In the Matter of: Dylan M. J.
The mother and stepfather of a nine year old boy filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the boy’s father, who was incarcerated at the time the petition was filed. The sole ground alleged in the petition was abandonment by failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s rights. The court ruled that the ground of abandonment had been proved because there was clear and convincing evidence that the father had failed to support the mother during her pregnancy, and that the father had subsequently shown wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to his incarceration. The court also found that termination of the father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We reverse. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elton Crawford
The defendant, Elton Crawford, entered an Alford guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court to the attempted rape of his daughter and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the county workhouse. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jan Oglesby and John Oglesby v. Edwin T. Riggins
This case arises from a car accident in which Appellant was injured when her vehicle was struck by Appellee’s vehicle. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded Appellant damages, including $100,000 for Appellant’s loss of earning capacity claims. Acting as the thirteenth juror, and based upon its finding that Appellant had failed to meet her burden to show loss of earning capacity, the trial court suggested remittitur of the entire $100,000 loss of earning capacity award. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steve McBroom v. Nissan North America, Inc. et al.
The employee alleged that he sustained a lower back injury as a result of his job. His employer denied the claim based upon findings by its work site medical staff. An evaluating physician opined that the employee’s job had caused an aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded benefits. The employer appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment, but we decline the employee’s request to find the appeal to be frivolous. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Wanda Elaine Brock
The defendant, Wanda Elaine Brock, appeals her Sullivan County jury convictions of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years of age and two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child less than eight years of age, Class A felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions into one count of aggravated child abuse and imposed a Range I sentence of 20 years to be served at 100 percent by operation of law. See T.C.A. § 40350501(i)(1), (2)(k). On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, (2) the trial court’s exclusion of extrinsic evidence concerning an inconsistent statement made by the victim, (3) the length of the sentence imposed, and (4) the trial court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions of aggravated child neglect. In consequence, with respect to counts three and four, the judgments of conviction are reversed, the verdicts are vacated, and the charges are dismissed. We further conclude, that the trial court erred by excluding extrinsic evidence of the victim’s prior inconsistent statement. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of conviction in counts one and two and remand those counts for a new trial. Concerning the trial court’s denial of coram nobis relief, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for a writ of error coram nobis and affirm the trial court’s order with respect to the coram nobis petition. In summary, the judgments of the trial court in counts three and four are reversed, and the charges are dismissed; the judgments of the trial court in counts one and two are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial on those counts; and the order of the trial court denying coram nobis relief is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Young Bok Song v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, Young Bok Song, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleges that he was denied the opportunity to contact the Korean Consulate General in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Treaty; therefore, he asserts that his judgments of conviction for seven counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery are void. We conclude that the petition fails to state a cognizable claim, and, therefore, the petition is a proper subject for summary dismissal. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Bonds v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Bonds, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations. We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs. Because the facts of this case do not warrant a tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of Jason C.H. et al.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found the Department of Children’s Services proved the grounds of abandonment and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Phillip Maxwell
Defendant-Appellant, Charles Phillip Maxwell, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of driving on a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a six-month sentence, with Maxwell to serve forty-eight hours in jail prior to serving the remainder of his sentence on probation. In Maxwell’s appeal, he argues that the trial court erred: (1) in failing to appoint counsel to represent him at trial; and (2) in orally denying his interlocutory appeal for the appointment of competent counsel. The State has conceded that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to appoint counsel for Maxwell prior to trial. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial following the appointment of counsel. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony F. Stiel, Jr. v. Susan M. Stiel
This post divorce appeal arises from the lack of symmetry between the parties’ 1995 Final Divorce Decree and a 1996 Qualified Domestic Relations Order that was not entered into contemporaneously with the Divorce Decree. The ex-husband, a General Motors retiree, contends the trial court erred in finding that his ex-wife was entitled to the marital portion of his early retirement supplements of his pension and in finding that her benefits are based on post-divorce increases to his pension benefits. For her issue, the ex-wife contends the trial court erred in failing to grant her survivorship rights in the ex-husband’s retirement benefits. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jay Bean
Defendant, Jay Bean, filed a “Motion to Furlough Defendant” from his sentence of incarceration in order for him to be admitted to a drug treatment program. The trial court denied the motion and Defendant filed a notice of appeal. Among other assertions, the State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because Defendant’s chosen avenue to seek review of the trial court’s order, Tennessee Rule of Appellant Procedure 3(b), does not permit an appeal as of right in this case. We agree with the State and dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Gaylon Douglas
The defendant, Jeffrey Gaylon Douglas, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of rape, a Class B felony, and sexual battery, a Class E felony, and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and two years, respectively. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Robinson
The defendant, Terry Robinson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its rebuttal closing argument, and he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky D. Garrett v. William David Brown, et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ricky D. Garrett (“Employee”) was injured when he fell from the roof of a barn during the course and scope of his employment as a handyman for William David Brown (“Employer”), a farmer who carried worker’s compensation insurance. Subsequently, Employee filed a complaint for worker’s compensation benefits against Employer and Employer’s insurance carrier. Employee also named the Second Injury Fund (“the Fund”) as a defendant and alleged that the injury he sustained in the fall in combination with his pre-existing disabilities rendered him totally disabled. The trial court agreed that Employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury sustained in the fall combined with the pre-existing disabilities and awarded Employee full benefits with 40% liability for the award assigned to Employer and 60% assigned to the Fund. The Fund appealed, asserting, 1) that Employer does not meet the definition of “employer” for purposes of the Second Injury Fund statute; 2) that the proof is insufficient to show that Employer had knowledge of Employee’s pre-existing disabilities; and 3) that the judgment awarded Employee was incorrectly apportioned between the Fund and the Employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Antonio Kendrick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maria Maclin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Maria Maclin, appeals from the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The State filed a motion requesting this court to affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Clay
A jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Clay, of two counts of facilitation of the sale of less than .5 gram of cocaine, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant, as a career offender, to concurrent twelve-year sentences for each count. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of facilitation of the sale of a Schedule II narcotic less than .5 gram; (2) the court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for the sale of Schedule II narcotics; and (3) the statutes under which the court sentenced him are unconstitutional as applied to him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lakeith Humphrey
The defendant, LaKeith Humphrey, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court erred in granting a special jury instruction; the trial court abused its discretion by allowing some testimony and limiting other testimony; the trial court erred in admitting the murder weapon into evidence; and the cumulative effect of these errors suffices to justify a new trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Demitrus M.T.
This is a wrongful death action filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Commission”) by the parents and brother (“the Claimants”) of six month old Demitrus M. T. (“the Infant” or “Demitrus”), individually and on behalf of Demitrus, after he drowned in a bathtub while in the care of Sherika Hamilton, a friend of the family identified in a Tennessee Department of Child Services (“DCS” or “the Department”) safety plan as the “placement caretaker.” There is no dispute that Hamilton left the Infant unattended in the bathtub while she was otherwise occupied in an adjacent room. The primary disputes at trial before the Commissioner, and on appeal, are whether the Infant was in the “care, custody and control” of the Department so as to provide jurisdiction to the Commission; whether the Department’s “Case Recordings,” some of which were made more than a month after the event they purport to record, are inadmissible hearsay; and whether it was foreseeable to the Department that Hamilton would leave the helpless Infant unattended in a bathtub and let him drown. The Commission found that it had jurisdiction because the Department had control of the Infant even though it did not have custody, that the Case Recordings were admissible, and that the Department was not negligent because it could not have foreseen this tragic event. The Claimants appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate the dismissal on the merits. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jeffrey Paul Roller v. Anna Marie Roller
The order from which the appellant Anna Marie Roller seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, December 15, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, January 18, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Guy Alexander, Jr., as surviving spouse of Julie Anne Alexander, deceased v. City of Murfreesboro
Julie Alexander died in an automobile accident on South Rutherford Boulevard in Murfreesboro. Her husband sued the city, claiming that the road was unsafe or dangerous and that the city had notice of the condition of the road. After a trial, the trial court found that the city did not have notice and that the road was not unsafe or dangerous. Ms. Alexander’s husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision that the city had no notice of the condition. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Healthways, Inc. Derivative Litigation
Plaintiff in shareholder derivative action appeals the dismissal of his suit alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and other misconduct, including insider trading, by current and former officers and directors of corporation. Plaintiff filed suit without first making demand on the board of directors of the corporation that the directors initiate the lawsuit. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege with requisite particularity that such demand would have been futile. We affirm the dismissal of the action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin McNeary, et al. v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, A Tennessee Corporation, et al.
This case arises from the grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss, whereby the trial court dismissed one of the party-defendants from this lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Specifically, the trial court determined that: (1) the Appellants had failed to serve process on the Appellee; (2) that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose operated to save the Appellants’ cause of action; and (3) that Appellants were not entitled to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 relief on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adler v. Double Eagle Proprieties Holdings, LLC v Airways Commons, LLC
In this declaratory judgment action, the parties sought interpretation of a real estate purchase contract. The contract between the buyer and the seller provided for the assignment of all leases on the property and proration of rents to the buyer. The parties disputed whether these provisions contemplated a separate agreement between the seller and a third party. At the behest of the parties, the trial court construed both agreements and granted summary judgment to the buyer. On appeal, we raise, sua sponte, the question of whether all necessary parties were before the trial court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19. After concluding that all necessary parties were not included in this action, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Duke, As Next of Kin of William Jerry Duke, Deceased, and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of William Jerry Duke v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves an arbitration agreement that was executed when a patient was admitted to a nursing home. The arbitration agreement was signed by the patient’s sister, who had presented a power of attorney document to the admissions staff that designated her as the patient’s attorney-in-fact. The patient’s representative in this lawsuit contends that the patient was incompetent when he executed the power of attorney document, and therefore, the sister lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement on his behalf. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the patient was incompetent when he signed the document and denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. We affirm and remand. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals |