COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

In Re Amayzha L.
M2023-00044-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sheila Calloway

This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“Juvenile Court”) seeking the termination of the parental rights of Horace L. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Amayzha L. (“the Child”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had established by clear and convincing evidence the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Determining that DCS presented insufficient evidence to establish that the Child was removed from Father’s home or physical or legal custody, we reverse the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and persistence of conditions. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights.

In Re Tinsley L.
E2022-00965-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

In this appeal from the termination of parental rights, the mother does not challenge the
grounds for terminating her rights. Rather she argues that the evidence was less than clear
and convincing that termination was in the child’s best interest. After a review of both the
statutory grounds for termination and the best interest determination, we affirm.

In Re Conservatorship of Gregory Blake Arvin
M2022-01808-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. The issues on appeal concern the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem in the amount of $1,060. The trial court assessed the fees against the petitioners and the respondent, jointly and severally. The petitioners appeal, contending that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-125, the court had no discretion but to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent. The petitioners and the estate of the respondent also challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent on other grounds. We have determined that the trial court was statutorily required to assess the fees of the attorney ad litem against the respondent and that it lacked the discretion to assess the fees against the petitioners. We have also determined that the petitioners have no standing to challenge the assessment of the fees against the respondent and that the issues raised by the estate of the respondent lack merit. Thus, we reverse the assessment of the fees of the attorney ad litem against the petitioners but affirm the assessment of the fees against the respondent.

CIC Services, LLC v. Suresh Prabhu, et al.
W2022-01431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

This case involves a dispute arising from services provided by the appellee, CIC Services, LLC (“CIC”), a creator and manager of “captive” insurance companies, to the appellant corporation, SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”).  SRM hired CIC to form and manage two captive insurance companies to serve SRM in risk management, and the parties memorialized their relationship in two management agreements, one for each of the newly formed captive insurance companies.  When CIC subsequently ended its contractual relationship with SRM for cause, SRM demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clauses contained in the agreements.  The arbitrator dismissed all of SRM’s claims.  CIC then demanded a second arbitration, seeking attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration and stating claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement against SRM.  The second arbitrator ultimately awarded to CIC $261,487.04 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the first arbitration proceeding, pursuant to the indemnity clauses in the parties’ management agreements, and $137,337.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs because CIC was the substantially prevailing party in the second arbitration.  When SRM did not respond to CIC’s demand for payment of this award, CIC moved for confirmation of the award in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”).   SRM responded by filing a motion with the trial court to modify or vacate the award.  After the parties fully briefed the issues, the trial court confirmed the award in full and concomitantly denied SRM’s motion to modify or vacate.  SRM timely appealed.  Upon review, we  affirm the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, determining that because appellant Suresh Prabhu voluntarily participated in both arbitrations without raising objection to the potential attachment of liability against him as an individual, Mr. Prabhu and SRM have waived objection to the attachment of individual liability to Mr. Prabhu.  We further determine that the trial court properly denied SRM’s motion to vacate the award because the second arbitrator acted within her discretion to direct the arbitration procedure and SRM has failed to show any of the criteria necessary to meet the high standard for vacatur pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act or the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.

Loretta Hartman v. Tina Massengill
E2022-01769-COA_R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Lauderback

This appeal concerns the ownership of property used by the defendant but owned by her
father and stepmother. The plaintiff stepmother secured a writ of possession from the
general sessions court once her husband passed away. The defendant appealed to the
circuit court, which ruled that the property at issue belonged to the plaintiff. We affirm.

In Re Austin S. Et Al.
E2022-01277-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey D. Rader

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children. Upon our review, we
conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds for
termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children.

Stephen Rushing v. Dawn Rushing (Strickland)
E2022-01229-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

This is an appeal of a modification to a permanent parenting plan. Dawn Rushing
Strickland (“Mother”) filed a motion to modify the permanent parenting plan governing
the custody and visitation of two children from her prior marriage to Stephen Rushing
(“Father”). The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“Trial Court”) granted the motion
and modified the permanent parenting plan to designate Mother the primary residential
parent and grant her 265 co-parenting days and Father 100 co-parenting days. Father has
appealed. Upon our review of the final order, we conclude that the Trial Court
erroneously considered Mother’s gender in determining that a material change in
circumstance had occurred affecting the children’s best interest and that its finding that
the best interest factors did not favor one parent over the other demonstrates that Mother
failed to carry her burden of proof. We accordingly reverse the Trial Court’s
modification of the permanent parenting plan. Mother’s request for attorney’s fees on
appeal is denied.

In Re Estate of Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard
E2022-01147-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

In this matter concerning the interpretation of a will, John Moon and Shannon Moon (“John” and “Shannon”) (“Claimants,” collectively) filed a claim in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) against the estate of their late sister, Mary Hutcheson Moon Ballard(“Mary”).1 Arthur Ballard (“Arthur”), Mary’s husband, filed an exception to the claim. Mary’s grandmother, Elise Chapin Moon (“Elise”), had established a trust for her grandchildren, including Mary. It is Claimants’ position that a bloodline provision in Elise’s will (“the Moon Will”) excludes spouses of grandchildren from receiving trust proceeds. The Trial Court, having put certain questions to a jury, ruled in favor of Arthur. Claimants appeal. We hold that once Mary received the funds from the trust, which dissolved in 2016, the funds were hers outright and no longer subject to the will’s “bloodline” restriction. We hold further that the Trial Court erred by putting questions to a jury when the case was resolvable as a matter of law. However, the error was harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Rex Sullivan Ex Rel. Rose Sullivan v. James Carden Et Al.
E2022-01234-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Justin C. Angel

This appeal concerns a claim of negligence. Rex Sullivan, individually and in his capacity as the Administrator Ad Litem for his deceased wife (“Plaintiff”),1filed a complaint in the Rhea County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”), seeking damages from James Carden and Carden Trucking Company (“Defendants”)for injuries Plaintiff suffered in a November 2018 car accident. Plaintiff alleged that his accident was caused by Defendants’ failure to remove excessive mud they had deposited onto the rural road he drove on. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, which Plaintiff has not appealed. Otherwise, given the existence of genuine issues of material fact such as how much mud was deposited on to the road and the foreseeability of the risk of injury, we reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Timothy Hopson v. Smith Wholesale, LLC
E2023-01153-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne S. Cook

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 6, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was not
filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until August 11, 2023, more than thirty days from the
date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice
of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Mechelle Hollis Ex Rel. Nicole N. Et Al v. Manuel M. Sanchez
M2022-01190-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

After a car accident, a plaintiff sued a defendant, but never served him with process.  Almost two years later, the defendant moved to dismiss the case as time-barred.  The plaintiff opposed the dismissal and moved for an enlargement of time to serve the defendant.  The court denied the requested enlargement and dismissed the case.  We affirm.

Amanda B. Wolfe v. Surgoinsville Beer Board Et Al.
E2022-01605-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge Thomas J. Wright

Following the denial of her application for a beer permit, Amanda B. Wolfe (“Ms. Wolfe”)
filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (the “trial
court”) against Surgoinsville Beer Board (the “Beer Board”) and the Town of Surgoinsville
(collectively, “the City”), seeking a trial de novo. Ms. Wolfe contended that the Beer Board
incorrectly reviewed her application for a beer permit under a newly amended ordinance.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in Ms. Wolfe’s favor, ordering the issuance of her
beer permit and finding that the amended ordinance lacked a rational basis. Having
reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Estate of Charles Leonard Welch
M2023-00118-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andra J. Hedrick

This appeal arises from a will contest by the decedent’s children. Counsel for the contestants and counsel for the executrix engaged in settlement negotiations on behalf of their clients. The executrix submitted a motion to enforce the settlement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the Probate Court granted the motion and entered an order of voluntary dismissal of the contestants’ claims with prejudice. The contestants appeal. We affirm.

In Re Jayla S.
M2022-01492-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Judge N. Andy Myrick

The parents of Jayla S. appeal the termination of their parental rights. Jayla was removed from her parents’ custody because Jayla tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) subsequently filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. Following a two-day trial, the trial court found that multiple grounds for termination had been proven, including the ground of severe child abuse. Finding it also to be in the best interest of Jayla that her parents’ parental rights be terminated, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Roger Fulmer et al. v. Sarco, GP d/b/a Sarco et al.
M2022-01479-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Thompson

This is an action to recover amounts due under a promissory note. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees of one-third of that amount, and prejudgment interest on both the compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that the individual defendants are individually liable on the obligation and that the ad damnum clause permitted the plaintiffs to recover $50,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. We vacate the attorney’s fees award and remand for a determination of the plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney’s fees award only. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Cole Bryan Howell, III v. United Rentals (North America), Inc., Et Al.
E2023-00170-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge William T. Ailor

The plaintiff appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this action.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence as barred by the statute of
limitations. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution
after finding the plaintiff could not establish that the defendants had initiated the issuance
of a criminal warrant without probable cause and with malice. Discerning no error, we
affirm the trial court.

Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
M2022-01019-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue- Dissenting
M2022-01019-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. As the majority notes, an administrative judge determined that the taxpayer’s sanitizing operations in this case do not constitute “manufacturing” as they are not “processing” tangible personal property. The administrative judge reasoned that a taxpayer is required to show that its activity fundamentally changes or transforms the property from the state or form in which it originally existed. Applying that standard, the administrative judge found that the state or form of the linens has not been changed or altered by the cleaning, as they remain the same linens before and after.

Monica A. Davalos (Dale) v. Douglas C. Dale
E2022-00859-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

Chad Aaron Reagan v. Rachel Bogart Reagan
E2023-00499-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carter Scott Moore

The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively
entered. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this appeal.

In Re James T.
M2022-01666-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Lee Davies

A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father.

Susan M. Austin v. Tommy Joe Richmond
W2022-00559-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James P. Gallagher

Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and
awarding Father a money judgment and his attorney’s fees. Because the trial court failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from
which to make a ruling. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all issues in this case.

Paul Lebel v. CWS Marketing Group, Inc.
E2022-01106-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

The plaintiff purchased a home at an auction. The home was sold “as is.” The plaintiff
sued the defendant marketing firm which had advertised the property for auction, alleging
that it had actual knowledge of mold issues but did not disclose them to bidders, and that
it misrepresented the acreage of the real property. The plaintiff’s claims for breach of
contract, fraudulent concealment, and reckless misrepresentation proceeded to a jury trial.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, which the
court denied, but did not renew its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the proof.
After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant did not file a post-trial
motion seeking a new trial. On appeal, we conclude that the defendant waived its right to
contest the trial court’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict by failing to file a motion
asking for a new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). We
further conclude that the defendant waived appellate review of whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the fraudulent concealment, breach of contract,
and reckless misrepresentation claims by failing to renew its motion for a directed verdict
at the close of all proof in the jury trial. We grant the plaintiff’s request for reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

John Stanley Jarnagin v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center Et Al.
M2022-01012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kelvin D. Jones, III

The Plaintiff brought suit alleging the Defendants failed to obtain informed consent prior to conducting a medical procedure.  The Defendants responded with a consent form signed by the Plaintiff detailing the potential side effects of the procedure of which the Plaintiff asserted he had not been informed, and they moved for summary judgment.  The Plaintiff argued the consent form in the present case was inadequate to establish informed consent.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.  The Plaintiff appealed, challenging the validity of the signed consent form based on an alleged misrepresentation and his inability to read because of an eye condition, and arguing, therefore, that there is a material question of fact as to whether informed consent was obtained.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Defari R.
E2022-00550-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy E. Irwin

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The juvenile court
terminated parental rights on the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest
an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for his child. The
court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.