Steve Stamson, Clerk of Juvenile Court of Shelby County, Tennessee v. David Lillard
This appeal involves the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. to civil service positions in Shelby County. The Juvenile Court entered a consent judgment on a salary petition filed by the Juvenile Court Clerk pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. This judgment allowed the Juvenile Court Clerk to fill certain civil service positions. When the positions were not filled, the Juvenile Court Clerk filed a Petition for Contempt. Subsequently, the Juvenile Court entered judgment on the Petition for Contempt. Finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., we vacate its judgments and dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens' Services v. Tina Temple, et al.
This a termination of parental rights case. The children were removed from Father’s custody due to his lack of stable housing as well as his allowing Mother to “be with” the children despite her drug use. Numerous permanency plans were entered, which required Father, among other things, to maintain stable housing and income, legitimate the children, complete parenting classes, identify a support system, and attend family and domestic violence counseling. At various times, Father had employment and housing; however, at other times, he did not. In 2008, DCS petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of failure to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, as well as three additional grounds available under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9) for the termination of a non-legal parent’s rights. Although this Court finds that Father failed to obtain and maintain stable housing and income or to legitimate the children, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights, finding that DCS failed to aid Father in such efforts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the petition for termination is dismissed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. Tina Temple, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. Specifically, I disagree |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson - Dissenting
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson
This case involves an appeal concerning the relocation of Elizabeth Leanne Hudson (“Mother”) and her two minor children from Nashville, Tennessee, to Hopkinsville, Kentucky. Larson Douglas Hudson (“Father”) opposed the relocation. After a three day bench trial, the trial court granted Mother’s request to relocate after finding, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108, that the relocation was reasonable and not vindictive. The trial court also awarded Mother attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the holding of the trial court regarding the relocation but reverse concerning the attorney’s fees.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: O.J.B., D.O.B. 07/24/05, A Child Under 18 Years of Age
This case involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and father. Both parents were addicted to crack cocaine, and the child tested positive for cocaine at birth. The child was taken into DCS custody and placed in a foster home at three days old. Three months later, the mother was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison as a habitual offender. When the child was 18 months old, DCS filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent. The father had visited the child only twice since she was placed in foster care, and DCS sought to terminate his parental rights for failure to file a petition to establish paternity. The trial court terminated both parents’ parental rights upon finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Both parents appeal. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas M. Gautreaux v. Internal Medicine Education - Dissenting
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas M. Gautreaux v. Internal Medicine Education Foundation, Inc.
This case1 involves the interpretation of a portion of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503. The trial court found that despite the fact the defendant foundation qualified for the statutory exemption set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(d)(1), the entity is subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act because it is the functional equivalent of a public agency. The foundation has appealed. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Beth Vancleave v. Reelfoot Bank
This is a retaliatory discharge case. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant bank. The plaintiff was asked by a customer to open an account in a manner that the plaintiff believed was illegal. The plaintiff refused to do so, and shortly afterward was terminated by the bank. The plaintiff employee filed suit against the bank, asserting claims of common law and statutory retaliatory discharge. After discovery, the bank filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, finding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under either theory because the purported violation of the various statutes and regulations cited by the plaintiff employee did not implicate an important public policy or an illegal activity affecting the public health, safety or welfare. The trial court also found the plaintiff employee, in refusing to open the requested account, had no intent to further the public good, but sought only to protect the bank. The plaintiff employee appeals. We reverse, finding that some of the statutory provisions at issue implicate important public policy and can constitute the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim, and that intent to further the public good is not a required element. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Grapevine Trucking, LLC. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, et al.
Grapevine Trucking, LLC (“Grapevine”) sued Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“Carolina Casualty”) and American Southern Insurance Company (“American Southern Insurance”) alleging breach of insurance contracts. The Trial Court granted Carolina Casualty summary judgment dismissing them from the suit. The Trial Court also granted Grapevine partial summary judgment finding that the theft of a truck and trailer covered by Grapevine’s policy with American Southern Insurance had occurred and that American Southern Insurance was liable. The issue of damages was tried, and the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the combined value of the stolen truck and trailer was $53,000 and that Grapevine was entitled to a judgment against American Southern Insurance for $53,000, plus state sales tax on Grapevine’s loss in the amount of $3,710. American Southern Insurance appeals. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
William Alan Watermeier v. Sherry Dunaway Moss AND Thomas R. Moss III
This is a petition to establish parentage case. Father/Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his petition. Finding that the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-304(b)(2) have not been met and that Appellant is the child’s biological and legal father, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Jeffrey Mauro Cusatis vs. Robert R. Casey, M.D.
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Marcel Eluhu, M.D. v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., Centennial Medical Center
Cardiologist whose hospital privileges were revoked brought suit against the hospital asserting multiple causes of action, including breach of contract. Finding the hospital entitled to immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and the Tennessee Peer Review Law, the chancellor granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all claims for monetary damages. The court subsequently granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. We have concluded that the court erred in granting summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief other than the breach of contract claims. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel Sumner v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Health
Appellants, citizens of Davidson County, sought review of the County’s mosquito control policies, which were in effect in 2005. Upon review, the Appellee, Metropolitan Board of Health of Nashville and Davidson County, denied Appellants’ claim for lack of standing. The trial court granted Appellants’ common law writ of certiorari and affirmed the Board’s findings. Upon review, we conclude that the Appellants’ have no standing, and that the issues presented are rendered moot based upon the County’s adoption of a new mosquito control policy in 2008. Affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: The Estate of Lucille Annetta Schisler
Two of a deceased mother’s six children appeal a jury’s specific findings that their mother’s last will was invalid because they had a confidential relationship with their mother and unduly influenced her to execute the will. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s four other children, commenced this action to contest the will the appellants offered for probate. On appeal, the appellants contend there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings that they had a confidential relationship with their mother or that they exerted undue influence. Appellants also contend the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a criminal conviction of one of the appellants. Whether to admit the evidence was within the sound discretion of the trial court and we find the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence; moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that evidence of the crime was only relevant as it pertained to motive and intent to influence the testatrix to change her will. As for the jury verdict, we find substantial and material evidence that supports the jury’s findings in the record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Lila M. Trout
This appeal involves a conservatorship. When the respondent was eighty-three years old, her sister |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Evelyn Nye, Individually and as Surviving Spouse and Next-of-Kin of Hugh Todd Nye, v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., et al.
Defendants sold materials containing asbestos to the deceased’s employer, where he was exposed to asbestos and contracted mesothelioma from which he died. Plaintiff’s widow brought this action against the supplier, a jury trial resulted and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, which the Trial Court approved. On appeal, we hold that certain jury instructions were error and we reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Morton v. State of Tennessee
Claimant filed this claim for damages seeking return of bond money he had posted. He alleged a violation of his constitutional rights resulted when the State charged him for the same two crimes in two different counties. The State responded with a motion to dismiss contending that the Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The Claims Commissioner granted the motion. Claimant appeals. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Arlene R. Starr v. Paul B. Hill, Sr., AND Paul B. Hill, Jr.
After Plaintiff was injured in a car accident, she filed suit against the minor who was driving the other vehicle and against the minor’s father, alleging that he was vicariously liable for the acts of his son pursuant to the family purpose doctrine. Father moved for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts showed that the family purpose doctrine was inapplicable as a matter of law. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the family purpose doctrine was applicable as a matter of law. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Father. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting Plaintiff’s motion, as we find the family purpose doctrine applicable to this case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William F. Mcneal v. Betty G. Mcneal
This appeal involves the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that the parties would jointly own various retirement accounts after their divorce. Several years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for relief alleging that the husband was using the funds in the retirement accounts for his own benefit and denying her access to the funds. The trial court essentially divided the retirement funds between the parties and ordered the husband to repay the wife one-half of the funds he had withdrawn since the divorce. The husband appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In RE: T.D.M.C. and D.M.A.
Mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two children. Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his child with Mother. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Cook Evans, et al. v. April Cook, Executrix of the Estate of David Carl Cook
This appeal involves claims made by a sister against her brother’s estate in addition to a separate dispute between the sister and the brother’s estate regarding how much money the estate was owed from the sale of a house owned by the brother and his siblings. The trial court referred the matters to a special master, who found in favor of the sister on some of the claims. Upon review of the special master’s report, however, the trial court rejected the special master’s findings in favor of the sister and ruled in favor of the brother’s estate. The sister appeals, claiming that the trial court should have deferred to the special master. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Rostis Timoshchuk v. Long of Chattanooga Mecedes-Benz, et al.
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after discovering damage to a Mercedes-Benz that had been represented to them as a new vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim against all defendants and plaintiffs’ breach of contract and warranty claims against defendant Mercedes-Benz USA. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jo Taylor v. Wendell Harris and Jo Taylor v. Louie R. Ladd
In this ejectment action, the plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s finding that they did not prove title to the property at issue by adverse possession in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-105 and that they failed to show the boundaries of the property they claimed. Plaintiffs also contend that they were entitled to the presumption of ownership set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109. Finding no basis to reverse the judgment of the trial court, we affirm same. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
The Conservatorship of Annette H. Cross
Appellant previously acted as co-conservator of respondent’s estate and person. He was removed from this capacity due to difficulties with his co-conservator cousin. Appellant sought to be renamed conservator of respondent’s estate, but the trial court instead appointed an independent conservator citing Appellant’s previous removal as conservator, the distance Appellant lives from respondent, and the fact that Appellant’s mother is currently acting as conservator of respondent’s person. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s appointment of Robert T. Condo as conservator of respondent’s estate, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
