Paul Wayne Vaughn, as Next of Kin of Pamela Annette Livingston Vaughn v. Mountain States Health Alliance d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center, et al.
The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against numerous healthcare providers. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Edward Boling
This is the second appeal as of right by Defendant, Robert Edward Boling, from his conviction in the Sullivan County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery. In his first appeal as of right, this Court addressed only the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, affirmed the conviction on that issue, and refused to address all other issues because they were waived by Defendant’s attorney’s failure to timely file a motion for new trial. See State v. Robert Edward Boling, No. E2008-00351-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 482763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2009) no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court granted Defendant a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113(a)(1)(“When the trial judge conducting a hearing pursuant to [the Post-conviction Procedure Act] finds that the petitioner was denied the right to an appeal from the original conviction in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Tennessee . . . the judge can . . . grant a delayed appeal;”). In accordance with our supreme court’s opinion in Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn. 2003), the untimely motion for new trial being a nullity, Defendant was granted the ability to file a timely motion for new trial. He did, and it was overruled. Defendant now appeals his conviction for the second time and appropriately raises two issues for our review in this appeal: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for new counsel; and (2) the trial court erred by denying his objection to certain photographs and testimony, which Defendant asserts were “fruit of the poisonous tree” of his coerced confession. Defendant’s third issue, the post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial, is premature. After a review of Defendant’s two properly presented issues, we again affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alexander Fuller
The appellant, Alexander Fuller, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation for theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars and ordering that he serve his eight-year sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Wayne Vaughn et al. v. Mountain States Health Alliance et al.
The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against numerous healthcare providers. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Bailey
The appellant, Jeremy Bailey, pled nolo contendere in the Hickman County Circuit Court to two counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and received consecutive four-year sentences with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve the sentences as eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail "day for day" prior to his being released on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his requests for judicial diversion and full probation and by ordering that he serve his sentence of confinement day for day. The State concedes that the trial court erred by imposing day-for-day confinement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and full probation but remand for correction of the judgments to reflect that the appellant is entitled to earn good conduct credits while serving eleven months and twenty-nine days of his felony sentences in jail. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deeric McAfee
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Deeric McAfee, of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal history, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce on cross-examination a letter written by the appellant, the trial court erred by giving an instruction regarding flight, and the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Huber Sumner
A Montgomery County jury convicted appellant, Frank Huber Sumner, of robbery. The trial court sentenced him to nine and one-half years of confinement as a multiple offender. Appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the length of his sentence is excessive and that he should have received an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Khaleefa Lambert
A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Khaleefa Lambert, of first degree premeditated murder; first degree felony murder; especially aggravated kidnapping by the use of a weapon; and especially aggravated kidnapping by the infliction of serious bodily injury. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the possibility of parole. The trial court also merged the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and sentenced the appellant to eighteen years to be served consecutively to the murder conviction. On appeal, the appellant argues (1) that counts one, two, and three of the indictment should have been dismissed for failure to state an offense; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to order the State to reveal grand jury testimony; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred in sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the convictions and sentences. However, we vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of the murder convictions and a single judgment reflecting the merger of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Robert Q. Jackson
Appellant, John Robert Q. Jackson, challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court after he was revoked from community corrections. He argues that the trial court erred by considering his pending criminal allegations when ordering that he serve some of his sentences consecutively with each other. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his record of criminal activity was extensive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Thomas D. Thomas, et al.
Plaintiff Bank accelerated a loan secured by an aircraft after Borrower failed to maintain insurance on the aircraft as required by the loan documents. Bank filed an action to collect amounts due; took possession of and disposed of the aircraft; and sought a judgment for the deficiency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Bank. Defendant Loan Guarantors appeal. We affirm in part; reverse in part, finding that Bank did not provide sufficient notice as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-611; and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ahmad R. Manning, Alias
On appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment due to pre-indictment delay. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment because it misapplied the law in reaching its determination that the delay caused the Defendant actual prejudice. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brys Andrew Hensley
Brys Andrew Hensley (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of two years. The State subsequently alleged that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced the Defendant. After a second hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to reconsider its previous ruling, and this appeal followed. We hold that, in revoking the Defendant’s diversion and probation, the trial court failed to exercise its statutory discretion and thereby committed reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kiara Tashawn King
The defendant, Kiara Tashawn King, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property with a value of $500 or more, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective five-year sentence, to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court failed to follow the correct sentencing procedure, imposed an excessive sentence, and erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an effective sentence of five years of probation and that its decision to deny judicial diversion did not wholly depart from the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court accordingly. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wendy Leverett, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
A woman who was severely injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an unlicensed minor filed suit against the minor. The minor’s parents’ insurance company denied coverage and refused to defend the suit on the basis of an exclusion in the insurance policy for damages caused by a party driving without permission of the owner or a person “in lawful possession” of the vehicle. No defense was offered, and the injured party obtained a $1 million default judgment against the minor driver. The injured party and the minor’s parents then jointly filed suit against the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company was liable for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act based upon its denial of coverage. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the minor was entitled to insurance coverage under her parents’ policy at the time of the accident. The remainder of the case was tried, and the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The jury also found the insurance company had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the trial court trebled the compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees under the Act. The insurance company has raised a number of issues in this appeal, inter alia, the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of coverage; the finding of liability for bad faith, the liability and enhanced penalty under the TCPA, and the requirement that plaintiffs should make an election between the punitive damages and the enhanced damages. We affirm the breach of contract holding, including the conclusion that the policy terms provided coverage. We reverse and vacate the holding of liability for bad faith, including the award of punitive damages thereunder, since the statutory cause of action was not plead. We also reverse the award of treble damages under the TCPA, but affirm the finding of a violation of the Act. We affirm as modified the award of attorneys’ fees. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy Leverette, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company - Concur and Dissent
I agree with the majority’s analysis of the coverage issue in Section V and its conclusion that TFM breached the contract by denying coverage. As a result of this breach, the judgment against TFM in the amount of $67,000 was appropriate. I concur as well with the analysis of the bad faith claims in Section VI. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael L. Snodgrass
The Defendant, Michael L. Snodgrass, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his judicial diversion for a charge of theft of property valued at less than $500 and imposing a split confinement sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in sentencing him to split confinement and imposing a requirement that he serve 75% of his sentence before eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and related rehabilitative programs. We affirm the denial of full probation but reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment that deletes the special condition that the Defendant to serve ten days “flat” and specifies the percentage of his sentence he must serve before eligibility for rehabilitation programs. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton
The appellant, Linda Gass (“Heir”), an heir to the Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton, appeals from an order of the trial court entered on October 30, 2012, which determined that certain specifically described real property upon which Heir lives is an asset of the estate and may be sold by the appellee, Barbara D. Carmichael, the Executrix of the decedent’s estate (“Executrix”), pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s will. Because it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked properly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Baleke Kromah
The Defendant-Appellant, Baleke Kromah, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. He was subsequently convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of count three and was acquitted of the remaining counts. Kromah was sentenced to ninety days of imprisonment followed by four years of probation. On appeal, Kromah argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election of offenses at the close of the State’s proof. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jameel Childress v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jameel Childress, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In January, 1999, the petitioner pled guilty, in seven separate cases, to two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and one count of theft of property over $1000. Because all sentences imposed in the case were ordered to be served concurrently, the petitioner received an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because the sentences imposed are illegal, as they were statutorily required to be served consecutively because the petitioner was on bond when the offenses were committed. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas Ray Ward
The defendant, Thomas Ray Ward, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class E felonies, and was given consecutive two-year sentences for each offense. However, the defendant was placed on probation for a period of eight years. A violation warrant was subsequently issued, and, at the hearing, the defendant acknowledged that he had committed the technical violations of his agreement. The trial court found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that the balance of the reinstated six-year sentence be served in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision to revoke was error because it was based upon the fact that the defendant had prior violations of his probation rather than on the technical violations which were established at the hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the revocation of probation. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Barnes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Barnes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The plea agreement provided for an effective eight year sentence and, further, that the petitioner could apply for a suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the State complied with an agreement to recommend probation to the trial court. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamey Ray Christy
The Defendant-Appellant, Jamey Ray Christy, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and aggravated assault, all class C felonies; and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon involved, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide convictions and imposed concurrent terms of eight years’ confinement for the vehicular homicide and aggravated assault and three years’ confinement for the reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a consecutive term of ten years’ confinement for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated child neglect. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Ray Boatwright
The defendant, William Ray Boatwright, was convicted by a Knox County jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault counts into the especially aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-five years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated robbery conviction, and twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated burglary conviction. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of forty-nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his identity as a perpetrator and argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony and by enhancing his sentences within his range and ordering consecutive sentencing. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity, that the defendant has waived the issue regarding the jury instruction, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentences within his range and ordering that they be served consecutively. However, we note under plain error review that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-404 d) prohibits the defendant’s dual convictions for both especially aggravated burglary and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we modify the defendant’s Class B especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and his sentence to ten years as a Range II, multiple offender for this offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Krissa E.M.L.
The guardian ad litem for the minor child Krissa E. M. L. (“the Child”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lanesha L. (“Mother”) to the Child. The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), which already had been involved with the Child’s case through dependency and neglect proceedings, was named in the petition and supported the prosecution of the petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie D. Seymore
The defendant, Jackie D. Seymore, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals |