Alden Joe Daniel, Jr. v. Jack Morgan, Warden
The petitioner was originally indicted on multiple sex offenses and felony failure to appear. A Morgan County jury found the petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., guilty of felony failure to appear but deadlocked as to his eight other sex offense charges. Before a retrial on the sex offenses and before a judgment of conviction was entered on the felony failure to appear conviction, the petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts, and the parties agreed that the judgment of conviction arising from the jury trial would reflect that the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor failure to appear rather than felony failure to appear. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that his convictions were void because he had been convicted by a jury of a felony but the trial court agreed to allow that conviction to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Further, he asserted that the reduction of this charge from a felony to a misdemeanor was a material element of the plea agreement, and he sought habeas corpus relief from all of his judgments. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Monroe
Appellant pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to one count of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault, and one count of leaving the scene of the accident. In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received sentences of three years, two years, and one year, respectively. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day, followed by ten years of probation. Appellant seeks review of the sentence on appeal. We determine that the trial court erroneously deprived Appellant of good conduct credits by ordering him to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day. The remainder of the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
R.L. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, R. L. Williams, appeals from the denial of his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2003 rape convictions. He asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to effectively challenge the DNA evidence, which he posits was the only convicting evidence because the testimony of the victim was unreliable. Holding that he has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mickey Jeffries v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mickey Jeffries, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to adequately communicate a plea agreement to him. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Synthia M. Durham v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
The employee sought workers' compensation for a knee injury suffered in a fall. While acknowledging compensability for the claim, the employer sought to cap the award at 1.5 times the disability rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008). The trial court held that the employee was terminated due to her injury rather than her misconduct but applied the 1.5 cap on the award. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's factual findings, but its application of the cap was in error. The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and the cause is remanded. |
Sevier | Workers Compensation Panel | |
David Cantrell v. Howard Carlton, Warden, and the State of Tennessee
Petitioner, David Cantrell, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner failed to comply with the procedure defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall A. Myers
The defendant, Randall A. Myers, appeals the sentence imposed by the Blount County Circuit Court following his open guilty plea to two counts of filing a false report, Class D felonies, and one count of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. After hearing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years, three years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The court further ordered the sentences to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the two felony sentences are excessive; (2) the court erred in denying an alternative sentence; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddrick Devon Pewitte
The Defendant, Eddrick Devon Pewitte,1 was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the admission of certain statements he made to police; (3) the State violated a discovery order; and (4) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors in sentencing him. We conclude that the Defendant’s first three points of error lack merit. We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in the application of certain enhancement factors. We remand for resentencing. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Franklin
The Defendant, Darrell Franklin, was convicted of one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony over his hearsay objection and in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction; (3) he received an excessive sentence; and (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. We conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err in sentencing him. We also conclude, however, that the trial committed plain error by admitting certain testimony in violation of the Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. We accordingly vacate his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latoya Keaton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., And Doyle Ray Atkins
Plaintiff alleged that she was robbed at knife-point on Wal-Mart’s parking lot, and Wal-Mart was negligent in failing to provide security to protect her from the robbery. Wal-Mart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Judge ruled due to the paucity of crimes in the parking lot, Wal-Mart owed no duty to the plaintiff to provide security where the crime allegedly occurred. Plaintiff has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe, Joe and Jane Doe v. State of Tennessee, Dept. of Children's Services
In this action, plaintiff charged that defendant had placed him on a “secret, government maintained ‘indicated’ perpetrator list”, without affording him due process of law. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, held that plaintiff’s action was not “ripe” for determination and dismissed |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Powell vs. Community Health Systems, Inc., National Health Care of Cleveland, Inc., d/b/a Cleveland Community Hospital
We granted an appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tenn. R. App. P., to determine the extent of discovery that would be allowed of an infection control nurse who had investigated the infectious rates at the hospital, because the investigation was prompted by the hospital’s Quality Control Committee. Defendants argued that the investigation was confidential and privileged, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-219. The Trial Court allowed discovery and we affirm, setting forth parameters of the discovery. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc., et al. - Dissenting
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Foreman v. Automatic Systems, Inc.
In this appeal, we determine the extent of Employee’s disability as a result of her June 24, 2004, work-related back injury. Prior to this work-related injury, Employee had been treated intermittently for back problems since 1995. The trial court determined that the June 24 injury caused only a temporary aggravation of Employee’s pre-existing condition and that this aggravation had resolved itself by September 7, 2004. On appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel agreed that Employee sustained only a temporary aggravation of her pre-existing condition. However, a majority of the Appeals Panel determined that Employee’s temporary aggravation had not reached maximum recovery until November 2, 2005, and thus, Employer should be responsible for Employee’s disability benefits and medical expenses until that time. Upon review of the record, we hold that the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we reverse the Appeals Panel and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Rollins
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bobby Joe Rollins, was convicted of aggravated robbery. For this Class D felony, he was sentenced to twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry County, Tennessee, Operating Through Its Adult Oriented Establishment Board v. Charles Redden, d/b/a “The Foxy Lady” and d/b/a “The SugarShack” and Roger Inman d/b/a “The Office”
In this appeal, we are asked to determine: (1) whether there existed sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding Appellant guilty of indirect criminal contempt; (2) whether the circuit court erred in finding Appellant “willfully attempt[ed] to circumvent the requirements of the Act and Injunction Order of the Court[;]” and (3) whether the circuit court erred in fining Appellant for fifty contemptuous acts when the exact number of such acts is uncertain. We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Edward Carpenter, Sr. v. Mary Alice Bobo Carpenter
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and enjoyed a high standard of living. The parties then filed for divorce. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court adopted the wife’s proposal for the distribution of marital property and ordered the husband to pay the wife substantial alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. The husband now challenges the distribution of marital property as well as the award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the husband argues that the trial court overvalued his law practice, undervalued the wife’s counseling business, and failed to give the husband credit for several tax liabilities that he assumed. He further argues that the trial court awarded the wife an excessive amount of alimony and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part as modified, determining that the facts as found by the trial court were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the distribution of marital property and award of alimony. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Psalms, Inc. d/b/a Kirby Pines Estates. v. William Pretsch
Appellant nursing home appeals the trial court’s award of a portion of the damages it sought from Appellee, the son of one of its residents. The Appellee had previously signed a guaranty to cover expenses that his mother could not meet on her own. At the initial hearing, Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof concerning damages, and the trial court re-opened the proof on its own motion to allow Appellant more time to produce the missing evidence. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in so doing, and that, in the absence of the new proof, Appellant failed to carry its burden, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC v. Dowlen Construction, LLC
This is a breach of contract case in which the plaintiff, reflected as “Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC” (“Realty Center”), a real estate broker, sued Dowlen Construction, LLC (“Dowlen”), a builder and developer, for unpaid commissions on sales of real estate. Realty Center signed the contracts at issue in a name slightly different from the name on its real estate broker’s license. The trial court held that Realty Center is entitled to commissions, prejudgment interest, and discretionary costs. Dowlen appeals. We hold, in accord with the general rule, that the misnomer in the contracts did not render those documents invalid or inoperative where there was evidence that Dowlen knew the identity of the real party and, in this circumstance, Dowlen was estopped to deny the existence of the entity with which it contracted. We further hold that the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973, Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-13-101 et seq. (“the Act”) does not expressly require a real estate broker to sign contracts in its licensed name, and we decline Dowlen’s invitation to construe the Act to find this requirement. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lon Cloyd vs. Hartco Flooring Company
In this workers’ compensation appeal, we initially made a referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). We then granted direct review. The employee filed suit for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that he suffered a work-related injury to his wrist, which caused an aggravation of the underlying dormant arthritic condition in his right wrist. In response, the employer asserted that the employee’s arthritis was not causally related to his employment and argued that the severity of the pre-existing condition was not advanced by his work activities. The trial court awarded benefits, concluding that the employee had sustained a 36% permanent partial impairment to his right extremity and was entitled to future medical treatment and discretionary costs. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee had sustained an injury that was causally related to his work activities and by ruling that the statute of limitations had not expired. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial court, we affirm. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Lon Cloyd vs. Hartco Flooring Company - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Cloyd’s scapholunate dissociation with radiolunate osteoarthritis is a compensable workers’ compensation injury. Mr. Cloyd had the burden of proving that his work-related activities caused his disabling condition. This required him to present expert evidence of causation. Glisson v. Mohom Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that except for the most obvious cases, employees must present expert medical evidence to establish that their injury was caused by their work-related activities). This evidence was provided by Dr. William Kennedy. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Clarence Trosper vs. Armstrong Wood Products, Inc. - Dissenting
The Court in this case has reversed the holding of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel that Mr. Trosper failed to prove that his preexisting osteoarthritis was permanently worsened by work he performed in the winter of 1997-1998. Based on a selective review of the evidence, the Court has concluded that Mr. Trosper is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because his work “advanced the severity” of his osteoarthritis. I respectfully disagree that Mr. Trosper has carried his burden of proof in this case. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
Clarence Trosper vs. Armstrong Wood Products, Inc.
Following surgeries on both of his hands, the employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits on the theory that the repetitive nature of his work in the employer’s flooring business exacerbated a pre-existing, but dormant, arthritic condition. The trial court found that the employee’s work duties had worsened his osteoarthritis and awarded 40% permanent partial disability to each hand. The trial court also awarded temporary total disability benefits for the time during which the employee was recuperating from the surgeries and unable to work. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the trial court, holding that the employee’s condition was neither caused nor aggravated by the work he performed for the employer. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of causation and the award of benefits, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Panel and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Scott | Supreme Court | |
In Re Estate of Lucille Ray Heirs of Howard Ray v. Magdalene Long and Joshua (“Josh”) Todd Crews
This is a will contest. The decedent had three children, two daughters who survived her and a son who predeceased her. Two months before the decedent’s death, she executed a will that left all of her property to her daughters and some of their family members, but left nothing to any of the six children of the predeceased son. After the decedent’s death, one of the daughters sought to probate the will. The deceased son’s children filed this petition to contest the will, arguing that it was procured through undue influence. After a jury trial, the jury found that the will had not been procured through undue influence and was, therefore, valid. The son’s children now appeal the jury verdict. We affirm, concluding that the evidence in the record supports the jury verdict. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Gregg Boles v. Timothy Moore and Moore Family Medicine, PLLC
This is a construction case. The plaintiff filed an action in general sessions court to collect money that he alleged that the defendants owed him under a construction contract. The general sessions court entered a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, and the defendants appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court also entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. After the circuit court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial, the defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |