Robert L. Delaney v. Brook Thompson, et al.
This Court has been appointed by the Governor to decide the case of Delaney v. Thompson, et al., in which the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the uniquely statutory merit selection system for appellate judges called the Tennessee Plan. Rather than contend with the constitutional issues, the majority, deciding this case by statutory construction, utilizes a construction which reflects neither the meaning of the statute nor the positions of the parties. In doing so, the majority opinion neither clarifies issues of importance to the electorate and judiciary, nor discourages future litigation on the same issues. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Gussie Willis Vann - Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s resolution of every issue in this case but one: the effect of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The majority concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree murder is not error because the evidence in the record does not support that offense. Because I find the evidence can indeed support a conviction of seconddegree murder, I respectfully dissent. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Deborah Lorraine Brooks v. Rickey Lamar Brooks - Dissenting
It is apparent that this Court has based its finding that Mr. Brooks is willfully and voluntarily underemployed simply on the fact that he, at one time, was more lucratively employed. Simply because a parent is not as lucratively employed as during the marriage, or for a time thereafter, no automatic inference that he or she is willfully and voluntarily underemployed should be drawn. We must remain cognizant of a parent’s right as a citizen to the pursuit of happiness and to the freedom to make reasonable employment decisions, while at the same time heeding the duty to support. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
April Wallace, Vickie Guinn, et al., v. National Bank of Commerce, et al.
This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment for the defendants. The trial court found that the |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Cheryl Hall v. James H. Crenshaw, M.D., The Jackson Clinic Professional Association, et al. |
|||
Cedric Dickerson v. State of Tennessee
Cedric Dickerson (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole for his first degree felony murder conviction and eleven years for his aggravated robbery conviction and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. See State v. Cedric Dickerson, No. 02C01-9802-CR-00051, 1999 WL 74213, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 1999). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following a post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that “the Eighth Amendment should prohibit life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.” Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief. |
|||
In re Conservatorship of Bill Bartlett
This is a conservatorship case. Appellee hospital filed a petition for appointment of an expedited limited healthcare fiduciary for the Appellant patient because the hospital believed that Appellant could not be safely discharged without assistance. The trial court determined that the appointment of a limited healthcare fiduciary was appropriate and in the Appellant’s best interest. The trial court then granted Appellee’s motion to amend its petition to include the appointment of a conservator. The trial court found that Appellant is an individual with disabilities, and further found that it is in the Appellant’s best interest to have a conservator appointed. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
|||
Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She argues that the trial court erred in holding that clear and convincing evidence established that she engaged in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to her incarceration and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both of the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Denver Joe McMath, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Denver Joe McMath, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
|||
State of Tennessee v. Tony Dale Crass
The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Tony Dale Crass, Defendant, with driving under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, and possession of a firearm while under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the State did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that video evidence of Defendant’s driving was erased and deleted as a result of a malfunctioning recording system in Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) Trooper Joey Story’s patrol car. The trial court concluded that the loss of video evidence constituted a violation of the State’s duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence recognized in State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and deprived Defendant of the right to a fair trial. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment, and the State appealed. We conclude that the video was not lost or destroyed by the State, (2) that a Ferguson violation is not applicable to a suppression hearing based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a traffic stop, (3) that the trial court misapplied the “degree of negligence” Ferguson factor by equating perceived public policy decisions on the part of the State to negligence, and (4) that Defendant’s right to a fair trial can be protected without dismissal of the indictment. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings. |
|||
In Re Zoey O. Et Al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest |
Court of Appeals | ||
Kristina Cole v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jaselyn Grant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jaselyn Grant, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Anderson
Defendant, Ricky Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for two counts of first |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Klowii W., Et Al.
This is a parental rights termination case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
WELFT, LLC v. Larry Elrod Et Al.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial real property. The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the appellants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Berl v. Thomas Berl
This appeal stems from a post-divorce custody modification in which the father sought increased parenting time with his minor daughter, I.B. The trial court agreed with the father that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that a modification of the father’s parenting time was warranted. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00, or roughly half, of his attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court proceedings. The mother appeals the trial court’s decision. Because the father was, for the most part, the prevailing party at trial and proceeded in good faith, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a portion of his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to attorney’s fees. However, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s final judgment placing a price cap on the minor child’s therapy fees. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Finally, we decline to award either party their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
ROAR NORMANN RONNING v. LESLEY ANNE RONNING
This appeal concerns divorce related issues including property division, alimony, and child custody. Roar Normann Ronning (“Father”) sued Lesley Anne Ronning (“Mother”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”). The parties have a minor daughter, Freya (“the Child”). Over the course of multiple hearings, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and ultimately approved a parenting plan whereby Mother was named primary residential parent and received more parenting time with the Child than Father. One of the relevant factors in the child custody determination was Father’s career as a commercial airline pilot, which means he has a varied schedule. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the Trial Court erred in designating Mother primary residential parent, granting Mother more time with the Child than Father, and granting Mother major decision-making authority. Mother raises separate issues, including whether this appeal is frivolous. We find, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in making its custody determination. We find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s judgment. Mother’s separate issues are without merit. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals |