La-Z-Boy, Inc., v. Patricia Van Winkle E2002-01423-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employer, La-Z-Boy, Inc., filed suit to resolve a workers' compensation dispute between La-Z- Boy, Inc., and Patricia Van Winkle, its employee. The trial court found the defendant sustained a one percent medical impairment to her left arm as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome and awarded her fifty percent disability to her left arm. The court found the defendant suffered no disability to the right arm as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome. The employer appealed the judgment and avers the trial court award is excessive based upon the medical evidence in this case. The employee asserts the trial court should have found her to be one hundred percent disabled based upon the evidence in the case. Further, the employee argues that the trial judge erroneously allowed an occupational therapist to give opinions on medical matters which were beyond his field of expertise. We reverse the judgment in this case and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Reversed and Remanded JOHN K. BYERS, SR.J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., and ROGER E. THAYER, SP.J., joined. David C. Nagle, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, La-Z-Boy, Inc. Michael A. Wagner, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Patricia Van Winkle. MEMORANDUM OPINION There is no dispute concerning the fact that the employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome in each arm while employed by La-Z-Boy, Inc., and that carpal tunnel surgery was performed on each arm - the left on January 19, 21, and the right on February 2, 21. We do not believe it is necessary to go into great detail concerning the medical evidence in this case. Rather, we focus on the reasoning of the trial court in the acceptance of the evidence presented by La-Z-Boy, Inc. over the evidence presented by the employee. The evidence of physicians was introduced by way of standard C-32 medical reports. These consisted of a report by a Dr. Walwyn, filed by the employee, and a report of a Dr. Boyd, filed by the employer. According to the reports introduced at trial, Dr. Walwyn examined the employee on October 22, 21. His report found the employee retained an eight percent impairment rating. The report noted he reviewed an EMG report but did not state the date upon which the test was performed. The report also included the results of an April 2, 21 physical capacity evaluation, and his examination of the defendant. Dr. Boyd spent one and one-half hours with the employee. She reviewed the operating physician's notes, physical therapy reports, and nerve conduction studies which were performed in November of 21 and September of 21. Dr. Boyd found the employee sustained a one percent impairment to her left arm and no impairment to the right arm. La-Z-Boy, Inc. called Brian Laney, an occupational therapist, to testify. Mr. Laney has a bachelors degree in occupational therapy from the Medical College of Georgia. He testified he conducted a test on the employee to determine her ability to perform tasks but that the test was less than successful because of the employee not fully cooperating during the test. Mr. Laney was asked about two functional capacity evaluations performed on the employee - one in April of 21 and one in September of 21. He said: The first thing that caught my eye whenever I finished my FCE and later found out that Gail had performed a former FCE, her surgical procedures, I believe, were a week apart, carpal tunnel release on the right and carpal tunnel release on the left. The purpose for a carpal tunnel release is to relieve pressure on the nerve that's traveling through that carpal and comes down. I'm not sure what complaints she had that necessitated her having the surgery, but generally people have tingling and numbness, which is hopefully relieved with the release. I believe it's in the notes that she did say the numbness and tingling had decreased after the surgery. When someone has release done, you don't expect immediate relief. Mr. Laney further testified: A nerve regenerates or heals at approximately _ in a distal extremity of about one inch per month, therefore, you're looking at about six months of healing time in -2-
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
City of Red Bank, Tennessee, et al. v. Kimilla R. Cofer E2002-00192-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jackie Schulten, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The City of Red Bank brought this suit against Kimilla Cofer, a police officer, to determine if it was liable under the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident. The trial court found the injuries suffered by Cofer did not arise out of or in the course of her employment with the City. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed BYERS, SR. J., in which ANDERSON, J. and THAYER, SP. J., joined. W. Gerald Tidwell, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant Kimilla R. Cofer. David R. Hensley, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, City of Red Bank, Tennessee and Tennessee Municipal League Risk Management Pool. MEMORANDUM OPINION Officer Kimilla R. Cofer was a police officer with the City. She was assigned by the City as the D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) Officer and she also performed normal patrol duty. Officer Cofer taught D.A.R.E. classes at three schools. In addition to teaching these classes, she would attend D.A.R.E. functions away from the school. If she attended D.A.R.E. functions outside the time of her normal duty hours, she would receive compensated time off instead of payment. On March 6, 1997, Officer Cofer worked her regular shift from 7: a.m. until 3: p.m. When she finished her shift, she drove to her home, donned a D.A.R.E. shirt, and waited for a skating party sponsored by the D.A.R.E. group to start. She left her home driving her own car, and was driving to the event when she was involved in an accident.1 There was evidence in the record that Cofer was expected to attend social functions of the students in the D.A.R.E. program such as the skating event on the day of the accident. She was permitted to drive a D.A.R.E. vehicle which was under the control of the city after her shift to these events if she obtained permission from her superior for its use. However, at the time of the accident she was driving her own vehicle. Cofer acknowledges that as a general rule an employee is not acting within the course of her employment unless the injury occurs on the employer's premises. Howard v. Cornerstone Medical Associates, 54 S.W.3d 238 (Tenn. 21); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989). Under the holdings in these cases, an employee driving to her place of employment is not in the course of her employment. Cofer insists, however, that she as a police officer is always on duty because officers often make arrests or engage in other police-type investigations, etc,. while off duty. She relies on the cases of City of Gallatin v. Anderson, 354 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. 1962), and Mayor and Alderman of the Town of Tullahoma v. Ward, 114 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. 1938), in support of this position. We do not find these cases to support Cofer's claim for compensation. In Ward, the officer was walking along a street in Tullahoma on his way to his home. He was in uniform and carrying a weapon at the time. Ward was run down by a drunken driver. Ward later found and arrested the driver. The court held that Ward was in the course of his employment at the time because he was on the streets of his employer at the time and as such was entitled to coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act. The court's rationale was that Ward was on the premises of his employment, and still under all the obligations of his employment, in uniform, carrying his badge and weapon of office. The court concluded that because of this, Ward was patrolling the streets at the time and his destination was not controlling. In Anderson, the officer was off duty and on a personal mission. He attempted to make an arrest and was injured. The court held that the evidence showed that Anderson was acting in his capacity as an officer at the time of the injury. In this case, Cofer was not traveling on the streets of the city. She was not in uniform, she 1 The defendant received injuries in the accident but these are not at issue at this time in this case. -2-
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
State of Tennessee v. Harold L. Green E2000-00616-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.
We granted Harold L. Green's application pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine the duration of the trial court's authority to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. On October 8, 1999, Green pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant and was, thereafter, sentenced by the Criminal Court of Anderson County. On November 5, 1999, Green filed a motion to withdraw the previously entered guilty plea; the trial court granted the motion. The State appealed pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. After granting the State's request for appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. We find that the trial court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion to withdraw the guilty plea continued for thirty days after the plea was entered. Accordingly, we reinstate the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for any further proceedings that may be appropriate.
Anderson
Supreme Court
Larry White v. Federated Mutual Insurance Company M2002-00621-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Holloway, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff had suffered a 16 percent loss of his left arm and 28 percent loss to his right arm and entered judgment accordingly. The trial court further ordered the defendant to hold the plaintiff harmless for any subrogation claims against him for recovery of medical bills paid by an insurance company under a policy for health care owned by the plaintiff. The defendant says the evidence does not support a finding the plaintiff was injured in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant; the court erred in not finding the last injurious rule should apply; there is no showing the plaintiff suffered any vocational disability to his arms, and that the trial court erred by finding the defendant should hold the plaintiff harmless for any subrogation claims of a health insurance policy for payment made on behalf of the plaintiff for treatment of the carpal tunnel syndrome. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J., joined. Gordon C. Aulgur and David Brett Burrow, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for the appellant, Federated Mutual Insurance Company. Tracy White Moore, Columbia Tennessee, attorney for the appellee, Larry White. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff (employee) was forty-nine years of age at the time of trial. He has a twelfth grade education and completed a three-year apprenticeship as an iron worker. Upon completing this apprenticeship, he received a card certifying him as a journeyman iron worker, which entitled him to perform all aspects of the trade including welding, structural steel, concrete work, fundamental iron, and all aspects of building metal buildings and concrete buildings. The plaintiff testified that at the time of the injury that is the cause of this action, he earned his income as a member of a trade union. At the local union hall, there was a listing of jobs he could perform if qualified and he would go out and perform the work. When he was finished with the job or laid off, he would return to the union hall for more work. This is how he came to work for Tomlin Construction Company, the company insured by the defendant. The plaintiff began working for Tomlin on March 24, 1999. He testified that while working for Tomlin between April 19, 1999, and April 26, 1999, he noticed for the first time that his hands were "going to sleep" and becoming numb and his arms began to hurt. He testified that his hands and arms had never bothered him in this manner before April 19, 1999. On May 6, 1999, while seeing his physician for unrelated treatment to his back, the plaintiff told this doctor, Dr. Darrell Rheinhart, about the problems with his hands. Dr. Rheinhart sent the plaintiff for an EMG (nerve conduction study) which was conducted on May 1, 1999. After the EMG, the plaintiff reported his injury to his supervisor at Tomlin and completed a First Report of Injury. After May 1, the plaintiff did not perform any work with his hands (such as welding or tying rebar,) for Tomlin. The remainder of his work for Tomlin involved light duty work that did not involve his hands. The last day the plaintiff worked for Tomlin was July 3, 1999. After leaving Tomlin, the plaintiff continued to work full-time performing welding work for other companies through his trade union. The plaintiff continued seeing physicians about his hand problems as he continued to work as an iron worker. He testified that during this time, his hand condition got no worse but got no better. At the recommendation of these physicians, the plaintiff had carpal tunnel release surgery performed on his right hand on November 9, 1999, and on his left hand on December 11, 1999, by a Dr. Schmidt in Nashville. The plaintiff testified that these surgeries relieved the numbness and tingling in his hands, but that he lost much of his hand strength as a result of the surgeries. He testified that he believed that thirty to forty percent of jobs that formerly would have been available to him are now not available to him due to the loss of strength in his hands. The work the plaintiff did at Tomlin required extensive use of his hands especially the bending and tying of rebar. Rebar is a rod used to strengthen concrete walls. To tie rebar, the worker must use a large pair of pliers to twist wire onto the bar and to bend or shape the bar. The plaintiff was doing this work for Tomlin from four to six hours a day. In addition to this, the plaintiff used an -2-
The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping on September 10, 1998, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of eight years at 35% for each count of aggravated assault and as a Range I, standard offender to eight years at 30% for the aggravated kidnapping charge, with the sentence suspended and the petitioner placed on eight-year probation. As a result of a probation violation, the trial court, on September 14, 2001, revoked probation and amended the judgments so that the sentence to be served for aggravated kidnapping was modified to eight years at 100%. Challenging the amendment, a pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on January 2, 2002, which was denied as being untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that, because the one-year statute of limitations began to run at the time of entry of the amended judgment for the kidnapping conviction, his post-conviction petition was timely. We agree and reverse the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.
The petitioner, Danyelle Dewain Parker, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.
The Appellant, William K. Robison, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Hickman County Circuit Court. Robison is currently serving an effective sentence of fifteen years as a result of his guilty pleas to aggravated assault, setting fire to personal property, escape and theft over $10,000. On appeal, Robinson argues the post-conviction court erred in finding that: (1) he received effective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. Finding no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Hickman
Court of Criminal Appeals
William Williams vs. Marla Barnes-Mason E2002-01442-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Mindy Norton Seals
Primary residential custody was awarded to mother. Father appealed. We affirm.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
In Re: Adoption of Samuel Downey, et.al. vs. Catherine Downey E2002-01972-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
The Trial Court approved adoption of three minor children by sister of biological mother. Mother appealed, insisting Georgia Court decree terminating her parental rights to the children was defective. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Jack Parks vs. Chuck Rich E2002-02014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
Jack H. Parks sued Chuck Rich, the owner of an apartment complex. Parks initially complained of a back injury resulting from his jumping off a first floor balcony railing, and irritation to his body caused by a bug spray applied in his apartment unit, both of which incidents occurred at the complex. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals, contending that summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to the bug spray matter and that the trial court erred with respect to certain discovery matters. We affirm.
Washington
Court of Appeals
Dept of Children's Srvcs. vs. L.F. E2002-02209-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Dwight E. Stokes
The trial court terminated the parental rights of L.F. ("Mother") with respect to her minor child, D.F. (DOB: January 28, 1994) ("the child"). Mother appeals, essentially arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that statutory grounds for termination exist and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. We affirm.
The petitioner, Randall Eugene Best, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.
Monroe
Court of Criminal Appeals
Jewell Winningham v. Findlay Industries, M2002-02059-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: James L. Weatherford, Senior Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the trial court erred in denying her application for reconsideration pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2). As discussed below, the panel has concluded that, under the circumstances, the claimant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether she is entitled to an increased award. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated and Case Remanded JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., and BEN H. CANTRELL, SP. J., joined. Sonya Henderson, Thomas, Henderson & Pate, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jewell Winningham Kenneth M. Switzer, Ruth, Howard, Tate & Sowell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Findlay Industries MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Winningham, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered when a heavy box of materials fell on top of her while she was working for the employer, Findlay Industries. Her alleged injuries included a crushed left hand with lacerated fingers, a fractured left knee and strains to her neck, back and shoulder. At trial, the claimant contended her award of permanent partial disability benefits should exceed two and one-half times her medical impairment rating for the injury because, although she had returned to work at an hourly wage equal to or greater than what she was receiving at the time of the injury, her actual wages were less than before because she was unable to work as many hours. A medical expert estimated her permanent medical impairment to be 18 percent to the whole body, as a result of her injuries. The special judge found the return to work issue "moot" and awarded permanent disability benefits based on 4 percent to the body as a whole, an amount less than two and one-half times the claimant's medical impairment rating. That judgment was filed on May 26, 2. No appeal was taken and the judgment became final. Thereafter, the claimant petitioned the court for reconsideration pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 5-6-241(a)(2) and a "Motion to Clarify" the final judgment. The motion to clarify was argued before a different special judge. At that motion hearing, the court considered the first special judge's testimony that he did not intend to preclude reconsideration by characterizing the return to work issue as moot. Notwithstanding that undisputed testimony, the special judge dismissed the application for reconsideration "based upon the judgment order of May 26, 2." The claimant has appealed. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without any presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 and 6 specify the post trial motions available to a party who is dissatisfied with a final decision. Motions to clarify are not included. The rules of civil procedure are applicable to actions to recover workers' compensation benefits. Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. 1997). In addition, the courts are not at liberty to issue advisory decisions. We conclude, therefore, that there is no such thing as a motion to clarify. Under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act, the right of an employee who suffers a work-related injury to recover compensation benefits from his employer is governed by the statutes in effect at the time of the injury. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998). Such statutes are part of the contract of employment and the rights and responsibilities of such injured employee and his employer can only be ascertained from a consideration of those statutes as construed by the courts. Hudnall v. S. & W. Constr. Co. of Tenn., Inc., 6 Tenn. App. 743, 451 S.W.2d 858 (1969). The entire workers' compensation system of law is statutory. Vinson v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tenn. 1983). The Act is in the nature of an insurance policy and an action to recover the benefits provided therein is an action on a contract. Woods v. City of LaFollette, 185 Tenn. 655, 661, 27 S.W.2d 572, 574 (1948). It must be interpreted in a manner designed to protect workers and their families from the economic devastation that can follow on-the-job injuries. Nance v. State Ind., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. 2). Where an injured worker is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits to the body as a whole and the pre-injury employer returns the employee to employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving at the time of the injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award that the employee may receive is two and one-half times the medical impairment rating pursuant to the provisions of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment or the Manual for Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent Physical -2-
Warren
Workers Compensation Panel
Susan Green v. Leon Moore M2002-00889-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Lee Davies
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the thirty (30)-day notice of appeal period, articulated in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) ("Rule 4(a)"), began to run when the appellees filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the final claim between all parties in this action, or when the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all parties in this action had been adjudicated. The Court of Appeals held that the thirty-day period commenced on the date the appellees filed the notice of voluntary dismissal and concluded that the appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the thirty-day notice of appeal period commenced on the date that the trial court entered an order confirming that all claims between all the parties had been adjudicated. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the intermediate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.
The co-defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to sell "ecstasy," a Schedule I controlled substance. After a sentencing hearing, each received a sentence of eight years to be served in split confinement, with all but eight months on probation. The co-defendants contend that the trial court erred in not granting them full probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Following a jury trial, Defendant, George Mears, was found guilty of theft of property of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000, a Class D felony. In his motion for a new trial, Defendant raised one issue, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant contended that his counsel failed to adequately investigate and develop all available defense strategies and failed to adequately prepare for trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial court concluded that Defendant's counsel should have interviewed two witnesses prior to the day of trial but that Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's delayed interviews. As to all other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court found that Defendant failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty years incarceration. The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony and received a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his three-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to grant the defendant probation or alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Hamilton
Court of Criminal Appeals
In Re: Crystal Michelle Moats E2002-01635-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William T. Denton
This is a paternity case. Following DNA testing, the parties agreed that Randy L. Garner ("Father") is the biological father of Crystal Michelle Moats (DOB: August 13, 1985) ("the child"). The issues remaining before the trial court were "current support, past due support, and medical payments." Following a bench trial, the court addressed these issues. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court awarded Mother $1,000 as support for the child from her date of birth to the date of filing of the paternity petition, i.e., September 18, 2000. Mother appeals, contending that the trial court erred in setting the amount of retroactive support for the period prior to the filing of the petition. We vacate the trial court's award of $1,000 and remand for further proceedings.
Blount
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Lee Pennell M2001-01863-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier
The defendant was found in criminal contempt of court for violating a court order by operating a motor vehicle after his driving privileges had been lost for one year, and received a ten-day jail sentence. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether a trial judge can revoke a Tennessee driver’s license; and (2) whether he was in contempt for driving his vehicle the same day and after he had lost his license. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Lee Pennell - Dissenting M2001-01863-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the Defendant’s conviction for criminal contempt of court should be affirmed. While I agree that the trial court did have the authority to suspend the Defendant’s driver’s license, I do not believe that the Defendant was sufficiently placed on notice that his conduct of driving a car could result in his being held in contempt.
