Raleigh Commons, Inc. v. SWH, LLC, et al.
This appeal arises from a prolonged dispute among business associates which they have come to refer to as a “business divorce.” The parties in this matter, each doctors, formed a limited liability company for the purpose of acquiring property and constructing a medical office building on the property. In order to acquire the property from the current owner, the doctors executed an assumption and modification agreement whereby the LLC and the doctors each individually agreed to be jointly and severally liable to the current owner for its obligations on a promissory note. Subsequently, one of the doctors, the Appellee, withdrew membership from the LLC and executed an indemnity agreement with the remaining LLC members whereby the Appellee would be held harmless from any liability of the LLC, including the note. Thereafter, the LLC and its remaining members defaulted on the note, and the holder of the note filed a complaint against the Appellee, the LLC, and the individual LLC members, seeking to collect the balance due under the note. In order to avoid having a judgment entered against him, the Appellee purchased the note and pursued a claim against the LLC and its individual members for indemnification and breach of the note. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on his indemnification claim, awarded him attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest, and dismissed the Appellant’s cross-claims against the Appellee. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of South Pittsburg, Tennessee v. James C. Hailey and Company, et al
In April 2008 the City of South Pittsburg hired a contractor to enlarge its sewage treatment plant. During construction of the project several sink holes developed, the last of which occurred in February of 2009 and caused the plant’s lagoon to collapse. The City made claim on the contractor’s builders’ risk insurance policy; the insurer denied the claim, contending that construction of the project was complete at the time of the collapse. The City, which had filed suit against the contractor, amended the complaint, adding the insurer as a party and asserting a claim for breach of contract against the company; the City also requested that the court issue a declaratory judgment that the losses sustained by the city were covered by the policy. The court subsequently granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment and denied the city’s motion for partial summary judgment. The city and the engineering firm engaged by the City to plan the project appeal the grant of summary judgment to the insurer and the denial of the city’s motion. We have determined that the court erred in granting the insurer’s motion and denying the City’s; consequently, we reverse both judgments. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Lisa Gail Hayes v. Mark C. Pierret
In these acrimonious post-divorce proceedings, the father of two minor children filed a petition seeking, inter alia, to be given sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency health care, religion, and extracurricular activities, and to be designated the primary residential parent or alternatively to receive more parenting time. The trial court found a material change of circumstances had occurred due to the parties’ total inability to cooperatively co-parent and that it was in the children’s best interest to spend more quality time with their father. However, the court found it was in the children’s best interest for the mother to remain the primary residential parent and to have final authority over the children’s non-emergency medical care after consultation with the father. The court found that the other major decisions concerning the children should be made jointly. Each party was ordered to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. We affirm the foregoing decisions; however, we have determined the father may be entitled to a modification of his child support obligation, which was not addressed in the trial court’s final order, and we remand this issue for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Jane Kathryn Ross
The trial court decreed a resulting trust in a house paid for by the decedent on property owned by her son. We have concluded that the trial court erred. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Don Mabee v. Gayle Mabee
The ex-husband of the defendant filed a petition to terminate alimony. The parties’ 2010 marital dissolution agreement provides that the petitioner shall pay alimony to his ex-wife for a specified period or upon her cohabitating with another man, and petitioner alleges that the defendant has been cohabitating with another man. The trial court made findings that, although the defendant had an intimate relationship with another man, she was not cohabitating as that term is defined; thus, the trial court denied the petition and awarded the defendant an arrearage judgment for alimony the petitioner failed to pay. Finding the trial court applied the correct legal standard and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Kitty Fern (Darden) Sartain v. Mitchell Carl Sartain
This appeal arises from the second divorce between these parties. Husband and Wife were married for nineteen years, divorced in 1997, and then married again for thirteen additional years. In this second divorce, the trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido in addition to 45% of Husband’s military retirement pay. As part of the first divorce the trial court had awarded Wife 36% of Husband’s military retirement pay. Although Husband retired in 2006, Wife had not received any portion of his retirement pay. Wife requested the court in this second divorce award her the money she should have been paid from the date of Husband’s retirement to the date of the second divorce. The trial court declined to make that award. On appeal we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. We reverse the court’s judgment denying Wife the portion of Husband’s retirement pay she had been awarded in the first divorce, and we remand the case for a hearing on the issues surrounding the Survivor Benefit Plan. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel E. Foster et al v. Walter William Chiles, III et al
This is a health care liability case. Samuel E. Foster and his wife, Mary Foster, timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to the potential defendants as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a) (2012). After nonsuiting their first lawsuit, they timely filed a second complaint in which they alleged the same cause of action against the same defendants. The second complaint alleged compliance with section 121(a), citing the notices already properly sent before the first complaint was filed. The trial court dismissed the second complaint with prejudice based upon the court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the notice requirement of section 121(a). We hold that plaintiffs complied with section 121(a)’s notice requirement by giving a written notice of their potential health care liability claim to each defendant at least 60 days prior to the filing of their second complaint. We further hold that section 121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms, and that plaintiffs’ inadvertent failure to file – with the second complaint – proof of their service of the subject notices does not warrant dismissal with prejudice. We vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Wheatley Sparkman v. Jason Aaron Sparkman
This appeal involves post-divorce proceedings arising out of numerous disputes between the parties. The only rulings that are challenged on appeal are the trial court’s conclusions that: (1) Father was required to pay uncovered medical expenses for the children’s counseling, pursuant to the divorce decree; and (2) Father must pay $14,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision on both issues. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Pearlie Mae Dunigan, Next of Kin/Personal Representative of Estate of Grover Dunigan, Deceased v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a claim for damages filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission, arising out of the death of an inmate while he was housed in a state penitentiary. The Claims Commission denied the claimant’s motion for a default judgment. Thereafter, the Claims Commission determined that the gravamen of the complaint was for medical malpractice, and consequently, it granted the State’s motion to dismiss based upon the claimant’s failure to comply with various provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. The claimant appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Sneed v. The City of Red Bank, Tennessee A Municipality
After his discharge as the Chief of Police for Red Bank, Tennessee, Larry Sneed filed suit against Red Bank pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act and the Tennessee Public Protection Act. He requested a jury trial on both claims. Red Bank filed a motion to transfer to circuit court and to proceed without a jury pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court transferred the case and ordered the case to proceed without a jury on the Tennessee Public Protection Act claim. Relying on University of Tennessee of Chattanooga v. Farrow, E2000-02386-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 935467 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2001), the court held that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act did not preclude a jury trial on the remaining claim. Red Bank pursued this interlocutory appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act applies to claims brought against a municipality pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act; therefore, that claim must also be tried without a jury. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nigel Marlin Reid Sr. v. Morristown Power et al
Nigel Marlin Reid, Sr. filed a complaint in the trial court. The court, sua sponte, held that the complaint is “frivolous” and that plaintiff’s claims against his brother are barred by res judicata. The court dismissed the action. Because the complaint fails to state a cause of action, we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Sabra Elaine Ellis O'Daniel v. Rusty Wade O'Daniel
The issues in this divorce case focus, for the most part, on the enforceability and interpretation of a prenuptial agreement entered into by Sabra Elaine Ellis O’Daniel (“Wife”) and Rusty Wade O’Daniel (“Husband”). Shortly after their marriage, Wife was diagnosed with a serious illness that resulted in several extensive hospitalizations. We have determined that the enforcement of the provisions limiting and waiving alimony contained in the parties’ prenuptial agreement is likely to render Wife a public charge. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment holding that these “alimony” provisions are valid and enforceable. We affirm the trial court’s award to Wife of 67 months of health insurance, but do so on a ground other than the one articulated by the trial court. We affirm the trial court’s award to Wife of a judgment for $16,000 based upon Husband’s breach of the prenuptial agreement requiring him to fund a retirement account for Wife. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings (1) to consider anew Wife’s request for alimony and (2) to set her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This appeal involves a dispute over an attorney’s fee in a wrongful foreclosure case filed by Client against Bank of America. Client originally signed a contingency fee contract with Attorney, who later withdrew from the case. Client hired a new law firm to represent him and subsequently prevailed following a jury trial. Attorney filed suit, alleging that he was entitled to recover his original contingency fee because Client’s behavior forced him to withdraw from representation. The trial court limited Attorney’s recovery of fees pursuant to quantum meruit. Attorney appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Howe, et al. v. Bill Haslam, as Governor of the State of Tennessee, in his official capacity
Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting a constitutional challenge to HB600. The trial court, however, dismissed the complaint because it found Plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed to allege an injury-in-fact, that their claims were not ripe for review, and that they were merely seeking an advisory opinion. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this court. However, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we remand the case to the trial court for resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum to Amend Complaint and for further proceedings, as necessary, consistent with this opinion |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.J.H. Casee Wagster Hart v. Randy Lewis
In this appeal, the mother of the child at issue appeals the trial court’s order establishing paternity. The appellant mother filed this parentage petition against the father. At the outset of the hearing on the petition, the mother’s attorney announced that he had developed a conflict of interest regarding his representation of the mother, because he had previously consulted with both the mother and the father when the parties agreed on the issues. By the time of the hearing, the parties no longer agreed and the father had hired his own attorney. Despite the attorney’s disclosure that he had developed a conflict of interest in continuing to represent the mother, the trial court proceeded with the paternity hearing. What ensued was a procedural train wreck; it ultimately resulted in orders that resolved all issues on their merits. The mother appeals. We conclude that this particular train never should have left the station. In light of the disclosure by the mother’s prior attorney that he had developed a conflict of interest, we vacate everything that followed the attorney’s disclosure, except the order allowing the mother’s attorney to withdraw. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter Of: Candelaria M.
Mother’s parental rights to her child were terminated due to her diminished mental capacity, which caused her to be incompetent to care for her child. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
William Michael Ray et al v. Southern Tennessee Medical Center, LLC et al
In this medical malpractice action, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the defendant doctor. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in allowing a medical expert witness to testify. We find no error in the trial court’s decision. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Wyatt # 291749 v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Petitioner asserts that disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in the conduct of the hearing and imposition of penalties. The trial court dismissed the petition; finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Bassam Issa v. Jack Benson, Sr.
This appeal concerns alleged defamation and the applicability of both the legislative privilege and the litigation privilege. Bassam Issa (“Issa”), a developer seeking rezoning of certain real property, sued Chattanooga City Councilman Jack Benson, Sr. (“Benson”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Issa alleged that, in two separate incidents, Benson had defamed him by accusing him of offering a bribe to influence Benson’s vote on the rezoning matter. Benson filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that his statements were protected by the legislative privilege and the litigation privilege. The Trial Court granted Benson’s motion. Issa appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Conoly Brown, et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
The Metropolitan Council adopted a series of three ordinances that (1) created a new zoning classification called Specific Planning (SP); (2) rezoned over 700 parcels of property to SP zoning; and (3) amended permitted uses in SP zones to exclude certain types of financial services, specifically check cashing services not part of a bank. The plaintiffs owned property on which that type of service was conducted and another parcel on which they intended to conduct the excluded services. Their parcels were among those rezoned as SP. We reverse the trial court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ challenge should have been brought as a common law writ of certiorari action because the act of rezoning by amending the zoning ordinance is a legislative act which is reviewable in a declaratory judgment action. We also hold that the ordinance rezoning the 700 parcels was invalid because it was not consistent with the enabling ordinance creating the SP classification. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Lou Uselton et vir, Terry Twayne Uselton v. Jessica Walton and Clinton Brandon Woodard
This is a grandparent visitation case. The biological parents of the child at issue were never married. When the child was born, the father was in the military and away most of the time. The mother permitted the father’s parents, the petitioners in this case, to have liberal visitation with the child. As time went on, the mother got married and had children with her new husband. When the subject child was five years old, the mother limited the grandparents’ visitation with the child, but she did not end it. Dissatisfied with the limitations, the grandparents filed this petition for court-ordered visitation pursuant to the Grandparent Visitation Statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-306. The trial court granted the petition and ordered a visitation schedule that essentially allowed the grandparents to have the father’s visitation rights when he was away. The court-ordered schedule even provided for visitation for the grandparents in the event the father chose to exercise all of the visitation to which he was entitled. The mother now appeals. We hold that the trial court erred in essentially placing the paternal grandparents in the stead of the father, and that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is not applicable because there was no proof that the mother opposed the grandparents’ visitation before the grandparents filed their petition for court-ordered grandparent visitation. Therefore, we reverse and dismiss the petition with prejudice. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Lou Uselton et vir, Terry Twayne Uselton v. Jessica Walton and Clinton Brandon Woodard - Dissent
This is a case involving the Grandparent Visitation Statute in which the grandparents unquestionably played a significant role in the child’s life. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Burt v. Donald L. MacTavish and Barbara W. MacTavish, et al.
This case presents the issue of whether the trial court properly dismissed the Appellees, Donald and Barbara MacTavish, as parties from the lawsuit below because Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Phillip Burt, Plaintiff below, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of all claims against Donald and Barbara MacTavish. We vacate the trial court’s order granting dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dean Moore, et al. v. Paul Brock, et al.
Dean Moore, Trustee for the Dean Henry Moore Living Trust (“Plaintiff”), Bobby Sullivan, and Willis Songer sued Paul Brock, Sanford Quay, and Russ Quay (“Defendants”) seeking, among other things, a declaration of a boundary line and a judgment for slander of title. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order on June 19, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff has superior title over Defendants to the disputed real property, that the title Defendants claimed by quitclaim deed from Jerry Edmonds shall be held for naught, and that Plaintiff did not prove slander of title. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing his claim for slander of title. Defendants raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding for Plaintiff on the boundary line issue. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings with regard either to the boundary line dispute or to Plaintiff’s slander of title claim, and we affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Burell Parrish v. Tammy Jo Scott Parrish
This is a divorce case in which the award of alimony in futuro is questioned. Appellant Husband and Appellee Wife were married for approximately thirty years. The trial court granted Husband a divorce, divided certain marital property and debt, and awarded Appellee Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $850 per month until death or remarriage. Appellant Husband appeals only the award of alimony. From the totality of the circumstances, and specifically based upon Wife’s health issues, her level of education, her employment history, and past earnings, it does not appear that rehabilitation will be possible. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the type and amount of alimony awarded. Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. Affirmed and remanded. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals |
