Marilee Ann Petrey Jones v. John Timothy Jones
After the parties' divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent and Father was ordered to pay $3,250.00 per month child support. Father filed two petitions seeking a reduction of his support obligation, which were denied. The parties then agreed that Father would pay $2,500.00 per month support through March 1, 2014. Thereafter, Father filed a third petition to reduce support claiming decreased income and increased parenting time. Subsequently, the parties signed an agreement allowing substantially equal parenting time, which was filed with the trial court, but never signed by the trial judge. The trial court denied Father's third petition for modification, finding both that he had failed to prove a significant variance and that he was contractually bound to his $2,500.00 agreement. The trial court also awarded Mother's attorney his $15,000.00 fee. We affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mother's attorney as well as its refusal to reduce Father's child support obligation due to his allegedly decreased income. However, we remand to the trial court for consideration of whether Father's child support obligation should be reduced due to increased parenting time, and for entry of the parties' Agreed Parenting Plan Order. We decline to award Mother her attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Two Rivers Baptist Church, et al. v. Jerry Sutton, et al.
Officers of a church appeal the trial court holding that under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 48-66-102 the members of the church have a statutory right to church records. We find that the members have a right to the records described in subsection (a) of the statute since such access is unconditional and since enforcing this right does not entangle the court in religious affairs in violation of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. However, the members failed to articulate a "proper purpose" as required in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 48-66-102(c) to gain access to those records described in subsection (b) of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Byars v. Earl Young
This is an appeal from a juvenile court custody proceeding. The mother filed a petition for legitimation in the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court entered an order finding that the defendant father is the child’s natural father, designating the mother as the child’s primary residential parent and granting weekend parenting time to the father. After a protracted dispute over parenting time, the Juvenile Court entered an order designating the father to be the child’s primary residential parent, with no provision for parenting time for the mother. The mother then appealed to the Circuit Court. After several years of Circuit Court proceedings, the case was transferred to another Circuit Court judge who ultimately entered an order dismissing the appeal. The mother appealed the Circuit Court’s order. After remand, the Circuit Court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals. We affirm the designation of the father as the primary residential parent but find that the Juvenile Court erred in not providing for parenting time for the mother, and remand the case to the Juvenile |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Discover Bank v. Joy A. Morgan
This lawsuit began as a collection claim filed by Discover Bank ("Discover") against Joy A. Morgan ("Morgan") for $16,341.52. Discover claimed Morgan owed this amount on a credit card originally issued to Morgan's husband, now deceased. Morgan filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for libel as well as claims pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. _ 1681, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-18-101, et seq. Morgan's attorney gave Discover's original attorney an extension of time in which to file an answer to the counterclaim. After this extension of time had run, Morgan's attorney warned Discover's attorney that a motion for default judgment would be filed if an answer was not filed within fourteen days. When Discover failed to file an answer within the fourteen days, Morgan filed a motion for default judgment. Discover's attorney failed to show up for the hearing and a default judgment was awarded to Morgan. Discover filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment "pursuant to Rule 60.02. . . ." This motion was denied. Following a later hearing on damages, Morgan was awarded compensatory damages totaling $125,200, which the trial court then trebled under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After obtaining new counsel, Discover filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. Discover now appeals. We affirm the trial court's Order denying Discover's motion to alter or amend the judgment and set aside the default judgment. We, however, vacate the award of damages and remand for a new hearing on the amount of damages and also to determine reasonable attorney fees incurred by Morgan on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Franke Elliott, et al. v. Icon in the Gulch, LLC
Purchasers of pre-construction condominium units sued the developer seeking rescission of their contracts to purchase the units. The developer filed a motion to compel mediation and/or arbitration pursuant to the contract. The trial court denied the motion and the developer appeals. Finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry B. Brinton, Jr. v. Lisa A. Brinton
Father and Mother divorced in 1989 with the marital dissolution agreement obligating Father to pay all expenses for four years of college and graduate school for both son and daughter. Father refused to pay the entire cost of college for both but did pay $20,000 a year for each, deeming that reasonable. Mother sued. The trial court found that the children's choices of college were reasonable and that Father could afford the college costs. The trial court awarded Mother the costs she incurred in sending the children to college, interest and attorney's fees. Father appealed. We affirm and, based on the attorney fee provision of the MDA, remand for a determination of attorney's fees for Mother on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Paul Clayton v. Andrea Dawn Clayton
Husband appeals the trial court's award of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido to Wife. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Mattie M. Lindsey, et al. v. Mark Lambert, et al.
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed against the attorneys and insurance company involved in the settlement of a personal injury claim. The trial court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs/appellants, Mattie and Edmond Lindsey, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Lindseys did not appeal the original dismissal of their claims but instead moved to set aside the court's judgment nearly one year later. The trial court declined to set aside its judgment and granted a motion for sanctions against the Lindseys. We affirm the trial court's denial of the Lindseys' motion to set aside, vacate its award of sanctions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Shelby R. and Sydnee R.
This appeal involves a custody dispute between a father and maternal grandparents. The father and grandparents initially filed a joint petition to remove custody from the children’s mother. When the father later filed a separate amended petition for custody on his own, the grandparents argued that he should be precluded from seeking custody due to a previous mediation agreement. The father argued that he was entitled to assert his superior parental right to custody against the grandparents. The trial court found the mediation agreement enforceable and did not consider the father’s petition for custody. The father appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P. and Orangeco, L.P.
This case involves the question of whether Appellee entities are partnerships under Tennessee law. Appellant appeals the trial court’s order, which found that Appellee entities were not partnerships. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert J. Miller vs. Stephanie L. Miller
Wife appeals the entry of an order of protection against her. Because the order of protection has expired, the appeal is moot, and therefore, is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Joy Lamberson McNaughten, et al. v. Larry Lunan, et al.
The owners of a piece of commercial property brought an unlawful detainer action against a lessee who had stopped paying rent. The trial court issued a judgment of $33,450 against the lessee for past-due rent, followed by a writ of ejectment. After the lessee moved from the property, the owners sued to collect the rent due on the five-year lease and for damages to the property. The lessee argued that irregularities in the execution of the lease rendered it unenforceable. The trial court determined that the lease was enforceable and that the lessee could be held personally liable for a judgment in the amount of $326,716.74. We find that the parties did not reach the meeting of the minds that is necessary to form an enforceable contract, and we accordingly reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Wade Keyt v. Nanci Suzanne Keyt
This is the second appeal in a divorce action. Husband appeals the division of marital property and the award of alimony in solido to Wife. In the 2005 Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court determined that the husband's shares of stock in the family business, which his parents gifted to him, were his separate property; however, the appreciation of that stock during the marriage, $1.7 million, was held to be marital property. The court awarded the wife 37.5 percent of the marital estate and alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month for the first year and $2,500 per month thereafter. This court affirmed the division of marital property but modified the award of alimony, holding that she was entitled to eight years of rehabilitative alimony but not alimony in futuro. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of the husband's stock was his separate property, not marital property, and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the division of the marital estate and to reconsider the award of alimony due to the substantial reduction of the marital estate. On remand, the trial court awarded the wife 64 percent of the substantially reduced marital estate and granted her alimony in solido in the amount of $478,000. In this second appeal by the husband, we affirm the division of marital property, finding it is not inequitable under the circumstances, and we affirm the award of alimony in solido to Wife, finding that the award was based on the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i). |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph W. Haskins Individually and as the Executor of The Estate of Drew E. Haskins, Jr., Deceased v. Drew E. Haskins, III
This case in on appeal for the second time after remand for determination of the defendant's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's award. After reviewing the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cleo Snapp
Anne Dowd and Ferrell Ervin filed a motion to intervene and to stay the distribution of the estate of Cleo M. Snapp, claiming they were heirs of the estate. Ms. Dowd asserted that she was the non-marital child of Thomas Ervin, a brother of Ms. Snapp, and Mr. Ervin asserted that his father, Ben Ervin, was the non-marital child of Thomas Ervin. The executrix of the estate responded by filing a motion to deny their claims. After a hearing, the trial court granted the executrix's motion to deny the claims because they were untimely. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Higdon vs. Regions Bank
This appeal concerns a primary lien holder's security interest in certain real property following a foreclosure sale and the obligation of a third-party purchaser of the foreclosed property to remit to the lien holder rents collected after notice of mortgage acceleration. The plaintiff contended that the defendant bank was not entitled to claim priority for any additional indebtedness above the original principal amount stipulated in the Deed of Trust, plus interest and attorney's fees. The plaintiff further alleged that the bank's payment in full of the first mortgage holder's loan constituted a release of this loan and not an assignment. The defendant bank claimed that the plaintiff was liable to it for rent collected by the plaintiff on the property after notice of the mortgage acceleration. The trial court ordered that the defendant bank was not required to release its lien on the property until all of the funds due were paid and that the plaintiff must pay the defendant bank $6,300 in rent payments. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
City of Brentwood v. George M. Cawthon
This is a condemnation case in which the City of Brentwood acquired 0.72 acres of land by eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a 2.5 million gallon water tank. Following a trial, the jury awarded $43,200 for the value of the land taken and $194,850 for the incidental damages to the remainder of the property. The City's ability to take the land and the amount awarded for the value of the land taken is not in question; rather, the City appeals the amount of incidental damages awarded. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Duncan Albright vs. Randolph & Sherry Tallent
Plaintiff brought this action, asserting that defendants were constructing a fence which impacted on her driveway right-of-way, and sought an injunction against the construction of the fence. The Trial Court determined the fence was being constructed on defendants' property and denied plaintiff relief. However, the Trial Court also determined that the fence served no useful purpose, and suggested it was a spite fence. Plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Judge as modified, the modification being that the defendant had testified in the Trial Court that he was building a fence of the same style and character as the fence around the rest of his property, which was a split board type, and would not block plaintiff's view. We modify the Judgment to restrict the defendants to constructing a fence as depicted in the exhibits filed in the Trial Court, i.e., the same type of fence he has constructed around the remainder of his property. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Casen J.
Father appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights. Finding that Father was in substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan and that termination was in the child's best interest, the court's decision is affirmed. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
McKenzie Banking Company v. Billy L. Couch
The parties each own a one-half undivided interest in property previously used as medical offices. MBC filed a complaint for partition and sale, which the trial court granted, finding that the property could not be partitioned in kind and that it was to the parties’ advantage to sell it. Dr. Couch appeals, and we affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Victoria S., et al
The Department of Children's Services brought this action to sever the parental rights of the mother to her three minor children. As the case developed, the sole ground for termination relied upon by the Department was the mother's conviction for violation of Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 39-15-402, concerning child abuse. However, this particular statute is not listed as the grounds for termination in Tenn. Code Ann. _37-1-102(C). The Trial Court terminated the parental rights based upon her criminal conviction. The mother has appealed. We reverse the Trial Court on the grounds that the statute relied upon by the Department does not establish grounds for termination of parental rights. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Rachel Sumner, et al v. Metropolitan Board of Public Health
Petitioners challenge a mosquito spraying plan adopted by a local board of health alleging that it violates an ordinance on the same subject. Dismissal by the trial court is affirmed since there is no conflict between the plan and ordinance and petitioners fail to allege a legally cognizable ground to challenge the plan since dissatisfaction with the plan is not sufficient. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lorenzo Johnson v. Corrections Corporation of America, et al.
This is an appeal in a civil rights action filed by the Appellant, a pro se litigant. During the course of the proceedings, the Appellant was incarcerated. The trial court involuntarily dismissed the Appellant’s claim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02 upon finding that the Appellant failed to prosecute his case. The Appellant appeals the dismissal. Finding that the trial court failed to rule on several of the Appellant’s motions and objections, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah E. Palmer vs. Michael Howard Palmer
Shortly after their marriage, both Husband and Wife filed complaints for divorce. The trial court found both parties guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and granted a divorce. Husband raises numerous issues on appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Allison J. Person, as Administratix of the Estate of Effie J. Wooten, Deceased, et al. v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., d/b/a Primacy Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, et al.
This is an action for negligence and wrongful death filed against a nursing home by the administrator of decedent patient’s estate. The trial court denied Defendant nursing home’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment upon finding decedent patient was not competent to execute the power of attorney pursuant to which decedent’s daughter had executed an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Defendant appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
