Jacqueline Lindbloom v. Metro 8 Sheet Metal, Inc. 03S01-9810-CH-00115
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Robert E. Corlew, III
Trial Court Judge: Hon. W. Frank Brown, III
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated _50-6-225 (e) (3) (1998 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant raises two issues for consideration by the Court: 1) whether the Trial Court's award of permanent partial disability payments of forty percent to the leg is supported by the facts and the evidence, and 2) whether an award for temporary partial disability benefits is justified by the evidence. After consideration of all of the evidence and the applicable law, we find that the judgment of the Trial Court should be modified with respect to both issues, and otherwise affirmed and remanded.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
David Coleman v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. W1998-00948-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Neal Small, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). This Court now determines where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
Barry L. Blackwell v. Madison County Sheriff's Dept. W1998-00280-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e) for a hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arises out of heart problems suffered by a sheriff's deputy. The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the statutory presumption in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 7-5-21(a)(1) allowing the court to presume that a law enforcement officer's heart problems are work-related. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered a 3 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole from this injury. Further, the trial court found that a bomb scare on June 3, 1996, was a precipitating factor that caused the plaintiff's problems. The defendant appeals the decision of the trial court, alleging that the court erred in finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the statutory presumption of causation. The plaintiff argues that the trial court correctly found that the presumption applies. He further argues that, even without the presumption, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). However, considerable deference must be given the trial court, who has seen and heard the witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved. Jones v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 811 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1991). After a review of the entire record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we REVERSE the trial court's judgment.
State vs. Deborah Leigh Goins M1998-00758-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Teresa Constantino/Lila Williams vs. Charlie/Glenda Williams W1999-00229-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: W. Michael Maloan
This case involves the interpretation of a deed. The granting clause of the deed created a life estate in the grantee, the ex-husband of the grantor, with a remainder to the three children of the grantee and grantor. However, the habendum clause retained a life estate in the grantor. The trial court decided that the grantor did not retain a life estate because any ambiguity in the deed should be construed strictly against the grantor. The grantor appealed to this Court. We reverse.
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Mickey Phillips, vs. Gwen Knox E1999-00205-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Ralph E. Williams vs. Dept of Employment Security , Comm. Margaret Culpepper, and Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority
01C01-9901-CR-00021 01C01-9901-CR-00021
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Bennie Faulkner vs. Homer Skelton W1999-00621-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
This is a personal injury and wrongful death case involving an automobile accident. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, suffered injuries, and the wife's mother, a passenger in the car, died as a result of the accident. The driver of the other car was a sixteen-year old boy. The plaintiffs sued the boy's grandfather, and various corporate entities that he owned, alleging that they were the true owners of the car and had let the boy drive it for family and business purposes, and also alleging negligent entrustment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm, finding the evidence insufficient to support claims under any of these theories.
Albert J. Shell v. Abb Combustion Engineering, Inc. 03S01-9902-CH-00018
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Howell N. Peoples,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Albert J. Shell, has appealed from the action of the trial court in dismissing his claim for benefits. The court concluded his condition and/or injury was not work-related. On appeal two questions are presented for review. First, it is contended the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding on the causation issue and second, it is insisted the court was in error at the close of all proof to require counsel to submit a hypothetical question to one of the expert medical witnesses. We have carefully reviewed the record with these issues in mind and are of the opinion the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed. Plaintiff was 54 years of age and is a high school graduate. He has been employed by defendant, ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc ., for a long period of time. In 199 he was involved in a work-related accident which was diagnosed as a disc injury causing back and leg pain. He did not undergo surgery and conservative treatment seemed to heal the injury as he returned to work after a short period of time. He continued to work without any significant problems until March 1995. On March 21, 1995, he testified he was using a hammer to attempt to disconnect metal that had been previously welded when the blow of the hammer caused a piece of the metal to break free and strike the top of his foot; that he immediately had pain in his foot and felt he had bruised it; several days later he began having pain in his leg calf and foot and some numbness; he saw his wife's family doctor whose medical records were filed in evidence and indicated the examination revealed "Left foot numbness and weakness since Thurs. No cause. . . . . . ." On March 29, 1995 he saw Dr. George Z. Seiters, an orthopedic surgeon, who testified by deposition and stated his examination revealed a foot drop condition; that the patient had indicated he had awakened with the symptoms and that he could not recall any precipitating event other than the hammer incident. Dr. Seiters referred the patient to a neurosurgeon for further evaluation. Dr. Seiters testified he was of the opinion there was no casual connection between the hammer incident and the foot drop condition and later diagnosed disc condition. He felt the disc condition which the neurosurgeon found was probably related to the 199 work-related accident. He also stated plaintiff never described any twisting movement during the hammer incident nor did he ever complain of having back pain. The neurosurgeon, Dr. Thomas D. Fulbright, first saw plaintiff on May 1, 1995 and he performed disc surgery on May 1th. He testified by deposition and was also of the opinion the hammer incident did not cause the foot drop condition or the disc condition. He said a bulging disc caused compression of the nerve root which caused the foot drop. In describing the hammer incident at work on March 21st to the company nurse, an insurance adjuster, his wife's family doctor, Dr. Seiters and Dr. Fulbright, 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Charles Pendleton v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation 03S01-9812-CH-00147
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John F. Weaver,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Knoxville Community Development Corporation 3S1-9812-CH-147 1 Pendleton v KCDC (hereafter "KCDC") appeals an award of 2 percent disability to the body. We affirm.