Donald Groton, Etc. v. Traverlers Insurance Co. 01S01-9607-CV-00154
Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Bobby Capers,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court is once again called upon to decide wither an injury sustained en route to work is compensable. We conclude that it is not and reverse the trial court's finding that it is. Regrettably, this case involves more than an injury. Donald Groton died from injuries he sustained in a car wreck while traveling to work on January 14, 1994. He worked for John Coleman Hayes, P.C. an engineering firm under contract with Nashville's airport authority to supervise noise abatement modifications being made to homes in the Antioch and Donelson neighborhoods close to the airport. Groton was one of two inspectors who examined the work of the contractors. He used his own vehicle in his work. The employer paid Groton mileage for driving from the office to job sites and from one job site to another. The employer did not pay Groton for driving from his home to the office or to the first job site of the day if Groton went there first. Likewise, the employer did not pay Groton for travel away from the office or from the last job site at the end of the work day. On the date of the accident, Groton did not report for duty at either the office or a job site as usual. James Michael Smith, John Coleman Hayes's construction manager, called Groton the day before and instructed him to go to a job site of a sister company, John Coleman Hayes Construction Company. Smith needed some surveying work done and Groton knew how to do it. -2-
Wilson
Workers Compensation Panel
Franklin Hartsell v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., et al. 01S01-9608-CH-00164
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, age 54, suffered a job-related myocardial infarction on March 1, 1994. A coronary arteriogram revealed an 8% blockage of his left anterior descending artery which was alleviated by an angioplasty procedure which reduced the blockage to less than 15%. Conservative treatment followed, and he was released to return to full employment on January 1, 1994. From that day forward, the plaintiff has worked steadily and without incident. In July 1991, the plaintiff was hospitalized with chest pains. A cardiac catheterization was performed, which revealed a serious lesion in his left circumflex coronary artery at the left ventricular ridge, with another lesion in his left anterior descending coronary artery. After the 1994 infarction, the lesion in the left anterior artery was substantially worsened. The employer insists that the award is excessive because it was improperly onerated with liability for impairment resulting from pre-existing coronary artery disease. Liability for benefits resulting from impairment as a consequence of the myocardial infarction is conceded. The dispositive issue at trial was the extent of the plaintiff's partial permanent disability. The Chancellor found that the plaintiff had a 5% permanent partial disability and awarded benef its accordingly. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the trial court's judgment is correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The treating physician, Dr. K.P. Channabasappa, testified that the plaintiff's impairment was 29%, which may be extrapolated to Category II of the AMA Guidelines. He stated in a pre-deposition letter that "it is 29%" and on direct examination testified that the impairment was 29%. There was no countervailing testimony offered. 2
Franklin
Workers Compensation Panel
Naomi Gentry v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., et al. 01S01-9608-CH-00165
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. K. Smith,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action was filed January 18, 1995 seeking benefits for a back injury sustained on April 6, 1994 while employed by the defendant hospital. The allegations of the complaint were generally denied, thus requiring the plaintiff to prove every element of her case by a preponderance of the evidence, except when relying upon TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-242 which requires clear and convincing evidence as a predicate. The appellee allegedly suffered a back injury while lifting a patient. She was initially treated by a general practitioner in Gainsboro, Dr. E. M. Dudney, who referred her to Dr. Ray Hester, a neurosurgeon in Nashville, on May 5, 1994. Dr. Hester had treated the plaintiff for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident in 1982. These injuries involved, inter alia, a ruptured disc. She was released from treatment in 1983 with a 15 percent permanent partial impairment, and her activities were restricted. As stated, Dr. Hester saw the plaintiff eleven years later for this workers' compensation injury. He ordered a CT scan which revealed no significant pathology or findings and ultimately diagnosed her complaint as a lumbar strain. On July 19, 1995, he advised the employer by letter that: " . . . Mrs. Gentry apparently had a back strain. She had underlying degenerative joint disease in her back which was the result of her previous injuries to her back and not the more recent one where she was doing some lifting. I don't think she has any permanent impairment in relation to her lifting incident and no anatomical changes as a result of it." At some point before his deposition was taken for proof, Dr. Hester changed his opinion. He testified that the appellee had a five percent permanent impairment solely as a result of her 1994 injury. He found no objective signs of radiculopathy or loss of structural integrity. He imposed moderate lifting restrictions, and thought the appellee should be able to return to work. He found no anatomical changes in her back. Significantly, he testified that his impairment ratings of 15 percent for the 1982 injury and five percent for the 1994 injury were "separate and not a part and parcel of 2
