Roy W. Keith v. Michael J. Jackson, Sr., and Nata M. Jackson
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract for employment. Roy W. Keith (“Keith”) sued Michael J. Jackson, Sr. and Nata M. Jackson (“the Jacksons”) in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”), alleging that he was not paid separation payments due to him under an employment agreement. The Jacksons answered the complaint, arguing essentially that Keith waived these payments when he accepted a job in the new corporation. Keith filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Jacksons appeal to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment as there remained a material controversy regarding whether Keith waived his right to payment under the employment agreement. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Ann Cradic v. Kenneth Wayne Cradic
This case focuses, in the context of the parties’ divorce, on the distribution of their marital assets and debts. Gwendolyn Ann Cradic (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce against Kenneth Wayne Cradic (“Husband”) on October 24, 2008. The parties went to trial in October 2011 on the issues of fault and division of property. The court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. It then divided the parties’ assets and debts. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of one asset and its division of marital property. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tiashaun C., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to two minor children (collectively “the Children”) of the defendant, Valtrella C. (“Mother”). The Children were placed in the custody of the petitioners, Jason C. and Edana B., in November 2009. The Children had been removed from Mother by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) because of Mother’s substance abuse problems. Jason C. and Edana B. filed a petition in June 2011 seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother. They alleged that grounds for termination existed due to abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit or pay more than token support. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had willfully failed to visit the Children. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald K. Nelson v. Gerald E. Nelson, et al.
This interlocutory appeal involves the question of whether the arbitration provisions contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7-1206(f)-(k)(2008), a part of the Tennessee uninsured motorist (“UM”) statutory scheme, apply to policies with UM coverage that were issued and delivered in Texas. The trial court held that the arbitration provisions do apply. The UM carriers, brought into this action pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. §56-7- 1206(a), appealed that decision. We reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Soumya Pandey v. Manish Shrivastava
Following a four-day trial in this divorce case, the trial court entered an order naming the Mother primary residential parent and permitting her to relocate to Arkansas with the parties’ minor child. The Father appeals. Because the trial court failed to provide any reason for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review on appeal. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order that contains the findings and conclusions mandated by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. James W. Frierson et al
This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Patelco Credit Union v. Chris E. Dutton
This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser following a bench trial. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Citimortgage, Inc. v. Angeline Renee Drake
This is one of three cases consolidated for oral argument. In each case, the following happened: (1) the borrower defaulted on his or her home loan and the lender foreclosed by non-judicial action, a procedure authorized by the deed of trust; (2) the purchaser at the trustee’s sale sought possession through an unlawful detainer action; (3) the borrower filed a counterclaim asserting that the non-judicial foreclosure process violates the Tennessee Constitution and is against public policy; and (4) the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and granted possession to the purchaser. The present case went off on summary judgment. The borrower appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Thais M. Lay v. Millard C. Wallace and Iris Carrington
This case involves the status of a road as public or private, as well as Plaintiff’s right to access such. We find that the roadway was a public road prior to 1960, but that it has since been abandoned. Finding no necessity, we further conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to a private easement over the road to access her property. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Edwin Lester Smith v. Wilma Neyman Smith
This appeal involves a claim filed to recover real property and personalty that was allegedly misappropriated from Decedent prior to his death. Decedent died at the age of 89, leaving Wife and Son as his survivors. Prior to his death, Decedent transferred the majority of his monetary assets and real estate to Wife. Following his death, Son brought this action, alleging that Decedent did not have the mental capacity to execute the transfers and that the transfers were a result of undue influence exercised by Wife, who exploited her confidential relationship with Decedent and also committed fraud to complete the unlawful conversion of the entirety of the estate. The trial court dismissed Son’s claims and awarded any remaining personalty to Wife. Son appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth R. Babb, et al. v. Trent Cross, et al.
In this case, Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment prohibiting Defendants from restricting the use of Marcum Creek Road. Defendants denied that Plaintiffs ever had a right of access to Marcum Creek Road and asserted that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a separate motion for a temporary injunction. The trial court consolidated the hearing on the injunction motion with a trial on the merits and issued a declaratory judgment, providing that Marcum Creek Road was a public road and that the public should have uninterrupted use of the right-of-way. Defendants appeal, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating the motion hearing with a trial on the merits. Defendants request remand of this case to the trial court for a trial on the merits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Cindy Russell v. Jean Claridy
A healthy, living tree located in neighbor A’s yard was knocked over during a storm and fell into neighbor B’s yard. The trial court found that neighbor A was not liable to neighbor B for the resulting damage. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Jeannie McGinnis Caldwell v. The Vanderbilt University d/b/a Vanderbilt University Medical Center et al.
Plaintiff filed suit against Vanderbilt University Medical Center for injuries she sustained during an MRI scan. The trial court held that the complaint stated a claim for medical malpractice and dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). Plaintiff appeals, asserting the complaint sounded in common law negligence and, alternatively, that the documents she filed complied with the TMMA. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Norma Ellington and Clifton Ellington, Individually and as next friend and natural parents of Jerome Ellington, Deceased, v. Jackson Bowling & Family Fun Center, L.L.C., Jackson Bowling & Recreation Center, Inc., and John Doe
This is a wrongful death action predicated on premises liability. The lawsuit arose out of a fight in the parking lot of a bowling alley owned by the defendants. After the plaintiffs’ 19-year-old son punched a member of a rival gang, another member of the rival gang drove up and shot the plaintiffs’ son in the chest, killing him. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendant bowling alley owners for the wrongful death of their son; they asserted that the defendants acted negligently or recklessly in failing to provide adequate security on their premises. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on two bases: (1) the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs’ son to protect him from the criminal acts of others, and (2) the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ son was at least 50% at fault for his death. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Company has not been met in this case. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Crosby Wilkinson v. Bradley Webb Wilkinson
This is a post-divorce case. Appellee Wife and Appellant Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement, which was incorporated, by reference, into the final decree of divorce. The agreement provided for transitional alimony payments, which would “self-terminate” upon the occurrence of certain conditions, including cohabitation. Husband developed a belief that Wife was cohabitating and, relying on the self-termination clause, ceased payment of spousal support without court intervention. Wife subsequently filed a petition for civil contempt, seeking a monetary judgment in the amount of alimony arrears and attorney’s fees. The trial court determined that Husband was not in contempt, but awarded alimony arrears and attorney’s fees in favor of Wife. Husband appeals. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Zamorah B.
The Juvenile Court Referee named Mother as the child’s primary residential parent and awarded visitation rights to Father. Mother requested a rehearing of the Referee’s decision before the Juvenile Court Judge, alleging that “visitation was unfairly decided.” Prior to the rehearing, the parties filed numerous petitions and motions related to visitation and custody, including requests for orders of protection and petitions for contempt. After a ten-day hearing, the Juvenile Court found that it was in the best interest of the child that Father be named her primary residential parent. Mother argues on appeal that the Juvenile Court should have applied the “material change of circumstances” standard to the evidence before it, and that, in any case, naming Father the primary residential parent was not in the child’s best interest. We find, however, that the court was correct to decide the question of custody solely on the basis of the best interest of the child since this was not a modification action. Because the Mother has attempted to prevent Father from having any relationship whatsoever with his child, we also affirm the trial court’s judgment naming Father as the primary residential parent. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Durrett Investment Company, LP v. The City of Clarksville, TN
City enacted an ordinance imposing a temporary moratorium on development of land within a 250 foot corridor abutting land owned by developer. Developer sued City asserting claims forinverse condemnation,wrongfultaking,tortious interference with businessrelationships, and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the trial court granted. Developer appeals, contending that the temporary moratorium constituted a taking and that the tortious interference with business relationships and interference with contract rights claims were allowed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s tort claims and reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation and takings claims. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC
In this case, we address the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiffs did not file any further bond at that time, but later filed a $500 cost bond. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. 27-5-103. The plaintiffs now appeal. After careful review of the statutes and caselaw, we overrule this Court’s prior decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug 10, 2012), and conclude that payment of a cash bond in the amount of the statutory court costs set out in Section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i) satisfied the plaintiffs’ obligation to “give bond with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal” under Section 27-5-103(a), and so the Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the action and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC - Concurring Opinion
I fully concur in Judge Kirby’s well-reasoned analysis, and also agree with Judge Stafford that the word "costs" contained in the statute is ambiguous. I write separately to offer additional historical perspective and to more fully address the implications of the conclusions reached in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC - Concurring Opinion
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize my reasoning in concluding that an ambiguity exists, in direct contradiction to our earlier decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3–CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012) (perm. app. denied Dec. 12, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dacia S., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Sheila W. (“Mother”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W., and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Selena V. and Liliana V.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for McMinn County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer K. (“Mother”) to the minor children Selena V. and Liliana V. (“the Children”), born in 2007 and 2008 respectively. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Mother to the Children after finding that the ground of persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Charles Thomas James
This appeal concerns the administration of an estate. Decedent died testate, leaving all of his non-marital property to his surviving spouse and appointing his daughter as executrix. Executrix and Beneficiary initially agreed that administration of the estate was unnecessary. After Beneficiary suffered an injury and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, Executrix attempted to parcel out the property to Beneficiary’s intended heirs. Shortly thereafter, Beneficiary sought administration of the estate. The trial court admitted the estate and following lengthy hearings regarding which items belonged in the estate, directed Executrix to pay the expenses and close the estate. Beneficiary did not appeal. Over Beneficiary’s objection, Executrix organized an auction of the items held in the estate to satisfy the expenses. Following the auction, Beneficiary filed a petition in which she alleged that Executrix breached her fiduciary duty to the estate by organizing an auction that resulted in waste and mismanagement of estate funds. The trial court denied the petition. Beneficiary appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Shonda Kay Finchum v. Danny Wayne Finchum
Wife and Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement whereby Husband agreed to pay Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years. Husband terminated these payments and filed a petition to modify when Wife remarried and her employment situation improved. Wife filed motion for summary judgment on the issue asserting that the alimony payments could not be modified or terminated. The trial court ruled the alimony payments could not be modified because they were contractual in nature and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Husband appealed both the court’s ruling as well as the award of fees. We reverse the trial court’s judgment that the rehabilitative alimony payments are unmodifiable because the applicable statute expressly provides that a court may modify this type of alimony upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the language of the parties’ agreement providing for the award of these fees. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Celia Moody Rodgers and Sherry Moody Gonzalez, Sole Survivors of Joan Lois Moody v. GCA Services Group, Inc., and Weakley County Tennessee
This appeal involves injuries allegedly sustained by an employee as a result of her employment. The heirs of the deceased employee filed this lawsuit asserting numerous common law tort claims against the deceased employee’s employers. The employers filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that the exclusive remedy for the alleged injuries was pursuant to the workers’ compensation law, and that the plaintiffs’ common law tort claims were barred. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals |
