Rodney And Tammy Henderson, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University - dissenting opinion
“The law of negligent infliction of emotional distress has been called ‘one of the most disparate and confusing areas of tort law.’” Lane v. Estate of Leggett, No. M2016-00448-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1176982, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017) (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1996)). While this is a statement with which I agree, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I certainly do not dispute that the Plaintiffs in this case have suffered extreme emotional distress, nor do I mean to discount their grief and suffering as a result of the death of their daughter, Halle Henderson. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Paschedag v. Patricia L. Paschedag
This is an appeal from the trial court’s designation of a child’s primary residential parent. After an analysis of the best interest factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a), the court concluded that it would be in the child’s best interest to designate Mother as the child’s primary residential parent. Father appealed. Mother has requested attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, grant Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, and remand to the trial court to determine the proper amount of Mother’s award of attorney’s fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Collierville, et al. v. Town of Collierville Board of Zoning, et al.
This is the third appeal in an ongoing dispute between the Town of Collierville and the owner of property on which two billboards are situated. On February 12, 2013, the Town filed a petition for writ of certorari, challenging a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals. Because the petition for writ of certorari does not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106, the trial court and, therefore, this Court lack subject matter jurisdiction. We vacate the judgment of the chancery court and dismiss the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome Antonio McElrath
The State appeals the suppression of evidence by the Obion County Circuit Court. The defendant, Jerome Antonio McElrath, was arrested on two separate occasions for criminal trespass. The searches of the defendant’s person incident to those arrests produced marijuana in the amounts of 10.1 grams and 4.0 grams, respectively. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrests and dismissed the charges. The State argues that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant and, therefore, the search incident to each arrest was lawful. Furthermore, the State contends that the evidence was legally obtained because the officer acted in good-faith reliance on information provided by dispatch. After review, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
L.J. Jackson, et al. v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
This appeal involves a dispute between a loan servicer and a family who subsequently defaulted on a mortgage for a piece of property. The loan servicer foreclosed and sold the property according to the express terms of the mortgage note and deed of trust after the family had been in default for multiple years and after multiple failed attempts to seek loan modification. The family sued for breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional misrepresentation, asserting that the loan servicer promised to postpone the foreclosure sale until after completion of the most recent loan modification review process. The trial court granted summary judgment to the loan servicer on all claims. The family appealed on all four issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Candice H., et al
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jeffrey H. (“Father”) to his minor children Candice, Danonie, and Izabella (“the Children”). The Children had entered DCS custody after a domestic incident between Father and the Children’s mother. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father appealed. Finding it inapplicable to putative biological parent Father, we reverse the ground of failure to establish paternity found as regards the child Danonie. We affirm the rest of the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio L. Fuller v. Blair Leibach, Warden
The Petitioner, Antonio L. Fuller, appeals as of right from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the petition stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Alfred Waters
The Defendant, John Alfred Waters, appeals as of right from his convictions for aggravated assault, violation of an order of protection, and attempted aggravated burglary. The Defendant contends (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for aggravated assault as charged in counts 6, 7, and 8; (2) that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of the Defendant’s previous conviction for violating an order of protection; and (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify that one of the victims was the “most terrified” victim he had ever seen because such evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ebony Marshall
The Defendant, Ebony Marshall, was convicted upon his guilty pleas of two counts of robbery, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to terms of twelve and thirteen years as a persistent, Range III offender for the offenses. The sentences were imposed to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences, and (3) he was denied his rights to due process and self-representation in the trial court proceedings. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Davarius Smith v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Davarius Smith, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he was entitled to post-conviction relief based on the following alleged violations of his constitutional rights: (1) that the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) that, alternatively, he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel regarding this undisclosed evidence; (3) that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress a witness’ prior identification of the Petitioner; and (4) that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to appellate counsel’s failure to challenge an allegedly impermissible comment by the prosecutor during closing arguments and to properly challenge a special jury instruction provided by the trial court. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deadrick Garrett v. State of Tennessee
Deadrick Garrett (“the Petitioner”) appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) communicate with the Petitioner and adequately explain criminal and trial procedure; (2) review discovery with the Petitioner, including witness statements and forensic evidence; (3) have the Petitioner evaluated by a mental health expert and pursue a diminished capacity theory of defense; (4) anticipate that the trial court would deny a self-defense jury instruction and develop a viable alternative defense; and (5) object to the Petitioner’s demonstrating on crossexamination that he could open the knife used in the murder with one hand. The Petitioner further asserts that trial counsel improperly: (6) advised a defense witness to be hostile towards the victim; (7) instructed the Petitioner to “cry on cue”; and (8) fabricated the Petitioner’s trial testimony “so as to create some justification for [the Petitioner’s] stabbing [the victim].” After a thorough review of the appellate record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lamar Hayes v. Glen Turner, Warden
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a pro se inmate’s complaint for failure to prosecute. After filing his complaint in 2005, the plaintiff took no action in the case for more than 10 years. In 2015, the trial court directed the plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Instead of providing an explanation for the delay, the plaintiff sought a default judgment against the defendant. The trial court then dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Eagle CDI, Inc., et al. v. Michael J. Orr, et al.
This appeal involves a contract dispute between a general contracting company and a husband and wife who sought the company’s assistance to build a log cabin home. After the husband and wife defaulted on the original construction contract, the husband and wife and the company signed a second contract, a promissory note, for the remaining balance. The husband and wife subsequently defaulted on the promissory note. The trial court held that the husband and wife breached the second contract, the terms were clear and unambiguous, and a potential ambiguity in the first contract regarding a nonrefundable deposit and/or retainer was legally irrelevant in determining the amount owed under the second contract. Because the second contract was clear and unambiguous, we hold that the total sum owed by the husband and wife is proper despite any ambiguity in the first contract. Further, we hold that the trial court properly denied the husband and wife’s motion to amend their answer because of undue delay. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Tysheka Barnett v. B.F. Nashville, Inc. DBA Wendy's Of Nashville
Tysheka Barnett brought this action solely against her employer, B.F. Nashville, Inc., dba Wendy’s of Nashville, alleging that Wendy’s general manager, William Rogers, sexually harrassed her during her employment at a Wendy’s restaurant. After a four-day bench trial, the court found that plaintiff had not met her burden of proof to show that the sexual conduct between her and Rogers was unwanted, and, therefore, she was unable to show harassment. On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that the sexual interaction in question was not unwelcomed by plaintiff. This ruling was driven and determined in large part by the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility, including demeanor, of the various witnesses. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Watson v. Rosemarie Ralston-Good et al.
The plaintiff business owner, who provided carpet cleaning services, filed an action in the Hamilton County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”) against a customer, alleging that the customer had failed to compensate him for services rendered. The customer subsequently filed a counterclaim against the business owner, alleging that he had ruined an oriental rug in her home and sprayed chemicals on her furniture. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the customer. The business owner appealed to the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a de novo trial, the trial court also found in favor of the customer, determining that the business owner had damaged the customer’s carpet. The trial court awarded damages to the customer in the amount of $500.00. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Betty Ann Torres (Stone) Spurlock v. Cesar G. Torres
In this child support action, the respondent father, who resides in Texas, filed a motion seeking to vacate the trial court’s previous child support orders, alleging that the court had no personal jurisdiction over him. The State of Tennessee (“the State”), acting on behalf of the mother, asserted that the father had consented to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction by previously seeking administrative review of the child support award. The trial court agreed, determining that its exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. The father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court did not have a proper basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the father, we reverse the trial court’s adjudication concerning personal jurisdiction. Because the trial court’s prior child support orders are void, we remand this matter to the trial court for a determination concerning whether exceptional circumstances exist that would justify denying relief from the prior void orders. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
David E. Scott v. State of Tennessee
Defendant, Scottie R. Buckles, pled guilty in ten separate cases to a total of sixty-three separate offenses for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied alternative sentencing after a hearing. Defendant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing on the basis that the trial court failed to consider whether Defendant should be sentenced under the special needs provision of the Community Corrections Act. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rafael Moreno, Jr.
Defendant, Rafael Moreno, Jr., pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to a three-year sentence of incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and/or an alternative sentence. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alejandro Avila Salazar v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alejandro Avila Salazar, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The Petitioner previously entered guilty pleas to second degree murder and attempted aggravated rape, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years' confinement. On appeal, he argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because his sentence for attempted aggravated rape is illegal and was a material, bargained-for element of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlene Trussell
The Defendant, Charlene Trussell, was found guilty by a Bledsoe County Circuit Court jury of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, three counts of the attempted sale of a controlled substance, and felony possession of drug paraphernalia. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014) (sale and delivery); 39-17-425 (2014) (drug paraphernalia); 39-12-101 (criminal attempt) (2014). The trial court merged the delivery convictions into the attempted sale convictions and sentenced the Defendant to an effective three years’ probation. The court did not impose sentences or enter judgment forms for the delivery convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and (2) as a matter of plain error, evidence of the confidential informant’s previous statements were inadmissible hearsay, violated the Defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and were inadmissible because the probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact. Although we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, we remand the case to the trial court for the imposition of sentences and the entry of judgments for the delivery of a controlled substance convictions, merger of the attempted sale convictions into the delivery convictions, and entry of corrected judgments for the attempted sale convictions. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scottie R. Buckles
Defendant, Scottie R. Buckles, pled guilty in ten separate cases to a total of sixty-three separate offenses for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied alternative sentencing after a hearing. Defendant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing on the basis that the trial court failed to consider whether Defendant should be sentenced under the special needs provision of the Community Corrections Act. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re March 9, 2012 Order
This appeal involves an attempt to set aside an allegedly void order pursuant to Rule 60.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court dismissed the petition for multiple reasons, including res judicata. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Casyn B., et al.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The court terminated the father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct that exhibited wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, as well as substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The court found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
City of Chattanooga, et al. v. Tax Year 2011 City Delinquent Real Estate Taxpayers
This case involves a request to redeem real property following a tax sale. The trial court entered an order of redemption, divested title out of the tax sale purchaser, and directed the court clerk to refund the tax sale purchaser the money expended to purchase the property, plus other sums. We affirm. Finding the appeal to be frivolous, we remand for a determination of damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Joshlin Renee Woodruff by and through Dorothy Cockrell, et al. v. Armie Walker, M.D., et al.
The plaintiffs, a mother and her child, filed this health care liability action in September 2015. The complaint alleged that both plaintiffs suffered permanent injuries resulting from the defendant health care providers’ negligent care during the child’s birth in June 2012. The defendants moved to dismiss the mother’s claims based on expiration of the one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116(a)(1) and to dismiss the claims of both plaintiffs based on expiration of the three-year statute of repose in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116(a)(3). With regard to the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs argued that the mother’s claims were timely filed because the discovery rule delayed the accrual of her claims until March 2015 and because she had been “adjudicated incompetent” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 such that the limitations period was tolled as to her claims. With regard to the statute of repose, the plaintiffs argued that their claims were timely filed because they were entitled to rely on Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), which extends the three-year statute of repose by 120 days when sufficient pre-suit notice is given. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that neither the discovery rule nor Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 applied to the mother’s claims and that her claims were therefore filed after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient presuit notice because the medical authorizations included in their pre-suit notice did not permit the defendants to obtain their complete medical records. Specifically, the trial court found the authorizations insufficient because they did not permit the defendants to obtain relevant medical records from prenatal treatment that the mother received prior to the date of the delivery. The trial court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to rely on the 120-day extended filing period and their claims were filed after expiration of the three-year statute of repose. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and the plaintiffs appealed. Having reviewed the record submitted on appeal, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the mother’s claims based on expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. We further hold, however, that the trial court erred in dismissing the child’s claims based on expiration of the three-year statute of repose. Records from prenatal treatment that the mother received prior to the date of the delivery were the mother’s medical records, and the child could not have unilaterally authorized their release. As such, his failure to do so did not render the medical authorizations provided with his pre-suit notice insufficient. The defendants have not asserted any other deficiencies in the child’s pre-suit notice. Because the child provided sufficient pre-suit notice, he was entitled to rely on Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), which extended the filing period by 120 days. The child’s claims were therefore timely filed prior to expiration of the extended statute of repose in October 2015. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |