Dorothy Watson v. Robert L. Payne, Jr.
amount of “zero.” The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for additur. We vacate the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or additur, and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell - Dissenting
I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct. After giving proper deference to the jury’s verdict, I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient to support Mr. Mitchell’s conviction for disorderly conduct. Moreover, I conclude that Mr. Mitchell’s conduct was protected as free speech. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Fred Thompson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Fred Thompson, Jr., appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of theft and theft of property valued less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of five years for the theft conviction. The Petitioner challenges the performance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teddy Ray Mitchell
The defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and sentenced to thirty days in jail, to be served on probation. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient. This Court granted the State permission to appeal in order to consider the admissibility of a racially derogatory term, to review the sufficiency of the evidence, and to determine whether the conviction violated the constitutional right to free speech. Because the disputed testimony was properly admitted, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct, and there was no violation of the right to free speech, the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed. The judgment of conviction and sentence is reinstated. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
In the Matter of Shelby L. B.
The divorced mother of a nine year old girl joined with an unrelated man in a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s father and to adopt, with the intention of having the unrelated man adopt the child in place of the father, while the mother retained her own parental rights. The trial court granted the father’s motion to dismiss the petition, holding that the petitioner lacked standing because the statutes governing termination of parental rights and adoption require that the mother relinquish her parental rights or that they be terminated before an adoption by an unrelated individual or non stepparent may proceed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodger Watts
The defendant, Rodger Watts, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony; burglary of a building, a Class D felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to nine years for the theft and four years for the burglary, to be served consecutively as a Range II offender, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest, to be served concurrently to the felonies. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence with regard to his theft conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
April Amanda Worley v. Richard Thomas Whitaker
Plaintiff sought and obtained an Order of Protection from the trial court against defendant, Subsequently, following an evidentiary hearing, the Court found defendant in contempt of the Order of Protection, and sentenced him to 1830 days in prison. Defendant has appealed to this Court inter alia, seeking a reduction in the sentence. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court, but modify by reducing his sentence to 730 days. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Rae Lewter
The Defendant-Appellant, James Rae Lewter, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, both Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced Lewter as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Lewter argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence of eight years in violation of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007); and (3) the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See State v. James Rae Lewter, No. M2007-02723-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1076716, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 9, 2009), rev’d, 313 S.W.3d 745 (Tenn. June 4, 2010). Upon initial review, this court, after concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, reversed and vacated Lewter’s convictions and dismissed the indictment. Id. Following the reversal, the State applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and on August 17, 2009, permission to appeal was granted. Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 746 (Tenn. 2010). Consequently, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the remaining two issues: (1) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in violation of Gomez, 239 S.W.3d at 740; and (2) whether the State engaged in misconduct during closing arguments. See Lewter, 313 S.W.3d at 751. On remand, we conclude that Lewter did not receive an excessive sentence pursuant to Gomez and that the State’s remarks during closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, as to the issues remanded for our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas E. Campbell
The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas E. Campbell, was convicted by a Warren County jury of attempted child abuse, a Class B misdemeanor, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to six months in the county jail for attempted child abuse. For aggravated sexual battery, Campbell was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Campbell claims that: (1) both convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; and (2) his sentence for aggravated sexual battery was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Benard Barnett
The defendant, Aaron Benard Barnett, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and vandalism over $1000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to six years for aggravated burglary and four years for vandalism, with the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Hervery
The defendant, Brian Hervery, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and one count of the employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged one of the convictions of aggravated assault into the conviction for attempted second degree murder and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of ten years for the attempted murder conviction and three years for the aggravated assault convictions. Because the defendant had a prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter, the court sentenced him to ten years at 100% for the firearm conviction and ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to the ten-year sentence for attempted murder, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324. The defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that would have shown the victims’ bias; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial following the prosecutor’s improper closing comments; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (4) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Lee Moore
The Defendant, Henry Lee Moore, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for two counts of violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act, a Class E felony, and one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and ordering the remainder of his effective four-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Alexander Montgomery, III
The Defendant, Paul Alexander Montgomery, III, was convicted of nine counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions of rape of a child and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the Defendant’s case for a new trial. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Mary Pauline Stumpe Schorn, Deceased
In March of 2004, the trial court entered an order to probate the Last Will and Testament of Mary Pauline Stumpe Schorn (“Deceased”) and appointed John H. Schorn the Personal Representative of Deceased’s estate (“Personal Representative”). On April 13, 2010, the trial court entered an order that, inter alia, ordered the Personal Representative to “compile a complete list of where the estate monies are and what has been spent since the last accounting was provided to the beneficiaries …,” within thirty days, and to close and settle the estate within ninety days. The Personal Representative appeals the April 13, 2010 Order to this Court. We hold that the order appealed from is not a final judgment, and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse L. Rogers, III., v. State of Tennesse
Plaintiff, an incarcerated prisoner, appealed a Circuit Court's decision dismissing his writ of habeas corpus to Chancery Court. The Chancellor held that an appeal from Circuit Court would not lie in Chancery Court which has no jurisdiction to try a writ of habeas corpus related to criminal proceedings. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Chancery Court and remand. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Ralph Kenneth Freeman v. City of Chattanooga
The Chattanooga City Police Department terminated petitioner for violation of policies, and the City Council upheld petitioner's termination. Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari in Chancery Court and the Chancellor upheld petitioner's termination. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Arnold v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Arnold, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a Shelby County jury of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective term of life in prison. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mack Transou v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby G. Neely v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bobby G. Neely, appeals the Marion County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, criminal attempt to manufacture a Schedule II controlled substance, and child abuse, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by determining that he failed to file his petition for post-conviction relief in a timely manner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This is a tort action for wrongful foreclosure. Suit was filed by Jesse R. Miltier against his lender, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). In his complaint, Miltier demanded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Miltier $750,000 compensatory damages itemized on the verdict form as $350,000 out of pocket money losses “related solely to foreclosure,” $100,000 out of pocket losses “related solely to lawsuit,” $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to foreclosure” and $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to lawsuit.” The jury also awarded Miltier $300,000 in punitive damages. BOA filed post-judgment motions asking that the compensatory damages be remitted to eliminate “amounts related solely to the lawsuit” and amounts awarded in excess of the $200,000 demanded in the complaint. Miltier responded asserting that the issue of damages over $200,000 was tried by consent. The trial court entered an order reducing the award of compensatory damages to $200,000. Later, the court entered a final order approving the jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Miltier appeals challenging the reduction of the verdict. His issues include a challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 which forbids amendment of pleadings after verdict to increase the ad damnum clause. The Attorney General has appeared on appeal to defend the constitutionality of Rule 15.02. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carlie G. C.
Philip C. (“Father”) appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Carlie G. C. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals and challenges the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Deanna Machelle Fletcher
The Defendant, Deanna Machelle Fletcher, pled guilty to three counts of identity theft, a Class D felony; burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; three counts of forgery, a Class E felony; and three counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150, 39-14-402, 39-14-114, 39-14-103 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement for identity theft, four years’ confinement for burglary of an automobile, four years’ confinement for forgery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement for theft, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentences and ordering confinement. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Reginald MacKinnon
A Sevier County Circuit Court jury found that the Defendant, Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, violated the implied consent law. See T.C.A. § 55-10-406 (2006) (amended 2008, 2009, 2010). The trial court ordered that his driving privileges be revoked for one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting a witness’s opinion testimony into evidence and (2) the jury instructions for violation of the implied consent law were insufficient because the trial court failed to define “reasonable grounds.” Because the trial court failed to determine the issue of the implied consent violation, submitting it to the jury instead, we vacate the judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Reginald MacKinnon - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing. Given that the Defendant does not raise any issue regarding the trial court’s failure to determine the implied consent law violation, that no prejudice has been demonstrated, and that the trial court acted as the thirteenth juror, I would address the issues raised on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willard J. Waters v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a work-related injury to his back in 1988. The settlement of his claim included the right to future medical treatment. During the subsequent years, he received treatment from various physicians for his back. In 2006, his treating physician recommended a spinal fusion. His employer’s insurer, Liberty Mutual, denied that the proposed surgery was necessary for the treatment of the1988 injury. The employee filed a motion to compel the insurer to pay for the proposed surgery, which was granted by the trial court. The insurer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We affirm the decision. |
Polk | Workers Compensation Panel |