed in bringing an indictment against him in order to gain a tactical advantage at trial; 3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its cross-examination of Defendant and during closing argument; 4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; and 5) cumulative error requires reversal. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Randolph Carter
The Defendant, Charles Randolph Carter, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |
