Randall Allen Cantrell vs. State of Tennessee
01C01-9902-CR-00050
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

Randall Allen Cantrell vs. State
01C01-9902-CR-00050
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Randall Allen Cantrell, appeals the order of the Sumner County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues which collectively challenge the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition as being time-barred.

C.L. Randolph v. Virginia Henley Randolph
03S01-9510-CV-00119
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Special Judge M. Drew Robinson

We granted this appeal to clarify the statutory standard by which the validity of antenuptial agreements should be judged. The trial court in this case held the antenuptial agreement invalid, finding the wife did not “knowledgeably” sign the agreement, as required by statute1. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed, finding the totality of the circumstances established that the wife possessed sufficient knowledge of the husband’s business affairs and financial status at the time she signed the agreement to meet the statutory requirement of "knowledgeably" executing the agreement and that the agreement was therefore enforceable. We interpret the statutory requirement that an antenuptial agreement is enforceable only if entered into "knowledgeably" to mean that the spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent and value
of his or her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse’s holdings.

Jimmy C. Wardlaw v. Standard Coffee Service Co., Etc.
02S01-9807-CV-00063
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Kay S. Robilio, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment, resulting in a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. We affirm.

John Matthews v. American Manufacturers Mutual Inc. Co.
02S01-9809-CH-00085
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6- 225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case was tried on June 25, 1998. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered a work-related injury on June 27, 1997, and awarded the plaintiff forty-five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court stated that the plaintiff's present disability, whether due to a heart attack or from heart disease, was caused by the exertion and strain of lifting fifty-pound buckets in 9-degree weather in the course of his employment duties. The defendant, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, has appealed the trial court's decision. After a careful review of the record, we find that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. At the time of trial, the plaintiff, John Matthews, testified that he was 47 years of age, had a bachelors degree in archeology, and had completed approximately one-half of his studies toward a masters degree in anthropology and archeology. Before pursuing his studies in archeology, the plaintiff did carpentry work, served in the military, and was employed as a service writer for a tire company. After receiving his degree in archeology, the plaintiff was employed by Brockington and Associates, the defendant's insured, as an archeologist from February of 1997 until the alleged injury in June of 1997. At the time of trial, he was working as an instructor at a job-training facility for the handicapped. On Friday, June 27, 1997, the plaintiff was working outside with his supervisor at the site of a proposed guitar company in a heat index of 14 degrees. Their job was to uncover archeological artifacts by removing five-gallon buckets of mud, weighing forty to fifty pounds each, from a six-foot deep trench. The plaintiff recalled that he was perspiring heavily. At approximately 3: p.m., the plaintiff felt a tightness with a little pain below his collarbone and was short of breath. Thinking that it was the heat, he took breaks to cool off and continued to work after drinking some water. He testified that he had no prior history of chest pain or heart disease. He was able to finish the day's work, and the chest pain eased by approximately 6: p.m. Over the weekend, the plaintiff worked in the yard 2

State of Tennessee v. Pat Bondurant
01S01-9804-CC-00064
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this appeal, the defendant, Pat Bondurant, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and arson. Upon finding that the State had proven two statutory. The jury found the following two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, which involve the use or threat of violence to the person;” and (2) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved to rture or de pravity of m ind.” Ten n. Code Ann. § 39 -2-203( i)(2) and (5 ) (1982). These statutory aggravating circumstances were redefined in 1989 and are currently codified at Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204(i)(2) and (5) (1998 Sup p.). 2Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997 R epl.).
aggravating circumstances1 beyond a reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution on the conviction for first degree murder. On the arson conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years consecutive to the death penalty. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court2 and set for oral argument with respect to eight of the issues raised by the defendant. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 12.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey D. Hunter
01S01-9806-CC-00118
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

We granted this appeal by Jeffrey D. Hunter, the appellant, in order to address issues pertinent to a trial court’s authority during probation revocation proceedings. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that when a trial court has determined that a probation violation has occurred, it possesses the authority to: (1) order incarceration; (2) order the original probationary period to commence anew; or (3) extend the remaining period of probation for as much as an additional two years. We further conclude that a defendant is not entitled to credit on his or her sentence of incarceration for any time served on probation prior to probation revocation and reinstatement of the original sentence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Demetra Lyree Parker v. Warren County Utility District
01S01-9806-CH-00107
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

We granted review to address the standard for an employer's liability in supervisor sexual harassment cases under the Tennessee Human Rights Act following the recent United States Supreme Court's decisions in Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998). Upon review, we adopt a standard consistent with Ellerth and Faragher and hold that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor. An employer, however, may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment action has been taken. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified.

Virginia Graf Waddey v. Ira Clinton Waddey, Jr.
01S01-9811-CV-00198
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew, III

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party receiving periodic alimony may obtain a modification or extension of alimony when: 1) a termination date was agreed to by the parties in their property settlement agreement; and 2) the petition to modify was filed after the termination date but prior to the expiration of thirty days. We hold that the alimony was not modifiable after one of the contingencies listed in the property settlement agreement occurred. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but we base our decision upon other grounds

Willamette Industries, Inc., v. Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission, Wayne County Assessor of Property, and Wayne County Trustee
O1A01-9812-CH-00639
Authoring Judge: Judge Charle D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The petition in this case seeks judicial review of real property valuations established by a final order of the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission (“AAC”), a body created by the State Board of Equalization to hear “appeals regarding the assessment, classification and value of property for purposes of taxation.” T.C.A.§ 67-5-1502(a). The AAC’s order in the instant case fixed, for ad valorem tax purposes, the separate values of 15 parcels of Wayne County woodland owned by the petitioner, Willamette Industries, Inc. (“Willamette”). Upon review of the AAC’s order, the trial court held, among other things, that the appraisal methodology utilized by the AAC was not per se contrary to Tennessee law, and that the record contained substantial and material evidence to support the AAC’s valuations based upon that methodology. Accordingly, it affirmed the AAC’s order. Willamette appeals, raising the following issues for our consideration:

United Agricultural Services, Inc. v. John W. Scherer, Jr.
02A01-9812-CH-00353
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This appeal involves jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Defendant/appellant, John W. Scherer, Jr. (Scherer), appeals the order of the trial court awarding plaintiff/appellee, United Agricultural Services, Inc. (Ag Services), damages for breach of contract.

D&E Construction, Inc., v. Robert Denley Company, Inc.
02A01-9812-CH-00358
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This is an action to enforce an arbitration award. Plaintiff/appellant, D & E Construction Company (D&E), appeals the order of the Chancery Court vacating an arbitration award rendered against defendant/appellee, Robert J. Denley Company (Denley).

Kevin Sanders and Patricia Sanders, v. Lincoln County and Steve Graham, Chmn of Lincoln County Commission
01A01-9902-CH-00111
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

Plaintiffs Kevin and Patricia Sanders appeal the trial court’s judgment which dismissed their complaint against Defendants/Appellees Lincoln County and Steve Graham, Chairman of the Lincoln County Commission, based upon the court’s rulings that the complaint failed to state an equal protection claim against the Defendants and, alternatively, that the Sanders’ equal protection claim was barred by principles of res judicata.1 We conclude that both of these rulings were in error and, thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jane H. Ralls v. William M. Coats
01A01-9903-CH-00143
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

In this action alleging breach of contract, the Trial Judge granted the plaintiff summary judgment for damages for breach of contract in the amount of $12,180.24. Defendant has appealed.

Wilson County Youth Emergency Shelter, Inc. v. Wilson County and Wilson County Board of Zoning Appeals
01A01-9812-CH-00634
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C.K. Smith

The Wilson County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”) denied the petition of Wilson County Youth Emergency Shelter, Inc. (“the Shelter”) for a use on review to construct a group home on 5.46 acres of property in Wilson County. The Shelter proposes to move its existing facility in the county to the new location. On petition for certiorari, the trial court affirmed the action of the BZA. The Shelter appeals, arguing that the BZA’s decision was illegal, arbitrary, and beyond its jurisdiction. By way of a separate issue, the Shelter argues that there is no material evidence to support the BZA’s denial of its petition.

Michael Keith Newcomb and wife Caroline Newcomb, Darden E. Davis and wife, Ann J. Davis, v, William Gonser, and wife Lois Gonser and Christopher Gonser, and wife Lisa Gonser, and Shirley Zeitlin & Company
01A01-9705-CH-00220
Authoring Judge: Judge Walter W. Bussart
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Michael and Caroline Newcomb and Darden and Ann Davis, from the decision of the Davidson County Chancery Court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants/appellees William and Lois Gonser. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

James R. Tully, Jr. v. USA Wireless, Inc., PMT Investments, Inc. and Patrick M. Thompson et. al.
01A01-9707-CH-00332
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The Chancellor granted summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s fraud claim. Because we believe the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make out a claim of fraud, and the defendant has been unable to negate those allegations, we find the fraud claim inappropriate for summary judgment, and we reverse. We also find that the plaintiff has not waived his contract claim, and we remand this case to the trial court for the resolution of both claims.

Dorothy and Roger Smith v. Maury County - Concurring
01-A-01-9804-CH-00207
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Cain

The plaintiffs, a mother and her son owning adjoining farms on a rural road in Maury County, sued the county for a nuisance created when the county improved the road. The county argued that the exclusive remedy was for inverse condemnation, and that the one year statute of limitations barred the action. On appeal the county asserts, in addition to its original defense, that the damages awarded were beyond the range of reasonableness. We reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial.

Linda Layne, individually and as the surviving spouse of James T. Lane, v. Pioneer Life Insurance Company of Illinois
01A01-9809-CH-00457
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James L. Weatherford

This is a suit in chancery for declaratory judgment relative to a policy of insurance. The primary question presented is whether or not participation by the insured in a motorbike event known as an "enduro" constitutes "racing" within the meaning of an exclusion in the policy. After the insured died from injuries he received while participatingin an "enduro," the defendant insurance company denied coverage. The lower court found that the particular loss in this case was excluded from coverage. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

William H. Thompson, Jr., v. Department of Codes Administration, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
01A01-9808-CH-00438
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

This case involves the refusal of the Metropolitan Department of Codes Administration ("the Department") to issue building permits to the petitioner/appellant landowner. Planning to divide and sell his land, the petitioner made preparations to subdivide this land pursuant to the Department's advice on how to avoid regulation by the Metropolitan Planning Commission ("MPC"). However, due to a new interpretation of existing statutory law, the petitioner's preparations, once completed, were no longer adequate and the Department deemed that the land must undergo review before the MPC as a subdivision. Consequently, the zoning administrator of the Department denied the petitioner the building permits and the petitioner brought suit claiming first that the division of land was not a "subdivision" as that term is defined by statute. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the zoning administrator's application of the newly-interpreted law to him violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process and effected against him the application of a retrospective law. In addition, the appellant claimed that the Department should be equitably estopped from refusing to issue the building permits. The trial court granted the Department's motion for involuntary dismissal of the petitioner's case. We affirm the decision of the trial court on all issues.

Allison Cooke Battles and Leslie Cooke Jones v. First Union Bank, Peggy Smith, Beverly G. Pitt, Leigh Ann Howard, and Exchange Insurance Co - Concurring
01-A-01-9809-CH-00497
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

Two of the beneficiaries of a will sued the witnesses and a notary public because the will was not properly executed. The plaintiffs also sued a bank, the witnesses’ employer, for not training its employees on how to properly witness wills.  The Chancery Court of Sumner County granted the defendants summary judgment.  We affirm.

Grei S. Hinsen, v. Mark E. Meadors, Individually and D/B/A MEM Contractors, and Hailey Brown
01A01-9811-CH-00583
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

This is an action by a homeowner against a remodeling contractor and a painter for the failure of the paint inside the house. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the homeowner’s claims. We affirm.

Southwest Progressive Ent., Inc. v. Shri-Hari Hospitality, LLC and Trans Financial Bank of Tennessee - Concurring
01-A-01-9810-CH-00542
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III

A construction company sued a hotelkeeper for payment of the balance due on their contract. The trial court ordered the hotelkeeper to pay the balance, as well as pre-judgment interest and attorney fees. We affirm the award of pre-judgment interest, but we reverse the award of attorney fees. We also reverse a $500 offset the trial court granted to the defendant for the plaintiff’s alleged failure to complete a punch list.

Michael King v. TFE, Inc.
01A01-9711-CV-00624
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this action filed against TFE, Inc. (hereafter “TFE”), Michael King appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to TFE as related to King’s claims for breach of an alleged employment contract. The trial court granted TFE’s motion for summary judgment based on the court’s conclusion that an employee handbook distributed by TFE did not constitute an employment contract. For the reasons hereafter stated, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Tim Taylor v. Robert L. Morris and Terry Muncey - Concurring
01A01-9804-CH-00211
Authoring Judge: Judge Farmer

Defendant Terry Muncey appeals, and Plaintiff Tim Taylor cross-appeals, the trial court’s judgment awarding Muncey $1000 in damages on his counterclaim for wrongful injunction against Taylor. We reverse the trial court’s judgment based upon our conclusion that Muncey failed to meet his burden of proving the elements of his claim for wrongful injunction.