COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Welborn vs. Sellars
M1999-00164-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This is an insurance case. The plaintiff was driving a motorcycle when he was involved in an accident with an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The plaintiff's motorcycle was not listed in his insurance policy. The plaintiff filed suit seeking damages for his injuries sustained in the accident. The plaintiff's insurance company moved for summary judgment in the case based on an exclusion in the plaintiff's insurance policy which denied uninsured motorist coverage for vehicles for which insurance was not afforded under the policy. The trial court granted the insurance company's motion and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm, finding that the policy exclusion applies to the plaintiff's motorcycle.

International Flight Center vs. City of Murfreesboro
M1999-00324-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Royce Taylor
This appeal arises out of a dispute between Plaintiff International Flight Center ("IFC") and Defendants City of Murfreesboro ("City") and City of Murfreesboro Airport Committee ("Airport Committee") regarding the alleged breach of a lease agreement and the nonpayment of certain property taxes. The trial court granted a judgment in favor of IFC in the amount of $174,718.00 plus ten percent prejudgment interest. Additionally, the court ruled that the City is estopped from collecting the property taxes allegedly owed to the City by IFC. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's finding that the City breached the parties' 1989 lease agreement, vacate the court's ruling regarding the jet fuel equipment that was purchased by IFC but that remained at the Airport following the expiration of the parties' 1989 lease agreement, remand the cause for further findings of fact regarding this jet fuel equipment, affirm the court's ruling regarding the matter of prejudgment interest to the extent hereinafter discussed, and reverse the court's ruling that the City is estopped from collecting the real and personal property taxes allegedly owed to the City by IFC.

American Airlines vs. Johnson
M1999-02390-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
American Airlines, Inc., appeals the trial court's final judgment denying its request for a refund of use taxes paid on aviation fuel purchased out of state during the years 1992 through 1995. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Ross vs. Campbell
M1999-01805-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
An inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction brought an action for declaratory judgment contending that the Department failed to give him all sentence credits due. The trial court granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment and we affirm on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact was shown.

Hartsville Hospital vs. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
M1999-01276-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
This appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of monies held in a bond fund. Hartsville Hospital Incorporated ("Hartsville") filed suit against Bay National Bank ("Bank") seeking the contents of the fund. The court below entered judgment for Hartsville, holding that Bank had no claim to the bond fund money pursuant to a release agreement between the parties and that Hartsville was not estopped from asserting ownership. Bank appeals.

Huffer vs. State
M1999-01278-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
The claimants sought to hold the State liable for the personal injuries and deaths caused in an automobile accident on U.S. Highway 64 in Franklin County. After first holding that the State's negligence was the cause of twenty-five percent of the damages, the Claims Commissioner modified his findings and concluded that the State had a discretionary function immunity and that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the injured persons were riding. We affirm on the proximate cause issue.

Johnson vs. Allstate
M1999-01639-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry
Insured sued his insurer to recover policy coverage due on a fire loss to his automobile after the insurer denied coverage under the fraud provision of the policy. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict for the insured, and the insurer has appealed.

Wright vs. Hull
M1999-02307-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
Plaintiff/Appellee, Bill D. Wright, sued to set aside a 1986 deed whereby he conveyed a certain tract of land to Defendant/Appellant, Bonnie S. Hull. He charged failure of consideration and fraud. Defendant, Ms. Hull, asserted that she and Mr. Wright cohabited without marriage for twelve years until their separation in 1998. She asserted that the property conveyance was a gift and was also conveyed to her by Mr. Wright to put the property out of the reach of his creditors. The trial court held the parties to be equal tenants in common and ordered the property sold. We reverse the trial court and dismiss the case.

Paul Wallace vs. Rhonda Mitchell
W1999-01487-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
Tenured teacher was discharged after an evidentiary hearing before the school board upon finding that the teacher inappropriately touched students and failed to discontinue the practice after warnings. The teacher filed a petition for writ of certiorari for review by the chancery court and after the chancery court's review of the record of the school board hearing, the action of the board dismissing the teacher was affirmed. The teacher has appealed to this Court.

Walter Jefferson vs. Captain D's et al
W1999-00574-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
In this personal injury action, plaintiff timely filed suit, which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Another suit was commenced within one year of the first dismissal. This suit was voluntarily nonsuited at a later date. A third suit was commenced within one year of the voluntarily nonsuit, but more than one year from the date of the first dismissal. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff has appealed.

Carl O. Koella, Jr. vs. Fred McHargue, et al
E1999-02752-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
This is the second time that this case has been before us on appeal. On the first appeal, which was filed with respect to an order entered pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, we affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the primary issue raised by the original complaint for declaratory judgment. While that case was pending on appeal, the original plaintiff, Carl O. Koella, Jr., died, and, on motion of his counsel, we entered an order substituting his widow, Maribel Koella, in his place. On remand, the plaintiff -- not otherwise identified in the pleading -- filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the defendants' still-pending counterclaim. That motion was based on the failure of the defendants, in their capacity as counter-plaintiffs, to file a motion "to substitute the proper party for [Mr. Koella] in the trial court." The trial court granted the motion. We reverse.

Byron Lowell Mitts vs. Virginia Ann Jones Mitts
E2000-00374-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
The trial court dissolved a marriage of over 26 years. Wife appeals, arguing (1) that the increase in value of Husband's separate property interest in two stock holdings is, in each instance, marital property; (2) that the trial court erred in its award of alimony; (3) that the trial court erred in calculating Husband's child support obligation; and (4) that she is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, both at the trial level and on appeal. We affirm the trial court's classification of the increase in value of Husband's Rivermont stock as his separate property. We also affirm the trial court's finding that no portion of the value of the Coca-Cola stock is marital property. We modify the award of rehabilitative alimony so as to provide for a monthly payment of $2,000 for a period of four years beginning with the first full month after the entry of the divorce judgment below. We find that Wife is entitled to her attorney's fees at both stages of this proceeding. We remand this case for the trial court to determine if the child support obligation should be increased due to Husband's lack of standard visitation.

State of Tennessee, Department of Children Services, v. MR
E1999-02703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Schulty

The Trial Judge granted the Department's petition to terminate parental rights of the mother to her ten year old child on numerous grounds. The mother has appealed, and we affirm termination.

Union Planters vs. Island Management
W1999-00541-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This is a dispute regarding the repayment of a $350,000.00 loan that Union Planters National Bank ("Union Planters") made to Island Management Authority, Inc. ("Island Management") in 1989. The trial court found that Mr. Criss, Mr. Tigrett, and Mr. Richards, each of whom had executed a guaranty in favor of Union Planters, are jointly and severally liable to Union Planters for the outstanding balance of this loan. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Emmanuel Page vs. Doctor R. Crants
W1999-02127-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
An inmate sentenced in Wisconsin and transferred to Tennessee, where he is presently incarcerated, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

Lisa Alfaro Munday vs. William Mark Munday
E1999-02605-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court designated William Mark Munday ("Father") as the primary residential custodian of two of the parties' children. He had been awarded primary residential custody of the parties' third child at an earlier time. Lisa Alfaro Munday ("Mother") appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the custodial arrangement and (2) that there had not been a material change of circumstances to warrant a change in custody. We affirm.

J.C.Bradford vs. Southern Realty
W1999-01617-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This cause came to be considered by the Court upon a claim for misrepresentation arising from a real estate transaction. This is the second occasion that the Court has had to address this case. Initially, this cause was set for trial, and following opening statements, the Chancellor ruled from the bench in the defendants' favor. On appeal, this Court remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, renewed a previously filed motion to dismiss and filed a counterclaim for attorneys fees. The trial court granted the defendants the requested relief. This appeal followed. Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that the trial court's orders granting summary judgment, dismissing the complaint and awarding attorneys' fees should be vacated and that the cause should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Alvin Herring vs. Interstate Hotels
W1999-01055-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a dispute between Plaintiff Alvin O. Herring, Jr. and Defendant Interstate Hotels, Inc. d/b/a Memphis Marriott ("Memphis Marriott") regarding the theft of Mr. Herring's property from the Memphis Marriott's premises. The Memphis Marriott argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motion for an extension of time to file an answer to Mr. Herring's complaint, in granting Mr. Herring's motion for a default judgment, and in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Daniel Ray Stanfill vs. Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill
E1999-01878-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court modified the judgment of divorce by changing the custody of Christopher Stanfill (DOB: February 12, 1993) from Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill ("Mother") to Daniel Ray Stanfill ("Father"). The trial court also established Mother's visitation rights with her son. We affirm.

Kenneth L. Storey vs. Randall Nichols, et al
E1998-00851-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: David H. Cate
An accused awaiting trial on a charge of aggravated rape filed an action in the Chancery Court of Knox County against the district attorney general and two of his assistants. The complaint sought an injunction preventing the defendants from proceeding with his prosecution, a money judgment to compensate him for his mental and physical suffering, and the loss of over two years of valuable time. The complaint also sought to disbar the defendants. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

William P. Henderson, et al vs. Henry Clay Hart, Jr.
E1999-01446-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
This appeal arises from an executory contract for the sale of real property. Henry Clay Hart, Jr., the Appellant, appeals the judgment from the Knox County Circuit Court in favor of William P. Henderson and Lillian R. Henderson, the Appellees. Mr. Hart raises the issues of whether the Trial Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and whether the Court erred in finding that the executory sales contract was no longer in effect. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of appeal against Henry Clay Hart, Jr. and his surety.

In Re: Estate of Bernie Riggs
W1999-01905-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Lee Moore
This appeal arises from a dispute over the disposition of the assets of Bernie F. Riggs ("Husband"). Plaintiff Julia Mae Riggs ("Wife") filed suit, alleging that Defendant Campbell ("Daughter") had used undue influence and had improperly disposed of Husband's assets through a power of attorney. The trial court found in favor of Daughter, holding that all transactions were valid and in accordance with Husband's wishes. Wife appeals.

LeCroy-Schemel vs. John Cupp, Sheriff
E2000-00024-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer
An attorney was found in contempt by the Chattanooga City Court Judge during proceedings relating to the attorney's client's conviction for violation of a municipal ordinance. The Judge ordered a ten-day jail sentence for the attorney, who was taken into custody and locked in a holding cell. The attorney was able to secure a writ of habeas corpus from the Hamilton County Criminal Court. After the attorney was released, the City Court Judge filed an Order to Appear and Show Cause why the attorney should not be jailed for contempt. The Criminal Court held a hearing at which it heard testimony of the attorney and another witness, and found that the City Court had exceeded its statutory authority by confining the attorney for contempt, that the City Court had not followed procedural requirements for punishing contempt, declared a section of the Chattanooga City Charter null and void, and dismissed the City Court's Order to Appear and Show Cause. The City of Chattanooga appealed the orders of the Criminal Court. We affirm the actions of the Criminal Court relating to the writ of habeas corpus, affirm the finding that the City Court was without authority to punish criminal contempt by confinement or fine in excess of ten dollars, and modify the judgment to reflect the holding of this Court in Poole v. City of Chattanooga.

Judd's Inc. vs. Dors L. Muir, et al
E1999-01836-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
In this appeal Doris and Allan Muir insist that the Chancellor was in error in not allowing their homestead exemption as to certain funds realized from the sale of real estate to satisfy a judgment previously entered against them. Their attorney, W. Richard Baker, Jr., insists that the Chancellor was in error in not enforcing a lien for his attorney fees that he claimed was properly perfected as to the same funds. We affirm.

Dickson County, Tennessee, v. H. Clyde Jennette, et al.
M1999-00054-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

This case involves the use of certain property in Dickson County in light of a 1988 zoning ordinance which provides that mining and quarrying on this property are permitted as a special exception only. When the county attempted to enjoin the property owners from mining or quarrying their property, the property owners argued that their property was being used as a quarrying operation prior to October 1988 when the city passed the zoning ordinance. Thus, it is the property owners' position that their quarrying operation constitutes a pre-existing nonconforming use and may continue pursuant to both the Dickson County zoning ordinance and Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b). In addition, the county enjoined the property owners from hauling rock in violation of a fifteen-ton weight limit on local roads. The property owners argued below that the enforcement of this local rule against them constitutes selective enforcement. The trial court found that the property owners had failed to show a nonconforming use, and it dismissed their claim for selective enforcement. On appeal, we find that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the property owners' operation was not a nonconforming use at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance. In light of that finding, the temporary injunction regarding the fifteen-ton weight limit is dissolved, and the selective enforcement issue does not need to be addressed.