Essie M. Butler v. Emerson Motor Co .
02S01-9805-CH-00045
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George E. Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to show she was entitled to compensation because of an alleged back injury.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The facts in this case are reasonably simple. The plaintiff, age 49, had been working for the defendant for 25 years. Several years prior to 1995 she injured her back at work. This injury is more historical than significant in the case before us. In January 1995, the plaintiff was working at a lathe, putting machine parts on the lathe and turning them. She began to experience pain in her back. She testified this was caused by having to twist her body side to side or back and forth in doing the work. Ultimately, the plaintiff was seen by several doctors and had several diagnostic tests and various treatments done. The most significant treatment was done by Dr. Dan Spengler, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed the plaintiff as having instability of motion at the L4-5 section of her spine with some pinching of the nerve. Dr. Spengler was of the opinion that the cause of this problem was a degenerative process in a person of the plaintiff's age. He was of the opinion the plaintiff's work did not cause the problem. 1 The plaintiff also sued for carpal tunnel syndrome and was found to be entitled to compensation. That matter is not raised in this appeal. 2

Gibson Workers Compensation Panel

Janice Leslie vs. Charles/Patricia Caldwell
02A01-9807-CV-00179
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers

Shelby Court of Appeals

State vs. Bobby Dale Franklin, Sr.
03C01-9804-CR-00129
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner

Greene Court of Criminal Appeals

Elipidio Placencia vs. Lauren Placencia
02A01-9803-CV-00065
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

Shelby Court of Appeals

State vs. Anthony Bonam
02C01-9804-CR-00109

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. John Greer
02C01-9806-CR-00167

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Jamell Richmond
02C01-9806-CR-00198
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Conister Trust v. Boating Corp. of America & Villas-Afloat
M1998-00949-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
The buyer of three boats that were to be built pursuant to specific instructions defaulted on payment for the second and third boats by failing to pay the entire purchase price of the boats. The seller resold the two boats and recovered its damages caused by the buyer's breach. A creditor of the buyer, who furnished funds for the purchase of the first two boats, sought the excess proceeds from the sale of the second boat asserting that it had an unperfected security interest. Because the buyer did not attain rights in the collateral sufficient to meet the requirements for attachment of a security interest, the creditor is not entitled to distribution of the proceeds under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead, the rights of the buyer and seller are governed by Article 2. The creditor was entitled to assert the buyer's right to restitution of partial payments, and the seller was entitled to recover its damages from the resale of the two boats. The seller also had a right of setoff which it exercised to recover losses on the third boat from moneys realized in the sale of the second boat. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

Sumner Court of Appeals

King vs. State
03S01-9801-CR-00001

Knox Supreme Court

Lovell Lightner vs. State
03C01-9808-CR-00277

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

Brewer vs. Lincoln Brass Works
01S01-9609-CV-00196
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

Wayne Supreme Court

State vs. Crutcher
01S01-9804-CR-00081
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft

Supreme Court

Helms vs. Dept. of Safety
01S01-9709-CH-00185

Supreme Court

State vs. Crutcher
01S01-9804-CR-00081

Supreme Court

State vs. Harris
02S01-9806-CC-00053

Henry Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Teresa Dion Smith Harris - Separate Concurring
02S01-9806-CC-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Justice David B. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The majority concludes that the jury’s finding of an incomplete aggravating circumstance permits Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a), harmless error review, holding the error statutory rather than constitutional. I agree that the error is statutory and that harmless error analysis applies. Accordingly, I join with the majority in affirming the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. I write separately, however, because I find that, in conducting harmless error review, the majority fails to perform a sufficient analysis to support its finding that the invalid aggravating circumstance did not “affirmatively appear to have affected the result of the trial on the merits.” See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

Henry Supreme Court

State vs. Small
03S01-9804-CR-00038

Knox Supreme Court

Harold David Jones vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9805-CC-00222
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

Petitioner, Harold David Jones, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court of Robertson County. Previously, he entered a nolo contendere plea to second degree murder and received a Range II sentence of 35 years. The following issues are presented for our review:

1. whether the petition was filed within the applicable statute oflimitations; and


2. whether the nolo contendere plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.


We find no reversible error and AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

Robertson Court of Criminal Appeals

Doyle Shirt Manufacturing Corporation, v. T. Michael O'Mara, et al.
01A01-9711-CH-00670
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Walter W. Bussart
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Vernon Neal

This appeal involves the requirement of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11.01 that pleadings be signed by an attorney or by a party if that party is not represented by an attorney. Finding that the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 11 within the statutory period of limitations, the Putnam County Chancery Court granted summary judgment to the defendant. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Putnam Court of Appeals

Luvana Leean Tudors vs. Carl William Bell, Jr., - Concurring
01-A-01-9802-CV-00103
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

This is an appeal of two ten-day sentences for criminal contempt. We find that the procedural requirements for a sentence for criminal contempt have not been satisfied. We, therefore, reverse the lower court’s order.

Marion Court of Appeals

Remington Investments, Inc., v. Ronald S. Obenauf and Ardeth Obenauf
01A01-9809-CH-00512
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment by the trial court domesticating a Connecticut judgment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-6-101 et seq. against both defendants. I. The Connecticut Action In September 1990, Connecticut Savings Bank brought suit in the Superior Court of the Judicial District of New Haven, Connecticut against Ronald S. Obenauf and Ardeth H. Obenauf on a promissory note in the amount of $34,000, executed by Ronald S. Obenauf and dated March 27, 1990. Plaintiff alleged that it was the current holder of the promissory note and that Ronald S. Obenauf had failed to make monthly payments in accordance therewith. The bank demanded judgment of the amount of the promissory note together with  nterest and costs. The bank further sought fees and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, asserting that plaintiff had been harmed by the failure of the defendant to make payment on the promissory note.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Paula H. Chaffin, Manny Formigo, and Brenda Thurman, et al., v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd, A/K/A Norwegian Cruise Lines, Inc., A/K/A Norwegian Cruise Lines, et al.
02A01-9803-CH-00080
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. Steven Stafford

Paula Chaffin, Manny Formigo, Brenda Thurman, Brent Mezzacasa, Maria 3 Rodriguez, Robert Kirk, Lloyd Ramer, Jerry Knott, and Mike Freeman (“Plaintiffs”), who were appointed by the trial court as class representatives in this conditionally certified class action, appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against four separate cruise line businesses, which included: (1) Norwegian Cruise Line Limited f/k/a Kloster Cruise Limited (“Norwegian”); (2) Carnival Corporation and/or Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Carnival”); (3) Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”); and (4) Princess Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Princess”). Plaintiffs’ claims were based upon alleged Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) violations and upon alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims based upon forum selection clauses contained in written cruise contracts. Based upon the following, we find that the subject forum selection clauses are neither invalid based upon fraud nor unenforceable based upon unreasonableness. Moreover, we find that the subject forum selection clauses do not contravene a strong Tennessee public policy. Accordingly, we find that the forum selection clauses are enforceable and that the trial court’s dismissal was proper. We therefore affirm.

Dyer Court of Appeals

Ray Darris Thompson v. Betty Hammond, et al. - Concurring
02A01-9808-CV-00221
Authoring Judge: Judge Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

Plaintiff Ray Darris Thompson appeals the trial court’s final order entering summary judgment in favor of Defendants/Appellees Betty Hammond, Vernon Brown, June Wesson, Bruce MacDonald, and Christine Bradley.  We reverse the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that the trial court erred in granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment  without considering Thompson’s motion to compel discovery.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Billy Wesson and Diane Wesson v. Woodworks, Inc. v. Larry Cupples, D/B/A Construction Company
02A01-9808-CV-00225
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer

Defendant Woodworks, Inc., appeals the circuit court’s final judgment in the amount
of $8288 which was entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Billy and Diane Wesson. We reverse
the circuit court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that the court erred in directing a verdict in
favor of Defendant/Appellee Larry Cupples, d/b/a Cupples Construction Company, and we remand
for a new trial.

Madison Court of Appeals

William Lewis Howell v. State of Tennessee
03C01-9806-CR-00200
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade

The pro se petitioner, William Lewis Howell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals