Moore Family Properties, LLC, et al. v. Pull-A-Part of Tennessee, LLC, et al.
This appeal involves a review of actions taken at a meeting of the Memphis City Council. When the council members voted on a resolution, for unknown reasons, the electronic voting machine did not record an entry for one of the council members. This resulted in six votes being cast in favor of the measure and six votes against it. The omitted council member orally expressed his intention to vote in favor of the resolution before the Chairman announced the result of the vote. The Chairman then called for the electronic voting machine to be cleared so that all members could re-enter their votes. After the second vote, the Chairman declared that the resolution passed by a vote of seven to six. The appellants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, alleging that the first vote was final and that the City Council acted illegally by taking a second vote. Upon review of the record of the proceedings, the trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Memphis and the Memphis City Council. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Edward Hargrove v. Merriellen Hargrove A/K/A Merriellen Warstler
This is a post-divorce case involving disputes over obligations in the Marital Dissolution Agreement and modification of the visitation schedule contained in the permanent parenting plan. Husband filed for divorce from Wife, and on August 25, 1998, the chancery court entered a final decree of divorce that incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement. The permanent parenting plan was filed on February 12, 2004. Concerning Husband and Wife’s minor son, born January 7, 1990, the residential schedule in the permanent parenting plan provided that Husband would be the primary residential parent and Wife would be responsible for the child every other weekend and during certain holidays. As to property division, the Marital Dissolution Agreement required Husband to transfer one-half of his pension plan to Wife. Concerning the marital home, Wife agreed to execute a quitclaim deed to Husband conveying her interest to Husband simultaneously with Husband paying her $15,000. After a contempt hearing, the court modified the parenting schedule; found that Wife was entitled to one-half of Husband’s pension, but not one-half of Husband’s annuity; and found that Husband had satisfied the $15,000 obligation. Wife appeals pro se, arguing that the modification of the residential schedule found in the parenting plan is void because the court did not follow Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a). Wife also argues that the parties’ intent was that she was to receive half the annuity along with half the pension. Finally, Wife contends that Husband did not meet his burden of proof to establish the defense of accord and satisfaction. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of M.P.J., DOB 1/29/02
This is a case involving the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Department of Children’s Services instituted a dependent and neglect proceeding and the court granted a protective order removing the minor child from the mother’s home. At the time, the father’s whereabouts were unknown. The child, almost seven months old, was placed in the temporary custody of her greataunt. The father subsequently began serving a 56 month sentence in federal prison. When the child was almost five years old, the great-aunt petitioned the court for the termination of both the mother and the father’s parental rights and for the adoption of the child. The mother joined in the petition. After a termination hearing, the court announced that the father had abandoned the child, that his rights were terminated, and granted the great-aunt’s petition for adoption. The court first entered an order of adoption, but had yet to enter the order terminating the father’s parental rights. The court then issued an order of termination, but failed to include any findings of fact. Next, the court issued an amended order of termination with specific findings of fact, nunc pro tunc to the termination hearing date. Father appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court failed to make findings of fact; (2) that there is not clear and convincing proof of abandonment; (3) that the Department of Children’s Services did not afford him a reasonable opportunity to reunite with the child; and (4) that substantial harm to the child must be proven before a court may constitutionally terminate a parent’s rights. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Levine et al. v. Ron Marsh et. al.
This appeal involves a dispute over the personal property of a wife who was murdered by her husband. Following their appointment as conservators of her property, the wife’s parents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against their son-in-law and certain members of his family seeking to recover their daughter’s personal property. Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a $222,449.10 verdict for the parents against the husband’s brother, sister, and brother-in-law. On this appeal, the husband’s family members take issue with the denial of their motion for directed verdict based on the statute of limitations, the failure to join the original conservator as a necessary party, the admissibility of certain evidence, and the jury instructions. We have determined that the trial court did not commit error during the trial and, therefore, affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Heatherly Awad v. Selma Curtis
This is a breach of contract case. The parties executed a contract for the sale of a beauty salon whereby, according to one of the provisions, Seller agreed to work for Buyer for a specific amount of time. Seller quit before the specified period expired. Both parties sued for breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages to Buyer in the amount of $18,000.00. Seller appeals, asserting that the provision at issue was too indefinite to be enforceable and challenging the damages awarded Buyer. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy L. Aldridge v. Pam Aldridge, et al. In Re: Conservatorship of Bill M. Aldridge
This is a case involving a petition for appointment of conservator and a request for attorney’s fees by the non-petitioning spouse of the ward. The husband and wife were married, but lived apart. The husband lived with his daughter from a previous marriage. Unknown by the husband’s children, he continued to see and financially support his estranged wife. The husband suffered from bipolar disorder requiring several hospitalizations. The husband, during a manic period, emptied his 401K account and purchased several vehicles and properties. The husband’s daughter petitioned the court for appointment of a conservatorship for her father. The court found that the husband was disabled, and appointed the daughter as the conservator over his person and a third-party attorney as the conservator over his finances. The wife was represented by counsel during the proceedings. The court ordered the conservator to pay the wife spousal support in the amount of $2,000 a month out of the husband’s $150,000 estate. The wife then petitioned the court for an award of her attorney’s fees, which the probate court denied. Wife appeals, arguing that the lower court has the statutory authority pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-109 to include in the award of financial support her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis
This appeal involves the second case filed by the appellants to challenge an annexation ordinance. Previously, the appellants filed a quo warranto action seeking to have the annexation ordinance declared null and void on various grounds. Other landowners had previously filed quo warranto actions that were consolidated and still pending, and the appellants sought to consolidate their action with the others. The trial court held that the appellants’ quo warranto action was not timely filed, and accordingly dismissed it. On appeal, this Court affirmed. The consolidated quo warranto proceedings concluded with a consent order approving the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance, but providing that the annexation would take place in two phases. The appellants then filed the present action seeking a declaration that the annexation accomplished through the consent order was procedurally invalid and unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Serena Rucker v. St. Thomas Hospital
This is a common-law retaliatory discharge case. Plaintiff/Appellant alleged that she was wrongfully discharged from her employment with Defendant/Appellee. Defendant/Appellee moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry D. Carmack et al. v. Louis W. Oliver, III
Landowners who hired an attorney to defend their property rights brought suit for legal malpractice |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Crawford, Sr. et al. v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc.et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
The defendants’ filings in this case clearly establish that Teri Crawford does not have a cause of action for intentional interference with the dead body of her brother, Robert H. Crawford. That cause of action belonged to Mr. Crawford’s widow, to the exclusion of all others. Furthermore, in my opinion, the record before us negates Ms. Crawford’s alleged causes of action against all defendants except those asserted against the individuals and entities directly associated with the operation of the Tri-State Crematory (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “the Tri-State Defendants”). As to these latter individuals and entities, I believe the defendants’ filings fail to negate Ms. Crawford’s three causes of action for (1) intentional, (2) reckless, and (3) negligent infliction of mental distress. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was correct in dismissing Ms. Crawford’s complaint with respect to these “infliction of mental distress” theories. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Crawford, Sr. , et al. v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves one of numerous civil lawsuits filed against T. Ray Brent Marsh and his former business, Tri-State Crematory, Inc., and others. The plaintiffs in this case are the parents and siblings of Robert H. Crawford, Jr., whose body was sent to the Tri-State Crematory for cremation. The body, however, was not cremated and to this day the plaintiffs do not know what happened to their loved ones’ body. The Trial Court dismissed the lawsuit after finding that the decedent’s surviving spouse was the only person with standing to bring the various tort claims asserted by the plaintiffs. The decedent’s sister, Teri Crawford, appeals that determination. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rondal Akers, et al. v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from three consolidated lawsuits filed against T. Ray Brent Marsh, Marsh’s former business, Tri-State Crematory, and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc. The plaintiffs are relatives and a girlfriend of three deceased individuals whose bodies were sent by Buckner-Rush Funeral Home to Tri-State Crematory for cremation. The bodies were not cremated and either were dumped or buried by Marsh on the Tri-State premises. The Trial Court dismissed all three lawsuits after holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring any of the tort, contract, or statutory claims at issue. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Rondal Akers, et al. v. Buckner- Rush Enterprises Inc. et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
For the reasons stated in my separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in the case of Robert H. Crawford, Sr. et al. v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc. et al., No. E2006-00987-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed November 21, 2007), I respectfully dissent from so much of the majority opinion as affirms the dismissal of the complaints filed by Rondal D. Akers, Jr., Lucinda Akers, Donna Burns, Susan Hall, Doyle Harden, Ricky Harden, Sandra Fogle, Mollie C. Denton, and Elaine Waldron, against the individuals and entities directly associated with the operation of Tri-State Crematory, as to the claims in those complaints alleging outrageous conduct/infliction of emotional distress. In all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Trent Watrous, Individually, and as the surviving spouse and next of kin of Valerie Watrous v. Jack L. Johnson, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent entrustment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Gordon C. Collins v. Barry L. Arnold, et al. - Concurring
I am in complete agreement with the court’s conclusions that the judgment in this case must be reversed because the trial court refused to give an instruction warranted by the facts and that the evidence does not warrant an award of punitive damages against either Graham Brothers Entertainment of Nashville or Tennessee Protection Agency. Because this case must be retried, I write separately with regard to the admissibility of the evidence regarding Mr. Gangwer’s prior conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gordon C. Collins v. Barry L. Arnold, et al.
The plaintiff was severely injured when the automobile he was driving was struck by a car driven by an impaired driver who was killed in the collision. The plaintiff’s suit named as defendants the estate of the deceased driver, the nightclub from which the driver departed immediately before the accident, and the company which provided security services to the bar. The jury declined to find the nightclub liable for serving alcoholic beverages, thereby making the only available basis for liability negligence in controlling the conduct of the deceased driver so as to prevent harm to others. The jury heard evidence that employees of the club and the security company had made efforts, albeit unsuccessful, to prevent the driver from leaving the premises in an intoxicated state. The jury found the plaintiff’s damages resulted from negligence and amounted to over $1,162,000. They allocated 30% of the fault to the deceased driver, 30% to the security company, and 40% to the club’s owner. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $1.5 million against the club’s owner and $500,000 against the security company. The club owner appealed. Because the jury was not instructed as to the conditions for liability under an assumed, rather than imposed, duty of care as established in Section 324A of the Restatement of Torts, we must reverse the verdict and judgment thereon. For separate and independent reasons, we reverse the award of punitive damages, because the conduct of the bar’s personnel in attempting to prevent its adult customer from driving while impaired did not reach the level of recklessness necessary to sustain a punitive award. Additionally, we find no error in evidentiary rulings or other procedures in the trial court that justify reversal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy J. Coleman v. Daystar Energy, Inc.
In this breach of construction contract suit, the trial court gave judgment in favor of plaintiff homeowner, and contractor defendant has appealed. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca L. Maino v. The Southern Company, Inc. D/B/A The Southern Company, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on the ten-year statute of repose applicable to products liability actions codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-28-103. We granted Plaintiff’s application for interlocutory appeal with respect to whether the savings statute saves a products liability action that was filed within the products liability statutes of limitations and repose, voluntarily dismissed, and refiled within one year where the products liability statute of repose expired during the one-year savings period. We hold Plaintiff may rely on the savings statute to refile her action. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Baldwin v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
A prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for writ of certiorari after he was denied parole. The trial court dismissed the petition on the basis that it was not sworn to and did not state that it was the first application for a writ. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Union Realty Company, Ltd. D/B/A Northgate Shopping Center v. Family Dollar Stores of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
This dispute arises from a premises liability action filed against Plaintiff property owner Union Realty Company. The trial court determined that Defendant Travelers Property Casualty Company had an obligation to insure Union Realty as a named insured under a public liability contract of insurance issued to Defendant Family Dollar store. Family Dollar and Travelers appeal; we affirm in part, vacate in part, and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vicky Berry v. Houchen's Market of TN, Inc. and J. D. Easterly Properties - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to the Defendant Houchens. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Plaintiff was, as a matter of law, 50% or more at fault when she slipped and fell in oil in the parking lot owned by the Defendant Eatherly. After a review of the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Berry, the nonmoving party, as is required when considering a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997), I conclude that there are facts and inferences reasonably drawn from the facts which would permit reasonable minds to differ as to whether Ms. Berry was less than 50 % at fault. Accordingly, I do not agree that the Defendant Eatherly is entitled to summary judgment. The undisputed facts are that Ms. Berry drove into the parking lot, parked her car, got out of her car, walked three or four feet, and then slipped and fell in a puddle of oil in the parking lot. Ms. Berry was looking straight ahead as she walked and did not see the oil. She did not see the oil when she drove into the parking spot or before she fell. She could not see the oil after she had gone into the store and was looking out onto the parking lot. She testified that the oil was invisible to her. I cannot conclude that because she had oil in her hair and down her backside after she fell that the oil puddle was so large that she should have seen it. I cannot agree that her recovery should be barred because she was looking straight ahead and not down at her feet as she was walking. We know there was oil in the parking lot. But how large was the puddle of oil? How visible was it? Should Ms. Berry have seen it? These are material questions of fact to be answered by a jury - not the trial court or the appellate court. Issues of comparison and allocation of fault are properly left to the jury. Prince v. St. Thomas Hosp., 945 S.W.2d 731,735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable minds can differ as to the reasonableness of Ms. Berry’s conduct as she left her vehicle and attempted to enter the store. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vicky Berry v. Houchen's Market of TN, Inc. and J. D. Easterly Properties
Plaintiff fell in a puddle of oil in the parking lot near the Save-a-Lot Market. The Trial Court granted the market and the owner of the parking lot summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of L.A.J., III State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Larry Jones, Jr.
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was born in 1992. In 2000, the child was taken into protective custody based on allegations that the father had sexually abused him. A no-contact order was entered against the father. The mother regained custody of the child in 2002. In April 2003, the mother voluntarily relinquished custody of the child and he was placed with his aunt and uncle. After the child kicked his pregnant aunt in the stomach, custody was returned to the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). In June 2003, the child was found to be dependent and neglected. After the father failed to comply with the child’s permanency plan, DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to both the mother and the father. Default judgment was granted as to mother. The court appointed an attorney to represent the father. A trial was held, after which the court ordered termination of the father’s parental rights on several grounds. The father appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the failure to appoint an attorney for him during the dependency and neglect proceedings violated his due process rights. Finding that the dependency and neglect proceedings are separate and distinct from the termination proceedings, we hold that the father received full procedural protection in the termination proceedings that are the subject of this appeal, and affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Jo Bertuca v. Theodore Joseph Bertuca
This is an appeal from a divorce action filed by Christina Jo Bertuca against her husband, Theodore Joseph Bertuca. The divorce was granted on June 23, 2005, but the trial court reserved the issue of a division of marital assets. That matter was tried in February, 2006. While the hearing related to a variety of assets, most of the evidence presented related to the value of the husband’s ninety percent ownership in Capital Food Services, a Tennessee general partnership that was engaged in the ownership and operation of seven McDonald’s franchises located in Wilson County, Tennessee. The trial court determined the value of Capital Food Services had increased by $1,000,000 above the amount paid for the restaurants. The value of Mr. Bertuca’s interest had, therefore, increased by $900,000 and half that amount was awarded to Ms. Bertuca. Mr. Bertuca has appealed challenging the conclusions reached by the trial court. Ms. Bertuca has appealed from the judgment of the trial court allowing Mr. Bertuca to pay the sum awarded in eighty-four equal monthly installments without interest and asserting she is entitled to her attorneys’ fees on appeal. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial but modify the increase in value of Capital Food Services to $780,768 and Ms. Bertuca’s award to $350,345.50, payable as ordered by the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Lane v. American General Life and Accident Insurance Company - Concurring
I concur completely in the result reached by the majority. In my opinion, the failure of Mr. Lane to correctly respond to the question pertaining to doctors seen and hospitals visited in the past five years and the question regarding medical tests administered in the same time frame, and the resulting increase in the risk under evaluation by American General, operate as a complete bar to the suit by Wife. Given the very recent nature of these doctor visits, the trip to the hospital, and the tests taken, the information pertaining to these matters had to have been within the consciousness of Mr. Lane when he responded to the subject questions. A trier of fact could not have reasonably found otherwise. Hence, in my judgment, there is no genuine issue of material fact on this critical point. Because of this, I do not think it is necessary to address the interplay between (1) the “knowledge and belief” language on the application and (2) the “unless the matter represented increases the risk of loss” language in Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-103. I disassociate myself from this analysis. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
