Charlie D. Evans, Jr. v. Cherokee Insurance Company, et al.
In 2005, the employee, a truck driver, sustained a compensable injury to his right leg that also aggravated a pre-existing low back condition. As a result of childhood polio, the employee’s left leg and foot were substantially smaller and weaker than his right leg and foot. The employee reported this pre-existing condition to the employer when hired in 2003. Medical proof established the employee’s combined anatomical impairment at 14% to the body as a whole. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court assigned 84% of the award to the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, Cherokee Insurance Company, and 16% to the Second Injury Fund. The employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding the |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Walter Wiggins, Jr. v. Dal-Tile Corporation
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought benefits for a right shoulder injury, which occurred after he had ceased working for Employer. He contended that his employment had caused a weakening of the structures of his shoulder, which contributed to his eventual injury. The trial court ruled that he did not sustain his burden of proof and entered judgment for Employer. On appeal, Employee asserts that the trial court erred in its ruling. We affirm the judgment. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
James Daniel Richardson Roberts, Jr. v. Champs-Elysees, Inc., et al.
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his malicious prosecution action and the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Finding that an essential element of Appellant’s cause of action had been negated, the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed. Finding there to be no abuse of discretion, the trial court’s imposition of sanctions is affirmed. Finding this appeal to be frivolous as to one of the Appellees, we remand the case for the trial court to determine the damages to be awarded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Chaurice Bagley v. Stephen Dotson, Warden (State of Tennessee)
The Petitioner, Chaurice Bagley, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wooten Tractor Co., Inc. v. Arcon of Tennessee, L.L.C., et al.
This appeal arises out of a tractor lease. After lessee failed to make the required monthly payments, lessor filed this action alleging that lessee breached several different contract provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment and awarded lessor the unpaid rentals. Lessee appeals arguing that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on grounds which lessor failed to allege in its motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew M. Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Matthew M. Jackson, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee - Dissenting
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an airplane which had been purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Department, but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer appealed and the Chancery Court reversed, finding that, because (1) taxpayer provided the seller with a certificate of resale, (2) taxpayer immediately leased the airplane such that it transferred possession and control of the plane to the user, and (3) taxpayer was a validly organized business which observed all corporate formalities, the sale-for-resale exemption pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(34)(A) applied to the transaction. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Michael Eugene Chittum
The Defendant, Michael Eugene Chittum, was charged with one count of reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony. His application for pretrial diversion was denied by the district attorney general and that denial was upheld by the Criminal Court of Trousdale County. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in upholding his denial of pretrial diversion because the district attorney general considered an irrelevant factor in his denial memorandum. On appeal, the State concedes that the district attorney general impermissibly considered an irrelevant factor and asks us to remand this case to the district attorney general for reconsideration. The Defendant, in response, asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order granting him pretrial diversion. After our review, we reverse, remand, and direct the entry of an order granting the Defendant pretrial diversion. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carol Ann Vick Watson v. Frank Lee Watson, Jr.
This is the second appeal in this divorce case. The husband is a lawyer and the wife was a homemaker during most of the marriage. After the divorce trial, the trial court divided the marital estate, awarded the wife transitional alimony, and ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed. In the first appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s valuation of two marital assets, stock and a corporation, and remanded for the trial court to re-value those assets. In addition, the trial court’s decision regarding the husband’s alleged dissipation of marital assets was reversed, and that issue was remanded to the trial court for reconsideration as well. The issues raised on alimony and attorney’s fees were not addressed in the first appeal. On remand, the trial court found a debt owed by the corporation to the husband was uncollectible and determined that the value of the corporation was zero. The trial court adjusted the valuation of the wife’s interest in the stock and engaged in a detailed analysis of the husband’s alleged dissipation of marital assets, finding no dissipation. On remand, the wife sought an award of alimony in futuro. The trial court declined to award alimony in futuro but awarded the wife an additional year of transitional alimony. Finally, the trial court declined the wife’s request for her attorney’s fees. Both parties now appeal. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the husband did not engage in dissipation, affirm the trial court’s increased property award to the wife, reflecting her interest in the stock, reverse the trial court’s finding that the value of the corporation is zero, and remand to the trial court for valuation of the corporation and division of that asset, modify the trial court’s award of alimony by awarding the wife alimony in futuro when the transitional alimony ends, affirm the trial court’s refusal to award the wife her attorney’s fees, and order the award of postjudgment interest on the wife’s increased property award from the stock, dating from the date of the judgment on remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Griffin, Jr. v. Terrance Borum, et al.
Appellant William Griffin, Jr. appeals the trial court’s denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to vacate or amend its order dismissing Mr. Griffin’s case against the Appellee Kentucky National Insurance Co. for bad faith denial of an insurance claim. We affirm |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Conaway v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After sustaining a workrelated injury to his back, the employee filed a complaint seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Marion County. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the employee to be totally and permanently disabled. The employer appealed, contending that the employee’s continuing employment as a pastor precluded a finding of total and permanent disability. An Appeals Panel reversed the trial court’s conclusion that the employee was totally and permanently disabled and modified the award to seventy-two percent (72%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Conaway v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., No. M2006-01177-WCR3-WC, 2007 WL 2141537 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 26, 2007). The employee, who had resigned as a pastor before the Appeals Panel decision was issued, filed a motion for modification pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-231(2) (2008). Following a second evidentiary hearing, the trial court again found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled. The employer appeals contending that the employee failed to present sufficient proof that he sustained an increase of incapacity solely as a result of his work-related injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Charles Taylor
Defendant was indicted for rape of a child, a Class A felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant, Robert Charles Taylor, was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, Career Offender, to thirty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and wife Deborah Jakes, et al.
A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. The trial court agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the developer, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim, but reverse its dismissal of the trespass claim because the evidence shows that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Helen M. Borner, et al. v. Danny R. Autrey
This case involves the interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-5-113(a), which provides a rebuttable presumption that medical bills itemized in and attached to the complaint are necessary and reasonable if the “total amount of such bills” does not exceed $4,000. We hold that a plaintiff may rely on section 24-5-113(a) if the total amount of the medical bills that are itemized and attached does not exceed $4,000, regardless of the total amount of medical expenses that may have been incurred. A plaintiff is not entitled to the presumption, however, if the plaintiff relies on medical bills that have been redacted to reflect a total of $4,000 or less. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred C. Whitehead
Appellant, Alfred C. Whitehead, pled guilty to possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. As part of the guilty plea, Appellant reserved the following certified question of law for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where the initial seizure occurred after police officers entered the residence based on consent. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony H. Dean v. Joe Easterling, Warden (State of Tennessee)
The Petitioner, Anthony H. Dean, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Lee Majors - Dissenting
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority view that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of tampering with evidence. The evidence did not establish the defendant’s guilt of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Lee Majors
The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Curtis Lee Majors, on one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor.1 The jury also convicted the defendant of evidence tampering as charged in Count 2 of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial court refused to apply one of the mitigating factors proposed by the defendant at his sentencing hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Daniels and Peggy Daniels v. Michael D. Wray
Plaintiff filed this action for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant answered, denying liability, and subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 to amend and make claim for personal injuries and property damage as a result of the accident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to property damages, but refused to allow defendant to assert the claim for personal injuries on the grounds inter alia that the statute of limitations had run on the personal injury claim prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The property damage claim was settled, but the refusal to allow the amendment has been appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
De'Andre Kendall v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, De’Andre Kendall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Martin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony Martin, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims on appeal that State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (Gomez II) established a previously unrecognized constitutional right to have a jury, rather than the trial judge, determine the existence of facts necessary to enhance his sentence. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of the motion to reopen pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quinton Sanders
The defendant, Quinton Sanders, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of murder in the perpetration of a felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to exclude evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation; (2) whether the trial court properly found that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the state in the exercise of peremptory challenges had not been established; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to grant a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Donnell Moore v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ronald Donnell Moore, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In seeking post-conviction relief on appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective: (1) in failing to seek proper jury instruction on the burden of proof; (2) in failing to request jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of first degree murder, in particular, the offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) in failing to object to the presence of a mannequin in the courtroom. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leitha C. Perkins and Robert L. Perkins v. Big Lots Store, Inc.
This is a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped on a floor mat and fell as she was entering the defendant’s store. A store security video showed that the corner of the floor mat was overturned by another customer twenty-one seconds before the plaintiff fell. At the time that the corner of the mat became furled, the assistant store manager was at the service desk several feet from the entrance. He denied seeing the overturned mat. The plaintiff sued the store, alleging negligence in allowing a dangerous condition to persist and in failing to warn the plaintiff of it. After the trial, the jury found that the defendant store was eighty percent at fault and that the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. The defendant store filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on comments by jurors to the attorneys. The store also contended that the evidence showed that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the corner of the mat had become folded over. Finally, the store maintained that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was less than fifty percent at fault for her own injuries. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |