Case Handyman Service of Tennessee, LLC v. Helen Marie Harben Lee
Homeowner retained Contractor to remodel her residence and paid Contractor two out of three installments as provided in the contract. Homeowner was not satisfied with Contractor’s work and refused to pay the final installment. Contractor sued for breach of contract and Homeowner filed a counterclaim asserting Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the job in a workmanlike and reasonable manner. Homeowner also claimed Contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair and deceptive practices. The trial court dismissed Contractor’s complaint and held Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the work in a reasonable and workmanlike manner. The court found Contractor was not liable for double or treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act because Homeowner did not prove its deficiencies were intentional or willful. Homeowner appealed, claiming the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend her counterclaim to assert a claim for rescission and erred in holding Contractor did not violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dan C. Ray et al. v. Sadler Homes, Inc.
Plaintiff-homeowners filed this action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the builder and seller of their home alleging that the home was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant breached the contract and the express and implied warranties, and violated the TCPA. The court awarded damages of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home. The court also held Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to the TCPA. Defendant appealed arguing that Plaintiffs failed to prove causation, that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home, and erred in finding it violated the TCPA for which the trial courtawarded attorney’s fees.We affirm the trial court’s findings as to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty and affirm the trial court’s determinations as to damages; however, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding of a violation of the TCPA and therefore the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Tom R. Smith v. Thomas Harding Potter
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney fees and court costs and executed an order to that effect. The plaintiff filed a motion for relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights by awarding the defendant attorney fees without providing proper notice and the opportunity to be heard. We reverse the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Butcher v. Ronald Butcher
Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property in this divorce action. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Town of Pegram v. Cornerstone Development, LLC et al.
Town of Pegram appeals from the trial court’s decision awarding it no damages in its claims against Cornerstone Development, LLC, the company which constructed theTown’scity hall and surrounding parking lot. Pegram also appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, which provided the performance bond assuring Cornerstone’s performance. We affirm the trial court’s findings in all respects. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Michael McGhee v. Shelby County Government
This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a former employee of Appellee Shelby County, filed suit against Shelby County for alleged breach of a settlement agreement. specifically, Appellant alleges that Shelby County breached the contract by failing to change Appellant’s employment record to reflect that he resigned, rather than that he was fired, and/or by informing Appellant’s potential employer that Appellant was fired. Shelby County filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions had expired. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We conclude that: (1) the contract is severable; (2) Appellant’s cause of action for Shelby County’s breach of its obligation to change his employment records was correctly dismissed on the statute of limitations ground; (3) Appellee’s contractual obligation to answer employment inquiries pursuant to the terms of the contract was not implicated until the condition precedent occurred (i.e., until inquiry was made by a third-party); and (4) the breach of this obligation accrued when Shelby County disseminated information counter to that contemplated in the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Appellant’s claim that Shelby County violated the express terms of the settlement agreement in 2010 by informing the Appellant’s potential employer that he was fired is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Decedant Estate of Edward Lavoy Glasscock
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition filed by the niece of a decedent’s surviving spouse to have the decedent’s estate administered and to have a personal representative appointed. The probate court dismissed the niece’s petition for lack of standing holding that she could not proceed as next friend of her aunt because her aunt had previously appointed the decedent’s brother as her attorney-in-fact. The niece contends on appeal that she has standing to pursue the administration of the decedent’s estate in accordance Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 17.03 because the attorney-in-fact for her aunt failed to initiate administration of the decedent’s estate. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Ron Fausnaught, Jr., M.D. v. DMX Works, Inc.
Defendant corporation, which failed to appear for trial, appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against it. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying its Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 motion for relief from judgment and in awarding the plaintiff damages that exceeded the ad damnum clause of the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Chandler Russell v. Household Mortgage Services et al.
Homeowner challenges the trial court’s dismissal at the summary judgment stage of all of her claims against lenders. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the homeowner’s claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of the Truth-In-Lending Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of her claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Paschall, et al. v. Patrick Srebnick, et al.
Plaintiffs, who voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit, appeal the trial court’s award of discretionary costs to the defendants. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
James Lafayette Moore v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
This is a certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary board proceeding that found him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding was conducted violated Tennessee Department of Correction policies. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
James Lewis Jackson v. John N. Jewell et al.
Wilson County appeals from the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed order of compromise and settlement based upon its contention that the agreement would violate a policy of the Wilson County Road Commission and that it “forgot” the policy when entering into the agreed order. The county also appeals from the trial court’s finding that it was in contempt of the agreed order and must comply with the order within six months, the trial court’s denial of its request to stay the judgment, and the trial court’s award of $750 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty C. Goff Cartwright v. Jackson Capital, et al.
This appeal involves various claims by a beneficiary of several trusts against his sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. The defendants/trustees filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void either because they were fabricated, or because he executed them due to undue influence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and the beneficiary voluntarily dismissed all of his remaining claims. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Haun Scarbrough v. Gary Lynn Scarbrough
Wife appeals the trial court’s classification of property and its division of marital property following the parties’ divorce. She also argues that Husband failed to demonstrate his need for spousal support and that the award exceeds Husband’s actual need. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. We find it appropriate to award Husband his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of such fees reasonably incurred. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Bellanti and Albert Bellanti v. City of Memphis
Plaintiff was severely injured when a padlock, which was allegedly thrown from a City of Memphis mower, broke through her vehicle window. Plaintiff and her husband successfully sued the City. On appeal, the City argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of the Public Duty Doctrine. Because the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to amend fails to explain the basis for its denial, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a reasoned explanation of its actions regarding the City’s motion to amend its answer. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna F. Smith Thompson v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to continue and awarded summary judgment to Defendant Bank. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke
In this divorce action, Father appeals certain provisions of the parenting plan, the award of rehabilitative alimony and award of counsel fees to Wife, and the finding that he was in criminal contempt. Mother appeals the valuation and division of marital assets, the failure of the court to require that payments to Mother be secured, rulings with reference to certain pre-trial matters, and the classification of alimony. We remand the case for further consideration of the amount of Father’s annual contributions into the children’s educational accounts; we affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke - Dissenting in Part
I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the requirements for rehabilitative alimony. All types of alimony are statutory, and the legislature’s definitions must be applied. The legislature has stated that it intends that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, through an award of rehabilitative alimony, whenever rehabilitation possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re The Matter of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba "The Cheetah Lounge" et al. v. Sarasota County
After a subpoena duces tecum was served on Chattanooga attorney Scott D. Bergthold (“the Attorney”) requiring him to appear for a deposition in Hamilton County and to produce documents regarding ordinances enacted by Sarasota County, Florida (“the County”)pertaining to “adult businesses,” he filed this action as a motion for a protective order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-9-201, et seq. (Supp. 2011). The Attorney asserted, on behalf of himself and the County, that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and that the discovery was overly broad and unduly burdensome. The trial court granted the protective order and quashed the subpoena. The subpoena had been issued and served at the request of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba “The Cheetah Lounge” and Sarasota Eateries, LLC (“the Adult Clubs”) as a part of their discovery in a Florida case wherein they challenged the constitutionality of the subject ordinances. The Adult Clubs appeal. While this matter was pending oral argument before us, the County filed motions asking that this Court consider dual facts, i.e., (1) that, following the entry of the trial court’s judgment, the Florida court dismissed the underlying case and (2) that court later denied the Adult Clubs’ motion to rehear. We directed the parties to brief the issue of whether this ancillary matter is rendered moot by the dismissal of the underlying action. We now hold that this case is moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Harriet Tubman Development/CHA v. Reginald Locklin
The Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”) evicted its tenant, Reginald Locklin (“the Tenant”), after two of his sons were involved in an incident with neighbors. The eviction was accomplished by order of the trial court giving CHA possession of the property. The Tenant appeals arguing that CHA, which is a public housing authority (“PHA”), made the decision to evict him and his family arbitrarily and without due process. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ethin E.S., et al.
Donna J.S. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ethin E.S. and Mary J.C. (collectively “the Children”). The younger child, Ethin, was born drug-exposed and required intensive care for treatment of his withdrawal symptoms. As a result, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) became involved. In the weeks after Ethin’s birth, a protective order was entered and DCS took temporary custody of the Children. Following a two-day bench trial, the court found that there are multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights and that termination is in the best interest of the Children, both findings by the court said to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges both of these determinations and, in addition, contends that DCS failed to provide reasonable efforts to assist her toward reunification with the Children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Riddle v. Keith Carlton
Former client filed a pro se complaint for legal malpractice against her former attorney. She had previously filed a complaint against the attorney with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, and that matter had been resolved in the attorney’s favor nearly two years before she filed the malpractice complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint for malpractice, finding it barred by the one-year statute of limitations for such claims. The former client appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dakota L.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Brandon M. and Anthony T. to their minor child. The trial court terminated Brandon M.’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination based upon, abandonment, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Brandon M. appeals the court’s best interest determination. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
JRM Investments, Inc. v. National Standard, LLC
The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rozbeh Zaire v. Amir Roshan-Far
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
