Wendy Leverett, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
A woman who was severely injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an unlicensed minor filed suit against the minor. The minor’s parents’ insurance company denied coverage and refused to defend the suit on the basis of an exclusion in the insurance policy for damages caused by a party driving without permission of the owner or a person “in lawful possession” of the vehicle. No defense was offered, and the injured party obtained a $1 million default judgment against the minor driver. The injured party and the minor’s parents then jointly filed suit against the insurance company, alleging that the insurance company was liable for breach of contract, bad faith, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and violation of the Unfair Claims Practices Act based upon its denial of coverage. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the minor was entitled to insurance coverage under her parents’ policy at the time of the accident. The remainder of the case was tried, and the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages on the bad faith claim. The jury also found the insurance company had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and the trial court trebled the compensatory damages and awarded attorney fees under the Act. The insurance company has raised a number of issues in this appeal, inter alia, the grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the question of coverage; the finding of liability for bad faith, the liability and enhanced penalty under the TCPA, and the requirement that plaintiffs should make an election between the punitive damages and the enhanced damages. We affirm the breach of contract holding, including the conclusion that the policy terms provided coverage. We reverse and vacate the holding of liability for bad faith, including the award of punitive damages thereunder, since the statutory cause of action was not plead. We also reverse the award of treble damages under the TCPA, but affirm the finding of a violation of the Act. We affirm as modified the award of attorneys’ fees. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy Leverette, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company - Concur and Dissent
I agree with the majority’s analysis of the coverage issue in Section V and its conclusion that TFM breached the contract by denying coverage. As a result of this breach, the judgment against TFM in the amount of $67,000 was appropriate. I concur as well with the analysis of the bad faith claims in Section VI. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton
The appellant, Linda Gass (“Heir”), an heir to the Estate of Tandy Nathan Dalton, appeals from an order of the trial court entered on October 30, 2012, which determined that certain specifically described real property upon which Heir lives is an asset of the estate and may be sold by the appellee, Barbara D. Carmichael, the Executrix of the decedent’s estate (“Executrix”), pursuant to the terms of the decedent’s will. Because it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court was not invoked properly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Krissa E.M.L.
The guardian ad litem for the minor child Krissa E. M. L. (“the Child”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sevier County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lanesha L. (“Mother”) to the Child. The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), which already had been involved with the Child’s case through dependency and neglect proceedings, was named in the petition and supported the prosecution of the petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Kruger, et al. v. The State of Tennessee, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. In the majority opinion, the majority states the issue raised by the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) as: “Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Dyer County Zoning Resolution does not require an applicant seeking a variance to have a written lease.” In a footnote, the majority observes that the appellate record contained “no such finding by the circuit court.” Instead of leaving it at that, the majority goes on to “construe the BZA’s argument as ‘Whether the Resolution requires an applicant seeking a variance to possess a valid lease.’ ” |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Marisa R. Rowland et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County et al.
In this case involving serious injuries sustained in a collision between a school bus and a pickup truck, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Andrews, Jr. v. Deborah L. Clemmer
This case involves the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiff did not file any further bond at that time. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the appeal from General Sessions Court in light of our recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Andrews, Jr., v. Deborah L. Clemmer - Dissenting
In reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff’s payment of $211.50 satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 for appealing a case from general sessions court to circuit court, the majority relies upon the recent case of Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013). Because I believe Bernatsky is based upon a flawed premise, I respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Kruger, et al. v. The State of Tennessee, et al.
Diane Benson and the Northwest Tennessee Shooting Sports Association filed requests for variances to devote property to a Use Permitted on Appeal within a Forestry-Agricultural- |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Thomas L. H. H.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child, who was born addicted to drugs and with extensive medical needs, on the ground of persistence of conditions; Father, who was incarcerated when the child was born, appeals, contending that the termination of his rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We have determined that the evidence shows that the Father’s lack of participation in the care of the child and the treatment of the child’s medical needs constitutes neglect; that the neglect persists and is reasonably probable to continue; that it will not be remedied; and that continuation of the relationship would put the child at further risk, thereby diminishing the child’s complete integration into a safe and stable home. Consequently, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alex Friedmann, Individually and as an Associate Editor of Prison Legal News v. Corrections Corporation of America
This is the second appeal in an action seeking settlement agreements and settlement reports from Corrections Corporation of America pursuant to the Public Records Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301 et seq. In the first appeal, this court determined that CCA is the functional equivalent of a governmental entity in operating correctional facilities and remanded the action to the trial court to determine whether the documents requested by the petitioner fell within the statutory definition of public records set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-301. On remand, CCA refused to turn over two categories of documents, settlement agreements and settlement reports, arising out of inmate litigation, arguing that they did not fall within the statutory definition of public records and are confidential. CCA additionally argued that the settlement reports are protected as attorney work product. The trial court held that both the settlement agreements and reports are public records, that the settlement reports do not constitute attorney work product, that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements and reports, and that the petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g). We affirm the finding that the settlement agreements are public records and that CCA is required to produce the settlement agreements. We also affirm the trial court’s findings that the settlement reports are public records and that CCA has failed to demonstrate that the settlement reports were produced “in anticipation of litigation;” therefore, the reports are not attorney work product and CCA must produce the reports. Further, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial that pertained to requiring CCA to produce the settlement agreements. Finally, we find the petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal to the extent they pertain to the settlement agreements, but not the settlement reports. On remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaycee W.
This is a dependency and neglect case focusing on Jaycee W. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Ellie H. (“Mother”) and Jerry W. (“Father”). At age five weeks, the Child suffered a suspicious broken leg. Further examination revealed multiple other broken bones. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) immediately took the Child into protective custody and filed a dependency and neglect petition alleging that the Child was severely abused in the custody of her parents. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court found that the Child was dependent and neglected and that both parents had committed severe child abuse. Both appealed to the trial court. Following a trial de novo, the trial court made the same findings. Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that she is guilty of severe child abuse. We affirm. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Natasha A.
The mother of the minor child at issue appeals the termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sullivan Electric, Inc. v. Robins & Morton Corporation
A subcontractor on a large project in Texas sued the general contractor claiming the general contractor breached an agreement the parties made regarding claims both had against the owner of the Texas project. The parties agreed the subcontractor would be entitled to a pro rata share of the settlement or judgment amount if the subcontractor’s claims were not itemized. The settlement agreement between the general contractor and the owner did not include an itemization of the subcontractor’s claims. The subcontractor had been given a prepayment of its claim against the owner in the amount of $300,000, and applying this to the subcontractor’s pro rata share, the general contractor determined the subcontractor was not entitled to anything more. The trial court deducted the $300,000 from the subcontractor’s claim and awarded the subcontractor its pro rata share of the difference. Both the subcontractor and general contractor appealed, the subcontractor claiming it was not awarded enough and the general contractor claiming the subcontractor was awarded too much. We reverse the trial court’s award and hold the $300,000 the subcontractor received as a prepayment was more than it was entitled to pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement. Accordingly, the contractor did not breach its agreement, and the subcontractor was not entitled to any damages. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna M. Williams v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint to recover for personal injuries sustained in a fall at the Davidson County Correctional Development Center. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl O. Charles v. Gisselle Carter Neely
This case involves an alleged agreement about funds distributed from a reopened estate. The decedent father died years ago, leaving three daughters and an estranged wife. The father’s estate was probated and closed. Long afterward, the petitioner daughter discovered unclaimed funds in the father’s name held by the State. Another daughter, the executrix of the father’s estate, reopened the father’s estate. Finding no claims against the estate, the probate court distributed the funds to the executrix, in accordance with the father’s will, and closed the estate. The daughter who discovered the unclaimed funds filed the instant petition in chancery court, asserting that the sisters had agreed that the funds would be split among them in accordance with their mother’s will. Based on the probate court’s adjudication of the father’s reopened estate, the chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of the executrix daughter, holding that res judicata barred the chancery court action. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to allegations in the chancery court petition that the probate court should have distributed the funds differently. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the remainder of the chancery court petition, finding that the petition also asserts claims based on an alleged separate oral agreement among the sisters, and hold that the respondent executrix sister has not conclusively established the defense of res judicata as to these remaining claims. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Meacham, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Meacham v. William Earl Starnes, Sr.
This case involves the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiff did not file any further bond at that time. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse in light of our recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Liput v. Bobby Grinder
Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellee uninsured motorist carrier for failure to properly and timely serve the alleged tortfeasor. After a careful review of the record, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Ann C. King (Walden) v. David M. King
Ann C. King (“Wife”) filed a motion seeking to renew a 2001 judgment against David M. King (“Husband”). After a hearing, the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“Anderson Chancery Court”) entered an order renewing the judgment. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Anderson Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction and whether the renewal of judgment complied with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 69.04. We hold that the Anderson Chancery Court had jurisdiction and did not err in renewing the judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Sue Cook v. East Tennessee Human Resource Agency, Inc., et al
This is a negligence case in which Passenger sued ETHRA and Driver for injuries she sustained when exiting an ETHRA public transit vehicle. The trial court dismissed the claim against Driver but denied ETHRA’s motion for summary judgment. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the claim against ETHRA, holding that Passenger failed to prove that Driver was negligent. Passenger appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Anna C.T.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ruby Lois Dye v. Leonard Waldo, et al
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property to which the appellees obtained title in May 2010. The appellant argued that the property belonged to her through the doctrine of adverse possession because she and her mother had used the property exclusively since 1937. The appellees proved at trial that the appellant had not paid taxes on the land for more than 22 years and moved for a directed verdict at the close of the appellant’s case-in chief. The trial court granted the motion based upon the statutory bar imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110. The appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dacia S., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Donald R.S., Jr. (“Father”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W. , and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Markina Westmoreland, et al. v. William L. Bacon, M.D., et al.
The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case to us for consideration in light of its opinion in Shipley v. Williams. In the original appeal of this medical malpractice case, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. On remand we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert was not competent to testify and consequently, the plaintiffs created genuine issues of material fact, making summary judgment for defendants inappropriate. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marina Castro v. TX Direct, LLC
Employer terminated employee shortly after discovering she was pregnant. Thereafter, employee filed a complaint against her former employer asserting claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and misrepresentation. Following a period of discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on each of the employee’s claims. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
