Billy W. Huffman, et ux v. Whitney Nichole Huffman
This appeal arises from a dispute over grandparent visitation. Whitney Nichole Huffman Lewis (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Isaiah Huffman (“the 1 Child”). Billy W. Huffman and Lora D. Huffman (“the Grandparents,” collectively), father and stepmother of Mother, filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) to establish visitation rights with the Child. The Child had visited often with the Grandparents, but Mother ended the visits after a falling out with Mr. Huffman. Following a trial, the Trial Court denied the Grandparents’ petition after finding there was no significant relationship between the Grandparents and the Child and that there was no risk of substantial harm to the Child. The Grandparents appeal to this Court. We find and hold that while the Grandparents and the Child did have a significant existing relationship, the Grandparents failed to prove that cessation of this relationship would pose a danger of substantial harm to the Child. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Amelia M.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Amelia M., the minor child (“Child”) of James M. (“Father”) and Bethany L. (“Mother”). On September 14, 2011, Mother filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father, which was subsequently joined by Mother’s new husband, William H. (“Stepfather”). Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit her and willfully failing to provide financial support in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley King v. Wilson and Associates, PLLC, US Bank, Bank of America, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,Inc.
This appeal involves a self-represented litigant’s continued efforts to occupy property which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings. After dismissal of his second action regarding the property, the appellant files this appeal. We dismiss the appeal for failure to file a brief that complies with the appellate rules and conclude that this is a frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Dunlap v. Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc.
Sheila Dunlap (“plaintiff”) brought this action alleging liability for the wrongful death of her daughter (“deceased”) on the part of the nursing home operated by Laurel Manor Health Care, Inc. (“defendant”) where deceased was living. Although the allegations of the complaint were couched in terms of ordinary negligence, the trial court determined that the cause of action was one for medical malpractice. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, which requires the filing a certificate of good faith with a medical malpractice complaint. We hold that the plaintiff’s claims that the nursing home failed to properly administer medication and a medical device prescribed by a physician, and failed to monitor the medical condition of the deceased at all times prior to her death, sound in medical malpractice. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy L. Wilson v. Hank E. Sledge, Jr., et al.
The trial court dismissed this action for professional malpractice based upon the running of the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly Weed v. First Acceptance Insurance Company of Tennessee
This appeal involves the interpretation of an exclusionary clause in an automobile casualty insurance policy. The policy excluded coverage for a loss resulting from an accident occurring while the vehicle was being driven by an unlisted driver who “is a regular or frequent operator of” an insured vehicle. Caleb Jenkins, who was not listed in the policy as a “driver,” was involved in an accident while driving the vehicle of Kelly Weed (“Insured”). Insured brought suit after First Acceptance Insurance Company of Tennessee, Inc., (“Insurer”) denied her claim. Insurer moved for summary judgment, alleging that Jenkins was a regular and frequent operator of Insured’s vehicle. Based on Insured’s statement that Jenkins was a “fairly regular” driver of her vehicle who had been driving it once or twice a week for six months, the trial court denied coverage and granted Insurer summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the policy excluded coverage because Insured’s admission establishes that Jenkins was a “regular or frequent operator” of her vehicle. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
James M. Bowley, et al v. Richard Lane, et al
James M. Bowley and Barbara A. Bowley (“Plaintiffs”) sued Richard Lane, Alvin Butler, and Danny Nicholson (“Defendants”) alleging defective construction of a log home built by Defendants for Plaintiffs. After trial, the Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendants had breached the implied warranty of habitability, and that Plaintiffs had sustained $50,000 in damages as a result of this breach. Defendants appeal to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in approving the verdict and denying their motion for new trial or for remittitur. Plaintiffs also raise an issue alleging that the evidence does not support the verdict. We find and hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and further find no error in the Trial Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for new trial or for remittitur, and the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial or for additur. We affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Lasonya Morrow v. Ray Anthony McClain
A man and woman lived together for six years and worked jointly on a number of business ventures during that period, but never married. After their relationship ended, the woman filed a complaint for a division of property, under the theory that the parties had entered into an implied partnership. The trial court heard conflicting testimony as to the respective contributions of each party to the acquisition, improvement and preservation of the properties at issue. The court declined to find that a partnership had existed between the parties, but ruled that the woman had an interest in all the real property acquired during the relationship. The court awarded her one parcel which the parties owned as cotenants in common and an additional $50,000 based on the value of her interest in the other properties. The man argues on appeal that the trial court overestimated the woman’s contributions during the relevant period and underestimated his own contributions. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stacy Christina Knellinger v. Mark Steven Knellinger and Becki Knellinger
In this post-divorce action, Father filed two petitions asserting several counts of criminal contempt against Mother based on alleged violations of the Parenting Plan. Father also petitioned the court to modify the Parenting Plan to name him the primary residential parent and grant him sole decision-making authority over the children’s educations, non-emergency healthcare, and extracurricular activities. Mother then filed a petition seeking to permanently enjoin Father’s new wife (“Step-mother”) from participating in certain activities with the children, such as signing their school report cards, volunteering at the school, and sending home notes in their lunch boxes. After a three-day hearing, the trial court found Mother guilty on three counts of criminal contempt, and assessed a $150 fine (fifty dollars per count), which the court required her to pay toward counseling with Father. The trial court denied Father’s Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, finding there was no material change of circumstances affecting the children’s interest, a finding which Father does not appeal. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition for a permanent injunction against Step-mother, finding it was unnecessary. Both parties were required to pay their own attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Mother’s request for a permanent restraining order against Step-mother. However, we have determined the trial court erred in finding Mother guilty of criminal contempt, and we reverse all three convictions. Finally, we find Mother is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court in defense of Father’s Petition to Modify the Parenting Plan, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), and remand for a determination and award thereof. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Raleigh Court Condominiums, Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. E. Doyle Johnson Construction Co., et al
Homeowners’ association filed suit against general contractor because of drainage issues alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and breach of the implied warranty of “good and workmanlike” construction. The trial court found in favor of homeowners’ association. The general contractor appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Marie Sykes v. Joshua Neal Sykes
In this divorce proceeding, Mother and Father entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement and Permanent Parenting Plan, which were incorporated into the final decree of divorce; the parties shared equal parenting time with their two children and neither party was obligated to pay child support. Mother subsequently filed a petition to set support, as well as a motion for relief from the final decree, both of which sought to have the court set support in accordance with the child support guidelines. The court denied the petition and the motion on the grounds that the parties had agreed in the parenting plan that child support would not be paid and that a significant variance did not exist. Finding that relief to Mother is appropriate under the circumstances, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Marie Sykes v. Joshua Neal Sykes - Concur/Dissent
This appeal involves a judgment by the trial court that dismissed two motions filed by Mother. The first was the Motion to Alter or Amend the trial court’s decision denying the Petition to Set Support. That petition was denied on the basis that no significant variance existed. The second was Mother’s motion for relief pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. That motion was directed to the original decree of divorce and, more specifically, to the original child support established in the parenting plan. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Aubrey Owens & The Estate of Louis Gernt v. Aleeta Tipton Evans, Timothy L. Goad et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered against one of four defendants. Because the judgment appealed does not resolve all the claims between all the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Sue Watkins v. Kenneth Danny Watkins
The trial court granted Father’s petition to modify child custody and child support, and denied Mother’s petition to increase alimony. Mother appeals. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to Mother’s petition to modify alimony, and remand for findings of fact and further proceedings, if necessary. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Personal Representative & Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman v. CSX Transportation, Inc. et al.
After a lengthy trial, the trial court determined that the decedent was more than 50% at fault for the collision that resulted in his death. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and we therefore affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Sandeep Gadhok v. Zameer Merchant
The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma Ann Vance v. Donah Howard Arnold
The trial court dismissed Husband’s post-judgment motion based on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Barnes v. Herbert Hamm
This appeal concerns the circuit court’s dismissal of an appeal from the general sessions court. We dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 29 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee v. Metropolitan Nashville Education Association
County board of education filed a declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that the high school principal’s decisions to re-assign certain extracurricular sponsorships were not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the board of education and the education association. The trial court entered judgment in the board of education’s favor and the education association appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE: Adoption of Alexander M. S. F. et al
The mother and stepfather of two children filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the children’s father on the ground of abandonment. The trial court terminated father’s rights on the grounds that he willfully failed to visit the children and paid only token support for the children in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court, finding there is not clear and convincing proof that father’s lack of visitation was willful. We further hold that father’s payment of $697.76 in child support during the relevant time period was not mere “token support.” |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Aspyn S. J.
Mother challenges the decision of the trial court terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Aspyn S.J. We find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Mother abandoned her child by willfully failing to provide support and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Richard McGarity and Teresa McGarity v. Corbin Jerrolds and Amber Jerrolds
This is a grandparent visitation case. The trial court awarded visitation to paternal grandparents on the basis of a finding of severe emotional harm to the child if visitation was not granted. The child’s mother and adoptive father appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling with regard to the evidentiary and procedural issues, but reverse as to the finding of a likelihood of severe emotional harm. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Parker, et al. v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., et al.
This is a premises liability case in which Plaintiffs alleged that a shower bench in Hotel collapsed, causing Husband to fall and sustain injuries. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, claiming negligence. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that he did not install the bench and did not have actual or constructive notice of the independent contractor’s negligent installation of the bench. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Johnny K.F. - Dissenting
The termination of Father’s parental rights was based upon his alleged abandonment of the Child because he had engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. The majority held that the trial court improperly relied upon this ground of abandonment because the termination petition merely alleged abandonment for failure to visit and to submit child support. I respectfully disagree. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Johnny K.F.
Grandparents Johnny F. and Sharon E. F. (“the Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Shawn L. F. (“Father”) and Shauna L. F. (“Mother”) to the minor child Johnny K. F. (“the Child”). After trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv) with respect to Father and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 102 (b)(23) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) with respect to Mother, and that termination was in the best interests of the Child. Father and Mother appeal to this Court. We reverse, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
