01A01-9903-CH-00185
01A01-9903-CH-00185
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

01A01-9904-CH-00209
01A01-9904-CH-00209
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Stephens vs. Henley's Supply & Industry
01S01-9712-CH-00277

State vs. Timothy Dewalt
W2001-00168-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
The defendant, Timothy Tereze Dewalt, was indicted for selling a controlled substance, a Class C felony. After his plea of guilty, the trial court imposed a standard Range I sentence of four years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends (1) that he was denied the right to counsel and (2) that his sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Ivey vs. Trans Global Gas & Oil
03S01-9804-CH-00037

State vs. Jimmy Ferguson
01C01-9809-CR-00359
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.

State vs. James E. Jackson
01C01-9809-CR-00358
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier

State vs. Richard Smith
02C01-9903-CC-00101
Trial Court Judge: Roy Morgan

State vs. Shawn R. Cotton
01C01-9805-CR-00209
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.

Brett Allen Patterson vs. State
01C01-9805-CC-00221

State vs. Eric B. Howard
01C01-9805-CR-00198

State vs. Brian Milam
01C01-9712-CC-00557
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Jones

Mickey A. Brown v. Tennessee Department of Correction
01A01-9808-CH-00437
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

A Tennessee prison inmate filed a Petition for a Declaratory Judgment, insisting that he was entitled to be immediately released because of the earlier expiration of a concurrent Florida sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

State vs. Kenneth Lee Kendrick
03C01-9810-CR-00374
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

Alfred Lee Mauldin v. Mark Luttrell, Warden, et al.
02A01-9902-CH-00065
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

Alfred Lee Mauldin appeals from the order of the chancery court dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Randall Allen Cantrell vs. State
01C01-9902-CR-00050
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

Randall Allen Cantrell vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9902-CR-00050
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

State of Tennessee vs. Betty W. Norman
01C01-9805-CC-00230
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles Lee

The appellant, Betty W . Norman, was convicted by a Moore County jury of two (2) counts of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and one (1) count of harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to consecutive terms of one (1) year and three (3) months and one (1) year and two (2) months for the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant received a concurrent sentence of six (6) months for her conviction for harassment. The trial court ordered tha t the appellant serve her sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues for our
review:

(1) whether the trial court erred in limiting the appellant’s crossexamination of a state w itness reg arding the trajectory of a bullet and by subsequently instructing the jury to disregard the witness’ testimon y regardin g the trajec tory of the bullet;
(2) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to question the victims, Robert and Loretta Norman, regarding anydomestic problems between them;
(3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the a ppellant’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt;
(4) whether the trial court imposed excessive sentences;
(5) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences; and
(6) whether the trial court erred in denying probation.

After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we conclude that theappellant was erroneously convicted of two (2) co unts of reckless endangerment arising out of the same course of conduct. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for reckless endangerment in Count One is merged with her conviction for reckless endangerment in Count Two. In all other respects, however, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

C.L. Randolph v. Virginia Henley Randolph
03S01-9510-CV-00119
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge M. Drew Robinson

We granted this appeal to clarify the statutory standard by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be judged. The trial court in this case held the antenuptial agreement invalid, finding the wife did not “knowledgeably” sign the agreement, as required by statute1. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed, finding the totality of the circumstances established that the wife possessed sufficient knowledge of the husband’s business affairs and financial status at the time she signed the agreement to meet the statutory requirement of "knowledgeably" executing the agreement and that the agreement was therefore enforceable. We interpret the statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement is enforceable only if entered into "knowledgeably" to mean that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value
of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse’s holdings.

John Matthews v. American Manufacturers Mutual Inc. Co.
02S01-9809-CH-00085
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6- 225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case was tried on June 25, 1998. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered a work-related injury on June 27, 1997, and awarded the plaintiff forty-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court stated that the plaintiff's present disability, whether due to a heart attack or from heart disease, was caused by the exertion and strain of lifting fifty-pound buckets in 9-degree weather in the course of his employment duties. The defendant, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, has appealed the trial court's decision. After a careful review of the record, we find that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. At the time of trial, the plaintiff, John Matthews, testified that he was 47 years of age, had a bachelors degree in archeology, and had completed approximately one-half of his studies toward a masters degree in anthropology and archeology. Before pursuing his studies in archeology, the plaintiff did carpentry work, served in the military, and was employed as a service writer for a tire company. After receiving his degree in archeology, the plaintiff was employed by Brockington and Associates, the defendant's insured, as an archeologist from February of 1997 until the alleged injury in June of 1997. At the time of trial, he was working as an instructor at a job-training facility for the handicapped. On Friday, June 27, 1997, the plaintiff was working outside with his supervisor at the site of a proposed guitar company in a heat index of 14 degrees. Their job was to uncover archeological artifacts by removing five-gallon buckets of mud, weighing forty to fifty pounds each, from a six-foot deep trench. The plaintiff recalled that he was perspiring heavily. At approximately 3: p.m., the plaintiff felt a tightness with a little pain below his collarbone and was short of breath. Thinking that it was the heat, he took breaks to cool off and continued to work after drinking some water. He testified that he had no prior history of chest pain or heart disease. He was able to finish the day's work, and the chest pain eased by approximately 6: p.m. Over the weekend, the plaintiff worked in the yard 2

Jimmy C. Wardlaw v. Standard Coffee Service Co., Etc.
02S01-9807-CV-00063
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Kay S. Robilio, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment, resulting in a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. We affirm.

Demetra Lyree Parker v. Warren County Utility District
01S01-9806-CH-00107
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

We granted review to address the standard for an employer's liability in supervisor sexual harassment cases under the Tennessee Human Rights Act following the recent United States Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). Upon review, we adopt a standard consistent with Ellerth and Faragher and hold that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. An employer, however, may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment action has been taken. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey D. Hunter
01S01-9806-CC-00118
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

We granted this appeal by Jeffrey D. Hunter, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to a trial court’s authority during probation revocation proceedings. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that when a trial court has determined that a probation violation has occurred, it possesses the authority to: (1) order incarceration; (2) order the original probationary period to commence anew; or (3) extend the remaining period of probation for as much as an additional two years. We further conclude that a defendant is not entitled to credit on his or her sentence of incarceration for any time served on probation prior to probation revocation and reinstatement of the original sentence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Pat Bondurant
01S01-9804-CC-00064
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.).
aggravating circumstances1 beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution on the conviction for first degree murder. On the arson conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years consecutive to the death penalty. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court2 and set for oral argument with respect to eight of the issues raised by the defendant. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 12.

Virginia Graf Waddey v. Ira Clinton Waddey, Jr.
01S01-9811-CV-00198
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew, III

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party receiving periodic alimony may obtain a modification or extension of alimony when: 1) a termination date was agreed to by the parties in their property settlement agreement; and 2) the petition to modify was filed after the termination date but prior to the expiration of thirty days. We hold that the alimony was not modifiable after one of the contingencies listed in the property settlement agreement occurred. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but we base our decision upon other grounds