In the Matter of: Anna C.T.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman
The primary issue we address in this appeal is whether certain evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and if so, whether it more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict. This case arose out of the death of Raymond Smallman and the ensuing dispute between his two sons from a previous marriage and Linda Caraway, whom he married two weeks before his death. Mr. Smallman’s sons challenged the validity of their father’s marriage to Ms. Caraway and the validity of the lost will that Ms. Caraway sought to have established. Ms. Caraway claimed to be Mr. Smallman’s surviving spouse and the sole beneficiary of his estate pursuant to the terms of his will. The case went to trial, and the jury was allowed to hear evidence about Ms. Caraway’s real estate holdings and her late mother’s will. The jury found in favor of Mr. Smallman’s sons. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Ms. Caraway permission to appeal to address whether Mr. Smallman’s sons had standing to contest the validity of their father’s second marriage and whether the introduction of evidence regarding Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will and her real estate holdings was error and if so, whether it more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict. We hold that Ms. Caraway waived her argument that Mr. Smallman’s sons lacked standing to contest the validity of her marriage to their father. We further hold that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real property holdings and her late mother’s will. Because this evidence more probably than not affected the jury’s verdict, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Raymond L. Smallman - Concur and Dissent
I concur with the Court’s decision to remand this case for a new trial because the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony regarding Ms. Caraway’s real estate holdings and regarding the execution and substance of Ms. Caraway’s late mother’s will. However, I disagree with the Court’s refusal to address Ms. Caraway’s challenge to the standing of Mr. Smallman’s sons to contest the validity of her marriage to their father and with the Court’s decision that Ms. Caraway may not raise the standing issue on remand. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Martin
The petitioner, Christopher Martin, was convicted in 1997 for rape of a child and received a twenty-five-year sentence. He was also convicted in Georgia of similar offenses and received a twenty-year sentence. The Georgia and Tennessee sentences were to be served concurrently. The petitioner filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to remove a Tennessee detainer against him. He asserted that the detainer prevented him from being eligible for parole in Georgia. The trial court denied the motion, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie Leroy Rowlett
The Defendant, Eddie Leroy Rowlett, was convicted by a Stewart County jury of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the entry into his home and his subsequent detention and arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; (3) several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of certain photographs and limitations on establishing a "criminal trespass" defense; and (4) the jury instructions, arguing that a special instruction should have been given for the State’s failure to disclose the deputy’s telephone records, and that instructions on self-defense and defense of others should have been included in the final charge to the jury. Because the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient, the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is reversed and modified to a conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault. The judgment for resisting arrest is affirmed. The case is remanded for resentencing. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Taylor v. Airgas Mid-South, Inc., et al.
In this workers’ compensation appeal, it is undisputed that the employee sustained a compensable injury, that the employer was providing medical care as required by the workers’ compensation statute, and that the employee sought and received a spinal fusion treatment without informing or consulting with his employer. The trial court ordered the employer to pay for the unauthorized treatment, and the employer has appealed from that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Lindsey Brooke Lowe
The Appellant, Lindsey Brooke Lowe, petitions this Court for an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2. The Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s order denying her motion to recuse. After a thorough review of the petition, this Court concludes that the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s motion for recusal. The order of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ruby Lois Dye v. Leonard Waldo, et al
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property to which the appellees obtained title in May 2010. The appellant argued that the property belonged to her through the doctrine of adverse possession because she and her mother had used the property exclusively since 1937. The appellees proved at trial that the appellant had not paid taxes on the land for more than 22 years and moved for a directed verdict at the close of the appellant’s case-in chief. The trial court granted the motion based upon the statutory bar imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110. The appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott McLain
The appellant, Scott McLain, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with seven days to be served in confinement. As a condition of his plea, he reserved certified questions of law concerning the suppression of the results of his blood alcohol test. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; however, our supreme court subsequently remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. 2008). Upon reconsideration, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for dismissal of the indictment. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Dacia S., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Donald R.S., Jr. (“Father”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W. , and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie Leroy Rowlett-concurring in part and dissenting in part
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. The majority concludes that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury to Deputy Saltkill. Nowhere in the Defendant’s brief does he even mention the issue of the sufficiency of the proof as to serious bodily injury. As the majority points out, the "crux of the Defendant’s sufficiency argument is that the State failed to prove that he did not act in self-defense." Indeed, I submit that, not only is it the "crux" of his argument, it is his only argument. The Defendant’s entire argument on the sufficiency issue is comprised of only one paragraph that consumes less than one-half of a page of the Defendant’s brief. The only citation in the paragraph is to the seminal case Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), regarding the general standard of appellate review on sufficiency issues. Moreover, the only reference to the proof was with regard to the issue of self defense. Under these circumstances, the Defendant clearly has failed to support any argument on the sufficiency of the evidence as to the issue of serious bodily injury "with argument, citation to relevant authorities, or any references to the appellate record." See Tenn. R. App. P. 27. Accordingly, I would find that the Defendant has waived any sufficiency argument with regard to the issue of serious bodily injury. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa Barnett v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the Polk County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding her convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for which she is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying her relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wade P. Tucker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Wade P. Tucker, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred in failing to consider his motion for appointment of counsel and that the indictment was defective so as to deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Pernell Taylor
Appellant, Eric Pernell Taylor, was on probation after entering guilty plea in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on January 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Appellant had failed to report his arrest, failed to report to his probation officer, failed to pay litigation taxes, and tested positive for cocaine. He also admitted to the cocaine usage in writing. After holding a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the probation or ordering the service of the sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Markina Westmoreland, et al. v. William L. Bacon, M.D., et al.
The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case to us for consideration in light of its opinion in Shipley v. Williams. In the original appeal of this medical malpractice case, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. On remand we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert was not competent to testify and consequently, the plaintiffs created genuine issues of material fact, making summary judgment for defendants inappropriate. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Derek Alton Badger v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Derek Alton Badger, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery after a jury trial in Bedford County. Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was unsuccessful on appeal. See State v. Derek Alton Badger, No. M2009-01295-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3489173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 25, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court failed to advise him regarding sex offender registration and community supervision. After a hearing on the post-conviction petition, at which Petitioner presented several witnesses, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal and seeks our review of the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Donnell Davis
The Defendant, Alvin Donell Davis, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Hamilton County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his probation because his sentences had expired. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Defendant’s probation on Count 2 of his convictions and affirm the trial court’s order of probation revocation and incarceration on that count. However, because the sentences in Counts 1 and 3 expired prior to the filing of the revocation warrant, the trial court lacked the authority to revoke the Defendant’s sentence on those counts; therefore, the orders of revocation and incarceration on Counts 1 and 3 are reversed and vacated. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc. et al.
The issue presented is whether the jury verdict against the management company of an assisted living facility for negligence based on understaffing is supported by material evidence. Mable Farrar’s physician prescribed Ms.Farrara daily dose of an over-the-counter medicine for constipation. The nursing staff at the assisted living facility where Ms. Farrar lived did not give the medicine to her as often as prescribed. As a result, Ms. Farrar became constipated and returned to see her doctor. Ms. Farrar’s doctor notified the nursing staff at the assisted living facility to give Ms. Farrar three to four enemas each day beginning on May 27, 2004. A facility nurse gave Ms. Farrar one enema on the evening of May 27, none on May 28, and one enema on the evening of May 29. Very soon after receiving the last enema on May 29, Ms. Farrar died from a perforated colon. Her daughters filed a wrongful death action against the nurse who gave the enema, the director of nursing at the assisted living facility, the owner of the facility, and its management company. The suit alleged that the negligence of the staff, the owner, and its management company caused Ms. Farrar’s death. The jury returned a verdict finding the nurse thirty percent at fault, the director of nursing twenty percent at fault, and the management company fifty percent at fault based on its failure to provide sufficient personnel at the facility. The management company appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict against the management company, finding that there was no material evidence that staffing deficiencies proximately caused Ms. Farrar’s death. We hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the award of punitive damages. |
Bedford | Supreme Court | |
Marina Castro v. TX Direct, LLC
Employer terminated employee shortly after discovering she was pregnant. Thereafter, employee filed a complaint against her former employer asserting claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and misrepresentation. Following a period of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on each of the employee’s claims. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Furlough v. Spherion Atlantic Workforce, LLC
We accepted review of this appeal to determine whether, when a workers’ compensation settlement involving an employee represented by counsel is approved by the Department of Labor and the SD-1 form is submitted contemporaneously with the settlement agreement, a court may set the settlement aside as non-final based on the court’s determination that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We hold that when the Department of Labor approves a settlement, it implicitly approves the accompanying SD-1 form, and a court has no authority to set the settlement aside based on its independent finding that the SD-1 form was not “fully completed.” We therefore reverse the judgments of the Panel and of the trial court and dismiss the employee’s petition. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lamont Simpson
The defendant, David Lamont Simpson, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Thereafter, he was sentenced to a term of fifteen years, to be served at 100%, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Because the defendant failed to file a transcript of the evidence on appeal, he is entitled to no relief, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Otis Maclin v. State of Tennessee
Otis Maclin ("the Petitioner") filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions based upon guilty pleas to the offenses of kidnapping, sexual battery, and aggravated assault. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective ten-year sentence. In his petition, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy W. Keith v. Michael J. Jackson, Sr., and Nata M. Jackson
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract for employment. Roy W. Keith (“Keith”) sued Michael J. Jackson, Sr. and Nata M. Jackson (“the Jacksons”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that he was not paid separation payments due to him under an employment agreement. The Jacksons answered the complaint, arguing essentially that Keith waived these payments when he accepted a job in the new corporation. Keith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Jacksons appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment as there remained a material controversy regarding whether Keith waived his right to payment under the employment agreement. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Ann Cradic v. Kenneth Wayne Cradic
This case focuses, in the context of the parties’ divorce, on the distribution of their marital assets and debts. Gwendolyn Ann Cradic (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Kenneth Wayne Cradic (“Husband”) on October 24, 2008. The parties went to trial in October 2011 on the issues of fault and division of property. The court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. It then divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of one asset and its division of marital property. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Chanda Langston v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Chanda Langston, pleaded guilty without a recommended sentence to six counts of forgery and one count of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years in confinement. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner now claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |