03C01-9406-CR-00242
03C01-9406-CR-00242

03C01-9406-CR-00242
03C01-9406-CR-00242
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner

03C01-9502-CR-00034
03C01-9502-CR-00034
Trial Court Judge: Mayo L. Mashburn

General Oils Company, Division of Ashland Oil, Inc., v. Claude Ramsey, Assessor of Property for Hamilton County, Tennessee and TN State Board of Equalization
01A01-9504-CH-00153
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert S. Brandt

General Oils Company ("plaintiff") filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County against the Assessor of Property for Hamilton County ("Hamilton County Assessor") and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization ("Board of Equalization") seeking judicial review of the decision by the Assessment Appeals Commission ("AAC") of the Board of Equalization that for tax assessment purposes plaintiff's petroleum storage tanks located in Hamilton County were real property. The chancellor reversed the AAC, holding that the tanks were personal property. On appeal Hamilton County Assessor and Board of Equalization present one issue 1On appeal the Board of Equalization only challenges the lower court's action to the effect that tanks are automatically considered tangible personal property under T.C.A. § 67-5-903(f) for property tax purposes. Because the broader issue raised by Hamilton County Assessor in essence encompasses this secondary issue, we approach this case from the standpoint of Hamilton County Assessor. 2 for our consideration: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the storage tanks should be classified as personal property for tax assessment purposes.1 For the reasons hereinafter stated, we find no error and affirm.

Sue McGee v. The First National Bank and Neal Lovlace, Jr., - Concurring
01A01-9508-CV-00341
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James L. Weatherford

This appeal involves a venue dispute. Plaintiff, Sue McGee, appeals from the order of the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial District in Maury County, Tennessee, that dismissed her suit against defendants, First National Bank and Neal Lovlace, for improper venue. The record in the case consists of what was formerly called the technical record and a "transcript of proceedings" which has no testimony and contains only argument and statements of counsel and the court.

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03A01-9509-CV-00320
03A01-9509-CV-00320

03C01-9501-CR-00004
03C01-9501-CR-00004
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner

03C01-9501-CR-00027
03C01-9501-CR-00027

01C01-9503-CC-00063
01C01-9503-CC-00063
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell

01C01-9404-CR-00154
01C01-9404-CR-00154
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

01C01-9408-CC-00286
01C01-9408-CC-00286
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

01C01-9411-CC-00391
01C01-9411-CC-00391
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee

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Jack Layne Benson vs. State
M1999-01649-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
The petitioner, Jack Layne Benson, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Convicted in 1996 of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and sentenced to consecutive terms of life and 24 years, the petitioner contended that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on the grounds that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate, for failing to adequately investigate, and for failing to obtain a transcript of the preliminary hearing. The petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to present additional issues on direct appeal. Because the petitioner has been unable to establish both deficiency in the performance of his counsel and prejudice in consequence thereof, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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State of Tennessee v. Arnold V. Porter
01C01-9410-CC-00353
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.

The defendant, Arnold V. Porter, appeals from a jury conviction in the Circuit Court of Coffee County for two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. The defendant received two two-year sentences as a Range I, standard offender to be served concurrently in addition to a fine of twenty-five hundred dollars in each count. In this appeal as of right, he presents the following issues:

I. whether the evidence is sufficient to support guilty verdicts for felony reckless endangerment,
II. whether he was denied a fair trial because the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community,
III. whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and
IV. whether the trial court abused its discretion in raising his bond pending appeal.

State of Tennessee v Carla Jo Fitch - Concurring
01C01-9209-CC-00290
Authoring Judge: Judge Penny J. White
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Charles Lee

I concur with Judge Cornelius' reversal of this case, but write separately to address other issues.

State of Tennessee v. Darryl Gene Farmer
01C01-9409-CC-00328
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles D. Haston

The appellant, Darryl Gene Farmer, appeals as of right pursuant to Rule 3 (b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from his conviction of murder in the first degree following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Warren County. The appellant was sentenced to life in prison. In this appeal he presents five (5) issues for our review.

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) Whether the indictment against the appellant was invalid because of irregularities in the selection of the venire and/or the presence of an unauthorized individual during grand jury proceedings;
(3) Whether certain statements made by the prosecuting attorneys during closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct;

(4) Whether the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence statements made by the appellant on the night of his arrest;
(5) Whether the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence statements made by the decedent.

After a thorough review of the record in this case, the applicable law, and arguments of counsel, we conclude that with regard to issues one (1) through three (3) no reversible error appears in this case. However, because the record is inadequate with regard to whether the appellant’ s right to counsel was violated during police questioning, we remand the case for further factual findings on issue number four (4). We conclude that error exists with regard to issue number five (5).