Brooks Cotton Company, Inc. v. Bradley F. Williams
This interlocutory appeal concerns the question of whether a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds. Appellant farmer allegedly entered into an oral contract to sell his cotton crop to Appellee cotton company. The farmer failed to deliver the cotton and the cotton company sued for specific performance. The farmer defended the suit by arguing that the alleged oral contract was unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds. The cotton company countered that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the cotton company, finding that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. We hold that a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds, the determination of which is a mixed question of law and fact. However, because the question of whether this particular farmer qualifies as a merchant raises genuine issues regarding the inferences to be drawn from the facts, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma J. Solock Smarsh v. David A. Smarsh
This is a divorce case of a marriage of approximately 34 years. After hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge awarded the divorce to the wife, "equally" divided the parties' marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife permanent alimony of $500.00 a month, and awarded the wife $10,000.00 in partial payment of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed and contended inter alia that the wife was not entitled to permanent alimony, nor was she entitled to have an award of attorney's fees against him. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Victor Raymond Peterson v. Kathleen Adelle Peterson
Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We remand to the trial court for further findings. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
William Mise, et al. v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. Virginia Mise was admitted to Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge following complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. She was diagnosed with chronic renal failure. Several days later, she died following a medical procedure. Her sons filed suit, alleging that Virginia Mise’s treating physicians and nurses failed to comply with the requisite standard of care, causing her death. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge and the treating physicians filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment. We affirm the grant of the motions for summary judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrie L. Durham v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development by and through James Neeley in his Official Capacity et al.
This petition was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner seeks judicial review of an administrative decision by the Tennessee Civil Service Commission to uphold the termination of her employment with the Tennessee Department of Labor. On motion by the petitioner, the entire administrative record was struck from the record in the judicial proceedings. Having no administrative record upon which to review the Department’s decision, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Durling Kemper v. Joe C. Baker, individually and in his capacity as City Manager of Berry Hill, Tennessee, et al.
This is a GTLA action against a city and city official following a construction accident in which an exterior wall of a building collapsed,causing serious injuries to one of the plaintiffs and causing the death of the other plaintiff. The building was being demolished and the plaintiffs were employed by a private company that was to disconnect gas utilities on the privately owned building. The plaintiffs claim the collapse was caused, in part, by the failure of the city and the city manager to enforce certain OSHA regulations and provisions of the municipal building code. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the city and the city official on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael H. Gaw, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University, et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. A surgeon performed a procedure on an infant to repair a birth defect at the defendant hospital. The infant sustained permanent injuries after the surgery. The parents filed suit on the infant’s behalf against the hospital for failing to adhere to the expected standard of care. At the conclusion of trial, the hospital moved for a directed verdict on all claims, with only the claims for informed consent and post-operative negligence being denied. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the infant. The hospital has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Monroe v. Travis Monroe
Husband appeals an order denying his motion to set aside a default judgment and the final judgment entered in his divorce action. On the facts presented, we hold that the default judgment should have been set aside; accordingly, we reverse the order denying Husband’s motion to set aside, and the case is remanded. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Consulting and Financial Services, Inc., et al. v. John H. Friedmann, Sr.
This suit arises as a result of the installation of tile flooring in a home. Homeowners sued the contractor for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court awarded $106,103.92 to homeowners and assessed $4,252.00 in discretionary costs. Contractor appeals asserting that, in finding liability, the trial court failed to apply the standard of performance set forth in the contract and that the court erred in calculating and measuring the damages. We have determined that the trial court applied an implied warranty or workmanship rather than the contractual standard; however we have reviewed the evidence de novo and modify the judgment to hold that the contractor breached the contractual standard. We remand the case for a determination of the appropriate amount of damages. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gina A.
Mother argues that the divestment of custody of her child from the Department of Children’s Services to a relative in another state constitutes de facto termination of her parental rights. We find no merit to this argument since the parent-child relationship was not terminated by the court’s custody decision. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Amy Trisler v. Scott A. Collins
Defendant Collins challenges his conviction for criminal contempt, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the use of certain evidence violated his constitutional rights. We affirm the conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Thomas R. Ralston v. Estate of Fred R. Hobbs
The defendant appeals from an Order of Sale of real property, which was sold pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.07 to satisfy a money judgment against the defendant. We have concluded that the defendant waived many of the issues raised and, as for its issue challenging the sufficiency of the notice of the sale, the sale may not be set aside on this ground because Rule 69.07(4) expressly provides that bona fide purchasers for value at the sale shall take free of any defects concerning notice. The purchaser here is a bona fide purchaser for value; thus, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis a/k/a Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the Anesthesia Defendants, among others. Prior to trial, one of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. McLaughlin, was excluded for failure to meet the requirements of the locality rule. Plaintiff proceeded to trial, and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. Plaintiff now appeals the expert’s exclusion and the subsequent jury verdict. In light of our previous vacation of the order excluding Dr. McLaughlin in Kennard 2, we remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of Dr. McLaughlin’s qualifications in light of Shipley. If the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin meets the requirements of the locality rule, as set forth in Shipley, it shall then consider whether he, as an OB-GYN, may testify against the Anesthesia Defendants. Finally, if the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin is competent to testify, it shall then determine whether his erroneous exclusion warrants a setting aside of the jury verdict rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. d/b/a Centennial Medical Center et al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a medical malpractice action due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide a certificate of good faith. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the medical malpractice action based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which provides: “If the certificate is not filed with the complaint, the complaint shall be dismissed, as provided in subsection (c), absent a showing that the failure was due to the failure of the provider to timely provide copies of the claimant’s records requested as provided in § 29-26-121 or demonstrated extraordinary cause.” Because the plaintiff failed to make a showing that the omission was due to the failure of any healthcare provider to provide records or demonstrate extraordinary cause, the trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The plaintiff asserts on appeal that the statutory requirement violates the separation of powers clause and that it violates the due process and equalprotection guaranteesofthe constitution of Tennessee bytreating plaintiffs in suits for medical negligence differently from plaintiffs in other civil litigation and by allegedly restricting access to the courts. Finding no constitutional infirmities, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Entertainment, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board
A sexually oriented business appeals from the trial court’s denial of relief sought in a common law petition for writ of certiorari for review of the Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board’s decision finding the business in violation of ordinances governing sexually oriented businesses and for which it imposed a 31-day suspension of its license. Finding that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence, and that the business’s due process rights were not violated, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ayden K.M.
This appeal concerns a dispute over parentage. Kelly Marie MacCord (“Petitioner”) filed suit against Jon Kyle McMillan (“Respondent”) in the Juvenile Court for Blount County (“the Juvenile Court”), seeking to overturn Respondent’s designation as the father of the minor child Ayden K.M. (“the Child”) and also seeking custody of the Child. The Juvenile Court held that Petitioner did not have standing to deny that Respondent was the Child’s father, noting that Petitioner had signed a sworn Acknowledgment of Paternity (“AOP”) in Texas that recognized Respondent as the father of the Child. Subsequently, Petitioner went to Texas and successfully challenged the AOP in a Texas trial court (“the Texas Court”). Respondent filed a writ of mandamus with the Court of Appeals of Texas, which held that the Texas Court did have subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner returned to Tennessee seeking to enforce the Texas judgment. The Juvenile Court declined to give full faith and credit to the Texas judgment, holding that the Texas Court lacked jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals. We hold that the Texas Court did have the appropriate jurisdiction and, therefore, the Texas judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. We reverse the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
G. Perry Guess, Executor of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard v. Elizabeth G. Finlay
This case involves a dispute between G. Perry Guess (“the Executor”),Executor of the Estate of C. Charlton Howard (“the Deceased”), and the Executor’s sister, Elizabeth G. Finlay (“the Survivor”), regarding the ownership of funds, following the death of the Deceased, in several bank accounts and certificates of deposit. The trial court awarded the bank accounts to the Executor and the CDs to the Survivor. The Executor claims he is also entitled to the CDs while the Survivor argues that she should have received all of the funds. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment awarding the bank accounts to the Executor. We modify the judgment in favor of the Survivor so as to award to her all of the bank accounts as well as the CDs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
BancorpSouth Bank v. 51 Concrete, LLC & Thompson Machinery Commerce Corporation
This is a conversion case. The appellant bank perfected its security interest in collateral for a loan by filing a UCC-1 statement. The debtor subsequently sold the collateral to appellee third parties, representing that there were no liens on the collateral. The appellee third parties later sold the collateral. The debtor defaulted on the loan to the appellant bank, and the bank obtained a default judgment against the debtor. The debtor then filed bankruptcy. The appellant bank filed this lawsuit against the appellee third parties for conversion, seeking the proceeds from the sale of the collateral. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court also adjudicated the bank’s claims for punitive damages and attorney fees. The bank now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s holding on its subject matter jurisdiction, vacate its rulings on the claims for attorney fees and punitive damages, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Deshon Ewan and Patrick Ewan v. The Hardison Law Firm and Jonathan Martin
This is an action for rescission of a release and settlement agreement based on fraud. The plaintiff was involved in a vehicular accident with a commercial driver. She and her husband filed a personal injury lawsuit against the driver and his employer. The parties settled the case for the limits of the defendants’ automobile liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs signed a release that included not only the defendants, but also the defendants’ attorneys and the insurance company. The plaintiffs later discovered that the defendants had a substantial general liability insurance policy. The plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit against the defendants’ attorneys, seeking to rescind the release based on the attorneys’ fraud, and a declaratory judgment that the general liability policy covered the plaintiffs’ injuries. In addition, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages from the attorneys for all damages resulting from the fraud and for punitive damages. The attorney defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Based on the language in the release, the trial court refused to consider extrinsic evidence of fraud and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We hold that the trial court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of fraud and reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the attorney defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kirk Alan Estes v. Kathy Jo Estes
Father and Mother were divorced in 2001 and Father was ordered to pay child support. The parties reconciled in 2002 and began living together but did not remarry. They had another child in 2004. They shared a bank account during their period of reconciliation into which Father deposited his paychecks and from which Mother paid the family’s living expenses, including the children’s expenses. The parties separated again in 2006. Father did not give Mother child support payments during their four years of living together, but resumed paying child support once they separated again in 2006. Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, and Mother filed a counter-petition seeking child support payments for the period from 2002 through part of 2006 when she and Father resumed cohabitation. The trial court gave Father credit for the necessaries he paid for the children’s support during the reconciliation period but ordered Father to pay Mother $32,886 for child support payments that accrued during that time as well as health insurance premiums and medical expenses that Mother paid over that period. Mother appealed the trial court’s refusal to award her child support for the child born during the parties’ reconciliation, and Father appealed the trial court’s refusal to give him more credit for his contribution to the children’s necessaries during the reconciliation period. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Mother’s request for support for the child born during the parties’ reconciliation, but reverse the judgment ordering Father to pay child support during the time the parties were living together as a family unit. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie S. Jernigan v. Leonidas J. Jernigan
The trial court granted a divorce to the mother of two children, named her as their primary residential parent, and awarded the father temporary visitation with the children. The father subsequently entered into an agreed order that suspended his visitation, with a provision that visitation was to resume only upon the recommendation of the children’s counselor. The mother eventually filed a motion to terminate the father’s visitation, while the father filed a petition for contempt against the mother and also sought to have his visitation restored. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, who recommended against resuming visitation between the father and his children. By that time, the father had not seen his children for over four years. The court dismissed the father’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for a prompt evidentiary hearing on the father’s petition. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Aundrey Meals, as Natural Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of William Meals v. Ford Motor Company - Partial Dissent
I concur with most of the majority’s thorough opinion. I must dissent from the majority’s decision to suggest a remittitur of the jury verdict, from a total $43.8 million to $12.9 million. Respectfully, nothing in the majority opinion states a basis under the law for such a remittitur. In the absence of a basis under the law for remittitur, I believe that the majority’s decision amounts to a policy determination, limiting the size verdict a jury may award. It may be that our Legislature can appropriately make such a policy decision, but the courts are not authorized to do so. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aundrey Meals, as Natural Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of William Meals v. Ford Motor Company
Following a seven week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in this products liability action. The jury awarded compensatory damages in excess of $43 million, and assessed 15 percent fault against Defendant car manufacturer. Defendant appeals. We affirm the jury verdict with respect to liability but remand with a suggestion of remittitur. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Outdoor Resorts at Gatlinburg, Inc. v. Utility Management Review Board et al.
Webb Creek Utility District (“WCUD”) is a public utility district that, for the most part, furnishes potable water to its customers and processes their sewage. One of its customers is the plaintiff, Outdoor Resorts at Gatlinburg, Inc., the operator of a large campground for ampers and recreational vehicles (“RVs”). Outdoor is somewhat unique in that it has its own water supply. It is a “sewer only” customer. From 1985 until 2008, the rate WCUD charged Outdoor was set by contract, which either party could terminate with sufficient notice. In 2008, WCUD terminated the contract and notified Outdoor that it would be charged based upon the number of campsites multiplied by a standard minimum rate per campsite. Outdoor objected to the rate. WCUD held a hearing and adopted the proposed rate over Outdoor’s objection. Outdoor asked for a hearing before the Utility Management Review Board (“the UMRB”). While the matter was pending before the UMRB, WCUD conducted a rate study, following which it proposed still another rate for Outdoor that was less than the objected-to rate, but more than the rate Outdoor had been paying under the terminated contract. The UMRB approved the new rate. Outdoor demanded a refund of overpayments made by it under the higher rate; the UMRB denied Outdoor’s request, stating that it lacked authority to order a refund. Outdoor also asked the UMRB to compel the individual who prepared the rate study to appear for a deposition. The UMRB denied the discovery request upon concluding that it did not have the authority to order such a deposition. Outdoor sought review in the trial court by way of a common law writ of certiorari on several grounds, including lack of material evidence to support the new rate, denial of due process in not compelling a deposition, and its characterization of UMRB’s action as illegal and arbitrary. The trial court allowed Outdoor to take the deposition of the author of the rate study; the court later admitted the deposition testimony into evidence. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the UMRB’s decision was supported by material evidence and dismissed Outdoor’s complaint. Outdoor appeals. We hold that Outdoor was not denied due process, but we vacate the trial court’s judgment because we hold that neither the first post-contract rate established by WCUD nor the newly adopted rate approved by the UMRB is supported by material evidence. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Wayne Brown v. Lisa Denise Brown (Church)
This post-divorce appeal arises from an action to modify the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, permanent parenting plan, and to award child support. The permanent parenting plan provided that the father’s child support obligation would not become effective until certain real property was sold; however, because the property had not been sold, the father never started making child support payments. Several hearings were conducted; at the final one, the mother also sought permission to move out-of-state with the minor children. The trial court denied the relief sought by the mother. The father was named the primary residential parent, and the mother was ordered to pay child support. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals |
