Opinions
In Re: Shyann B.
This is an adoption case involving Shyann B. (“the Child”) (DOB: April 11, 2005). We are asked to decide a jurisdictional question. At an earlier time, a juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected. She was placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed by it in the foster care of Teresa S. (“Foster Mother”). Louis F. B. (“Uncle”), the Child’s maternal great uncle, had also sought custody, but his petition was ultimately denied. After the parental rights of the Child’s biological parents were terminated, Foster Mother filed a petition to adopt in the 1 trial court. Uncle responded with a counterclaim seeking to intervene and adopt, or, in the alternative, to obtain custody of the Child. At trial, Foster Mother took a voluntary nonsuit of her adoption petition and, on the same day, refiled a petition for adoption in the Chancery Court for Greene County. In the trial court, Uncle contended that the trial court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate his counterclaim for custody. The trial court found that, by virtue of Foster Mother’s filing in chancery court, jurisdiction over the Child was then in chancery court. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment reciting “this cause is hereby dismissed.” Uncle appeals. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Delivetrick Blocker v. David Osborne, Warden
The petitioner, Delivetrick Dewon Blocker, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Johnson, et al. v. Jerry R. Floyd, M.D., et al.
This case concerns the application of the medical malpractice notice requirement to a lawsuit that was previously nonsuited and then re-filed pursuant to the saving statute. The children of a woman who died due to alleged medical negligence filed suit against the defendant medical providers. The children subsequently nonsuited the lawsuit. Within one-year of the nonsuit, the children sent notice of a potential claim to the medical providers. Within one year and 120 days from the nonsuit, the children re-filed their claim. The medical providers moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was not filed within the one-year period provided by the saving statute and, as such, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the action and the children appealed. Concluding that the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105(a) is not an “applicable statute[] of limitations or repose,” we hold that the saving statute is not extended by compliance with the medical malpractice notice requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c). Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Wayne Carter
The Defendant, Patrick Wayne Carter, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher S. Robinson
The defendant, Christopher S. Robinson, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the court erred: (1) in finding that his due process and speedy trial rights were not violated by the long delay between the filing of the probation violation warrant and the revocation hearing; (2) in finding that he violated the terms of his probation; and (3) in ordering him to serve six months in confinement. Following our review, we conclude that the twelve-year delay between the filing of the warrant and the revocation hearing, under the facts of this case, violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the revocation warrant. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corry Tyrone Owens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Corry Tyrone Owens, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, to ten years of incarceration, to be served at 45%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Davidson Taylor v. State of Tennessee
Davidson Taylor (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for evading arrest in a motor vehicle and driving under the influence. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel: (1) failed to advise the Petitioner properly regarding his right to testify; and (2) failed to request a continuance once trial counsel learned of a death in his family. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael G. McCall v. Jennifer Sue McCall a/k/a Jennifer Sue Jordan
Father and Mother filed a joint motion to modify a parenting plan entered by the trial court in 2010. In their motion, Father and Mother asked the court to reduce Father’s child support obligation, to modify the parenting time schedule, and to amend the plan to permit a known registered sexual offender to be in the presence of their children. The trial court denied the motion with respect to allowing a sexual offender to be in the presence of the children, and otherwise granted the motion. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Matthew B.B. et al.
The married parents of two minor children are involved in custody/visitation litigation in the trial court. The most recent decision by the trial court was prompted by a petition filed by he children’s father. The trial court denied the father’s attempt to obtain custody and suspended his visitation rights pending his completion of anger management and parenting classes. The father appeals. Because the trial court’s judgment is not a final judgment, we dismiss the father’s appeal. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Dana Ruth Johnson Gregory
The executor of the estate of Dana Ruth Johnson Gregory waited approximately 14 months after her death before seeking to open her estate. The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim approximately four months later, shortly after receiving the executor’s notice of the death and the opening of the estate. The executor objected to the claim as untimely under the statute of limitations applicable to claims by the state. The trial court rejected the objection and held that the claim was valid. The executor appeals. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Montana R.T.
This parental termination case concerns the child’s surname. The appellant biological father consented to the termination of his parental rights so that the child could be adopted by the appellee adoptive parents. At the conclusion of the telephonic hearing in which the biological father confirmed that he consented to the termination of his parental rights, the adoptive parents requested that the child’s surname be changed. This request was granted. The biological father now appeals the trial court’s decision on the child’s surname. We affirm. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Signature Designs Group, LLC v. Wayne Ramko and Donna Ramko
This case involves an alleged breach of a construction contract. The plaintiff contractor entered into a fixed priced contract to build a custom home for the defendant homeowners. During the construction, the contractor told the homeowners that the project was under budget, and that they could apply the cushion in the budget toward upgrades. Many upgrades and additions outside the scope of the original contract were made. The project ended up over budget, and the homeowners refused to pay more than the fixed price of the contract. The contractor filed this lawsuit, alleging breach of contract. The homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the contractor some of the upgrade costs and dismissed the homeowners’ counterclaims. The homeowners now appeal. We reverse the award for the cost of the upgrades and remand for specific findings as to each upgrade or addition. In all other respects, the trial court’s order is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Ferrari-Bullock v. Justin Randall
This appeal involves an order of protection obtained by Wife against Husband in 2009 and the extension of that order of protection in 2010. We find no basis for Rule 60 relief with respect to the original order of protection. As to the child support provisions in the amended order of protection, we vacate and remand for a determination consistent with the child support guidelines. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
VFS Leasing v. Bric Constructors, LLC et al.
Secured party brought action against debtors and guarantors, seeking recovery of deficiency which remained after sale of collateral. The trial court granted summary judgment to secured party. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Eddie Maclin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner-Appellant, Joe Eddie Maclin, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaac McDonald Jr.
The defendant, Isaac McDonald, Jr., was convicted by a jury of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony, and sentenced to serve twelve years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Eric Hurd
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment for each count, to be run concurrently, with a fine of $25,000 for the first count and a fine of $15,000 for the second count. On appeal, the defendant’s sole issue is the contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mikel Shane Hutto v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden
The Petitioner, Mikel Shane Hutto, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he failed to receive statutorily mandated pretrial jail credits for his sentences, thereby rendering the confinement illegal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Lindsey v. Joe Easterling, Warden
Michael Lindsey (“the Petitioner”), pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentence on his second degree murder conviction is illegal, and therefore, his judgment of conviction was void. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing. The Petitioner then filed this appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Alexander DeWeese
Upon a plea of guilty, Defendant, Justin Alexander Deweese, was convicted of child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15401(a), a Class D felony. He submitted to the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered a three-year sentence of confinement. Defendant has appealed, asserting that he should receive a totally suspended sentence to be served on probation. He does not challenge the length of the sentence. Having fully reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deney Brockman
Deney Brockman (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building other than a habitation. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Holmes v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Tony Holmes, of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The jury sentenced him to life in prison for first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole for attempted first degree premeditated murder, to be served consecutively. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress an eyewitness’s identification of him. He also contended in his petition that trial counsel was ineffective for improperly making personal attacks against the prosecutor during closing arguments, for failing to impeach witnesses with their prior criminal convictions, and for failing to impeach a witness with her prior inconsistent statement to police. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Charles Austin
Appellant, Jason Charles Austin, was indicted by a Washington County grand jury for one count of first-degree murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder and subsequently sentenced to twenty-three years. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing Appellant’s case to be severed from the case of his co-defendant; (2) the State violated Appellant’s rights under the Tennessee and United States Constitutions; (3) the trial court erred in concluding that Christina Boone was a hostile witness and allowing the State to examine her with regard to her previous statement made to the police; (4) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the loss of key evidence; (5) the State violated the Rule of Exclusion; (6) the trial court erred by refusing Appellant’s request to call a surrebuttal witness; (7) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that guilt may be inferred from evidence of flight and from concealment of evidence; (8) the trial court erred by imposing a twenty-three-year sentence; and (9) Appellant was denied a fair trial because of cumulative error. Following our review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Alvin Young
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Alvin Young, of aggravated kidnapping and domestic assault. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See State v. Michael AlvinYoung, No. E2010-00849-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5517281 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 9, 2011). The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Jason Lee White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). After considering the facts and circumstances of this case as compared to those in White, we again affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Panzini v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Panzini, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 100%. The record contains two judgments of conviction, one provided by the State and one provided by the Petitioner. The judgment form in the official court file indicates the box on the judgment form showing the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life as checked. The judgment submitted by the Petitioner does not contain that check mark. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence was illegal because he was not sentenced to community supervision for life. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his original judgment of conviction did not include community supervision for life as required by statute and that his judgment was modified without notice, a hearing, or an order. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |