In this retaliatory discharge action, the plaintiff, Geneva Coffey, appeals fromtwo aspects of the Court of Appeals’ judgment: (1) its suggested remittance of the punitive damage award from $500,000 to $150,000; and (2) its disallowance of the $20,000 in “front pay” awarded by the trial court. After a careful consideration of the law and the record in this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects. Therefore, we reverse that court’s judgment, and reinstate, in its entirety, the judgment rendered by the trial court.
This case presents the question of whether the plaintiff, attorney Frank White,may recover attorney’s fees from the estate of Kasper McGrory. This broad question may, in turn, be divided into two specific subissues: (1) whether the contingency fee contract between White and McGrory is “clearly excessive” under Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professiona Responsibility, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, and is, thus, unenforceable; and (2) if the contingency fee contract is unenforceable, whether White may, nevertheless, recover attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the contract is unenforceable and that White is not entitled to recover under the theory of quantum meruit. Because the probate court and the Court of Appeals held that White could not recover under the contract, but could recover on a quantum meruit basis, we reverse the latter part of the judgment.
Plaintiff Shirley Moore, on her own behalf and on behalf of her deceased son, Tracy W. Moore, appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee Haulers Insurance Company, Moore’s uninsured motorist carrier. In granting the motion, the trial court ruled that the automobile insurance policy issued by Haulers did not cover Moore’s claim because Moore failed to give prompt notice of the claim to Haulers as required by the policy provisions. We affirm.
Henderson
Court of Appeals
03C01-9510-CC-00328 03C01-9510-CC-00328
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Reba Joyce Moody v. Phelps Security, Inc. and Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York 02501-9509-CV-00080
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert A. Lanier, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special W ork ers ' C om pe ns atio n A pp ea ls P an el of the Su pre m e C ou rt in acc ord an ce with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and rep ort ing of fin din gs of fa ct a nd co nc lus ion s o f law . Suit was filed in the Circuit Court at Memphis b y Re ba Joyce Moody as representative of the estate of her deceased h usband, James Jun ior Mo ody, against Phelps Security, Inc., the employer, and Fid elity and Ca sualty Co. of New Y ork, the em ployer's workers' comp ensation insurance carrier. The plaintiff sued for workers' compensation benefits as a result of an accidental injury tha t alle ge dly caused th e d ea th o f Jam es Jun ior M oo dy, in clud ing a po rtion o f the medical ex pe ns es inc urr ed . T he de fen da nts filed an an sw er a dm ittin g that Jam es Jun ior M oo dy s us taine d a ccid en tal inju ries g row ing o ut o f and in the cou rse of h is em ploy m en t, but they denied that these injuries resulted in the de ath of Ja m es Jun ior M oo dy. The answ er also stated that the insurance carrier had paid that portion of the medical expenses which w ere rela ted to th e in jurie s s us tain ed by James Junior Moody on or a bo ut N ov em be r 7, 1 99 2, th e d ate of th e a ccid en t. The de fen da nts filed a suggestion of death showing that Reba Joyce Moody, Administratrix, died on September 19, 1 994. James Moo dy and Deborah Ann Wolfe were appointed as successor Co - Administrators of the estate. The trial judge found in fav or o f the plain tiff and aw ard ed w ee kly be ne fits from the date of the death of the deceased on January 13, 1993 to the widow's death on September 19, 1994. The total medical expenses owing was Two Hundred and Fifty-Seven Thousand, Three 2
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
Reba Joyce Moody v. Phelps Security, Inc. and Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York 02501-9509-CV-00080
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert A. Lanier, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special W ork ers ' C om pe ns atio n A pp ea ls P an el of the Su pre m e C ou rt in acc ord an ce with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and rep ort ing of fin din gs of fa ct a nd co nc lus ion s o f law . Suit was filed in the Circuit Court at Memphis b y Re ba Joyce Moody as representative of the estate of her deceased h usband, James Jun ior Mo ody, against Phelps Security, Inc., the employer, and Fid elity and Ca sualty Co. of New Y ork, the em ployer's workers' comp ensation insurance carrier. The plaintiff sued for workers' compensation benefits as a result of an accidental injury tha t alle ge dly caused th e d ea th o f Jam es Jun ior M oo dy, in clud ing a po rtion o f the medical ex pe ns es inc urr ed . T he de fen da nts filed an an sw er a dm ittin g that Jam es Jun ior M oo dy s us taine d a ccid en tal inju ries g row ing o ut o f and in the cou rse of h is em ploy m en t, but they denied that these injuries resulted in the de ath of Ja m es Jun ior M oo dy. The answ er also stated that the insurance carrier had paid that portion of the medical expenses which w ere rela ted to th e in jurie s s us tain ed by James Junior Moody on or a bo ut N ov em be r 7, 1 99 2, th e d ate of th e a ccid en t. The de fen da nts filed a suggestion of death showing that Reba Joyce Moody, Administratrix, died on September 19, 1 994. James Moo dy and Deborah Ann Wolfe were appointed as successor Co - Administrators of the estate. The trial judge found in fav or o f the plain tiff and aw ard ed w ee kly be ne fits from the date of the death of the deceased on January 13, 1993 to the widow's death on September 19, 1994. The total medical expenses owing was Two Hundred and Fifty-Seven Thousand, Three 2
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
Debra Michelle Lambert v. Famous Hospitality, Inc. 02S01-9511-CV-00112
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was working at Bruce Hardwood Floors when she injured her right shoulder in October of 1991 while lifting pieces of wood from a conveyor belt. In May of 1992, she complained to her treating physician of pain in her hands and wrists. She alleged work-related permanent disability as a result of these conditions. The trial court awarded plaintiff 33 percent permanent partial disability to each arm. We find the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proving permanent partial disability and therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff testified that she was removing thin or short wood from a conveyor belt and lifting 4 to 5 pounds frequently when her right shoulder started bothering her, sometime in October or before October. The employer referred her to Convenient Care Clinic, then referred her to Dr. Alan Pechacek, board-certified orthopedic surgeon, at Jackson Clinic. Dr. Pechacek's examination and x-ray on November 11, 1991 gave him the impression that plaintiff's right shoulder pain was due to some irritation or inflammation of the rotator cuff tendons. He prescribed physical therapy, exercises, pain medication and work restrictions, which improved plaintiff's condition. In January of 1992, Dr. Pechacek told plaintiff she could return to full work with no restrictions. He continued to see her for renewal of prescriptions but felt she was "basically functional, as far as being able to do her job." In May of 1992, plaintiff returned to Dr. Pechacek complaining of shoulder pain and also bilateral wrist and hand pain and numbness. She said this bothered her both at work and at home at night. At her June, 1992 office visit, Dr. Pechacek stated that plaintiff's symptoms were "mild and vague," and he gave her splints to wear on her wrists. She was no longer working because of some dispute with her employer, and he thought she could control her hand activity at home. In July 1992, she returned still complaining of discomfort, so Dr. Pechacek ordered nerve conduction studies, which showed mild changes in the median nerve 2
Smith
Workers Compensation Panel
Blanche Rene Smith v. Bruce Hardwood Floors 02S01-9512-CH-00130
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This case is before the Court upon a motion for review purAppellate suant to C ourt Tenn.Clerk Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the motion for review is not well- taken and should be denied; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court. Costs will be paid by the plaintiff-appellee, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Joe Boatman v. Ww of Memphis, Inc. D/B/A. Advance Muffler & Auto Service and Amerisure Insurance Company 02S01-9508-CV-00065
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judg
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Swearengen
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff 5% permanent partial disability to each arm. Defendant challenges 1) the finding of permanent vocational disability to the right arm and 2) the finding of 5% permanent partial disability to each arm. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 54 at the time of trial, has a high school degree and some college education, sufficient at least to be certified as a junior high school shop teacher in Texas. He taught for about two years. He has also been certified in mechanics by a vocational-technical school in Memphis. His work history includes work as a military supply clerk, factory worker, supervisor of inmates and of youths in juvenile detention and mechanic. Plaintiff worked for defendant-employer as an installer of brakes and mufflers and as a manager. On November 4, 1992, he slipped on some oil while guiding a car into the shop and fell into the pit, about eight feet down, head first. He tried to catch himself with his hands. Dr. Phillip Wright, an orthopedic surgeon, testified by deposition. He testified that plaintiff was diagnosed with a fracture of the left radial styloid (in the wrist), a fracture of the proximal phalanx of the left thumb and carpal tunnel syndrome in his right arm. Surgery was performed and a pin was temporarily placed in his left wrist. Plaintiff was given a splint for his right wrist and, in March 1993, was given a cortisone shot. After the shot, Dr. Wright did not testify to any complaints by plaintiff concerning his right arm. Dr. Wright assigned ten percent permanent impairment to the plaintiff's left upper extremity. He testified that, if plaintiff continued to have the same symptoms in his right arm, plaintiff would have a ten percent impairment to his right upper extremity. 2
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
Jimmy Mccarver v. Tecumseh Products Company 02S01-9512-CV-00124
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Julian P. Guinn,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Tecumseh, contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's disability arose out of the employment. The panel agrees. On October 1, 1993, the employee or claimant, McCarver, while working for the employer, bumped his leg against a metal container and felt immediate pain. He was referred to a doctor, who diagnosed a bruised leg and arthritis. When the pain persisted, the claimant was referred to another doctor, who made a similar diagnosis. The claimant testified that he has difficulty standing, walking, squatting, sitting and sleeping that he did not have before the accident, and that he is no longer able to work. His condition interferes with his hunting and fishing. Doctors have determined that he has degenerative joint disease and synovitis of the left knee. There is no medical evidence that his condition is causally connected to the work-related accident of October 1, 1993. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of seventy-five percent to the left leg. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Unless admitted by the employer, the employee has the burden of proving, by competent evidence, every essential element of his claim. Mazanec v. Aetna Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 616 (Tenn. 1973). He must prove, among other things, that his injury arose out of his employment. In order to establish that an injury was one arising out of the employment, the cause of the injury must be proved. In all but the most obvious cases, causation may only be established by expert medical testimony. Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991). In the present case, there simply is no medical evidence either that the accident at work caused the injury or that it aggravated a pre-existing condition, causing the disability. Moreover, the causal connection is not obvious from the circumstances. We therefore find that the evidence preponderates against any award of permanent disability benefits. 2
Henry
Workers Compensation Panel
Jimmy Mccarver v. Tecumseh Products Company 02S01-9512-CV-00124
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Julian P. Guinn,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Tecumseh, contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's disability arose out of the employment. The panel agrees. On October 1, 1993, the employee or claimant, McCarver, while working for the employer, bumped his leg against a metal container and felt immediate pain. He was referred to a doctor, who diagnosed a bruised leg and arthritis. When the pain persisted, the claimant was referred to another doctor, who made a similar diagnosis. The claimant testified that he has difficulty standing, walking, squatting, sitting and sleeping that he did not have before the accident, and that he is no longer able to work. His condition interferes with his hunting and fishing. Doctors have determined that he has degenerative joint disease and synovitis of the left knee. There is no medical evidence that his condition is causally connected to the work-related accident of October 1, 1993. The trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of seventy-five percent to the left leg. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Unless admitted by the employer, the employee has the burden of proving, by competent evidence, every essential element of his claim. Mazanec v. Aetna Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 616 (Tenn. 1973). He must prove, among other things, that his injury arose out of his employment. In order to establish that an injury was one arising out of the employment, the cause of the injury must be proved. In all but the most obvious cases, causation may only be established by expert medical testimony. Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991). In the present case, there simply is no medical evidence either that the accident at work caused the injury or that it aggravated a pre-existing condition, causing the disability. Moreover, the causal connection is not obvious from the circumstances. We therefore find that the evidence preponderates against any award of permanent disability benefits. 2
