David M. Sharp v. Debbie F. Stevenson
I must respectfully dissent in this case. Unfortunately, I find that I disagree with both the majority opinion and the concurrence. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
In Re IMP: a Child Under the Age of Eighteen Years, J.J.A., Petitioner/Appellant, v. M.P., et al.
Petitioner brought this action in Juvenile Court to establish paternity and set co-parenting time with the child. The mother answered and, as an affirmative defense, averred that the father had signed a waiver of his parental right and cited the statutes stating that a waiver of parental rights could not be revoked. The Trial Court appointed a guardian ad litem, and the sole issue tried by the Trial Court was whether the waiver should be voided on the grounds that the father had signed the waiver under duress and undue pressure. The Trial Judge found that the father failed to carry the burden of proof to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he signed the waiver of interest and notice due to fraud, duress or intentional misrepresentation. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Saundra J. Counce, RN, v. Asecension Health, et al.
The plaintiff, formerly an at-will employee of Baptist Hospital, filed this action asserting that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment. She asserted twelve claims, inter alia, retaliatory discharge, age and sex discrimination, sexual harassment, violation of wage and hour laws, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The trial court summarily dismissed all of the claims. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Markie Jade Laxton v. Samuel Byron Biggerstaff
This is an appeal by the father requesting modification of his child support obligation due to |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Tennessee, LLC, et al., v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County adopted a redevelopment plan for an area of the city which included the site of a long-existing billboard. The Tennessee Department of Transportation subsequently ordered the removal of the billboard to accommodate a road-widening project. The sign’s owner filed an application for a permit to relocate the sign on another portion of its leasehold, but the city declined to approve the application because the redevelopment plan totally prohibits signs of that type. The sign company filed a petition for certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 of the zoning statutes gave it the right to replace the sign. The court agreed, and ordered the city to re-evaluate the permit application in accordance with the statutory provisions for a pre-existing non-conforming use after a change of zoning. We reverse, finding that the grandfather provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 have no applicability to the restrictions contained in redevelopment plans under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-20-201 et seq. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shuttleworth, Williams, Harper, Waring and Derrick, PLLC, v. Gary K. Smith, Smith, Sabbatini, & McLeary, PLLC
This dispute is between an attorney and his former firm. All parties to this suit appeal the trial court’s interpretation of their operating agreement about how the fees and expenses generated by the withdrawing member’s cases should be apportioned among them. The operating agreement gave the firm discretion to value the services provided by its other members, but the trial court correctly determined that the firm’s claimed value was not reasonable. We reverse the trial court’s holding with regard to the withdrawing lawyer’s interest in a member’s share of the expenses he is obligated to pay the firm. The trial court is affirmed on the issue of sanctions and as to its refusal to make an award to nonparties. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles M. Myer, III, et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Property owners sued, alleging that the Metropolitan Government was using or taking their property without their permission and without compensation. The Metropolitan Government took an easement over the property by eminent domain and the State built the Victory Memorial Bridge over part of it. The Metropolitan Government later transferred its interest in the property to the State. Much later, the Metropolitan Government built the Gay Street Connector over part of the easement and maintained exclusive control over the part of the easement not used for the bridge. The trial court found for the government. The property owners appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alice L. Warren v. David E. Warren
In a divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate, its determination of her income for child support purposes, and its division of the parties’ income tax liabilities. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Field, et al., v. The Ladies Hermitage Association and State of Tennessee
The heirs of the woman who conveyed Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association filed suit claiming, among other things, that due to the Association’s failure to pay the heirs as required in the deed of conveyance, the property reverted to the heirs. We affirm the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to the Association holding that the Association did not fail to comply with the obligations relevant to the reversion, so no reversion was triggered. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Naomi Schutte, as Adminstrator of the Estate of William Anthony Lucy, deceased v. Cheyenne Johnson, Shelby County Assessor et al.
This appeal arises out of an action to refund tangible personal property taxes. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: The Estate of Anna Sue Dunlap, Deceased, Richard Gossum, Administrator CTA
This dispute involves the administration of a decedent’s estate. The chancery court removed |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dravyn L.D.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Altice v. NATS, Inc., et al
Judgment creditor sued defendants to collect a judgment against a defunct nonprofit corporation, claiming defendants were the alter egos of the defunct corporation. In a prior appeal, this court instructed the parties to focus on whether certain transactions were or were not loans. If they were loans, then the plaintiff could not prove her case to make the defendants responsible for the judgment against the defunct corporation. The trial court found that the transactions were loans. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dorian Jones v. Ronald Hicks, Individually and DBA R and R Collision
Dorian Jones left his Jeep with Ron Hicks dba R and R Collision for restorative repairs in the |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Carroll C. Martin vs. Jimmy Bankston, et al
Plaintiff sued defendants, seeking to enforce the restrictive covenants on defendants' property as to an outbuilding constructed on defendants' property and seeking an injunction against defendants' alleged operation of a business on their premises in violation of the restrictive covenants. The Trial Court ruled in favor of defendants, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maverick H., Samantha Ann Moore, a/k/a Michelle M. Hartmen v. Mark W. Givler
In this action to establish paternity and recover back child support, plaintiff did not appear when the case was set for trial and the Trial Judge dismissed the action. Plaintiff then filed a Rule 60 motion to reinstate the case to the trial docket, which the Trial Judge denied. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin Quarles v. Barbara Atkins Smith
This case involves a boundary line dispute. Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin Defendant Walker from entering property they claimed to own. However, Defendant Walker filed a counter-claim against Plaintiffs asserting, among other things, ownership by adverse possession. The trial court found that title to the disputed property had vested in Defendant Walker, and therefore, it granted summary judgment in his favor. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
William W. Reed v. Bill McDaniel And Ahmad Elsebae
This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff/Appellant sustained injuries after a fall through the |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
R&F Enterprises, Inc., v. Mike Penny, d/b/a Integrated Electrical Concepts, Inc.
The Sessions Court set aside plaintiff's default judgment based on Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 60 |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Laura Jan Melton v. Bnsf Railway Company
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the Appellee in a case based on the Federal |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Marler Van Hooser v. Susan McCreight Van Hooser
This is an appeal from the trial court’s award of alimony, division of marital property, and |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Redmon v. City of Memphis, et al.
A City of Memphis employee was terminated after accessing a city-owned database to obtain |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Evan Ethelread Arrindell v. Gail Marvita Shipp Arrindell
This is a divorce appeal. The parties had a twenty-one-year marriage and one minor child at the time of divorce. For the majority of the parties’ marriage, the husband owned a business, and the wife was a homemaker. After a trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced, designated the wife as the child’s primary residential parent, divided the martial estate, and awarded child support, transitional alimony, and alimony in futuro. The wife appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Wash v. Correctional Corporation of America
Appellant filed a complaint alleging various causes of action against numerous defendants. The trial court dismissed his complaint for failure to comply with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-801, et seq. We affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Johanna L. Gonsewski v. Craig W. Gonsewski
The wife in this divorce action contends the trial court erred in the division of the marital property, in denying her request for alimony, and in denying her request to recover her attorney’s fees. We have determined the wife is in need of and the husband has the ability to pay alimony in futuro, in the amount of $1,250 per month, and that she is entitled to recover attorney’s fees. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court regarding alimony in futuro and remand the issue of attorney’s fees, leaving it to the discretion of the trial court to determine an amount that is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals |