Tommy K. Hindman vs. Louise Helen Hindman
Louise Helen Hindman (“Wife”) and Tommy K. Hindman (“Husband”) were divorced in August of 1997, at which time the trial court approved a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”) submitted by the parties. Relevant to the instant case, the MDA addressed future medical and educational expenses for the parties’ minor child (“Son”). After Wife refused to reimburse Husband in compliance with the pertinent provisions of the MDA, he filed a petition seeking to have her held in contempt. The trial court ultimately ordered Wife to pay $43,678. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Randall Phillip Boyce v. Tennessee Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission
Sheriff filed a petition for judicial review regarding a decision of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (POST) denying the sheriff’s request for certification. The sheriff argued that his basic recruit training in 1976, when he was a sheriff’s deputy, was equivalent to the Tennessee Law Enforcement Training Academy recruit training required by POST. The chancellor ordered POST to issue a certificate of compliance to the sheriff. Finding no error in POST’s decision, we reverse the chancellor’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ryne W. Brown v. Catherine L. Brown, Trustee, et al.
Appellant contends that he is a beneficiary of a trust created by his parents and thus entitled to distributions of principal and income. In a declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined that Appellant was not entitled to mandatory distributions of income or principal until both of his parents were deceased. We affirm this portion of the trial court’s judgment. The trial court also determined that no corporate trustee was required. We reverse this portion of the trial court’s judgment and remand for the appointment of a corporate trustee. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg, Deceased
The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim against a decedent’s estate to recover the cost of medical assistance provided to the decedent. The Estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court sustained the claim, and the Estate appealed the probate court’s ruling to the circuit court which heard the matter de novo. The circuit court reversed the probate court and disallowed the claim of TennCare. TennCare appeals; we hold that the circuit court was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the probate court’s order. We vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Melany Faye (Ellett) Morris v. Johnny Edward Morris, II
This is a divorce case. One minor child was born of the marriage. After the parties filed for divorce, the wife relocated out of state with the parties’ child without obtaining court permission to do so. The husband filed a petition to hold the wife in contempt for relocating out of state with the child. The trial court declined to hold the wife in contempt, designated the wife as the primary residential parent, and ordered the husband to pay child support. In dividing the marital property, the husband was ordered to pay the statutory penalty for early withdrawal of the monies in his retirement savings account. The wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony and attorney fees as alimony in solido. The husband now appeals the relocation decision, the designation of primary residential parent, the assessment of the retirement account penalty, and the award of attorney fees. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Advanced Photographic Solutions, LLC v. National Studios, Inc., et al.
Advanced Photographic Solutions, LLC (“Advanced”) sued National Studios, Inc. a/k/a NSI Closeout, Inc. (“National”) and Harold C. Lewis (“Lewis”) alleging that National owed on an account that was in default. After a jury trial, the trial court entered its Final Judgment on the jury’s verdict finding, inter alia, that Advanced had a contract with National, that National had breached the contract, that Lewis had a contract with Advanced providing his personal guaranty to pay National’s debt, and that Lewis had breached his contract of personal guaranty. The Final Judgment awarded Advanced judgment against National and Lewis jointly and severally in the amount of $400,526.70, and judgment against Lewis solely in the amount of $54,806.00 as attorney’s fees. National and Lewis appeal to this Court. The issues raised on appeal concern whether there was material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We find that the record contains material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and we affirm the trial court’s Final Judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald A. Barker, a/k/a George N. Bailey v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Inmate of the Tennessee Department of Corrections appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department in inmate’s declaratory judgment action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy N. White, et al. v. Bruce White, et al.
This appeal arises out of the dissolution of a partnership. After several days of trial, the parties reached a settlement agreement. After the partnership property was sold pursuant to the settlement agreement and the proceeds were to be disbursed, one of the defendants claimed that he was entitled to more money than the settlement agreement provided for him to receive. The trial judge denied the request for additional funds. We affirm and remand for the trial court to determine a reasonable and appropriate attorney’s fee. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Navaeh L.
This is a termination of parental rights case concerning a minor child Navaeh L. (“the Child”), who is the daughter of Elizabeth L. (“Mother”) and William T.(“Father”). Separate petitions to terminate the parents’ rights were filed by Nicole Q., the Child’s maternal aunt, and her husband, Bryan (collectively, “Aunt and Uncle”), after the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, pursuant to Mother’s stipulation. Following this finding, the Child was placed in the custody of Aunt and Uncle. Father’s paternity of the Child was not established until after the adjudicatory hearing, but before the petition to terminate was filed. Mother and Father, represented by separate counsel, each opposed the termination of their rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted both petitions upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that each of the alleged grounds was established and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. As to Father, the trial court relied upon the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit and the persistence of unremedied conditions. Father appeals. 1 We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Dale Raper v. Johanna Raper
In this divorce case, the trial court granted Roger Dale Raper (“Husband”) and Johanna Raper (“Wife”) an absolute divorce, thereby ending their 26-year union. A bench trial was held to resolve the remaining issues of property division and alimony. The court divided the marital property and awarded Wife alimony in solido and alimony in futuro. Husband appeals and challenges each of these determinations. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy V. Galloway v. Brian K. Vaughn, et al.
Plaintiff, a guest passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident, filed this action to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The vehicle in which Plaintiff was riding was owned and operated by an insured of Shelter Insurance Company. The accident was the fault of the driver of another vehicle who was not insured; therefore, Plaintiff seeks to recover uninsured motorist coverage benefits from Shelter. Insisting that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the driver’s policy because Plaintiff did not meet the definition of an “insured” in the policy, Shelter moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that Plaintiff was an “insured” under the terms of the Shelter policy and denied the motion. This interlocutory appeal followed. We have determined that Plaintiff is not an “insured” pursuant to the terms of the Shelter policy and that Shelter is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant Shelter’s motion for summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marriott Applewhite v. James Blanchard, Jr.
The trial court awarded a directed verdict to the Defendant in this tort action arising out of an automobile accident. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Lillian M, DOB 08/08/06, a minor child under the age of Eighteen (18) years old, State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. TM and CM
In this action, the Trial Court ordered the Department of Children's Services which had custody of the minor child, to furnish the parents with medical information, including video tapes. A written response was not made by the Department and the video tapes were not obtained and furnished to the parents. The Trial Court held the Department in willful contempt of the Court and entered sanctions as punishment. The Department has appealed. We hold that the record does not establish a basis to hold the Department in willful contempt of Court and we reverse the Trial Court's contempt judgment. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Kay Sauer v. Donald D. Launius dba Alpha Log Cabins
Kay Sauer (“the Plaintiff”) sued Donald D. Launius (“the Defendant”) on a civil warrant in general sessions court alleging, among other things, that the Defendant did business as Alpha Log Cabins. The Defendant appealed an adverse judgment in general sessions to the trial court. In the trial court, the Defendant, by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Plaintiff had sued the wrong party as the contract upon which she had sued was with Alpha Log Cabin Sales and Rentals, Inc. (“the Agent”). The case was set for hearing on April 13, 2009. In the meantime, between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the hearing date, the Defendant’s attorney withdrew. The Defendant failed to appear on the hearing date, and the court entered judgment in the Plaintiff’s favor. The Defendant filed a motion to set aside pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 supported by his affidavit in which he stated that he did not receive notice of the hearing date. The trial court denied the motion to set aside. The Defendant appeals. We remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order vacating the court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Robert E. Davis et al. v. Crawford L. Wiliams et al.
Robert E. Davis and wife, Angela K. Davis (“the Buyers”), filed this action against Crawford L. Williams and wife, Betty Jo Williams (“the Sellers”), to enjoin them from taking possession of real property that the Sellers had sold the Buyers and re-acquired through foreclosure. The Buyers also sought to set aside the foreclosure sale. The Sellers moved to dismiss and then for summary judgment on the ground that a final judgment against the Buyers in an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court barred the present action under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sellers. The Buyers appeal. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Tina J. Parks v. Mid-Atlantic Finance Company, Inc.
Tina J. Parks (“the Buyer”) purchased an automobile on an installment payment plan and signed a “Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement” (“the Installment Contract”) pledging the vehicle as collateral to the seller-lender, Chris Yousif dba Quality Motors (“the Seller”). Mid-Atlantic Finance Company, Inc. purchased the Seller’s rights in the Installment Contract. Mid-Atlantic later informed the Seller when the Buyer fell behind on her payments. The Seller repossessed the vehicle. Mid-Atlantic sold its rights under the Installment Contract to the Seller. The Buyer then filed this action against the Seller and Mid-Atlantic on various theories. The trial court granted Mid-Atlantic summary judgment and dismissed the Buyer’s claim against the company, finding that, as the purchaser of the Installment Contract, it had no duty to the Buyer. The Buyer appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
David L. Morrow and Judy M. Wright v. Suntrust Bank, et al.
Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to be named the sole heirs to trust residue. However, the Attorney General moved for summary judgment, claiming that a later trust document provided for a full disposition of the trust assets, and therefore, that no assets remained to which Appellants could be entitled. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the intent to leave no residue stated in the later document superseded the prior edition. On appeal, Appellants argue that intent is irrelevant without a determination of the legal efficacy of the trust documents, and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion. We find that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction in adjudicating the declaratory judgment. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs to SunTrust incurred at trial, and we decline to award SunTrust its attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Depot Property, LLC and Terry Cox v. Town of Arlington, Tennessee
This is a zoning case. The homeowner purchased a house in an area zoned as single-family residential and applied to have the property rezoned for office use. The application was considered by the town legislative body. Some members of the legislative body recused themselves. A majority of the members present voted in favor of the rezoning application, but it did not receive a majority of the entire membership of the legislative body, including the members who recused themselves. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 13-7-204, the rezoning application was deemed to have failed. The homeowner then filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari, asking that the trial court deem the rezoning application approved based on the favorable vote of the majority of the members who participated in the consideration of his rezoning application. The trial court granted the writ, deemed the rezoning application approved, and modified the legislative body’s decision to grant the homeowner’s application. The town appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia, that an affirmative vote by a majority of the entire membership of the town legislative body was required for adoption of the rezoning application. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Markina Westmoreland et al. v. William L. Bacon, M.D. et al.
Plaintiffs appeal the summary dismissal of their medical malpractice claims against three physicians, an orthopedic surgeon, and two hematologists. In December 2004, Plaintiffs’ mother, who suffered from several medical conditions, underwent a total hip replacement and remained in the hospital under the care of several doctors for ten days. Nine days after surgery, her condition dramatically declined; she died the following day from a severe diffuse pulmonary and gastrointestinal hemorrhage. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the physicians breached the standard of care for their respective specialties in the care of their mother. Each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and each motion was supported by the affidavit of the defendant as an expert witness. Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of their expert witness in response. The trial court ruled that Plaintiffs’ only expert was not a qualified witness under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 and granted summary judgment to all three defendants. On appeal, Plaintiffs claim the trial court abused its discretion in finding that their expert witness was not qualified to testify. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that Plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to testify under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115 and the summary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Markina Westmoreland et al. v. William L. Bacon, M.D. et al. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the holding that Dr. Sobel was not competent to opine as to whether one or more of the defendants deviated from the standard of care. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Rowland v. Rishi K. Saxena, M.D.
State representative appeals dismissal of her suit to recover attorney fees incurred as a result of her former opponent’s contest of the election. The trial court held that the Tennessee Constitution and statutes governing election contests vest exclusive jurisdiction to decide contests for the office of state representative, and that, consequently, the court was without jurisdiction to determine the issue of costs and fees awardable under the statute. We hold that the chancery court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to decide issues arising under § 2-17-115. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald P. Boaz v. Rozanne Jackson, et al.
The plaintiff claimed that in 1997 he entered into a verbal partnership agreement with the defendant to open and operate the antique store that the plaintiff managed for the next twelve years. He further claimed that the defendant withheld profits and other benefits of the partnership from him, in violation of their agreement. The plaintiff accordingly asked the trial court to dissolve the partnership and to award him his share of the partnership assets. The defendant filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. She denied that she had ever been in any sort of partnership relationship with the plaintiff and claimed, instead, that he was a salaried managerial employee-at-will of her solely-owned corporation. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The allegations in the complaint, which we must take as true, state a claim for relief. Additionally, material extraneous to the complaint was submitted and presumably considered by the trial court, requiring that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment. Disputes of material fact exist in the filings, precluding the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee American Water Company v. The Tennessee Regulatory Authority, et al.
The Tennessee American Water Company petitioned the Tennessee Regulatory Authority to approve a revision to the existing rates it charges its customers for water. The Authority authorized a revision in the existing tariffs but made several rulings adverse to the plaintiff. Plaintiff has appealed numerous issues. On appeal, we affirm the rulings of the Authority, except its ruling which only allowed plaintiff to recover one-half of the rate case expenses. We hold that ruling was arbitrary and we require the Authority to pay the full amount of the rate case expenses claim. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Michelle Forgey-Lewis vs. John Paul Lewis, Sr.
Prior to their marriage, John Paul Lewis, Sr., (“Husband”) and Miechelle Forgey-Lewis (“Wife”) signed an antenuptial agreement. In this divorce proceeding filed by Wife, the parties agreed that the antenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable but they disagreed sharply as to its application. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce and alimony in futuro of $3,000 per month retroactive to the date of the filing of the complaint. Wife collected approximately $5,000 of the accrued alimony through garnishments. Husband appeals, challenging the alimony award as well as the garnishments. Wife contends the trial court erred in allowing Husband an offset of approximately $80,000 against her entitlements under the court’s orders for payments made by him on joint debts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court except for the garnishments. We quash the garnishments and order the return of funds collected through them to the garnishee. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Young, et al. v. First Bank of Tennessee
Kathy Young (“the plaintiff”) stepped backward onto an elevated curb as she opened the driver’s door of her vehicle to leave the parking lot of First Bank of Tennessee. She was injured when she tripped over the curb and fell into the shrubbery that bordered the parking lot. She and her husband filed this action alleging that First Bank was negligent 1 in creating or maintaining a dangerous condition. First Bank filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals |
