Trecia Gayle Watson v. Bradley County School Board, et al.
Trecia Gayle Watson (“Plaintiff”) formerly was employed as a teacher with the Bradley County School System. In 2002, Bob Taylor (“Taylor”), the Director of Schools for the Bradley County School System, instituted disciplinary charges against Plaintiff seeking to have her employment terminated. Plaintiff voluntarily resigned prior to completion of the disciplinary proceedings. In 2007, pursuant to a grand jury subpoena from the criminal court in Whitfield County, Georgia, Taylor sent all information pertaining to the disciplinary charges and other information in Plaintiff’s personnel file to the criminal court. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued for defamation and filed suit against Taylor, the Bradley County School Board (the “School Board”), and various other defendants. All of the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and, thereafter, sought various forms of sanctions against Plaintiff for numerous alleged violations of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. The Trial Court expressly declined to Rule on the motion for Rule 11 sanctions, providing instead for this Court to dispose of the defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiff appealed. The Trial Court then granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We conclude that because the Trial Court has yet to rule on the defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, there is no final judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Forgey-Lewis vs. John Paul Lewis, Sr.
Prior to their marriage, John Paul Lewis, Sr., (“Husband”) and Miechelle Forgey-Lewis (“Wife”) signed an antenuptial agreement. In this divorce proceeding filed by Wife, the parties agreed that the antenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable but they disagreed sharply as to its application. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce and alimony in futuro of $3,000 per month retroactive to the date of the filing of the complaint. Wife collected approximately $5,000 of the accrued alimony through garnishments. Husband appeals, challenging the alimony award as well as the garnishments. Wife contends the trial court erred in allowing Husband an offset of approximately $80,000 against her entitlements under the court’s orders for payments made by him on joint debts. We affirm the judgment of the trial court except for the garnishments. We quash the garnishments and order the return of funds collected through them to the garnishee. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. R. D. Aldridge, et al.
Bank purchased property at a foreclosure sale, and a tenant of the previous owner continued to occupy the property after the sale. The deed of trust executed by the previous owner provided that if the property was sold, any person holding possession of the property through the borrower would either surrender possession of the property or become a tenant at will of the purchaser. Bank filed a detainer warrant against the tenant and was awarded possession of the property by the general sessions court. On appeal, the circuit court also awarded possession to the Bank. The tenant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Destiny H. A. A. M. M. M., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christina M. (“Mother”) to her daughters Jazsman (d.o.b. 5/28/08) and Destiny (d.o.b. 11/18/09). DCS was excused from being 2 required to make reasonable efforts to assist Mother to accomplish the goal of reunification because she has previously had children removed involuntarily from her custody. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g)(4). The trial court found and held that clear and convincing evidence existed on the ground of mental incompetence to terminate Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the children. Mother appeals, asserting that DCS should have been required to make reasonable efforts to maintain her daughters in her care. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County Health Care Corporation, d/b/a Regional Medical Center v. John Baumgartner, Elizabeth Baumgartner, a/k/a Daray Baumgartner, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity
This appeal involves the impairment of a hospital lien. The individual defendant was treated at the plaintiff hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by a thirdparty tortfeasor. The patient incurred substantial medical expenses. The hospital filed a hospital lien for the amount of the patient’s medical expenses. Subsequently, the patient received insurance proceeds from his own insurance company under his uninsured motorist coverage, and another payment from the tortfeasor’s insurance company. Nothing was paid to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital filed this lawsuit against both insurance companies for impairment of its hospital lien. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted in part the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Against the patient’s own insurance company, the hospital was awarded one-third of the monies the patient received. Against the tortfeasor’s insurance company, the hospital was awarded an amount equal to the policy coverage limit. The hospital now appeals, arguing that it was entitled to recover from both insurance companies jointly the reasonable cost of the hospital services rendered to the patient. The insurance companies also appeal, arguing that there was no impairment of the lien and that, if there was impairment, the hospital’s recovery should have been limited to one-third of the payments made to the patient. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that the hospital’s lien was valid and was impaired, but that the hospital can recover only for the damages caused by the impairment of its lien. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Swecker, et al., v. Steven Michael Swecker, et al., and, Dinah Sluder, et al., In Re: Estate of Joseph James Swecker, Steven Swecker, et al., v. Richard Allen Swecker
Plaintiffs brought this action to establish a partnership with the deceased against the estate's personal representative and others. Defendants answered, denying the allegation that a partnership existed, and filed a counter-complaint, asserting the estate should be reimbursed for plaintiffs' mismanagement of the farm, and for monies the plaintiffs removed from the estate's bank account. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court held that deceased and plaintiff had entered into a partnership and that the partnership would be wound up by the Court and the partnership assets distributed. Also, the Trial Court held that plaintiffs would be required to pay rent on the house they occupied on the farm for several years. On appeal, we affirm the finding that a partnership existed, but reverse the Trial Court's holding that plaintiffs owed the estate rent for occupancy of the house on the farm. We remand, with directions to the Court to wind up the partnership. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Carolyn A. Montgomery v. Daniel Kueter, M.D.
We granted the application of Daniel Kueter, M.D. (“Defendant”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal on the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in reinstating this case to its active docket after it had been dismissed without prejudice over a year earlier. We find and hold that although plaintiff was not entitled to relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the Trial Court did not err when it granted Plaintiff’s motion to enter an agreed order nunc pro tunc reinstating this case. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lesa C. Williams, et al. v. Renard A. Hirsch, Sr.
This application for an interlocutory appeal concerns a client’s standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of fees to be paid to one of the three attorneys who represented her in a personal injury suit. The trial court dismissed the client’s complaint for lack of standing but granted the client permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also conclude that the client has a real interest in the litigation, and we thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the client’s complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Erda M. Gonzalez v. Neft Ali Gonzalez
Mr. Gonzalez filed a petition to alter his final divorce decree, alleging that the decree violates federal law by allowing the wife to receive more than 50% of his military retirement. The trial court denied relief. Mr. Gonzalez appealed. We affirm, holding that federal law does not limit Tennessee trial courts to awarding a maximum of 50% of a former service member’s retirement to the ex-spouse. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Dan Kenneth Kelly v. Sonya Frances Kelly
In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court denied the petitions of both parents to modify the parenting time but granted the mother’s petition to modify child support. We affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to parenting time but reverse and remand for a proper determination regarding modification of child support. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Spencer E.
Father filed a petition to relocate with the parties’ minor child, and the trial court denied his petition. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court made evidentiary and procedural errors necessitating vacating its decision, that the trial court’s decision denying his petition to relocate was erroneous, and that the trial court erred in declining to award him his attorney fees in defending against Mother’s petition for dependency and neglect. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Ward v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Plaintiff, a railroad employee, filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that his left ankle injury was caused by his working conditions. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but subsequently granted the railroad’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the railroad’s application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for summary judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Floyd E. Bell v. Eller Media Company, a Tennessee Corporation
Pursuant to a lease agreement, Defendant was allowed to place a billboard on Plaintiff’s building. After the billboard allegedly caused damage to Plaintiff’s building, Plaintiff notified Defendant. Defendant then sent a letter to Plaintiff terminating the lease, but Plaintiff claims Defendant later agreed to remove the billboard and make repairs to his building. When such repair and complete removal were not made, Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Judith Anne Shaw v. Jason Patrick Shaw
In this divorce case, we granted the request of Jason Patrick Shaw (“Father”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal on three issues: (1) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to grant his request for access to his older daughter’s counseling records with a licensed clinical social worker; (2) whether the Trial Court properly prohibited Father from taking this daughter’s deposition, and (3) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused Father visitation with any of the parties’ three children. As to the first issue, we remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether furnishing the social worker’s records would be against the daughter’s best interest, as discussed more fully in this Opinion. We vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father to depose the daughter. Finally, we vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father any meaningful visitation and remand for the Trial Court to determine an appropriate supervised visitation schedule. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mark W. Urlaub, as Next of Kin and Executor of the Estate of Bertha Worley Urlaub v. Select Specialty Hospital-Memphis, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff filed this medical battery suit on behalf of his deceased mother and named as defendants the nephrologist who ordered an allegedly unauthorized hemodialysis procedure, another treating physician, and the hospital where she was treated. The trial court granted summary judgment to the treating physician who did not order the procedure and to the hospital. Plaintiff appeals. We find that both of these defendants were entitled to summary judgment and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert D. Gray v. Andy B. Roten, II and Gary B. Roten
This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee’s truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee. On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Destiny S.
Hank P. (“Father”) is the biological father of Destiny S. (“the “Child”). After the Child was removed from Father’s home in 2006, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) eventually filed a petition to terminate his parental rights to the Child. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(2) and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also found that the evidence established clearly and convincingly that it was in the best interest of the Child for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals challenging these findings as well as an evidentiary ruling and the Juvenile Court Judge’s refusal to recuse himself. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Open Lake Sporting Club v. Lauderdale Haywood Angling Club
This appeal involves a dispute over the location of a boundary line between tracts of land owned by two hunting clubs. After many years of litigation, the parties agreed that a new survey would be conducted by a new surveyor and that they would be bound by his decision. After the new surveyor filed a report and survey, one of the clubs filed a motion to set aside the survey, contending that the new surveyor did not make an independent determination regarding the location of the boundary line, but rather, copied a previous survey that was completed in the past. The trial judge refused to hold a hearing regarding the validity of the survey because the parties had agreed to be bound by the surveyor’s decision. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee for the use and benefit of Williamson County, et al. v. Jesus Christ’s Church @ Liberty Church Road, et al.
Landowner appeals trial court’s grant of summary judgment to county in action to enforce delinquent tax lien. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Rose v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center Authority, et al.
Plaintiff, a lactation consultant formerly employed by Cookeville Regional Medical Center, sued the hospital for common law retaliatory discharge and violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act; plaintiff also asserted a claim for punitive damages. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, the court granted the Medical Center’s motion for directed verdict on the Protection Act and punitive damages claims; the common law retaliatory discharge claim was allowed to proceed to the jury. The jury found for the Medical Center. Plaintiff appeals, asserting error in the trial court’s grant of directed verdict and its rulings on evidentiary issues. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa J. Allen v. Randy C. Allen
In this divorce case, Plaintiff and her counsel failed to appear in court on the scheduled date of trial. The trial court held the hearing ex parte in their absence. Plaintiff hired new counsel and filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment,” which we discern to be a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59. The trial court held a hearing on the motion; however, Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence explaining her failure to appear on the scheduled trial date. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion. After reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin Wilhite v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Appellant filed this petition for common law writ of certiorari when the Board of Probation and Parole denied him parole. He contends the Board’s decision was illegal, arbitrary, fraudulent, and in excess of its jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tyrone W. Vanlier v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board et al.
An inmate at the Turney Center Industrial Complex filed this petition for writ of certiorari to challenge the ruling of the Turney Center Disciplinary Board that he failed to report for work, imposed a fine, and placed him on probation. After the Board’s ruling was affirmed by the Warden and Commissioner of Correction, this petition was filed. The chancellor dismissed the writ. We affirm the ruling of the chancellor. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lindsey N.L.
In this child support matter, the mother filed a motion for contempt after the father failed to pay the minor child’s medical bills and insurance expenses as ordered by the trial court. After being found by the trial court to be in contempt, the father requested a new trial or an amendment of the judgment. The trial court denied the request and the father appealed from that order. The State of Tennessee, on behalf of the mother, moved to dismiss the appeal, asserting that it was prematurely filed. Upon our review of the record, we find that the father has appealed from an order that does not resolve all the claims against him. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
William (Bob) Simerly, et al vs City of Elizabethton
William (Bob) Simerly and Lewis Honeycutt (collectively “the Retirees”), along with numerous other former employees of the Elizabethton Electric System (“the EES”) brought this civil action against the City of Elizabethton (“the City”) to recover the value of certain EES benefits claimed to be owed them and wrongfully withheld by the City. After the City agreed to reduce its claims and counterclaims along with all the former employees taking voluntary dismissals, with the exception of Mr. Simerly and Mr. Honeycutt, both parties jointly filed a motion for partial summary judgment whereby the trial court was asked to rule on the legal validity of the underlying contracts upon stipulation by the parties of a number of exhibits and facts. The trial court granted the Retirees partial summary judgment, finding the underlying contracts to be legally valid, and the benefits promised thereunder to still be in force. The trial court’s partial judgment reserved the issue of the amount of the Retirees’ damages for a later hearing. The City then filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s ruling before the hearing on the damages could be scheduled. The Retirees moved in this court to dismiss the appeal on the basis of lack of finality of the trial court’s partial judgment. We denied the Retirees’ motion without prejudice. We reverse the ruling of the trial court on the partial summary judgment. |
Carter | Court of Appeals |
