Sherry Ellen Carwile v. Compass Group, USA, Inc., W2001-03163-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: William Michael Maloan, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, certain medical expenses allegedly incurred by the plaintiff. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that proof that the expenses allowed were reasonable and necessary was not required where the employer failed to provide medical care as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-24(a)(4)(A). Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Ronald L. Harper and R. Scott Harper, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Compass Group, USA, Inc., d/b/a Canteen Vending Services Jay E. DeGroot, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Sherry Ellen Carwile MEMORANDUM OPINION This civil action was initiated by the employee or claimant, Ms. Carwile, to recover workers' compensation benefits, including reasonably necessary medical expenses, for a work related injury. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ordered, among other things, that the claimant recover any outstanding medical expenses incurred, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6- 24. The employer, Compass Group, USA, has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Obion
Workers Compensation Panel
Rosie Fuller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., W2002-00745-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial judge found the plaintiff had suffered a 9 percent disability to her body as a whole as a result of an injury to her legs and back. The award was apportioned at 75 percent to the employer and 15 percent to the Second Injury Fund because the plaintiff had a previous injury to her leg which amounted to a 25 percent permanent partial disability, which was paid by Wal-Mart. We modify and affirm the judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed as Modified and Remanded JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J. and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J., joined. Jay L. Johnson, Jackson, Tennessee, attorney for appellant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. David Hardee, Jackson, Tennessee, attorney for appellee, Rosie Fuller. Paul G. Summer, Attorney General and Reporter; E. Blaine Sprouse, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. MEMORANDUM OPINION In 1997, the plaintiff developed tarsal tunnel syndrome in her right leg. She was placed in a brace to support her right leg. In September of 1999, the plaintiff started having pain in her left leg. Dr. Wormbrod placed a brace on the left leg as well. Further, the plaintiff began to experience back pain. The plaintiff fell on July 4, 2, while at work and represented she injured both legs and her back. The plaintiff continued to work for the defendant throughout the time of her leg problem and was still working at the time of trial. The defendant assigned her to work at a light-duty job which accommodated the medical restrictions set by physicians. A supervisor testified that plaintiff was a good employee and there was no plan to discharge her. The plaintiff received two raises after her disability and is making more than she was prior to her injuries. Medical Evidence Dr. James Warmbrod, an orthopedic surgeon, was the plaintiff's treating physician. He described the tarsal tunnel syndrome condition the plaintiff suffered and was of the opinion this could be caused by her long hours of standing on concrete in her job. He placed restrictions on long periods of standing, weight lifting, etc., and recommended that she do only sedentary jobs. Dr. Warmbrod did not fix any medical impairment rating, nor did he testify as to a date of maximum medical improvement. He testified the plaintiff might require surgery in the future. He was, however, reluctant to do surgery for various reasons. He was of the opinion the back pain the plaintiff suffered was because her gait was altered as a result of wearing the braces. Dr. Riley Jones, an orthopedic surgeon, filed a C-32 form, basically stating the plaintiff's problems were not related to her work and gave no impairment rating. Dr. Robert Barnett, an orthopedic surgeon, evaluated the plaintiff and confirmed Dr. Warmbrod's opinion of the injuries. Dr. Barnett found the plaintiff had sustained a 44 percent whole body disability. This included a 5 percent rating because of back pain, 15 percent for the left leg problem and 3 percent for the previous injury to the plaintiff's right leg. There is no medical evidence in the record to show the plaintiff sustained any injury to her right leg which would be compensable as a result of the fall of July 4, 2. Findings at Trial The trial judge found the case involved injury to both legs and also to the plaintiff's back. He found the plaintiff had to alter her gait since she began wearing a brace on her right leg in 1999. He found the injury at work on July 4, 2, aggravated her three prior injuries. The trial court found the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement on June 2, 2, the date Dr. Wormbrod placed work restrictions on her. The trial judge found the plaintiff had sustained a 9 percent whole body disability as a result of the injury and because of the previous disability, which was 25 percent to the body as a whole. The trial court concluded that the defendant must pay 75 percent or 36 weeks of the award and the -2-
The petitioner, Benjamin Blackwell, was convicted of second degree murder and, on direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The appellant, Angela Caprice Parchman, was convicted by a jury in the Obion County Circuit Court of the sale of .5 grams or more of crack cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II multiple offender to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that her trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner, Adarryl Devon Brooks, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which followed his jury convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, criminal impersonation, and failure to appear. On appeal, the petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate his case and in failing to interview prospective witnesses. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The defendant, John L. Shelton, pled guilty to driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, and was sentenced to one day in jail and a fine of one dollar. The State appealed, arguing that the sentence was illegal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant, John Richenberger, entered a plea of guilt to driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed a Range I jail sentence of one year, requiring a mandatory minimum of 150 days' service. There was a $3,000.00 fine. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to order a sentence in the community corrections program. The judgment is affirmed and the cause remanded for consideration of correction of the length of the sentence.
The appellant, Alan E. Monday, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-215 (1997). He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to convict the appellant of reckless homicide; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to require the prosecution to identify the reckless act upon which it relied; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
In Re: Petition of James F. Watson, General Sessions Court Judge E2002-02480-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
This is a declaratory judgment action. Judge James F. Watson was, at all relevant times, the general sessions court judge for McMinn County. Prior to 2000, McMinn County was classified as a county of the second class and Judge Watson was paid in accordance with the statutory compensation scheme for such counties. As a result of the 2000 census, McMinn County became a county of the first class. Judge Watson filed a petition seeking a determination as to the proper calculation of his salary as a class one general sessions court judge. The trial court determined that Judge Watson was entitled to continue receiving the jurisdictional supplements to his salary that he had been receiving as a class two judge. We reverse.
McMinn
Court of Appeals
Wanda Shadwick vs. F.H. Shoemaker E2002-01525-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
Wanda Shadwick, individually, and as Executrix of the Estate of her common-law husband, Kenneth Lee Phillips, sued F. H. Shoemaker Distributors, Inc., and Floyd H. Shoemaker, II. The theory of the lawsuit is that the Defendants were guilty of abuse of process in connection with the sale of certain real estate and personal property owned by Kenneth Lee Phillips at the time of his death to pay a claim of the Corporation against his Estate. This claim, in the amount of $25,079.54, had been sustained by the Probate Judge. We find that neither the Corporation nor Mr. Shoemaker are liable for the misdeeds of Max Huff, the first attorney employed by them. Having so found, we reverse the judgment both as to compensatory damages in the amount of $156,000 which, incidentally, was higher than Ms. Shadwick's testimony as to the wholesale value of the personal property, and of punitive damages in the amount of $250,000, which was the amount of the ad damnum clause in the complaint. Mr. Shoemaker filed a counter-complaint seeking to recover the amount paid in delinquent taxes as to a house and lot he purchased at the purported sale, as well as delinquent taxes owed thereon. On this issue the jury found in favor of Ms. Shadwick and we affirm this determination.
Scott
Court of Appeals
John Doe vs. Randall Pedigo E2002-01311-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
Brenda Jones vs. David Jones E2002-01684-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
In this post-divorce case, David Wayne Jones (Husband) filed a motion requesting the Trial Court to discontinue alimony payments. The sole basis for the motion was that Brenda Gail McNeeley Jones (Wife) was "currently residing with a male individual." Wife denied that a reduction in alimony was appropriate, due to her alleged continuing need and Husband's continuing ability to pay. Wife moved for an increase in alimony payments due to her "increased medical expenses, and vocational disability that [she] suffers by reason of the need for eye surgery." The Trial Court awarded Husband a reduction in the amount of alimony from $1,500 per month to $1,000 per month. On appeal, Husband argues that the Trial Court erred by refusing to eliminate the alimony payments, and Wife argues that the Court erred by reducing them. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
The petitioner, Donald C. McCary, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he alleges (1) that he was not competent to enter pleas of guilty; (2) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently plead guilty; (3) that the trial court impermissibly participated in plea negotiations; (4) that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel; and (5) that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because a presentence report was not prepared before the sentencing hearing. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Hamilton
Court of Criminal Appeals
Herbert Heinze vs. Patricia Severt E2002-01184-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Greene County the Appellant, Herbert Arthur Heinze, contends that the Trial Court erred in finding that a valid accord and satisfaction was entered into between him and the Appellee, Patricia Christine Severt (Heinze), with respect to the distribution of proceeds realized from the sale of the parties' marital residence pursuant to a divorce judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for collection of costs and enforcement of the judgment.
Greene
Court of Appeals
In the Matter of: Conservatorship of Ellen Groves M2000-00782-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
This appeal involves the conservatorship of an elderly widow. Both the widow's brother-in-law and a niece filed petitions in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County requesting to be appointed her conservator. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the widow was "competent" and, therefore, dismissed both conservatorship petitions. The trial court also disapproved the brother-in-law's accounting of his expenditures on the widow's behalf and directed the brother-in-law and his wife to return the widow's real and personal property to her. On this appeal, the widow's brother-in-law asserts that the trial court erred (1) by refusing to appoint him conservator, (2) by refusing to approve reimbursing him for his expenses in caring for his sister-in-law, and (3) by directing him to return his sister-in-law's real and personal property. We have determined that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's conclusions that the widow is not disabled and that she does not need a conservator. However, we have also determined that the trial court properly declined to reimburse the widow's brother-in-law for his expenses in caring for her and properly ordered him to return her real and personal property.
Petitioner, Jeffrey M. English, was charged with three counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. He entered open pleas of guilt to the three counts of aggravated robbery, and the State nolled the aggravated assault count. A sentencing hearing was conducted, and Petitioner received a sixteen year sentence for each of the three counts of aggravated robbery. Petitioner also received an eight year sentence for a probation violation, which Petitioner conceded. The trial court ordered all four sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of fifty-six years. Petitioner's sentence was affirmed by this court on direct appeal. State v. Jeffrey English, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 911, No. M1999-02495-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, November 22, 2000) perm. to appeal denied April 9, 2001. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was appointed new counsel, and he subsequently filed an amended petition. An evidentiary hearing was conducted, and the trial court denied the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Petitioner, Donald G. Brooks, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, theft of property over $1,000 and setting fire to personal property. In his petition, Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that Petitioner's appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to request a transcript of Petitioner's sentencing hearing on appeal. The post-conviction court found that all of the other grounds presented by Petitioner for post-conviction relief were without merit. After a careful review, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
Margaret Wightman vs. Truman Clouse E2002-00318-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
The Trial Court held plaintiff was entitled to use roadway across defendants' land. On appeal, we affirm.
Cumberland
Court of Appeals
Shirley Klein vs. David Klein E2002-00867-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben K. Wexler
In this divorce proceeding the wife, Shirley Jean Klein, appeals the judgment of the Trial Court which held that Ms. Klein was not entitled to alimony. We affirm.
Greene
Court of Appeals
Robert M. Overholt, M.D., et al vs. Hugh Ray Wilson E2002-01479-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler
In this suit, Plaintiffs Robert M. Overholt, Joe W. Black, and Michael D. Price sue Defendant Hugh Ray Wilson, seeking possession of a portrait of long-time University of Tennessee football coach, General Robert R. Neyland. The suit also sought injunctive relief as to a proposed sale of the portrait by Mr. Wilson in connection with a bankruptcy sale of assets of a corporation owned by him. Mr. Wilson's sole defense of the suit was that it was barred by T.C.A. 28-3-105(2), the three-year statute of limitations for recovery of personal property. The trial court submitted to the jury a single question regarding the only material factual dispute, and upon receipt of the jury's finding held that the statute of limitations was not a viable defense and granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs. Mr. Wilson appeals and raises four issues, hereinafter set out, for our consideration. We find that they are without merit and affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Jackson Rose vs. Rick Welch E2002-02042-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Attorney R. Jackson Rose ("Plaintiff") was hired by Rick Welch ("Defendant') to defend him on drug related criminal charges. The parties agreed to a flat fee of $25,000 for this legal representation. A retainer of $5,000 was paid up-front. Defendant signed a promissory note for the remaining $20,000. Defendant claims he lost confidence in Plaintiff's ability to adequately represent him after Defendant paid a total of $6,850 in attorney fees. Defendant discharged Plaintiff and obtained new counsel. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim for legal malpractice and also claimed as a defense, inter alia, that Plaintiff's representation fell below the professional standard of care. The case was tried to a jury. After all of the proof was presented, the Trial Court directed a verdict for Plaintiff because Defendant had offered no expert proof to support his counterclaim or his defense to the breach of contract claim. We hold expert proof was not necessary in order for Defendant to prove he lost confidence in Plaintiff and discharged him with cause for that reason. We, therefore, reverse the entry of the directed verdict as to that issue only and remand the case for trial on the sole issue of termination for cause because of Defendant's "loss of confidence." We affirm all other aspects of the Trial Court's judgment.
Claiborne
Court of Appeals
Margaret Wightman vs. Truman Clouse E2002-00318-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
The Trial Court held plaintiff was entitled to use roadway across defendants' land. On appeal, we affirm.
