City of Murfreesboro vs. Pierce Hardy Real Estate, Inc. M2000-00562-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This case involves a dispute between the City of Murfreesboro and a landowner over the value and the acreage of a tract of land taken by the city to be used for a greenway along the Stones River. The city appeals the trial court's denial of a motion in limine that the city filed to exclude testimony of the landowner's appraiser. The motion stated that the expert's testimony relied on an inadmissible method of valuation and should, therefore, be excluded. Additionally, the landowner appeals the trial court's ruling that the landowner did not own a .61 acre portion of the of the land taken because, as it sits at the bottom of a navigable waterway, it is not subject to private ownership.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
In the Matter of the Estate of S.W. Brindley M1999-02224-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
This is a will contest between two siblings. After the onset of the parties' father's final illness, during which his competence was questioned and eventually a conservator appointed, the father executed a codicil to his will that materially altered the distribution of his estate in favor of his son, the appellant herein. The testator's daughter challenged the validity of the codicil in the underlying action. After the jury found that the codicil was not the testator's "own free act," but was instead the result of undue influence on the son's part, the codicil was declared a nullity. We affirm the jury's verdict.
Giles
Court of Appeals
In the Matter of T.S. and M.S. M1999-01286-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ben Hall Mcfarlin
This case involves the termination of parental rights regarding two children who were removed from the parental home by the Department of Children's Services in 1995 and placed in foster care. The mother was ordered to take steps to remedy the deficiencies in the home and made some efforts to comply. After four years, DCS petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights. The trial court found that the mother had failed to substantially comply with the Plan of Care and terminated the mother's rights on grounds (1) that the conditions that led to the children's removal continued to persist with little likelihood of remedy and (2) that the mother was incompetent to adequately provide for the children. Because DCS has established grounds for termination and has also established that termination is in the best interest of the children, we affirm.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Russo vs. Russo M1999-02380-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from an action for divorce initiated by Donald Joseph Russo ("Husband") against Debra Ann Russo ("Wife"). The trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce and alimony in futuro; awarded custody of the parties' minor children to Wife; ordered Husband to pay child support in the amount of thirty-two hundred dollars per month with additional child support of two thousand dollars per month to be placed in educational trust for parties' minor children; and awarded the majority of marital assets to Wife. Husband appeals.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Murphy vs. Martin M1999-02273-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
The trial court dismissed this negligence action for the failure to prosecute. On appeal the plaintiff asserts that she did not have adequate notice that her lawsuit was in jeopardy. We affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Vonkrosigk vs. Rankin M1999-02254-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Don Ash
Buyer in real estate sale contract contingent on obtaining the financing sued for return of earnest money after she failed to qualify for a loan to finance to purchase. The trial court found that buyer acted in good faith in attempting to secure financing and entered judgment for buyer. Sellers have appealed.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Geldreich vs. Hall M1999-02258-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This appeal arises from a suit initiated by Geldriech ("Investors") alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion by Hall in his capacity as corporate officer. When Hall failed to answer and appear for hearing, Investors' motion for default judgment was granted. Thereafter, Hall filed a motion to strike the default judgment that was denied by the court below. Hall appeals the trial court's failure to grant him relief from the default judgment.
Dickson
Court of Appeals
State, ex rel Boren vs. Town of Orlinda M1999-02240-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
This appeal arises from property owners' quo warranto challenge to an ordinance annexing their property. Property owners allege that the annexation was not reasonably necessary for their health, safety, and welfare and for the annexing municipality. Prior to trial, the trial court denied Defendant's motion in limine which sought to exclude testimony of the property owners, a comparison of the services offered by the annexing municipality and a neighboring municipality interested in annexing the disputed area, evidence regarding the public hearing on annexation, and evidence of the annexing municipality's other annexations. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs, finding the annexation was not reasonable, and the trial court entered judgment thereon. Defendant appeals.
Robertson
Court of Appeals
Joseph Spottswood Crowell vs. Mayme Modena Roberson E1999-00348-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
The appellee has filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. In the first ground of his petition, he asserts that we made a mistake in computing the "[a]djustment re: North Carolina property" reflected on page 8 of our opinion. The appellee is in error in this assertion. We purposely utilized an adjusting figure of $141,915 rather than $140,447.50 -- the latter figure being fifty percent of the value of the marital property share of the North Carolina property. The larger figure was a "plug" figure used to achieve equality in the overall division of the parties' marital property. Since it will be necessary to transfer funds to consummate this division, we deemed it equitable in this case to equally divide the parties' marital estate. The trial court found that equality was equitable and the evidence does not preponderate against this finding.
Roane
Court of Appeals
Hudgens vs. Rogers M2000-00239-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
The mother of four minor children appealed the trial court's decision to change custody from Mother to Father based on a material change in circumstances. Prior to the entry of that order, it had been determined that an agreement, originally announced to the court which awarded custody of the children to Mother, had been set aside due to the court's finding that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties as several critical issues had been left unresolved. We have determined that the court was correct in that decision. Therefore, the standard which the trial court should have applied was one of comparative fitness and best interest of the children rather than a material change of circumstances. This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Johnna Hayes vs. Jeff Hayes W1999-00445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Johnna Lea Hayes (Beuerlein) and Defendant Jeff C. Hayes regarding the amount of Mr. Hayes' child support obligation and the enforcement of a promissory note executed by Ms. Beuerlein in conjunction with the parties' divorce. The trial court found (1) that Mr. Hayes has an annual income of $64,139.00, (2) that Mr. Hayes' child support obligation is $1,221.00 per month but that this amount should be reduced to $621.00 per month until Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is satisfied, (3) that Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage is equal to $14,940.00, (4) that Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is equal to $39,569.85, (5) that, subtracting Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage from Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note, the net amount that Ms. Beuerlein owes to Mr. Hayes is $24,665.85 plus ten percent (10%) interest, and (6) that each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth below, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Talmage Crump vs. Kimberly Bell W1999-00673-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff filed a complaint and issued summons, which was returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued an alias summons which was also returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued pluries summons more than one year after the return of the alias summons. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to comply Rule 3, Tenn.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff asserts that defendant is equitably estopped from relying upon Tenn.R.Civ.P. 3, because of action of defendant's liability insurance carrier leading him to believe that the defense would not be raised upon which he relied to his detriment. The trial court found no estoppel, and plaintiff has appealed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Merritt vs. Yates M1999-00775-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute between Plaintiff June Yates Merritt ("Ms. Merritt") and Defendants Aileen Biron Yates ("Mrs. Yates") and Claire Biron ("Mr. Biron") regarding the proper interpretation or construction of mutual wills executed in April of 1985 by Mrs. Yates and her husband Thomas Harry Yates ("Mr. Yates"), who was the father of Ms. Merritt. After the death of Mr. Yates in December of 1985, Mrs. Yates deeded certain real property to Mr. Biron, gifted certain personal property to Mr. Biron, and established a revocable trust using money received as a result of her husband's death. In an action filed by Ms. Merritt challenging these transactions, the trial court determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and entered a judgment in favor of Ms. Merritt. Additionally, the court denied Ms. Merritt's motion for discretionary costs. Mrs. Yates appeals the court's order granting a judgment in favor of Ms. Merritt and Ms. Merritt appeals the court's ruling regarding her motion for discretionary costs. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Inscoe, et al vs. Kemper, et al M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from a suit filed by Inscoe seeking the return of earnest money held in escrow for the purchase of Kemper's residence. When Inscoe decided not to purchase the residence, Kemper refused to return the earnest money. The trial court found in favor of Inscoe and ordered the return of the earnest money. In making its finding, the court stated that Inscoe's promise to buy was illusory and there was no meeting of the minds, thus the contract was void and unenforceable. Kemper appeals.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Beavers vs. The Lebanon Democrat Newspaper M1999-02401-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from an action initiated by Plaintiffs, Mae and Jerry Beavers, against the Defendant newspaper, the Lebanon Democrat, for libel and slander. The Beavers' claim arises out of two separate articles published by the newspaper. The trial court granted the newspaper's motion for summary judgment, holding that the first article was substantially true and the second article was a non-actionable opinion. The Beavers appeal.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Jeremy Tompkins vs. Mary Rainey W1999-01218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
In this action to establish parentage, Jeremy Earl Tompkins (Father) appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding Mary Helen Rainey (Mother) custody of the parties' infant son. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
In Re: S.D., M.D., Sh.D., & Ma.S. M2003-02672-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Barry R. Brown
This case comes before the Court on appeal from the Sumner County Juvenile Court's termination of Appellant's parental rights as to four children. Each parent raises separate issues on appeal. We affirm the action of the trial court in all respects.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
James Powell vs. M.P. Gurkin W1999-00827-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
This is a personal injury action arising out of a slip-and-fall accident which occurred at a laundromat owned by the Gurkin Defendants. The fall was allegedly caused by a hole in the floor of the laundromat which was created by the Defendant Hardin in attempting to locate and repair a water leak in the laundromat. The Plaintiff fell while walking into the laundromat carrying his laundry basket. He brought the present suit claiming that the Defendants were negligent in failing to repair the hole or providing adequate warning of the dangerous condition. The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the Plaintiff failed to use reasonable care in confronting a known risk. After arguments of counsel, the trial court granted both Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.
Fayette
Court of Appeals
John Watson vs. Mike Young W1999-00683-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by an inmate at the Northwest Correctional Complex. The complaint sought damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of an electrical shock allegedly caused by the Defendant's inactions. The Lake County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint finding that the plaintiff's claim sounded in negligence and the defendants, as state employees, enjoyed absolute immunity from negligence claims.
This is a medical malpractice case. The paintiff’s husband died of a cardiac rupture while in the care of the defendant physicians. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit, asserting medical malpractice in the care of her husband. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant doctors, finding that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony failed to show that a breach of the standard of care by the defendants caused the death of the plaintiff’s husband. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff did not present evidence that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a breach of the standard of care by the defendants caused the death of the decedent. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the trial court is affirmed
A divorce decree was filed in 1993 with the marital assets being divided by agreement of these parties. The decree awarded Husband’s military retirement benefits to Wife “as a division of marital property.” The decree also provided that inasmuch as Wife was to receive that pension, she should be responsible for the support of the parties’ two minor children. In 1999, after the children reached majority, Husband filed this “Petition to Discontinue Child Support and Modify Final Judgment by Restoring Retirement Benefits.” The Trial Court held that the divorce decree ordered Husband to pay Wife his military pension as a division of marital property, not child support, and therefore declined to modify the original decree. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there is no basis for invalidating the 1993 award to Wife of Husband’s Air Force retirement -- an award made by the trial court “as a division of marital property.” As a part of an unappealed-from final judgment, the trial court’s division-ofproperty award is not subject to challenge in this proceeding, see Vanatta v. Vanatta, 701 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), in the absence of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 basis for relief, and I find no such basis in the meager record before us.
