In Re Bernard T, et al.
This appeal involves a termination of rights proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113 (Supp. 2009) with regard to five children between the ages of twelve and seventeen. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services removed the children from the custody of their biological mother and the person thought to be their biological father and entered into a series of permanency plans with them for the next three and one-half years. Shortly after discovering that the putative father was not the biological father of two of the children, the Department filed a termination petition in the Shelby County Juvenile Court. The juvenile court entered an order on October 31, 2008, terminating both the biological mother's and the putative father's parental rights. The putative father appealed the juvenile court's decision to terminate his parental rights based on both Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi). While the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's finding that grounds for termination of the putative father's rights existed, the court reversed the judgment terminating the putative father's rights based on the majority's conclusion that the Department had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to address the causes for termination under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3). The majority also reversed the termination of the father's rights under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi) because the Department had failed to aid the putative father in establishing paternity. State, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Tina T. (In re B.T.), No. W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3681884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009). We granted the Department's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that the Department used reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to establish his parentage and to regain custody of his biological and legal children and that the juvenile court properly terminated the putative father's rights with regard to all five children. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Patricia Henderson v. SAIA, Inc. et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal was initially referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). After oral argument was conducted before the Panel, but before the Panel filed its opinion, the case was transferred to the full Court in order to consider a request under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to set aside a judgment approving a settlement. The trial court found no basis for setting aside the settlement under Rule 60.02. Neither do we. The judgment of the trial court upholding the parties’ settlement is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jeffery Aaron Lane v. State of Tennessee
We review this post-conviction case to determine the validity of defendant's guilty plea when the trial court did not specifically ask the defendant "How do you plead?" and he did not respond with the words, "Guilty" or "Not guilty." We hold that the defendant's guilty plea was valid because the facts and circumstances of the case show that the defendant intended to plead guilty, affirmatively admitted his guilt, stated that he was entering his plea voluntarily, and believed that he was pleading guilty. Accordingly, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, and the guilty plea proceedings in this case substantially complied with the mandates of federal and state law. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and we remand for reinstatement of the defendant's conviction under the accepted plea agreement. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Marcus Ward v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction case, the issue we review is whether the defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated sexual battery was knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily made when the trial court did not advise the defendant of the following consequences of his guilty plea: (1) mandatory registration as a sexual offender, and (2) a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life in addition to his incarceration. We hold that the trial court was not required to advise the defendant of the requirement of sex offender registration because it is a remedial and regulatory measure, and therefore a collateral consequence of the guilty plea. We further hold that the trial court was required to advise the defendant of the mandatory sentence of lifetime community supervision because it is a punitive and direct consequence of the guilty plea. Because the trial court failed to ensure that the defendant was informed of the lifetime supervision consequence, we hold that his guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery was not knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Estate of Joyce Bell et al. v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation d/b/a The Regional Medical Center
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act to an action for damages filed against a defendant that was not covered by the Act when the injuryproducing events occurred. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County seeking the benefit of the claims and defenses available to government entities under the Act. The plaintiffs responded by challenging the constitutionality of legislation extending the coverage of the Act to the defendant on the ground that the legislation had been enacted after the plaintiffs had sustained their injuries. The trial court held that the Act applied to the defendant but granted the plaintiffs permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal after the Court of Appeals declined to consider the case. We have determined that applying the substantive amendment to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act enacted after the injury-producing events occurred to the plaintiffs' damage claims violates the prohibition against retrospective laws in Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Tennessee. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralphelle James
The defendant, a Range I offender, was found guilty of public intoxication, theft of property over $1,000, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of thirty days for the misdemeanor and four years for the felony theft; because the six-year sentence for aggravated burglary is to be served consecutively, the effective sentence is ten years. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal to consider the propriety of instructions to the jury permitting inferences of both theft and burglary from the possession of recently stolen property. A second issue is whether the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of aggravated burglary for insufficient evidence. As his final issue, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to further examine a defense witness after jurors had submitted questions pursuant to rule. Because the instructions were proper, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict on the burglary charge, and the procedure utilized for juror questions was compliant with the rule, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Melissa Michelle Cox v. M. A. Primary and Urgent Care Clinic et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the standard of care that applies to a physician assistant in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff sued for injuries she allegedly suffered as a result of physician assistant Michael Maddox's failure to diagnose her condition accurately. The plaintiff did not sue Maddox, but sued the clinic which he owned and in which he practiced and Dr. Austin Adams, Maddox's supervising physician. The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment, supported by their testimony that (1) Maddox did not violate the standard of care applicable to physician assistants and (2) Dr. Adams did not violate the standard of care applicable to physicians. The plaintiff responded with her cardiologist's testimony that Maddox violated the standard of care applicable to primary care physicians. The cardiologist testified that he was not familiar with physician assistants or their supervision. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to establish that Maddox violated the professional standard of care applicable to him. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the standard of care applicable to physician assistants is the same as that applicable to physicians. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the standard of care applicable to physician assistants is distinct from that applicable to physicians. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants is reinstated, and the case is dismissed. |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Rae Lewter
A jury convicted the defendant of burglary and theft in connection with the break-in of a dental office. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the evidence, which included a white shirt bearing the defendant's DNA found at the crime scene, was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Upon further review by this Court, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Supreme Court | |
Timothy Darnell Flowers v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Memphis lawyer whose practice focuses on immigration law. Following a hearing, one of the Board of Professional Responsibility's hearing panels unanimously determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for one year and should be required to make restitution to three clients. The lawyer sought judicial review of the hearing panel's suspension of his license. Based on the record of the proceedings before the hearing panel, the Chancery Court for Shelby County determined that twenty-three of the twenty-six courses of conduct found by the hearing panel to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct were supported by substantial and material evidence and that the evidence supported the hearing panel's reliance on seven aggravating factors. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the suspension of the lawyer's license for one year was supported by the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005) and was not arbitrary and capricious. The lawyer appealed to this Court. We affirm the suspension of the lawyer's license to practice law for one year and the order directing him to make restitution to three of his clients. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Brown
The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment and in the reasoning of all but Sections III and IV.B of the majority’s opinion. In Section III, the majority holds that “the first step” in addressing whether to apply the peer review privilege set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-219(e) “is to determine whether the subject matter of the underlying proceeding is within the subject matter covered by the statute.” In Section IV.B, the majority relies on the rationale developed in Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2010), observing “that the privilege in [section] 63-6-219(e) applies only to peer review proceedings regarding a physician’s professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.” The majority determines “that some, but not all, of the functions of the Quality Review Committee [at Cleveland Community Hospital] were peer review proceedings involving the professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine of the physicians on the hospital’s medical staff.” |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital’s medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital’s infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into postoperative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(e). The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital’s business and because the infection control director was the “original source” of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009). We granted the |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al. - Dissenting
While the majority’s narrow interpretation of the statutory peer review privilege has appeal, I cannot reconcile its result with the basic principles of statutory construction. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al.
This appeal involves the application of the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment and in the reasoning of all but Sections III and IV.B of the majority’s opinion. In Section III, the majority holds that “the first step” in addressing whether to apply the peer review privilege set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-219(e) “is to determine whether the subject matter of the underlying proceeding is within the subject matter covered by the statute.” In Section IV.B, the majority relies on the rationale developed in Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2010), observing “that the privilege in [section] 63-6-219(e) applies only to peer review proceedings regarding a physician’s professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.” The majority determines “that some, but not all, of the functions of the Quality Review Committee [at Cleveland Community Hospital] were peer review proceedings involving the professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine of the physicians on the hospital’s medical staff.” |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves the evidentiary privilege in the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 [Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219 (Supp. 2009)]. A former hospital employee filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County against the hospital and an orthopaedic surgeon on the hospital's medical staff. During discovery, the former employee sought to depose the hospital's infection control director regarding the details of an investigation into post-operative nosocomial infections and her knowledge of whether the defendant surgeon had tested positive for infectious diseases. The hospital moved for a protective order on the ground that the requested information was privileged under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219(e). The trial court declined to issue a protective order after determining that the information sought by the former employee was not privileged because it had been created in the regular course of the hospital's business and because the infection control director was the "original source" of the information. After granting the hospital an interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No.E2008-00535-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 17850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2009). We granted the hospital's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that records received or made in the ordinary course of a hospital's business apart from the operation of a peer review committee are not protected by the peer review privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219. We have also determined that documents prepared by or at the request of a peer review committee exercising its peer review function and documents prepared by third parties as part of the work of a peer review committee performing its peer review function are privileged. Finally, we have determined that the hospital did not waive its right to invoke the privilege in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-219(e) with regard to the work performed by its infection control director in the context of a peer review proceeding. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al. - Dissenting
While the majority’s narrow interpretation of the statutory peer review privilege has appeal, I cannot reconcile its result with the basic principles of statutory construction. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beecher et al.
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Williamson | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Sidney J.
We granted appeal to determine whether a trial court may grant an intervening adoption petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) when the intervening petitioners did not have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted at the time they filed their petition. The maternal grandparents petitioned to adopt the child, who was in their physical custody, and the paternal grandparents filed an intervening adoption petition. After engaging in a comparative fitness analysis, the trial court granted the paternal grandparents' petition. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering the paternal grandparents' petition because they did not meet the physical custody requirement in section 36-1-116(f)(1) and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting the maternal grandparents' petition. We hold that section 36-1-116(f)(1) includes an exception to the physical custody requirement when the petitioners have filed an intervening adoption petition and the child sought to be adopted is in the physical custody of the original petitioners. We also hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the paternal grandparents were fit, that they were financially capable of providing for the child, and that the child's best interests would be served by granting their petition. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
As the majority opinion observes, the Court of Criminal Appeals has twice held that petitioner Davis’s sentences were illegal. After our intermediate appellate court’s first opinion in this case, Davis v. State, No. M2007-01729-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 1958174, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2008), we granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2008). Upon reconsideration, the Court of Criminal Appeals again remanded to the trial court for the entry of habeas corpus relief. Davis v. State, No. M2009- 00011-CCA-RM-HC, 2009 WL 961777, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 8, 2009). Upon application by the State, we granted permission to appeal. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I write separately to state my position in this case. I concur with the views of my colleagues as expressed in the majority and concurring opinions that the defendant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. My decision in this case would have been different had the trial court imposed this sentence on the defendant after a trial. However, because this was a voluntary guilty plea agreement, and not a sentence imposed by the trial court following a trial, the defendant waived any habeas corpus relief he may have been entitled to receive because the sentence he bargained for was within the statutory minimum and statutory maximum for the offense. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Lavar Davis v. State of Tennessee
We granted permission to appeal in this habeas corpus case to address the legality of a pleabargained sentence requiring the defendant, being sentenced for two cocaine offenses committed in a school zone, to serve twenty-two years of a Range I sentence at “100%.” The defendant alleges that his sentence is illegal because it makes no provision for the possibility of early release on parole. The trial court denied relief. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. We hold that the defendant’s sentence is not illegal, and he is therefore not entitled to habeas corpus relief. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hickman | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
We granted permission to appeal in this case in order to consider whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 permits a defendant to amend his motion for new trial after the hearing on the initial motion has been conducted and an order denying the motion has been entered. In this case, newly-appointed defense counsel filed several pleadings seeking to add grounds in support of a new trial after the hearing on the original motion for new trial had been held and an order denying a new trial had been entered. The trial court considered the new grounds and subsequently entered a second order denying a new trial. The defendant appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to consider any issues raised after the trial court denied the original motion for new trial. As to the issues that were raised in that motion, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the defendant is not entitled to relief. We have concluded that trial courts should not permit the defense to amend its motion for new trial after the new trial hearing has been held and an order denying a new trial has been entered. Further, we have reviewed an issue the defendant properly preserved and have reviewed for plain error the issues the defendant failed to preserve but argues to this Court. We hold that the defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Hatcher
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Franklin
We granted this appeal to determine whether the admission into evidence of an automobile license tag number observed and written down by a bystander near the crime scene who did not appear at trial violated the defendant’s right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions. A few seconds after being robbed at her place of employment, the victim ran out of the business, told a bystander that she had been robbed, and asked the bystander to observe the tag number of the vehicle operated by the man who had just left the business. The bystander did so and then came inside the store to write the number down for the victim. The victim added other descriptive information about the robber to the same piece of paper and then turned it over to the police. The tag number was traced to a vehicle owned by the defendant, whom a jury ultimately convicted of one count of robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the written tag number was “testimonial hearsay” within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), and concluding that the statement’s admission was plain error. Based on our objective review of the circumstances surrounding the statement, we conclude that the written tag number was “nontestimonial hearsay” that did not implicate the defendant’s right of confrontation and was admissible as an excited utterance. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate defendant’s conviction. |
Shelby | Supreme Court |
