State of Tennessee v. Kenneth EugeneTroutman
While this case has ultimately been decided on a waiver issue, we granted this appeal to take the opportunity to address two very important issues of statutory construction in misdemeanor sentencing. The general issues may be framed as whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210 apply to misdemeanor sentencing. Specifically, the issues have been stated as: (1) whether a trial judge must state on the record, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(f), what enhancement or mitigating factors were employed in setting the sentence length in a DUI case; (2) whether a trial court must make specific findings on the record, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann § 40-35-209(c), when fixing the percentage of a sentence to be served in incarceration under the misdemeanor sentencing statute; and (3) whether the appellate court erred in remanding this case for re-sentencing. We hold that §§ 40-35-209, - 210(f) are inapplicable to DUI sentencing and that the defendant's sentences should be affirmed. |
Washington | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Burns
The defendant, Kevin Burns, was convicted of two counts of felony murder and two counts of attempted felony murder. The jury imposed the death penalty for one of the felony murder convictions after finding that evidence of an aggravating factor -- that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim murdered -- outweighed the evidence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury imposed a life sentence for the other felony murder conviction. |
Jackson | Supreme Court | |
Deborah Williams v. Tecumseh Products Company
The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel approved the trial court’s award of benefits to Deborah Williams, the plaintiff, who had suffered symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome related to her employment as an assembly-line worker for Tecumseh Products Company, the defendant. At issue are the causation and permanency of the worker’s injuries and the payment of discretionary costs related to the deposition of an examining physician. For the reasons appearing below, we adopt the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issues of causation and permanency. Although we affirm the award of discretionary costs, we vacate the panel’s order invalidating certain local procedures of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. |
Henry | Supreme Court | |
McCurry vs. Container Corp. of America
|
Supreme Court | ||
Chrisman vs. Hill Home Development et al
|
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Chrisman vs. Hill Home Development et al
|
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Victor James Cazes vs. State
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Premium Finance Corp. vs. Crump Ins. Ser. of Memphis et al
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Williams
|
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
03S01-9706-CR-00068
|
Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Quintero and Hall
|
Humphreys | Supreme Court | |
01S01-9705-CH-00110
|
Supreme Court | ||
01S01-9711-CH-00248
|
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Blanton
|
Supreme Court | ||
City of Fulton vs. Hickman-Fulton
|
Weakley | Supreme Court | |
Crittenden vs. State
|
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Callahan
|
Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Dewayne Butler, Fredrick D. Butler, and Eric D. Alexander
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Dewayne Butler, Fredrick D. Butler, and Eric D. Alexander
|
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
The City of White House vs. Whitley
|
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
The City of White House vs. Whitley
|
Robertson | Supreme Court | |
John Kohl & Company P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, a Tennessee General Partnership, and Dan E. Huffstutter
In this legal malpractice action, the plaintiffs, John Kohl & Company P.C., John B. Kohl, III and Helen H. Kohl, Individually, and John B. Kohl, III, Trustee, as Trustee of the John Kohl & Company, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, (collectively referred to as the “plaintiffs”), appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the trial court’s finding that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ recovery for negligently provided legal advice pertaining to certain business matters. The plaintiffs have also appealed from the denial of legal fees associated with prosecuting this action against the defendant, Dearborn and Ewing, and one of its associates, Dan Huffstutter. The issues before us are: (1) whether certain of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice actions, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, and (2) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover legal fees associated with prosecuting this action. For the reasons explained hereafter, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Chrysta Gail Pike
In this capital case, the defendant, Christa Gail Pike, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing on the conviction for first degree murder, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;” and (2) “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) and (6) (1997 Repl.). Finding that the two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution. With respect to the defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the trial judge imposed a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Barbara White as the Administratrix of the Estate of Earl R. White, deceased v. William H. Lawrence, M.D.
The Court has considered the Petition for Rehearing filed by the defendant/appellee, and it is the decision of a majority of this Court that the petition is without merit. The Petition for Rehearing is denied. |
Supreme Court |