Jessica Diane Toms v. James Anthony Toms
This divorce action was dismissed by the trial court after the parties resumed cohabiting. This ruling was not appealed. The issues on appeal involve Grandparents’ right to intervene, joinder of third parties, the appointment of an attorney ad litem and the assessment of fees of the guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Grimes v. Stephen Dotson, Warden
The Petitioner, Mark Grimes, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harry McLemore v. David Mills
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lester P.Parker, III v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lester P. Parker, III, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. His post-conviction relief petition attacked his 1997 conviction of attempt to possess cocaine with intent to deliver, as a result of which he received a two-year suspended sentence. His post-conviction claims of the state's suppression of exculpatory evidence and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are spiced with allegations that the prosecution was the result of conspiratorial retaliation for his championing a fight against corruption in the Alcoa Police Department. The post-conviction court denied relief, and we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teresa C. Graves
The defendant, Teresa C. Graves, was convicted of theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, for which she was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender, to nine years in the Department of Correction. The defendant was granted a delayed right of appeal and raises two issues: (1) whether she should be given a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction. The State also appeals and raises two issues: (1) whether the delayed appeal is time barred by the post-conviction statute of limitations; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not sentencing the defendant as a career offender. Following our review, we conclude that (1) the defendant's delayed appeal is not barred by the post-conviction statute of limitations; (2) the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not properly before this court; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction; and (4) the defendant should have been sentenced as a career offender. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for resentencing as a career offender. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Stephen Mayes
The defendant, Gary Stephen Mayes, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury on two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and one count of stalking, a Class E felony. The trial court dismissed one of the sexual exploitation counts at the end of the State's proof; and, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of the remaining sexual exploitation count but acquitted him of the stalking count. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a repeat, violent offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by not severing the stalking count of the indictment; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the videotape he made of the child victims; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court committed harmless error by not severing the stalking offense, that it properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the videotape, and that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelly Michael Pickett
After a bench trial, the Davidson County Criminal Court convicted the appellant of eleven counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective four-year sentence to be served as ninety days in the county workhouse at one hundred percent and the remainder on probation. The appellant appeals, claiming (1) that the sexual exploitation of a minor statute is unconstitutional, (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to prove that he "possessed" pornographic images as required by the statute and because the State failed to prove that the images were real as opposed to virtual; (3) that his convictions are multiplicitous; and (4) that the trial court erred by not sentencing him to full probation and by not granting him judicial diversion. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the offenses are multiplicitous and reverse the appellant's convictions for counts two through eleven. We also modify the sentence for count one to reflect that the appellant is eligible to receive applicable statutory credits. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles E. Crews, d/b/a Dexter Ridge Shopping Center v. Michael L. Cahhal, et al.
This Court reversed a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiff’s action and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court entered judgment for Plaintiff, as authorized by the appellate court, and also, on motion of Plaintiff, awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Defendant-Appellants appeal, asserting that the award of attorney fees was not authorized by the appellate court and, therefore, the trial court did not have authority to award same. Appellants also assert that the award of attorney fees was excessive, and Appellee asserts, in a separate issue, that the award of fees was inadequate. Both parties appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Allen Ledford v. American Motorist Insurance Company, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 20 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Plaintiff contends he should have received an award for total permanent disability. Judgment is affirmed. |
Anderson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. David Kyle Gilley
We granted review of this interlocutory appeal to address the admissibility of prior acts of physical abuse committed by the defendant against the victim and others under Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The trial court ruled prior to trial that the State's evidence of the defendant's prior acts was admissible in part and inadmissible in part. After granting an interlocutory appeal as requested by both the defendant and the State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that prior acts of physical abuse committed by a defendant against a victim are per se admissible at trial and that there is no longer a requirement for such a prior act to be relevant to a contested issue. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we hold (1) that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in granting interlocutory review of the trial court's pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 404(b), and (2) that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that prior acts of physical abuse committed by a defendant against a victim are per se admissible at trial. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Minna E.H. Evans v. Steven Wintrow et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute between an investor and the owners of several failed business ventures. The investor filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against her erstwhile business colleagues seeking to recover damages for breach of contract and conversion. A jury awarded the investor $86,691.82 in compensatory damages and $40,000.00 in punitive damages. One of the defendants appealed. We have determined that the judgment must be reversed because of inconsistencies in the jury's verdict caused by ambiguous special interrogatories. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roketa Mason, a Minor by Yolanda Mason, as next friend and natural mother, and Yolanda Mason, Individually v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
Plaintiff, a tenth grade high school student, was attacked while riding the school bus. She was seriously injured by another student using a razor provided by the school as part of the cosmetology curriculum. Plaintiff filed this action against the school system alleging negligence for failure to properly supervise students using dangerous instructional instruments and for violation of the school's zero tolerance policy by permitting students to take razors to and from school, thereby permitting the attacker to have the razor on the school bus where the attack occurred. Following a bench trial, plaintiff was awarded a judgment of $80,000 from which defendant appeals. Finding the school system is not liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to enter an order dismissing the action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Debra Elaine Kirk
Defendant, Debra Elaine Kirk was indicted on one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of felony murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse of a child less than six years old, a Class A felony, and criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and lesser included offense of felony murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction and two years for the criminally negligent homicide conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve her sentences concurrently. In this appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the length of sentence imposed for her aggravated child abuse conviction violated the principles set forth in the recent United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004); (2) that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress her statement and in allowing Defendant's statement to be introduced into evidence; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of evidence of Defendant's prior drug use; (4) that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Darinka Mileusnic to testify about certain toxicology test results; and (5) that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent. Because we determine that reversible error occurred in the trial court's admission of evidence at trial of Defendant's prior drug use, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Janice W. Purkey, et al. v. American Home Assurance d/b/a AIG Insurance, et al.
