In Re Estate of Donald Patrick Burns
A decedent’s stepchildren filed a complaint contesting ownership of a portion of his twenty-acre property. They asserted theories of adverse possession, express oral trust, and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Because we conclude that the allegations of an express oral trust and breach of contract are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, we reverse in part. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Guardianship of Beatrice Rose Malone - Dissenting
For disobedience of or resistance to a court order to constitute contempt, four elements must be satisfied. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga–Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3) (2024) (defining the scope of a court’s contempt power). This case turns on the second of the four: whether “the order alleged to have been violated . . . [was] clear, specific, and unambiguous.” Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354. Because the order here was not sufficiently specific to support the finding of contempt, I would reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jared A. Smith
Following a jury trial, a Cheatham County jury convicted Defendant, Jared A. Smith, of three counts of Rape of a Child, four counts of Aggravated Sexual Battery, and three counts of Incest, for which he received a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a police witness; (2) the State’s election of offenses was “vague, ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence,” in violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (3) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on generic evidence. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Caz H. et al.
The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to six children based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and severe abuse. The trial court further concluded that terminating the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Guardianship of Beatrice Rose Malone
Katherine Malone died in an accident in Idaho. Her ex-husband, Patrick Malone, was named guardian of their child, Beatrice Rose Malone (“Rosie”). A trust (“the Tennessee Trust”) was established in Davidson County, Tennessee, for all funds due to Rosie. Katherine Malone’s parents, James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“the Roses”) were the personal representatives of her estate and “Limited Trust Protectors,” of the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone, as Rosie’s guardian, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Idaho and recovered a settlement. The settlement funds were placed in a trust Mr. Malone established in Missouri with Blue Ridge Bank and Trust. The Roses filed this action to transfer the funds to the Tennessee Trust and to find Mr. Malone in civil contempt. The Probate Court agreed with the Roses, finding Mr. Malone in civil contempt and ordering that the funds be transferred to the Tennessee Trust. Mr. Malone and Blue Ridge Bank and Trust appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rico Eugene Mallard v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rico Eugene Mallard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 1999 especially aggravated robbery conviction, for which he was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to his life sentence for first degree murder. The post-conviction court found that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to Petitioner’s case, and therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled, and the petition was time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janet Doe v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
Shortly after the City of Memphis (“the City”) made public announcements regarding untested sexual assault kits, three women filed a class action complaint alleging that the announcements caused them severe emotional distress. More than a year after the announcements, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a new plaintiff. The three original plaintiffs’ claims were either voluntarily dismissed or dismissed by the trial court based upon the statute of limitations. The City sought summary judgment against the only remaining plaintiff on the ground that her claims were time-barred. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and this Court granted the City’s petition for an interlocutory appeal. Concluding that the applicable statute of limitations barred the new plaintiff’s claims, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Hunt v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ricky Hunt, pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, along with two amended petitions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the corroboration requirement regarding accomplice testimony and for failing to help him file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel failed to advise him that his sentence was required to be served at 100%. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mendy Powell Neal
After three days of a Dickson County jury trial, the Defendant, Mendy Powell Neal, who was charged with the first degree premeditated and felony murder of her husband and the aggravated arson of their home, entered a North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), best interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, in exchange for the dismissal of the felony murder and aggravated arson counts of the presentment and an agreed range of three to four years, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, determined that she was not a suitable candidate for probation or other alternative sentencing, and sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to four years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following the denial of what the Defendant styled as a “Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court treated as a Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence, the Defendant filed an untimely appeal to this court in which she argues that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentence. Based on our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived for the Defendant’s attempt to appeal the trial court’s original sentencing determinations. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by declining to reduce or modify the sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Calvin Dwight Butler
The defendant, Calvin Dwight Butler, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor. As a |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Logan R. McDavid v. Andrea Murray
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Doe v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
This is an appeal from a class certification. Because the trial court failed to clearly define the class being certified, we are unable to proceed to review the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Anthony Williams, Alias
The Defendant, Joshua Anthony Williams, alias, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was to receive a four-year sentence as a Range II offender to be served on probation following one year of confinement, and the trial court was to determine whether to grant judicial diversion and whether to require the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, extending the diversionary period to six years, and placed the Defendant on the sexual offender registry during the diversionary period. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in placing him on the sexual offender registry. We conclude that the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that the Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements for extraordinary relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carrie M. Thompson v. Stephen Matthew Thompson
Parents filed competing petitions to modify a parenting plan. The parents agreed there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification. But they disagreed over the residential custody schedule and decision-making provisions. After a hearing, the trial court modified the schedule and granted joint decision-making. Because neither decision was an abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kedalo Construction, LLC et al. v. Linda Duygul Ward et al.
Ms. Ward hired Kedalo Construction LLC (“Kedalo”) to renovate her store. She claimed that the work was not completed or was not done properly. After Kedalo attempted to remedy the situation, Ms. Ward was still not satisfied. Kedalo then said she was not their problem anymore. Ms. Ward created a website and Facebook page criticizing the company. Kedalo sued for defamation. Ms. Ward responded with a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After many filings and a deposition, the trial court dismissed the petition. Ms. Ward appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin W. Addis Et Al. v. Eagle CDI, Inc.
In this contract dispute, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation predicated on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the defendant. The petitioners have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Desmond Lanier Hatchett
Defendant, Desmond Lanier Hatchett, was convicted by a Knox County jury of evading |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ann Marie Roberts v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority
In this negligence action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff, who is legally blind, had failed to present evidence that her fall from a street curb and resultant injury were caused by the defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to make a courtesy stop at the location the plaintiff had requested for exiting a city bus. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Dion Wells
The Defendant, Timothy Dion Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karl Raymond Duffy v. Jenifer Michele Duffy
In its divorce decree, the trial court “adopted” Wife’s proposed parenting plans without signing or attaching the plans. More than a year after the resolution of Husband’s subsequent motion to alter or amend, the trial court eventually signed the parenting plans pursuant to a motion to enter by Husband. Because we determine that Husband’s argument that the trial court’s order only became final when the plans were signed is without merit, we conclude that Husband’s appeal was untimely. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed. Wife is awarded her appellate attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Home Service Oil Company v. Thomas Baker
A judgment creditor petitioned to enroll and enforce a Missouri judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. In an earlier appeal, we determined that the trial court properly enrolled the foreign judgment, but we vacated the enforcement decision to determine the outstanding amount owed under the judgment. In this appeal, the judgment debtor faults the trial court for not considering his equitable estoppel defense on remand. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Garramone v. Tommy Dugger et al.
This Tennessee Public Participation Act appeal involves three parties and multiple issues. The plaintiff/appellee, Lisa Garramone (“Ms. Garramone”), while serving as a commissioner for the City of Nolensville, Tennessee, filed a complaint for, inter alia, false light invasion of privacy against four defendants, including appellants Jason Patrick (“Mr. Patrick”) and Dr. Joe Curtsinger (“Dr. Curtsinger”). Ms. Garramone alleged that the defendants acted in concert to spread defamatory information about her during her 2022 re-election campaign. Each defendant responded by filing a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 20-17-101 to -110 (“the TPPA”). Mr. Patrick also filed a motion for summary judgment; Dr. Curtsinger did not. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Garramone filed a notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice” of all of her claims under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01(1), to which the defendants objected. While the TPPA petitions were pending, this court ruled on the interplay between the TPPA and Rule 41.01(1) in Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade I”), No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2200729 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023). Consequently, the trial court ordered the parties to reargue the TPPA petitions considering this court’s rulings in Flade I. Thereafter, the trial court determined that Ms. Garramone’s voluntary dismissal mooted Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition but that it was ineffective against Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition because of his pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court further held that Mr. Patrick established that the TPPA applied because Ms. Garramone’s claims were based on, related to, or in response to his exercise of the right to free speech. But the court held that Ms. Garramone failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for her tort claims as required by the TPPA. Thus, the court granted Mr. Patrick’s petition, dismissed Ms. Garramone’s claims against him, and ordered Mr. Patrick to submit his claim for attorney’s fees and costs. Mr. Patrick sought $74,346.50 in attorney’s fees and $920.09 in costs, but the court awarded him only $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $66.91 in costs based on its determination that the TPPA’s fee-shifting provision—Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-107—should be construed narrowly because it runs contra to the American Rule. Thus, the court found that Mr. Patrick was entitled to only those fees “reasonably incurred in obtaining the dismissal of the action,” which did not include, inter alia, services rendered to prepare a defense against Ms. Garramone’s tort claims. The court reasoned that “more than $46,600.00 of his total fees and $853.18 of his costs” were incurred after Ms. Garramone filed her notice of voluntary nonsuit with prejudice, which the trial court stated disposed of the case “for all practical purposes.” Mr. Patrick appeals the amount of the award for his attorney’s fees and costs; he also seeks his attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. Dr. Curtsinger appeals the denial of his TPPA petition as moot. For her part, Ms. Garramone contends the trial court erred by not denying Mr. Patrick’s TPPA petition as moot when she filed her notice of voluntary dismissal “with prejudice.” After these consolidated appeals were filed and argued, our Supreme Court rendered two decisions pertaining to the TPPA, Charles v. McQueen, 693 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2024), and Flade v. City of Shelbyville (“Flade II”), ––– S.W.3d ––––, No. M2022-00553-SC-R11-CV, 2024 WL 4448736 (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024). Based on the reasoning in Flade II, we hold that Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition did not curtail Ms. Garramone’s “free and unrestricted” right to voluntarily dismiss her claims against him; thus, we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Curtsinger’s TPPA petition as moot. We further find that Ms. Garramone’s characterization of her dismissal as “with prejudice” did not place it outside the ambit of Rule 41.01(1)’s summary-judgment exception. As for Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs, we rely upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charles and Flade II to find that the trial court erred by categorically excluding all fees and costs he incurred in preparing a defense to Ms. Garramone’s claims. Accordingly, we vacate the award of Mr. Patrick’s attorney’s fees and costs and remand for reconsideration of the reasonable amount to which he is entitled under § 20-17-106 and to enter judgment accordingly. We also find that Mr. Patrick is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this appeal pursuant to § 20-17-107, as explained in Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers, 639 S.W.3d 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021), and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Alexander Greene
The Defendant, Steven Alexander Greene, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, a Class |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Avyona P.
Appellant/Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the Department of Children’s Services withdrew noncompliance with the permanency plan as a ground for termination, we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Antonio M. Starnes
A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Antonio M. Starnes, guilty of first degree premeditated murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus seventeen years and six months. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in issuing a flight instruction; and (3) the trial court failed to properly poll the jury. We remand for entry of judgments reflecting the trial court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |