Sharon Abbott v. Saturn Corp. 01S01-9703-CH-00071
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William B. Cain,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated the issue raised by the employee or claimant, Abbott, is that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that her permanent disability is not causally connected to her work- related injury. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed. On or about September 1,1993, the claimant,while working for the employer, Saturn, felt a sharp pain in her neck and shoulder while reaching for boxes of parts. She continued to work off and on with pain until November of 1994, when she became disabled to work and was referred by the employer to a Dr. Tom Bartsokas, a family and sports medicine practitioner. The doctor made a preliminary diagnosis of cervical disc disease with myelopathy and myofascial pain syndrome. He excused her from work for one week and ordered a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan. He also prescribed physical therapy. The MRI scan revealed areas of disc bulging in the midline at three levels, particularly C4-C5, C5-C6 and C6-C7 with degenerative disc narrowing from C4 down to C7. In his deposition, Dr. Bartsokas opined the claimant was permanently impaired and gave the following testimony concerning causation: Q. All right. Sir, do you have an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to what was the cause, then, of this permanent impairment that she has? A. My personal opinion is that, number one, she has cervical disc degeneration. It's a form of disc disease compounded by osteoarthritis, spurring of the spine, and particularly at the level where she had her disc degeneration. And this condition that she was born with the proclivity to manifest was aggravated by the work she performed. In July of 1995, the claimant was referred to Dr. Noel Tulipan, a neurosurgeon, who also found her to be permanently impaired and, by deposition, gave the following testimony: Q. So you said earlier that the patient attributed her condition to her work. My question is to you, do you attribute her condition, the condition that you've described and that you found in her neck, to her work? 2
Maury
Workers Compensation Panel
Christopher v. Sockwell 01S01-9703-CH-00067
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carol Mccoy,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the employee's injury did not arise out of her employment. The employee contends the award is inadequate. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Before she began working for the employer, Printing Industry Association of the South, the employee or claimant, Vance, worked as a nurse technician for Baptist Hospital in Nashville until she suffered a back injury for which she received a workers' compensation award based on fifty percent to the body as a whole. She began working for the present employer on May 23, 1995, doing bindery work requiring repetitive use of the hands. On September 1, 1995, while attempting to lift a carton of tapes, she felt a sudden pain in her shoulder and neck, but finished her shift. She sought medical care the next day when the pain worsened and her hands swelled. She was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which was surgically treated. The operating surgeon did not testify, but a report from him reflected that he advised the claimant she would never completely recover from the condition. Two examining physicians confirmed the injury was causally connected to the accident of September 1, 1995 at work. One of them assessed her permanent medical impairment at ten percent to both arms. The chancellor found the claimant's injury compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on twenty-eight percent to both arms. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). An accidental injury arises out of one's employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon a consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993). The evidence fails to preponderate against the chancellor's finding that the claimant's injury was one arising out of her employment with the defendant. Once the causation and permanency of an injury have been established by expert testimony, the trial judge may consider many pertinent 2
Andrea Nichols v. Square D Company 01S01-9611-CH-00226
Authoring Judge: Robe R T S. Br Andt , Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court's award of 65% permanent partial disability to the p laintiff's left ha nd is exces sive. The p anel conc ludes that it is and reduces it to 5%. While working in an assembly line job in August 1994,, the plaintiff developed a repetitive motion injury to her left hand. She is right handed. The initial conservative medic al treatm ent con sisted of restrictin g the rep etitive us e of the plaintiff 's left ha nd. She tried on e job, but said she could n't do it, then w as given a jo b she cou ld perform with only one hand. She said s he couldn't do that, either. The employer informed the plaintiff that no more jobs were available for her that day, but mad e an appo intment fo r her to see an orthoped ic surgeon . The first av ailable appointm ent was f airly far in the futu re, so the em ployer told the p laintiff that it w ould attempt to accommodate her restriction until the appointment. The plaintiff responded by quitting her job . She ne ver retu rned to work for the e mployer . And s he has n ot soug ht any oth er emp loyment. Dr. Howard Miller performed outpatient surgery on the plaintiff in January 1995 and released her to light duty work shortly thereafter. He released her to return to her former job at the end of February. The doctor reported in June 1995 that the plaintiff had full motion in her wrist a nd digits and that she w as largely asympto matic. Dr. M iller did not give the plaintiff any permanent restrictions and did not give her any permanent impairm ent. The plaintiff's attorney sent her to see another doctor, Earl Jeffres, in September 1995. He assessed a 22% permanent partial impairment to the plaintiff's left hand. He acknowledged that the plaintiff's complaints of pain exceeded his objective findings. The plaintiff's complaints of pain in her left hand and the probability that she should av oid repetitive u se of it does limit her emp loyability. But she is ce rtainly employable. She completed two years of business school and worked as assistant mana ger at a r estaura nt for a n umbe r of years . Given the treating physician's finding of no permanent impairment, the other physician's finding of 22% impairment to the non -dominant hand , and the plaintiff's acknowledged refusal to even attempt to find any other work, the panel concludes that the award of 65% to the left hand is excessive and reduces it to 5%. Costs are taxed to the - 2 -
Plaintiffs’ complaint against defendants, Clayborn Ball Temple AME Church and Reverend E. Albert Brown, Jr., is titled “Complaint for Breach of Contract for Sale of Real and Personal Property.” The complaint alleges that defendant Brown acting as the agent and with authority from defendant church entered into a contract with plaintiff providing for conveyance of real property and certain personal property to the church. Prior to the consummation of the transaction, Reverend Brown, for the church, assumed the duties of managing the property and collecting rent, but failed to abide by the contract and pay the mortgage indebtedness and taxes due on the properties. The contract was breached by default in the payment of the mortgage obligations and taxes and further that payment was not made for the property as required by the contract. The complaint avers that as a result of the defendants’ actions, the property was foreclosed, and plaintiffs were liable for deficiencies and other expenses that should have been paid by defendants.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
03C01-9611-CR-00417 03C01-9611-CR-00417
Trial Court Judge: Frank L. Slaughter
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Alpheious Neely W1999-01215-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of one count of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. On appeal he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial judge erred in ruling that his eleven (11) prior burglary and theft convictions were admissible for the purposes of impeachment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
State vs. Ronnie Dulworth M2000-01681-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Lillie Ann Sells
The defendant appeals from his conviction for assault, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and the manner of service of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Overton
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Vincent Bolden W1999-01481-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This appeal arises out of the defendant's conviction for selling a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a public or private school. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