We accepted three questions certified to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee concerning whether provisions in automobile insurance liability policies that exclude coverage for bodily injury to household or family members of the insured are void as against Tennessee law or public policy. We conclude that such provisions are valid. |
Supreme Court | ||
Belinda Carol McGrory Forbes v. Philip Dale Forbes
This is a post-divorce modification of child support case. The trial court reversed the Divorce Referee and found that the provisions of a Marital Dissolution Agreement unambiguously obligated Father/Appellant to pay child support based upon his stated earning capacity for 1998. Finding that the Marital Dissolution Agreement, by its plain language, is modifiable, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Griffin - Concurring
I concur in the result regarding the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser offense of Class E evading arrest. In my view, the legislature was empowered to enact the 2001 amendment (effective 2002) to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-18-110. As a result, the defendant’s failure to make a timely objection or request for a special instruction equates to a waiver of the issue on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Griffin
The appellant, Anthony Griffin, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and felony evading arrest. After the trial, the trial court set aside the conviction for aggravated assault. The appellant was sentenced to twelve (12) years as a career offender for the Class D felony evading arrest conviction. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of evading arrest and that he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Shane Salyers v. Jones Plastic & Engineering Company, LLC., et al.
From the determination by the trial court that the Worker sustained 28% vocational disability apportioned to the right leg, the Employer appeals. The Employer contends that the Worker’s injuries neither arose out of nor occurred in the course of his employment. We conclude otherwise and, thus, affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Summer Taylor v. Carhartt, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with the Tenn. Code Ann. Section §50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, employer, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the employee sustained a permanently disabling condition while employed with the appellant and that if she did, the trial court’s award of 25% permanent partial disability to each arm is excessive and is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The appellee, employee, argues that the trial court’s ruling was correct and should be affirmed. For the reasons discussed below, the panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Thomas Albert Dolan v. Bruce Poston, et al.
The plaintiff is a former University of Tennessee faculty member. He was dismissed from his position after the defendant corporate officer circulated a letter to government officials accusing him of using numerous deceptions in the procurement of a grant from the United States Department of Energy. The plaintiff's pro se defamation lawsuit named the defendant in both his individual and his corporate capacities. The trial court dismissed the claim against the defendant in his individual capacity under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and certified the dismissal as final under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 so it could be appealed. We reverse the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Murphy v. Jennifer Ann Janowitz
Respondent appeals to set aside an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. She argues the evidence does not support the Order. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
CMH Homes, Inc. vs. Darrell McEachron
Plaintiff purchased real property at delinquent tax sale and in a declaratory judgment action the Trial Court held the sale included a mobile home located on the land. On appeal, we reverse. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Dewey Householder
The appellant, Adam Dewey Householder, pled guilty to theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. He received a four year sentence, with nine months to be served in the county jail and the remainder on supervised probation. In addition, he was ordered to pay $26,820.00 in restitution. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion and in ordering a sentence of split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robin E.O.S. Craster v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc. et al.
The parties filed Motions for Summary Judgments. The Trial Court granted defendants' Motion which stated defendant was not a proper party and insurance policy issued to plaintiff did not cover plaintiff's damages. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vincent Jackson
We granted the State’s application to appeal in this case pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to determine, in light of the 1989 Revision of the Criminal Code, whether the longhonored rule that a homicide is presumptively second degree murder should be abandoned. Because our current statutory scheme requires that each element of the charged offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that the second degree murder presumption is now obsolete. Additionally, we have addressed the sufficiency of the evidence without engaging the presumption, and we conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient to convict the defendant of first degree murder (premeditated) beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is, however, sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant knowingly killed the victim and, thereby, committed second degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |