In Re Estate of Janice N. Smith
This appeal concerns a partial summary judgment order certified as final pursuant to Rule |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Welch, et al. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center, LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis, et al.
At issue in this appeal is whether an individual, now deceased, lacked the requisite mental capacity when he signed a durable power of attorney for health care. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative, specifically concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was incompetent. As a result of this determination, the trial court further concluded that an arbitration agreement later signed by the decedent’s brother using the power of attorney was invalid, a conclusion which in turn prompted the trial court to deny the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the basis of that agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Alethea Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Alethea Skeen
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection shouldtherefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Alethea Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tina Batten
Tina Batten, Defendant, entered a best interest plea to aggravated assault and possession of a firearm while under the influence in exchange for a total effective sentence of five years with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered Defendant to a sentence of split confinement on the basis that granting diversion would depreciate the severity of the offenses and would have a detrimental effect on deterrence. Because the trial court failed to consider the proper factors in rendering its decision to deny diversion and failed to weigh those factors, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration. On remand, the trial court should utilize the factors set forth in Parker and Electroplating, weigh the factors against each other, and place an explanation of its ruling on the record. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Crockett County v. Farhad Motamedi v. Michael Moore
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to set aside a tax sale of unimproved real property. The petitioner had acquired the parcel in 2017 but had failed to update his address with the property assessor and other taxing authorities and had failed to pay taxes associated with the parcel from 2017 through 2021. The taxing authorities, as plaintiffs, commenced a lawsuit to collect the delinquent taxes in 2020. Unable to locate the petitioner for lack of a current address, the taxing authorities sought permission from the trial court to notify the petitioner of the lawsuit through publication in the local newspaper, which the trial court granted. After the time for notice by publication had expired, the taxing authorities sought and were granted default judgment regarding the petitioner’s property, and the taxing authorities sold the real property at a delinquent tax sale. The order confirming the tax sale was entered on April 7, 2021, but was not recorded with the local register of deeds until April 26, 2022, after the one-year statutory redemption period had passed. In July and August 2021, the petitioner contacted the taxing authorities to inquire about taxes he owed on the property and traveled to Crockett County to meet with the city and county officials and pay the delinquent taxes. For unknown reasons, the taxing authorities did not inform the petitioner that the real property had been sold at a tax sale earlier that year. The petitioner did not initiate a redemption action and did not file a petition to have the sale set aside at that time. In June 2022, after the one-year redemption period had elapsed and the statute of limitations period for setting aside the tax sale had expired, the petitioner sued to set aside the tax sale, which action the trial court denied as untimely. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Denise Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Denise Skeen
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Denise Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Cheryl Hanzlik
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Cheryl Hanzlik
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Cheryl Hanzlik, in the form of attorney’s fees. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Tomlin, Individually, and d/b/a The Tomlin Company v. Nephrology Associates, P.C. Et Al.
A renal care company retained a broker to locate sites for new dialysis clinics. The company agreed to pay the broker a commission when leases were signed and “at the renewal or extension of said leases.” The company later negotiated amendments to the leases without the broker’s participation. The broker sued the company for breach of contract, alleging that he was due a commission on the lease amendments. The trial court determined that eight lease amendments were renewals or extensions of the original leases. And it entered a judgment against the company for the amount of the unpaid commissions. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the court’s finding that two of the lease amendments were renewals or extensions. So we affirm the judgment as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Katelyn R. et al.
The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from their parents’ |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Kari Dale Remus v. Brandon Joseph Nunn
In this post-divorce case, the husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment on the issue of whether a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement concerning military retirement was modifiable. The trial court dismissed the husband’s petition on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and ruled that the provision at issue was not modifiable. While we find that the trial court erred in granting the wife’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we affirm the result reached by the trial court on the merits of the dispute. Further, we have determined that the wife was not entitled to an additional award of attorney fees at trial and is not entitled to her attorney fees on appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Sullivan County Tennessee Et Al. v. Amy S. Tochev Et Al.
A taxpayer failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The county began enforcement proceedings and, following the entry of a default judgment against the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property was ultimately sold at a delinquent tax sale. The purchaser filed a writ of possession to obtain possession of the property from the taxpayer, at which time the taxpayer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and resulting tax sale. The taxpayer alleged lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax proceedings and violation of her due |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Caprice McLemore Et Al. v. Knox County, Tennessee
Caprice McLemore, Gary McLemore, Misty Tanner, Barrett Tanner, and McKinley Tanner (together, “Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their case against the defendant, Knox County (“Appellee” or “the County”). Appellants were injured in a car accident on Clinton Highway after being struck by a vehicle driven by Roy Michael Simmons (“Mr. Simmons”), who was evading a Knox County sheriff’s deputy. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that it was liable for their injuries arising from the accident. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the deputy pursuing Mr. Simmons did not act unreasonably under the circumstances and that the County was thus not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Porter v. Amber Phillips, Director of Sentence Management Services, Tennessee Department of Correction
Gary Porter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Davidson County Chancery Court (the |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Dakari M.
A mother and a father appeal the termination of their parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of four statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and five statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights. The court also determined termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Jason Vandenberg v. Ashley Kay Vandenberg
This appeal arises from a divorce after a short marriage. The husband appeals from the ruling of |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick M. Malone v. James William Rose, et al
This matter concerns prior restraint on speech. Patrick M. Malone (“Father”) is a party to |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Haddix d/b/a 385 Ventures v. Jayton Stinson, et al.
This appeal arises from a breach of contract action wherein the appellee was directed to deposit funds owed to the appellant with the Clerk and Master. The appellee claimed an interest in some of the deposited funds pursuant to a separate contract. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of the appellee for the requested amount. Because the appellant failed to comply with the briefing requirements set out in Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Lachion W. Et Al.
This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2023. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until December 8, 2023, more than thirty days after the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shatara Evette Jones
In this delayed appeal, Defendant, Shatara Evette Jones, appeals her conviction for first degree murder for which she received a mandatory life sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenges: 1) the trial court’s restricting her right to cross-examine a State’s witness; 2) the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss, pursuant to State v. Ferguson, based on the State’s failure to preserve evidence; 3) the trial court’s denial of her motions to suppress her statement to police and cell phone data; 4) the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the victim’s gang involvement and a rap video in which he is depicted holding a gun; 5) the trial court’s omission of an instruction in the written jury instructions; and 6) the sufficiency of the evidence of her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David E. Tate v. Felicia M. Tate
This appeal arises from a divorce action following a short-term marriage. There were no children born of the marriage, and the only issue on appeal pertains to the classification of real property. At issue is the Wade Springs property, which the husband purchased using his separate property. He closed on the purchase of the Wade Springs property the day after the parties married, and the property was deeded in the husband’s name only. Because the property was used as the marital residence during the two-year marriage and marital assets were used to maintain the property, the wife contended that the property became marital property by transmutation, commingling, or Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121. The trial court found that the Wade Springs property was the husband’s separate property at the time of purchase and it remained his separate property. The court further found that the wife’s contributions to the property could easily be extracted and awarded her, inter alia, a cash judgment in the amount of her contributions to the home. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against these findings, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |