Norman Hamby vs. State W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff's fall into a ventilation pit on the University of Tennessee at Memphis (referred to herein as UT) campus when an aluminum grate covering the opening collapsed while Plaintiff was standing on it. The Commissioner of Claims of the Western Division held that the accident was not foreseeable and that UT did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the grating over the pit. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.
Court of Appeals
Connie Pugh vs. Poplar Apartments W2001-02050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This case involves allegations of unlawful ouster. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the defendant landlord. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Christian Yeubanks vs. Methodist LeBonheur W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a procedurally complex medical malpractice case. A child was injured in a car accident. She was taken by helicopter to the hospital, where she died. The child's mother filed suit, alleging liability on the part of three physicians, and vicarious liability on the part of the hospital for the actions of the three physicians. She also asserted that the second physician's medical group was liable for that physician's actions. The complaint was later amended to include independent allegations of liability against the hospital. The mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the first physician; however, the claim of liability against the hospital for the actions of the first physician remained. Immediately before the trial, the mother asserted that the hospital was liable for the actions of a fourth physician. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding a claim against the fourth physician was not admissible. Near the close of her proof, the mother voluntarily dismissed her claims against the second physician and his medical group. At the conclusion of the mother's proof, the trial court granted motions for directed verdict for the claims based on the independent actions of the hospital and for the claims against the hospital based on the actions of the first physician. The trial court then denied a motion for directed verdict on the claim of vicarious liability against the hospital for the actions of the third physician. The trial court then heard a motion to strike testimony related to claims against the third physician. Prior to a ruling on the motion, the mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the third physician and against the hospital based on the actions of the third physician. The trial court awarded costs against the mother and ordered that, prior to refiling her case, the mother would be required to pay the costs. The mother appeals, arguing that consideration of the motions for directed verdict was premature, that the trial court's decision is not final and appealable, that the trial court improperly excluded evidence on claims that the hospital was liable for the actions of the fourth physician, that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for the independent claims of negligence against the hospital, and that the trial court erred in awarding costs against the mother and in requiring her to pay those costs prior to refiling her case. We reverse the portion of the trial court's decision requiring the mother to pay the awarded costs prior to refiling her case. The remainder of the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Watson & Son Landscaping vs. Power Equip. W2002-00136-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This is a sales/UCC case. A landscaper contracted to purchase a used piece of machinery, an excavator, from an equipment company. The excavator had a defective hydraulic system. Under the terms of the sales contract, the equipment company was to repair the defective hydraulic system. The equipment company attempted to do so and delivered the excavator to the landscaper. The hydraulic system, however, did not work properly and the equipment company was unable to repair the excavator to the landscaper's satisfaction. The landscaper then had the excavator repaired by a third party. The landscaper sued the equipment company for failure to satisfy a condition precedent to the contract, and for breach of contract. The trial court awarded actual damages for the difference in value between the excavator bargained for and the excavator actually received, as well as consequential damages. The equipment company appeals. We modify the actual damages to the cost to repair the excavator, and we reverse the award of consequential damages, finding that the proof of consequential damages was too speculative to support such an award.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Sheri English vs. Chris Pretti W2001-01657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier, finding that the carrier's liability was offset by the workers' compensation award which the Plaintiff received for her injuries. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
In Matter of R.C.V. and O.V. W2001-02102-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This is a termination of parental rights case on appeal for the second time. This Court in the first appeal reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the parties primarily because the trial court failed to provide counsel to the parties pursuant to Rule 39, Tenn. R. Juv. P. On remand, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of parental rights pursuant to the applicable statutes and that termination was in the children's best interests. The juvenile court also held that the appointment of a special judge in this instance was not unconstitutional nor was the parent denied due process in the termination proceeding. As appealed, we affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Allen Prentice Blye E2001-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck
The Defendant, Allen Prentice Blye, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary, and as a Range II, violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape.The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years. The Defendant now appeals as of right, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence; erred in admitting certain testimony at trial concerning DNA evidence; that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him the services of a psychological expert for sentencing purposes; and that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors in setting the length of his sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Allen Prentice Blye - Concurring E2001-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck
I write separately to express my concern over utilizing the ex parte search warrant process rather than an adversarial hearing to secure a blood sample from a defendant after adversarial proceedings have begun where there are no exigent circumstances. To my knowledge, this issue has not been addressed by our state supreme court.
The defendant, James A. Mellon, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and waived his right to a trial by jury. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend concurrent sentences on these charges of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and twenty-five years imprisonment, respectively, in exchange for the defendant's agreement to testify truthfully and consistent with his previous statement at the trials of his codefendants. Thereafter, the defendant refused to testify as required by his plea agreement, instead, moving to withdraw his guilty pleas. That motion was denied, the State withdrew its sentencing recommendation, and a sentencing hearing was held. The jury, at the sentencing hearing, found the statutory aggravating circumstance that the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence to the person and sentenced the defendant to death. For the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, the defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of twenty-five years imprisonment. He then filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the imposition of the death penalty.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
Estate of James Sanderson W2001-01938-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
This case concerns the administration of an estate. The decedent's widow appeals the trial court's judgment claiming that it was error to deny her claim for an elective share of the estate. Appellant also alleges error in the finding that the administrator had not caused the estate to suffer monetary loss as a result of actions taken by him in his role as administrator. We affirm.
Hardeman
Court of Appeals
Larry Bullock vs. Charles Spell W2002-00053-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This appeal arises from a contract dispute. The trial court, finding that Mr. Bullock had substantially complied with the contract provisions and that he did not repudiate the contract, entered judgment in his favor. The court awarded damages based on breach of contract, including attorney fees and additional damages. The parties raise multiple issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.
The defendant, Rodney Williams, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction for aggravated robbery. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and insists that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the victim's pretrial and in-court identification. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Town of Collierville vs. Norfolk Railway W2001-02391-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a condemnation case on appeal for the second time. At three places at which roads were to cross over an existing railroad track, the town filed a petition to condemn property in which the railroad owned a right-of-way, in order to build railroad crossings. The trial court initially found that the railroad could not challenge the town's right to take the property and granted the town's motion for the writs of possession. The railroad appealed for the first time. In the first appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and found that the railroad was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the railroad crossings would materially impair or interfere with the railroad's prior use of the rights-of-way. On remand, the trial court found that they would not, thus concluding that the town had the right to condemn the property. The trial court then considered the damages for the condemnation. The railroad sought incidental damages related to its depreciation costs, as well as costs for its increased exposure to liability because of the additional crossings. The trial court determined that the railroad, as a matter of law, could not recover depreciation costs, and also held that the railroad failed to produce proof to support an award of damages for increased liability exposure. The railroad appeals. We affirm, finding that the railroad can recover neither depreciation costs nor damages for increased exposure to liability from the additional crossings.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Renee Moore E2001-01905-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp
The appellant, Stacey Renee Moore, entered guilty pleas to two counts of theft over five hundred dollars ($500), Class E felonies; one count of theft under five hundred dollars ($500), a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony. For each felony conviction, the appellant received a one-year sentence, with the sentences to be served consecutively. Additionally, the appellant received an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for the misdemeanor conviction to be served concurrent to the felony convictions. The trial court denied the appellant's request for alternative sentencing and sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Washington
Court of Criminal Appeals
CH-01-1148-3 CH-01-1148-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
Shelby
Court of Appeals
CH-01-0462-2; CH-01-0462-2;
Trial Court Judge: Kenny W. Armstrong
Shelby
Court of Appeals
James Edwards vs. Banco Lumber E2002-01038-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
James and Margaret Edwards ("Plaintiffs") sued Banco Lumber Company Inc., ("Banco") claiming Banco had trespassed on their property and removed timber. Banco filed a third-party complaint against Nathan Byrd, Betty Byrd, Fred Byrd, and Barbara Byrd (the "Byrds") for indemnification relying on a Timber Deed and Contract between Banco and the Byrds. Plaintiffs nonsuited their action against Banco and an Order was entered on May 16, 2000, dismissing only Plaintiffs' action. Apparently realizing this was not a final order, the Trial Court entered a "Final Order" three days later which disposed of not only Plaintiffs' claims but also Banco's third-party complaint against the Byrds. Plaintiffs re-filed their lawsuit against Banco one year and two days after the first order was entered, but less than a year after the "Final Order" was entered. Plaintiffs also sued the Byrds, for the first time, in this second complaint. The Trial Court held the entry date of the first Order should be used when determining whether the second complaint had been re-filed within the one-year time period under the "Saving Statute." The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against Banco and the Byrds holding the statute of limitations had run. We vacate in part and affirm in part.
This appeal arises from an action brought by the plaintiff/seller to enforce an agreement made as an addendum to a contract for sale of a home purporting to give a mortgage to the seller. We find that both parties acted with unclean hands. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Robert May v. Woodlawn Memorial Park M2001-02945-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman
This appeal involves a dismissal in circuit court of a general sessions appeal for failure of plaintiff-appellant to obtain a trial date within 45 days of the appeal pursuant to local rule of court. After the trial court's dismissal, plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P., Rules 59 and 60, which motion was denied. Plaintiff has appealed. We reverse and remand.
This appeal involves a suit by an attorney against a former client for attorney fees allegedly due when the client terminated contingency fee contracts. The trial court denied plaintiff-attorney's motion for partial summary judgment and granted defendant-client's motion for summary judgment, holding that the attorney was not entitled to recover fees for services provided to the client prior to discharge. Plaintiff has appealed. We reverse and remand.
This case involves a traffic accident and the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Plaintiff's vehicle was struck after Defendant failed to yield at an intersection. Defendant contended that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (Metro) was partially at fault for its failure to properly warn motorists of the upcoming intersection. After Plaintiff and Defendant settled their suit, Defendant pursued a claim against Metro. The trial court granted Metro's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Metro was entitled to governmental immunity. We vacate the trial court's award of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother of two young children on multiple grounds, including the mother's inability to meet their special needs. The mother argued on appeal that the grounds for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the trial court.
This case involves a petition to change custody. The parents were divorced in July 1998. By agreement, custody of the parties' two minor children was awarded to the mother. In February 2001, while the children were staying with the father at the mother's request, he filed a petition to modify custody to make him the permanent custodial parent. In his petition, the father alleged a material change in circumstances, in that the mother had difficulty keeping a job, maintaining a home, and taking care of the children. The trial court granted the father's petition. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not err in finding a material change in circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in changing custody to the father.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Beale St. Dev. vs. George Miller W2001-01133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
This is a disagreement over the exercise of an option contract. The Appellant asserts that he was prevented from exercising his option. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the Appellant never made an unconditional tender of the funds required to exercise the option, and thus did not properly exercise the option during its term.
