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| Bonnie Doss Knutson v. Dollar General Corporation
01S01-9709-CV-00207
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. |
Workers Compensation Panel | 10/12/98 | ||
| Glenn M. Berger v. Lear Seating Corporation
03S01-9708-CV-00102
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, alleging that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of back injuries which he suffered during his employment in August 1994 and May 1996. The trial court found that the plaintiff timely notified the defendant of these injuries and determined that these injuries arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 1 percent permanent total disability but did not award him certain discretionary costs. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reduce the judgment by the amount of social security benefits attributable to employer contributions under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(4)(A). The defendant appeals and raises the following issues: "1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff provided adequate notice of an injury as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 21, 5-6-22? 2. Whether the plaintiff's claim for benefits is barred by the one-year statute of limitations as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-23? 3. Whether the court erred in its award and assessment of benefits in light of the medical and lay testimony at trial? 4. Whether the trial court erred in awarding permanent total disability? 5. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's Motion to Reduce the Judgement [sic] by the amount of social security benefits attributable to employer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27 (4)(A)?" The plaintiff raises this single issue on appeal: 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Kindall Lawson, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 10/06/98 | |
| The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Karen Morrisett
03S01-9708-CH-00097
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal has been perfected by the employee-defendant, Karen Morrisett, from a ruling of the trial court in dismissing her complaint for benefits against the plaintiff-insurance carrier, The Travelers Insurance Company. The Chancellor held the employee had failed to carry the burden of proof in establishing a physical and/or mental injury had occurred as a result of her employment activities. Defendant, 34 years of age, possessed a G.E.D. certificate and had worked for her employer, Rittenhouse, for about eight years. She did heavy work and operated a machine that cut large rolls of paper. On April 19, 1995, she testified she was rolling a 2-25 lb. roll of paper underneath a conveyor belt and as she pushed it, she felt a "pull" in her back and upon raising up, she felt pain. She reported the incident and was taken to the emergency room where she said she saw a Dr. Ellis. The next day she saw Dr. John W. Fetzer, the company doctor, who referred her to Dr. Sidney L. Wallace at the Knoxville Orthopedic Clinic. Later she saw several other doctors. She stated her job caused a lot of stress; that she had been told by her supervisor that if her production rate did not increase she would be fired. She also accused her supervisor of sexual abuse. When questioned about this allegation, she said "He liked to touch me." When asked how long this had been going on, she responded, "As long as he was supervisor, but I would always tell him to leave me alone." Counsel asked if anything ever happened between her and the supervisor to which she replied, "No." There were no other details concerning this subject. She also testified she experienced difficulty in walking and sometimes she could not get out of bed on her own movement; that her legs would be numb. On cross-examination, she admitted she had seen a therapist at Cherokee Mental Health Center on April 13, 1995, which was several days prior to the incident in question. She told the therapist she suffered from stress at work; that sometimes she could not swallow her food; that she had panic attacks while driving a vehicle; and she suffered from head pain and dizziness. She admitted she had been 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Chester S. Rainwater, Jr. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/25/98 | |
| Angela N. Bilbrey v. American Nat'L. Bank & Trust Co.
03S01-9708-CH-00092
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant contends the evidence preponderates against the chancellor's findings that the employee's permanent mental and physical injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. At the time of the trial, the employee or claimant, Angela Bilbrey, was fifty years old. She has a high school education and attended a business school for two years. She has served in the United States Navy, where she received some technical training. She has worked for American National Bank, now SunTrust, since 1979 as a collector or account adjuster. In April of 1987, she went to Sierra-Tuscon, an alcohol and drug dependency center, where she was treated for emotional problems related to her family situation and her difficulty coping with them. There is some history of mental dysfunction in her family and there is evidence she was mistreated by her mother and that her former husband is a recovering alcoholic. She told a psychologist at Sierra- Tuscon she wanted "to know why I am unhappy a lot." She worked on the third floor of her employer's building. On June 29, 1993, she and another employee entered an elevator on the third floor to go to the lobby floor. The elevator fell from the third floor to some distance below the lobby floor, before stopping suddenly. She remained "stuck" in the elevator for approximately half an hour until she could be removed by other persons. Following the injury, she complained of shoulder pain and, after receiving emergency care at East Ridge Hospital, she was referred by the employer to Dr. George Seiters, a licensed and board certified orthopedic surgeon practicing in Chattanooga. Dr. Seiters diagnosed a cervical sprain, left rotator cuff tendinitis with mild impingement syndrome and possible bursitis in the left shoulder, all of which he treated conservatively. When her shoulder pain and loss of motion persisted, he injected her shoulder with six milligrams of cortisone on October 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Howell N. Peoples, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/25/98 | |
| Scott M. Shultsz v. Baneberry Golf Course
03S01-9707-CV-00133
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Baneberry Golf Course, and insurance carrier, U.S.F.&G. Company, have appealed from a judgment entered by the trial court awarding the employee, Scott M. Shultz, 5% permanent partial disability benefits to the body as a whole. The appeal presents issues concerning whether the court was in error in (1) awarding 5% disability, (2) exceeding the 2 _ multiplier provisions set forth in T.C.A. _ 5-6-241, (3) awarding certain unauthorized medical expenses and (4) awarding certain discretionary costs. Plaintiff was 32 years of age and left school before completing the 12th grade. He does not have a G.E.D. certificate and his work experience has been in the construction industry where he has been a general laborer. He was employed by the defendant golf course as a maintenance worker which required him to operate a large mower and a weedeater about the golf course. On August 23, 1995 while mowing, he noticed the mower deck had jumped its track. He stopped the tractor and squatted down to lift the deck up. As he lifted, he felt a sharp pain in his back and fell to the ground. A co-worker saw him and helped get him back to the shop and on to the hospital emergency room. He testified he worked some period of time after the accident although it was painful; that he was laid off in October or November due to the seasonable nature of his work; that he was furnished a list of physicians and went to see Dr. Kevin Bailey during October, 1995. The record indicates Dr. Bailey ordered an M.R.I. examination and the report showed a large central and right ruptured disc at the lowest disc level and a smaller herniation at the level above that. Dr. Bailey, a physical medicine specialist, did not believe surgery was necessary but referred him to Dr. Bishop, an orthopedic surgeon practicing in the same group, for a second opinion. Dr. Bailey gave a 7% medical impairment for his condition. Dr. Bishop recommended surgery and this was performed during March 1996. Plaintiff was eventually released to return to work on 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Kendall Lawson, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/23/98 | |
| Larry Donald Setsor v. England Corcsair, Inc.
03S01-9708-CH-00103
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee [appellee] sustained three successive cervical spine injuries while working for the employer [appellant]. Appellee filed suit in January 1995 for the first injury and in August 1995 for the second injury. Appellant filed suit in August 1996 for judicial determination of its rights and obligations after the appellee alleged the third injury in May 1996. These three cases were consolidated for trial. The trial judge found the appellee had sustained 25 percent vocational disability from the first injury, 25 percent from the second injury, and no vocational disability from the third injury. The employer appeals, insisting that the trial judge improperly assessed the credibility of the medical evidence to reach an excessive award and erred in authorizing the employee to choose a new treating doctor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Larry Donald Setsor, the appellee, is 45 years old, has a high school education, and has three months' vocational training1 for air-conditioning and refrigeration repair. He also trained to sell insurance, and attempted unsuccessfully to do so for eight months. His work experience includes upholstering, assembly line production and truck driving for this employer. In April 1994, appellee ruptured a cervical disc at C6/7 while unloading furniture at work. The employer sent him to a chiropractor, who referred him to Dr. Fred Killeffer, a neurosurgeon, who performed surgical removal of a disc 1He did not complete the course. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Chancellor |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/21/98 | |
| Amy v. Hollars
03S01-9707-CH-00084
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). This case presents the issue of whether the trial judge erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim, which was filed on February 14, 1996, for workers' compensation benefits by way of summary judgment. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. On February 1, 1995, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a settlement of a workers' compensation matter on a joint petition. The defendant filed the petition to resolve the case because of some question as to whether the plaintiff had a compensable claim. The plaintiff was unrepresented throughout the proceeding. The settlement entered into was to compensate the plaintiff for injuries to her sinus cavities as a result of exposure to chemicals used in the dark room of the x-ray department where she worked. Because the medical evidence indicated the plaintiff was allergic to these chemicals, the plaintiff quit work upon entry of the judgment approving the settlement. We find the following facts in the pleadings, etc. filed by the parties on the motion for summary judgment. Prior to the settlement, the plaintiff had been experiencing some joint pain and was examined for this on September 19, 1994 by Dr. Patrick Tsui. Dr. Tsui's notes 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Samuel F. Payne, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/21/98 | |
| Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.
03S01-9712-CV-00138
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue for review is whether the claim is barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23, a statute of limitations. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The trial court overruled the employer's pre-trial motion for summary judgment and, after a trial, found that the injury did not manifest itself until March of 1993 and awarded benefits to the injured employee. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). It is undisputed that the action was commenced on June 23, 1993. The employee or claimant, Valentine, was 5 years old at the time of the trial. She has a ninth grade education and has worked for the employer, Heekin, as a packing machine operator since 1984. In June of 1991, she twisted her neck and arm while pulling cans from the line. She immediately notified a supervisor but he did not complete a work related injury report because there was no visible evidence of injury. Instead, the employer filed a health insurance claim. The next week, Valentine took a vacation, but continued to have neck and arm pain. She went to a medical clinic, where she received pain medication and a soft neck collar. She returned to work following the vacation, but her neck and arm still hurt, so she reported the injury to a plant manager, who attributed the problem to "old age" and refused to complete a work related injury report. Concerned with the financial strain of the copayment requirement of her health insurance coverage, the claimant spoke directly to the secretary who handled workers' compensation claims for the employer. The secretary, in her trial testimony, admitted the claim was mishandled, but testified also that she only designated claims as workers' compensation claims when instructed to do so by a supervisor. 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Richard R. Vance, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 09/07/98 | |
| Sarah Taylor v. Harman Automotive, Inc.
02S01-9708-CH-00074
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The issue raised in this case is whether the trial judge erroneously set aside a previously approved settlement of the plaintiff's workers' compensation case against the defendant. We find it was error to set this judgment approving the settlement aside. We reverse the judgment which did so and reinstate the judgment approving the settlement. Prior to April 17, 1995, the plaintiff and the defendant reached an agreement to settle the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. The parties filed a joint petition seeking court approval of the agreement. On April 17, 1995, the petition was heard by Chancellor Morris, sitting by interchange for Judge Whitenton in Hardeman County. After hearing the plaintiff and other statements, Chancellor Morris found the settlement was proper, was understood by the plaintiff, and gave her substantially what she was entitled to under the Workers' Compensation Act. On May 4, 1995, the plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the settlement because "her workers' compensation settlement was procured by fraud, or in the alternative, the settlement did not secure to her in a substantial manner the benefits under the workers' compensation law of the State of Tennessee." 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton, |
Hardeman County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/31/98 | |
| David F. Summers v. K.U.B and Larry Brinton, et al
03S01-9703-CH-00029
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated, the issues referred to the panel for findings and conclusions are (1) whether the chancellor erred in computing the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits based upon a percentage of benefits payable to the employee up to age 65, (2) whether the chancellor erred in holding the employer liable for all benefits payable until the time of the employee's death, from a cause other than the compensable injury, on September 8, 1996, and (3) whether the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to order the claimant's counsel to remit a portion of his fee because the claimant died before the expiration of 4 weeks. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed as to all three issues. The employee or claimant, Summers, was fifty-four years old at the time of the trial. He had worked for the employer, Knoxville Utilities District, since 1965. On June 2, 1993, he suffered a compensable neck injury, which injury was superimposed upon three prior disabilities, none of which entitled him to an award of workers' compensation benefits. As a result of the compensable injury, for which the chancellor found him to be thirty percent permanently disabled, combined with the pre-existing physical disabilities, the claimant is permanently and totally disabled. The trial judge so found and, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-28(a)(1)1, apportioned the award thirty percent to the employer and seventy percent to the Second Injury Fund, to age 65. The employer contends, by its first issue, that its liability should be limited to thirty percent the first 4 weeks of benefits. 1 5-6-28(a)(1) If an employee has previously sustained a permanent physical disability from any cause or origin and becomes permanently and totally disabled through a subsequent injury, such employee shall be entitled to compensation from such employee's employer or the employer's insurance company only for the disability that would have resulted from the subsequent injury, and such previous injury shall not be considered in estimating the compensation to which such employee may be entitled under this chapter from the employer or the employer's insurance company; provided, that in addition to such compensation for a subsequent injury, and after completion of the payments therefor, then such employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for the permanenttotal disability out of a special fund to be known as the "second injury fund" therein created.
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Billy Joe White, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/31/98 | |
| Henry Mitchell Brummitt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems
03S01-9707-CV-00089
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he became totally disabled on account of anxiety and depression caused by several specific, acute and sudden stressful job-related incidents, all of which were denied by the defendant. The trial judge found that the plaintiff's mental problems were the result of a "gradual build-up of stress caused by the plaintiff's overreaction to his work," and hence not compensable. The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). I The plaintiff is 58 years old. In June 1976 he was employed by the defendant's predecessor as a fire truck driver. Promotions came his way and in 1984 he was named maintenance officer of all the fire and guard facilities at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James B. Scott |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/31/98 | |
| James Walker Hurst v. Scruggs, Inc.
03S01-9703-CH-00032
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). We find the record supports the finding that the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled. We modify the apportionment of liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund.1 The trial court found the plaintiff was injured within the scope of his employment with the defendant on June 17, 1994. The plaintiff had two previous compensable injuries. On June 6, 1983, he was found to have a 6 percent disability to the body as a whole, and on October 8, 1993, he was found to have a 7.5 percent disability as a result of an injury. The trial judge found the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled from work following the injury of June 17, 1994 (this case). Further, the trial court found, and the record shows, the plaintiff met three out of four requirements for Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242, which would permit the trial court to exceed the multiplier caps of the statute and award recovery for 4 weeks. In this case, however, the trial court found the plaintiff was entitled to receive benefits until age 65 under the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(4). In fixing the disability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, the trial court found that the employer was liable for 32.5 percent of the injury to the plaintiff and the Second Injury Fund was liable for 67.5 percent. At the time the 1 This case was filed March 13, 1997 and has awaited the Supreme Court's decision in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998), which was filed May 26, 1998. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/10/98 | |
| Donna Lee Stephen v. R. C. Leamon and Conditionaire Company, Inc.
03SO1-9707-CH-00091
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this claim for death benefits, the claimants contend the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that the decedent was an independent contractor and that the defendant, Leamon, was not a statutory employer. At the conclusion of the trial, the chancellor made the following findings and conclusions: "The issue in this case is whether Mr. Stephens, Mr. Raymond Stephens, was an employee or independent contractor. In resolving that issue, the Court has placed primary reliance upon the testimony of Kim Ray, Leon Evans and WilliamLevon Stephens, because those are the witnesses who were most intimately involved in the work that was performed by Raymond Stephens. "It's undisputed, based on the testimony of these witnesses that Mr. Raymond Stephens did perform services for Conditionaire Company. In particular, he installed duct work for heating and air systems. He would perform that work in accordance with plans and specifications that were provided by Conditionaire. "He was not directly supervised in the performance of his work. There was no one on a daily basis, or even an hourly basis, who reviewed his work or the method in which he did his work. The work that he did was reviewed from time to time and, upon completion of the assigned work, was reviewed by Mr. Kim Ray and by Mr. Leon Evans on behalf of Conditionaire. The purpose of that review was to ensure that the work complied with the plans and specifications and with the applicable codes. "Mr. Stephens was at times provided with time frames within which the work was to be done, but he was not given a specific time to report to work each day and a specific time to terminate work each day. He was not directed as to when he could eat or when he could take breaks. Primarily, he provided his own tools; however he did from time to time use ladders and a vacuum cleaner that were provided by 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Howell N. Peoples, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/10/98 | |
| Jacob E. Carter v. Lumbermen's Underwriting
03S01-9610-CH-00095
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The issues raised on appeal are: whether the evidence preponderates against the finding by the trial judge that the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled; whether the trial court erred in apportioning the liability of the insurer at 25 percent and of the Second Injury Fund at 75 percent; and whether the trial court erred in limiting the insurer's liability to 25 percent of 4 weeks and imposing liability on the Second Injury Fund for the remainder of the weeks until the plaintiff reaches age 65. We affirm the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled and that the apportionment of this liability is on the basis of 25 percent to the insurer and 75 percent to the Second Injury Fund. We modify the apportionment of the liability at 25 percent of 4 weeks to the insurer and the remaining liability to the Second Injury Fund. We apportion the award in accordance with the holding of the Supreme Court in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). The plaintiff has an extensive medical history as demonstrated by the medical evidence in this case, which consists of the depositions of five physicians, the report of physician, and the appearance of two physicians at trial. Additionally, the medical records of one physician were introduced by the Second Injury Fund. The medical evidence consists of physical evaluations and treatment, as well as a psychiatric evaluation. The plaintiff also presented a vocational expert's testimony at trial. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald, |
Carter County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/10/98 | |
| James G. Cooper v. Asarco, Inc.
03S01-9709-CV-00114
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on seventy-five percent to the leg is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Cooper, is sixty-one years old and has a fourth grade education, but cannot read. He has worked as garbage collector, laborer and welder. He suffered a compensable knee injury on January 19, 1995, but continued to work with pain and swelling until April of the same year when he consulted an orthopedic surgeon. When the pain and swelling persisted, the surgeon performed arthroscopic surgery and diagnosed mild spurring and joint effusion superimposed on degenerative arthritis. The claimant was returned to work with permanent restrictions. The employer has made accommodations and the claimant has returned to work with restrictions and limitations. The trial judge found the claimant entitled to permanent partial disability benefits based on seventy-five percent to the injured leg. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal without any presumption of correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review. Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1996). The appellate tribunal, however, is as well situated to gauge the weight, worth and significance of deposition testimony as the trial judge. Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1991). Once the causation and permanency of an injury have been established by expert testimony, the trial judge may consider many pertinent factors, including age, job skills, education, training, duration of disability, and
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Rex Henry Ogle, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 08/03/98 | |
| Vickie S. Heidel v. Barnes & Noble Bookstores, Inc., et al.
01S01-9709-CV-00195
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Originating Judge:William S. Russell |
Putnam County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/30/98 | |
| Darrell Swearengin v. Pacific Employers & Dina Tobin, Dir.
01S01-9704-CH-00090
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. There are no issues of fact in dispute in this case. All sides agree that the plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled and that he qualifies for payment until age 65. Because the injury in this case was subsequent to previous injuries, the Second Injury Fund incurred liability under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-28(a). The employer and the Second Injury Fund agree that their liability is properly apportioned at 25 percent to the employer and 75 percent to the Second Injury Fund. The trial judge ordered the employer and the Second Injury Fund to make payment concurrently and a mathematical formula was reached which would fulfill each of the payor's liability for their portion of the award when the plaintiff reached age 65. The employer asserts its liability should be limited to 4 weeks and insists the trial court properly ordered concurrent payment by it and the Second Injury Fund. The employer concedes these issues would be resolved by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998).1 The Supreme Court has decided Bomely and the issues raised herein by the employer have been decided adversely to it. The Supreme Court held the percentage of liability of an employer in cases such as this shall not be limited to the relationship of its percentage of liability to 4 weeks. Rather, the Court held the liability would be apportioned over the total amount of the award in accordance with the percentage of liability affixed to the employer and the Second Injury Fund. Further, the Court held that the employer shall pay its portion of the award first and the Second Injury Fund shall commence payment when the employer has satisfied its liability. The trial court's judgment requiring concurrent payment by the employer and the Second Injury Fund and limiting the employer's liability to 25 percent of 4 1 This appeal was filed April 18, 1997 and the opinion in Bomely was filed by the Supreme Court on May 26, 1998. We have abided the decision in that case to decide this case. 2
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Henry Denmark Bell, |
Williamson County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/30/98 | |
| Sandra Gail Holmes V Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
01S01-9710-CH-00237
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff sought workers' compensation benefits for plantar fasciitis, which she alleged was caused by standing on a concrete floor at work for twelve hours shifts. The defendant argued that plantar fasciitis is not caused by standing for long periods and therefore plaintiff's job did not cause her condition. The trial court, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, found the preponderance of the evidence proved the condition to be work-related and awarded benefits, which the defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Sandra Gail Holmes ["Employee"] began working for Bridgestone ["Employer"] in 1987. Her job as a tire builder consisted of twelve hour shifts during which she stood on a concrete floor on a 1/4" rubber mat while building tires. She was not permitted to sit unless she was on break. In 1994 she began complaining of her feet, and on August 22, 1994, requested medical treatment at work owing to burning pain shooting through her heel and arc of her left foot, up through the calf muscle, and lesser symptoms in her right foot. The employer's on-site physician, Dr. Flynn, sent her to Dr. Mark Christofersen, an orthopedic surgeon, whom employee testified she saw once, for ten or 15 minutes, on September 1, 1994. Dr. Christofersen examined employee and found excellent joint motion and no swelling but with tenderness to palpation at the origin of the plantar fascia and arch on the left and to a lesser extent on the right. She had been on a 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/20/98 | |
| Richard May v. Liberty Mutual Insurance & Southern Manufacturing
01S01-9709-GS-00193
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Richard May filed this complaint alleging permanent partial disability after a mold dropped on his left hand at work, causing a crush injury. The trial court found he had sustained 45% permanent partial disability to the left arm and awarded temporary total, permanent partial, mileage and medical benefits, as well as discretionary costs. Southern Manufacturing Group ["Southern"] appeals and presents for our review the issues of (1) whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a lesser amount of permanent partial disability, and (2) whether the weekly benefit rate should be $24.76 rather than $226.52. On May 6, 1996, Mr. May was injured while working for Southern when his hand was crushed between two halves of a large metal mold weighing approximately 15 pounds. He notified his employer immediately and went to see Dr. Gregory Wiley, whom he selected from the employer's list of approved physicians. After a brief period of conservative treatment, Dr. Wiley referred Mr. May to Dr. Ramotsumi Makhene, a board-eligible plastic surgeon who also practices reconstructive surgery with a subspecialty in hand surgery. Dr. Makhene saw Mr. May on July 31, 1996 and noted swelling of his left hand and a nodule on the back of his hand above the knuckle, along with limited range of motion. He diagnosed tendinitis and prescribed a splint, anti- inflammatory medication, and occupational therapy. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Barry Medley |
Warren County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/20/98 | |
| Danny E. Ray v. The Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company
01S01-9710-CH-00223
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. I The plaintiff seeks an enlargement of a prior award for workers' compensation benefits, as allegedly provided by T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. Appeal from a summary judgment order in a workers' compensation case is not controlled by the de novo standard of review, but is governed by Rule 56, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1991). Further, no presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgment because they involve only questions of law; thus on appeal the reviewing court must make a fresh determination concerning whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. 1993). II The petitioner suffered a sprained shoulder on November 11, 1994, during the course of his employment by Kantus Corporation. He sustained a seven percent permanent partial impairment as a result of the accident and returned to work after recuperation. His claim for benefits for partial permanent whole body disability was settled on the basis of 17.5 percent, or seventy weeks, arrived at by multiplying his anatomical impairment by 2.5, as directed by T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(1). The settlement was approved on June 3, 1995, upon the joint petition of Kantus Corporation and its insurer, The Yasuda Fire 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Lee Russell |
Marshall County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/20/98 | |
| Richard Lee Bennett v. Bridgestone, U.S.A., Inc.
01S01-9710-CH-00236
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the trial judge properly dismissed the complaint owing to the failure of the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of all the evidence that his disability was job-related. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). I The complaint alleged that the plaintiff experienced a `work-related event' in November 1994 which worsened a `progressively deteriorating back disease.' He is 44 years old and has worked at Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. continuously from 1985 through April 2, 1996. The onset of back problems was traced to 1988, with no history of a specific injury at any time. On November 5, 1994, he was working in the curing department at Bridgestone when he suddenly could not lift any more tires. At his request, his supervisor helped him complete his work that shift, and he took a vacation day the following day. No particular event or incident caused his inability to work, although two days earlier he had presented himself at the Health Unit at Bridgestone, where he gave a history of back pain for three years and that the pain originally began on "4/11/88." Four days later he again visited the Health Unit for ongoing back pain. Plaintiff first saw Dr. Gregory Lanford on November 14, 1994, to whom he gave a history of three years of back pain with no precipitating trauma. He 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. James Weatherford, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/20/98 | |
| Kenneth M. Ward v. Tangent Industries
01S01-9710-CH-00235
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues are whether the leg injury suffered by the plaintiff was properly apportioned to the body as a whole and whether the Court correctly ordered the award to be paid in a lump sum. A non-issue is whether the trial judge properly awarded interest on the judgment.1 The plaintiff is a 41-year-old single man whose testimony that he finished eighth grade was so suspect as to move the Chancellor to observe "I don't mean to disrespect you Mr. Ward, [but] you probably don't have an eighth grade education," and who is by virtue of that fact and other limitations capable only of basic manual and menial labor. On December 8, 1993 during the course of his job, a heavy bundle of steel fell from a forklift and crushed his left leg and foot. He was initially treated by Dr. Charles Emerson of Murfreesboro, and later by Dr. Joe Luna of Maryville, which was made necessary because he moved to the home of his sister in Blount County. Dr. Luna referred the plaintiff to Dr. Turner, under whose care he remains. To comply with an order to prosecute, the plaintiff was evaluated by an independent medical examiner, Dr. Steven C. Weissfield, on July 28, 1997, who graphically described the crushing injury. Reduced to the necessary, the leg bones were multi-fractured, refused to heal, pieces of them were removed subsequently, screws and pins were inserted; the lower portion of his leg filled with fluid which the experts could not alleviate. Four or more 1Much of the oral argum ent was given over to the propriety of the Court's action in awarding statutory interest on the "full amount," which the Court did not do. The issue of interest was neither raised nor addressed by the trial Court. The subject appeared, for the first time, in the brief of the appellee. 2
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Don R. Ash |
Rutherford County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/20/98 | |
| Liberty Mutual Ins. v. Larry Brinton, Jr.
03S01-9706-CH-00072
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal presents a novel issue arising from the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5- 6-238(b), which is one of the 1992 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act. The appeal was perfected by the defendant, The Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund, from a ruling of the trial court awarding plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a judgment in the sum of $6,526.52. The complaint alleged plaintiff was the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Macawber Engineering, Inc. and one of their employees, Lonnie D. Roberts, contended he sustained a work-related injury (heart attack) on July 19, 1993, as a result of stress due to overtime work and excessive heat at his workplace; that upon reviewing the claim plaintiff denied the heart attack was work- related and declined to pay benefits and medical expenses; that the claim was reviewed by a workers' compensation specialist who ordered plaintiff to pay temporary total disability benefits of $6,526.52 for a period beginning July 2, 1993 to January 17, 1994, and plaintiff complied with this order; that sometime after February 14, 1994, the Department of Labor determined the claim was not compensable as the heart attack was not work-related; that plaintiff made a demand upon the state Second Injury Fund for a refund which was declined. The complaint alleges that a copy of the state department's order to pay, drafts issued by plaintiff in satisfaction of the order and a copy of the department's order denying plaintiff's claim were attached to the complaint as exhibits but the certified record does not contain any of these documents. Defendant answered the complaint by alleging it was without sufficient information or knowledge to form a belief as to the allegations and strict proof of same was demanded. For further answer it was alleged that T.C.A. _ 5-6-238 allowed a workers' compensation insurance carrier to receive a refund under circumstances as alleged in the complaint when the Defendant was furnished a copy of a court order finding the claim was not compensable and since no such order had been submitted to it, the claim for a refund was premature. 2
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Sharon Bell, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/16/98 | |
| Broderick Kelsey v. Kraft Food Service
03S01-9710-CH-00121
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellants contend the trial court's award of benefits based on six times the medical impairment rating is excessive. The appellee contends the award is inadequate because the chancellor erred in "finding three of the four factors listed under Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 242 were not proven by clear and convincing evidence" and that the award of benefits based on forty-two percent to the body as a whole is inadequate. The appellee also contends the chancellor erred in failing to award its vocational expert's fee as discretionary costs. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. At the time of the trial, the claimant, Kelsey was thirty-five years old and a high school graduate. Following high school graduation, he served three years in the United States Army, where he worked as a warehouseman and equipment operator. He has worked as a truck driver. He worked for the employer, Kraft Food Services, for about two years until June 27, 1995, when he suffered a compensable back injury while lifting a case of potatoes. He has not worked since. The treating physician, Dr. Seiters, diagnosed a protruding or bulging disc, provided conservative care and estimated his permanent medical impairment at seven percent to the body as a whole. The doctor further opined the claimant reached maximum medical improvement on November 15, 1995 and could return to light work. The treating physician and another doctor who had first examined the claimant were of the opinion that the claimant could be exaggerating his symptoms. At the trial, the claimant gave conflicting testimony concerning his ability to read. On direct examination, he testified that he could not read. On 2
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Howell Peoples, |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/13/98 | |
| Johnny T. Brown v. State of Tennessee
2A01-9701-BC-0001
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the Commissioner of Claims found that the claimant/appellee was entitled to total disability payments from August 9, 1994 through November 9, 1994, in the amount of $3,617.57. The Commissioner also found that the claimant sustained a permanent partial impairment of 5% to the body as a whole in the amount of $55,5. Further, the Commissioner found that the State was not liable for payment of any medical expenses incurred for the services of Jackson-Madison County General associated with the claimant's August 9, 1994 surgery or for any deposition fees or medical bills of Dr. George Copple, Dr. Ray Hester or Dr. Joseph P. Rowland. Attorney's fees in the amount of $11,733.51 (2%) were awarded to the claimant. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of the decision of the Claims Commissioner, we affirm. The State admits in November 1991 that the claimant, Johnny T. Brown, then a 4-year-old male, sustained a back injury while pushing a two-hundred pound tent out of the back of a truck, a duty within the scope of his employment as a maintenance supervisor at Paris Landing State Park. Mr. Brown is a high school graduate with extensive experience in construction, maintenance and electrical work. He also has experience in tobacco farming and in computer applications. When the injury occurred, the claimant did not go directly to the emergency room, but later saw his family physician Dr. Charles Tucker. Dr. Tucker ordered a CT scan and an MRI and, in his Attending Physician's Report of November 21, 1991, diagnosed the claimant with a "lumbar strain from lifting heavy objects." Dr. Tucker then referred the claimant to Dr. Robert Merriweather, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Merriweather treated the claimant conservatively with physical therapy and anti-inflammatory and pain medications. During the course of treatment, Dr. Merriweather conducted a physical examination and reviewed the MRI ordered by Dr. Tucker. In addition, Dr. Merriweather ordered a myelogram and post-myelogram CT 2
Authoring Judge: Robert L. Childers, Special Judge
Originating Judge:Hon. Martha B. Brasfield |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | 07/07/98 |