State of Tennessee v. James P. Stout
W2000-01743-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

On March 12, 1996, the petitioner, James P. Stout, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner elected not to pursue a direct appeal of his conviction and instead filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Richardson
W2000-01438-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

Petitioner, Anthony Richardson, was convicted of first-degree murder in the Shelby County Criminal Court. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Richardson, 995 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief, which the post-conviction court subsequently denied. Petitioner challenges the denial of his petition, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court's comments during a witness' testimony deprived him of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial; (2) whether Petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial when the trial court "forced" counsel to proceed to trial; (3) whether the prosecutor's biblical reference at trial constituted reversible error; and (4) whether there was a conflict of interest when the same judge presided at both his trial and post-conviction hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brenda Braden, v. Modine Manufacturing Company, Inc .
2001-00219-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Circuit Judge
this workers' compensation case is whether the evidence supports the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff is forty percent disabled where the treating physician found no impairment, where the independent medical examiner found ten percent impairment to each upper extremity and where the plaintiff testified to continuous pain necessitating medication following surgical releases of carpal tunnel syndrome. Based upon a review of the record, the briefs of the parties and the argument of counsel, We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed W. NEIL THOMAS, III, Special Judge, in which William M. Barker, Justice, and John K. Byers, Judge, joined. Michael J. Mollenhour, Knoxville, for the appellant, Modine Manufacturing Company, Inc. Roger L. Ridenour, Clinton, for the appellee, Brenda Braden MEMORANDUM OPINION Modine Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("Modine") appeals from the judgment of the court below finding that each upper extremity of the plaintiff, Brenda L. Braden ("Braden"), is forty percent disabled as a result of carpel tunnel syndrome after surgical procedures to release the carpel tunnel syndrom. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. This action was commenced by Braden against Modine on August 19, 1999. The complaint alleges that Braden suffered bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome as a result of her employment with Modine. Modine filed an answer on September 2, 1999, generally denying the allegations of the complaint. The lawsuit was tried on December 1, 2, and judgment was entered January 8, 21. Notice of Appeal was filed January 29, 21. The evidence which was received consisted of the testimony of the plaintiff; her treating physician, Dr. Joseph DeFiore, Jr.; her supervisor, Dave Deganie; and an independent medical examiner, Dr. Cletus J. Mahon, Jr. Dr. Mahon opined that Braden has residual damage to her median nerve and has ten percent permanent physical impairment to each upper extremity after surgical procedures which released each carpel tunnel syndrome. Dr. DeFiore opined that Braden has no impairment and that she was released by him on June 18, 1999. Mr. Deganie testified that he has supervised Braden for four years and that she has not complained of pain or numbness in her hands. Braden testified that she is 58 years old and has worked for Modine for 25 years. She performs TIG welding for Modine and generally welds 6-7 units per shift with at least four welds per unit. When changing a weld type on October 15, 1998, she experienced pain in her wrists. She saw Dr. DeFiore who performed surgery on her wrists and released her with restrictions on April 12, 1999. Although she received physical therapy from Healthsouth, she continues to take pain medications "to get through the day and to sleep at night." Finally, she testified that her life consists of going to work and then going home. At trial the parties stipulated that the "plaintiff was an employee of the defendant in October, 1998, when she developed bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome." At the conclusion of the trial the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for forty percent permanent partial disability to each arm and awarded Braden $36,28.8. The trial court further awarded Braden discretionary expenses in the amount of $954.35. The latter award was not the subject of the appeal. The review of the findings of the trial court is de novo with a presumption of the correctness of the decision unless a preponderance of the evidence is contrary to those findings. Spencer v. Towson Moving & Storage, Inc., 922 S.W. 2d 58 (Tenn. 1996). In addition, this Court is required make an independent determination as to the preponderance of the evidence. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Service, 822 S.W. 2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). As stated by the Court in Galloway, supra at 586, this Court "is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conduct an independent examination to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Mary Jane Campbell v. The Travelers Insurance Company
E2000-01894-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman, Circuit judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals the trial court dismissal of her claims that a chemical exposure at work caused her disability. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Condra
M2000-02864-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

The defendant, who was charged with vehicular homicide and failure to yield right of way, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review district attorney's denial of pretrial diversion. The trial court found that district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. William Ray Collier
M2001-00893-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Defendant, William Ray Collier, was convicted by a jury of two counts of possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver within one thousand feet of a school, one count of possessing heroin with intent to sell or deliver, and three counts of driving on a suspended license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of seventy-one years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises three issues: whether the trial court erred in admitting certain expert testimony; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; and whether his sentence is excessive. Finding no merit in any of the Defendant's contentions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Bikrev
M2001-01620-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

The Defendant, Michael Bikrev, was convicted of theft of property over $1,000.00 by a Williamson County jury. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the sentence conditioned upon the Defendant serving one year in the Williamson County jail and completing four years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the State did not prove venue, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a tacit admission made by the Defendant, and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Edward Arnold Rivera
W2001-00857-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The Defendant, Edward Arnold Rivera, was indicted by a Hardin County grand jury on two counts of official misconduct, each a felony, and one count of misdemeanor theft. The Defendant submitted an application for pre-trial diversion which was denied by the District Attorney General. The Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Hardin County Circuit Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 38 for review of the denial of pre-trial diversion. The Circuit Court found no abuse of discretion, denied the petition, and granted the Defendant leave to seek an interlocutory appeal to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a). The Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the District Attorney General abused his discretion in denying pre-trial diversion and (2) the record does not support the denial. This Court granted the Defendant's application, and we now affirm the Circuit Court's denial of the petition.

State of Tennessee v. Roland G. Ransom
W2001-00530-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to facilitation of the sale of cocaine greater than 0.5 grams for an agreed sentence of four years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Hershell W. Estes, Jr.
E2000-01869-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of rape of a child. For the former the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years, and for the latter he received a sentence of twenty-three years. The trial court then ordered these sentences to run concurrently. Subsequently, the defendant brought an unsuccessful motion for new trial and now pursues the present appeal in this Court raising two issues. More specifically, the defendant avers that the trial court erred 1) by limiting defense counsel's questioning of the victim concerning her prior sexual experiences and 2) by improperly utilizing two enhancement factors in sentencing the defendant. Upon review of these issues, we find that neither merit reversal and, thus, affirm the convictions and sentences. However, we have noted error in the rape of a child judgment requiring a remand for correction thereof.

State of Tennessee v. Amos L. Brown
E2000-00285-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

In May 1999, a McMinn County jury found the Defendant guilty of the felony murder of one victim and of the criminally negligent homicide of a second victim. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to concurrent sentences of life in prison for the felony murder conviction and two years incarceration for the criminally negligent homicide conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support his conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to order the State to reveal the identity of a confidential informant; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the Defendant's co-defendant to testify against him at trial; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view a video tape of the Defendant's arrest; (5) whether the trial court allowed the jury to hear inadmissible hearsay testimony; (6) whether the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the entire written statement of the co-defendant; (7) whether the Defendant was denied a fair trial as a result of the State's failure to disclose exculpatory information; and (8) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion requesting individual voir dire of the potential jurors concerning pretrial publicity. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the Defendant's convictions.

Joyce Ramsey v. City of Dyersburg,
W2001-01059-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr. Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
In this appeal, the appellant contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the claimant's husband's fatal heart attack arose out of and in the course of employment. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed.

Amy Jo Stone, et al., v. Regions Bank
M2001-00856-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

This is a dispute over life insurance proceeds. Plaintiffs' mother was indebted to defendant-bank and entered into a contract with the bank and the plaintiffs to secure past and future indebtedness by assignment of a life insurance policy on her life. The policy was duly assigned pursuant to the contract with the bank. Subsequently, plaintiffs' mother filed a bankruptcy proceeding, and her liability to the bank on her indebtedness was discharged, but the insurance policy was not affected. The bank continued paying the annual premiums on the policy, and several years after the bankruptcy proceeding, the plaintiffs' mother died. The insurance company, by virtue of the assignment of the policy, paid the insurance proceeds to the bank which then satisfied its indebtedness and paid the balance of the proceeds to the plaintiffs pursuant to the contract. Plaintiffs sue to recover the full amount of the insurance proceeds, contending that there was no existing indebtedness as specified in the contract. The trial court entered judgment for bank, and plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm.

David Travis Bennett v. Pamela Jean Bennett
M2000-02448-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The parties were divorced in 1995. The Final Decree awarded joint custody of their minor child. Pamela Jean Bennett ("Mother") was awarded primary physical custody, while David Travis Bennett ("Father") was awarded visitation. Thereafter, the Trial Court held three hearings upon the parties' petitions regarding several issues. Father appeals two of the three orders that the Trial Court entered, and his issues on appeal involve the following: the Trial Court's refusal, at the second hearing, to allow proof regarding issues previously reserved by the Trial Court at the first hearing; the Trial Court's refusal to allow Father to fire his attorney during the second hearing; the Trial Court's increase of Father's child support obligation; the Trial Court's refusal to modify child custody; the Trial Court's finding Father in contempt for failure to pay child support; and the Trial Court's refusal to find Mother in contempt for her alleged failure to comply with the visitation schedule. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Joel M. Puentes
M2001-01115-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The defendant, Joel M. Puentes, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court for facilitating second degree murder, a Class B felony, for which he received a nine-year sentence. He contends that (1) the indictment is deficient in its allegations regarding homicide, (2) the proof is insufficient to convict him, and (3) the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding accessory after the fact as a lesser included offense to homicide. We conclude that no error exists and that the evidence is sufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Earl Dewayne Cole
W2000-02029-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The appellant, Earl Dewayne Cole, was convicted by a Madison County jury of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to a term of seven (7) years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal the appellant claims the trial judge failed to adequately respond to a jury question regarding the need for unanimity in their verdict, that the written jury instructions showed the victim's name and weapon only under the main charge, and that the trial judge should have considered a lesser offense at sentencing. We find that all of these alleged errors have been waived by the failure of the appellant to enter a contemporaneous objection to them, by the failure to raise these issues in the motion for a new trial, and by the failure of the appellant on appeal to cite to any relevant authority supporting his arguments. Moreover, we find that none of these alleged errors constitute plain error. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael W. Smith v. James Dukes, Warden
W2001-01535-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Petitioner, Michael W. Smith, filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County. He alleged that his conviction for escape in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County was invalid because of an illegal and void sentence. Petitioner did not attach to his petition the Hardeman County judgment or any other portion of that record. He also alleged that the sentence had been served, that he was illegally sentenced as a Range II offender because he had no prior felony convictions, and that no enhancement factors could properly be applied to a Range I sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition and assessed trial court costs against Petitioner, who now appeals both the summary dismissal of his petition and the assessment of costs against him. We affirm the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, but reverse that portion of the order taxing costs to Petitioner.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher D. Lanier
W2001-00379-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

The defendant, Christopher D. Lanier, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to incarceration for nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court's decision to not require a police officer who testified for the state to reveal the identity of a confidential informant. Finding no error warranting reversal, we affirm.

Bonner Mccluskey v. F&M Incorporated,
2001-00468-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: George Brown, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the appellant insists (1) the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for permanent disability benefits based on a finding that the proof of permanency was insufficient, and (2) the trial court erred in disallowing the appellant's post-trial application for relief. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed. JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and L. T. LAFFERTY, SR. J., joined. Steve Taylor, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bonner McCluskey R. Scott Vincent and Ronald L. Harper, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, F&M Incorporated d/b/a Domino's Pizza, Inc., and Domino's Pizza, Inc. MEMORANDUM OPINION On or about January 13, 1999, the employee or claimant, Bonner McCluskey, was injured at work when a box of pepperoni fell from a freezer shelf, striking him in the left shoulder and neck. He reported the injury to the employer, Domino's, and was provided medical benefits. He lost a few days of work, then returned. The employee was treated for his injuries by Dr. Dawoud, who prescribed physical therapy and released the employee to full duty without restrictions. The only issue presented for trial was the extent of the employee's permanent vocational disability, if any. His attorney referred the claimant to Dr. Tewfik E. Rizk, whom he saw a number of times. Although diagnostic testing revealed no evidence of injury, Dr. Rizk diagnosed muscular fibrosis and thoracic outlet delay, provided conservative care and estimated the claimant's permanent whole body impairment to be 25 percent. The employer's insurer referred the claimant to Dr. John D. Brophy, who reviewed Dr. Rizk's records, diagnosed a soft tissue injury, consulted with another board certified specialist and examined the claimant. Dr. Brophy concluded that Dr. Rizk's diagnoses were erroneous. Dr. Brophy opined at trial that the claimant did not have any permanent impairment. Both doctors testified by deposition. The claimant testified that he continues to have disabling pain. He is currently working for another employer, earning more than $4,. per year as a service manager. The trial court rejected the opinions of Dr. Rizk in favor of those of Dr. Brophy and dismissed the claim for insufficient evidence of permanency. Appellate review of findings of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The extent of an injured worker's permanent vocational disability is a question of fact. Collins v. Howmet Corp., 97 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tenn. 1998). This tribunal is not bound by the trial court's findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance lies. Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn. 1991). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circumstances on review, because it is the trial court that had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and to hear the in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Ind., Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). The appellant first contends the trial court erred in accepting the opinions of Dr. Brophy, instead of those of Dr. Rizk, because Dr. Rizk was a treating physician. Trial courts are not required to accept the opinion of a treating physician over any other conflicting expert medical testimony. When the medical testimony differs, the trial judge must choose which view to believe. In doing so, he is allowed, among other things, to consider the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information by other experts. Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991). Moreover, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to conclude that the opinion of certain experts should be accepted over that of other experts and that it contains the more probable explanation. Hinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 675, 676-7 (Tenn. 1983). From our independent examination of the record, we are unable to find the preponderance of the evidence to be otherwise than as found by the trial court. The first issue is accordingly resolved in favor of the appellee. The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in disallowing his post- trial motion for -2-

Melvin Peacock v. State of Tennessee
M2001-00831-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Through his 2000 post-conviction petition, Melvin Peacock seeks to avoid his 1996 Davidson County jury convictions of possession of cocaine for resale and felony possession of a weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of 20 years. After appointing post-conviction counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's single issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the lower court denied post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the court's decision, we affirm.

Stanley Green v. Nashville and Davidson County
M2001-01561-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
A man arrested for statutory rape sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Metro Nashville Police Department to furnish him with copies of records relating to his arrest. Metro filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that records pertaining to sexual offenses against minors are confidential, and may not be disclosed. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered the production of the requested records. We affirm the ruling of the trial court, but modify it to require that all records furnished to the petitioner be redacted to protect the victim's identity.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Randall Elrod
M2001-01125-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer

The defendant was convicted at a bench trial of three counts of aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) he was denied the right to testify; and (3) the sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Jimmy M. Millican
M2000-02298-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated vehicular homicide and driving on a revoked license. He was sentenced to 25 years for aggravated vehicular homicide and a concurrent six months for driving on a revoked license. The defendant contends in this appeal that (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (2) a facially invalid judgment for a prior DUI conviction was used to enhance his conviction to aggravated vehicular homicide; and (3) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Clifford Coleman, Sr.
M2000-01916-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

The defendant, Clifford Coleman, Sr., was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues as follows: (1) The evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree murder; (2) the trial court erred by denying his requested jury instruction on deliberation; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after dismissing a juror; and (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after a witness was allowed to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Melvin E. Beard
M2000-02207-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

After being indicted for aggravated perjury, the defendant, Melvin E. Beard, filed a motion for a bill of particulars. In response, the state filed two bills of particulars, one on January 22, 1999 and one on August 5, 1999. At the conclusion of a jury trial, which was held on March 8-9, 2000, the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated perjury. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve five years in confinement. The defendant now brings this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence on several grounds. Following a thorough review, we find none of the issues raised warrant relief and we therefore affirm the conviction and sentence.