Delores M. King v. Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company, et al.
This case involves payment of an insurance claim demanded by Appellee from Appellant after Appellee’s belongings were destroyed in a fire. Appellant refused payment on the basis that Appellee failed to notify Appellant of an address change. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Appellee $32,000, representing her claim under the insurance policy, and $8,000 as a 25% bad faith penalty. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate the award representing a bad faith penalty. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
T. Green, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Plaintiffs, police officers along with a number of others, were promoted to sergeant after passing a promotional test. Subsequently, the test was declared invalid by the federal court and the city announced its intention to restore the affected officers to their previous rank pending the administration of a new promotional test. Plaintiffs, along with others, filed suit in chancery court to enjoin this action on the part of the city. The chancery court issued a temporary injunction, enjoining the city from removing plaintiffs from their rank of sergeant or from reducing their pay pending final judgment. The chancellor clarified the injunction by order which provided that the injunction would be in effect only “until such time as promotions are made from the 2001 sergeant promotional process.” Of the fifty-four plaintiffs in the chancery court taking the new promotional test, the seven plaintiffs-appellants did not rank high enough for promotion. On motion of the city, the chancery court dissolved the preliminary injunction previously issued and, by consent order, allowed the plaintiffs full credit of time served as sergeant as a result of the first promotional process. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.C.P.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights with regard to her ten-year-old daughter. The Department of Children’s Services obtained custody of the child after discovering that she had been sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend. Approximately three months later, the Department and the child’s guardian ad litem filed separate petitions in the Juvenile Court for Coffee County to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) (Supp. 2003) and severe child abuse under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). Following a bench trial, the juvenile court determined that the Department and guardian ad litem had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of abandonment but concluded that the mother had committed severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect her daughter from her boyfriend. The mother has perfected this appeal. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court’s conclusion that the mother knowingly failed to protect her child from her boyfriend’s sexual abuse and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.C.P. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate her parental rights |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, Rose Ostrow, Max Ostrow
This is a premises liability and nuisance case that arose when Plaintiff fell on a public sidewalk. Plaintiff’s fall occurred on a patch of broken concrete located on the portion of sidewalk abutting Neighbor’s property, which is located immediately to the north of the lot owned by Defendants. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her fall was caused, in part, by overgrown bushes on Defendants’ property that obstructed passage on the sidewalk. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, because the fall took place on broken concrete in front of Neighbor’s property, Plaintiff cannot establish duty or causation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, and, for the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, Rose Ostrow, Max Ostrow - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion in this case. I disagree first with the majority’s characterization of the evidence. The majority states that Ms. Hale “admitted” that the cause of her fall was a crumbled section of sidewalk in front of the Ostrow property. Ms. Hale certainly contended that the crumbled sidewalk contributed to her fall,but at no point did she concede that it was the only cause. She clearly alleged that she was forced to attempt to walk in the street because the overgrown bushes from the Ostrow property blocked the sidewalk: |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn C. Black v. Stevan L. Black
This is an independent action for fraud and coercion based on a marital dissolution agreement. On September 13, 2000, the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement, and they were divorced by final decree entered in circuit court ninety days later on December 12, 2000. In February 2003, the wife brought this independent action in the chancery court below for damages for fraud, deceit, and coercion. She alleged that the husband had coerced her into signing the marital dissolution agreement by the use of threats, had prevented her from obtaining the benefit of counsel, and had misrepresented the value of his marital assets. The husband filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the wife had failed to state a claim upon which relief could granted. The trial court dismissed the wife’s lawsuit, determining that the complaint was essentially an action to set aside the divorce decree, and that the wife did not set out sufficient facts to support that claim. From that decision, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the allegations in the complaint cannot be the basis for an independent action essentially to set aside the divorce decree. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., v. City of Memphis, Tennessee
Telecommunications corporation appeals trial court’s grant of summary judgment to city, alleging that trial court incorrectly determined that city ordinance imposing a charge of five percent |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Howard and Suzanne Levy v. James and Rhonda Franks, Lindsey Butler and Tennessee Valley Homes, Inc.
This case involves a dispute between neighbors. The plaintiffs owned a one-acre parcel of property in a rural setting almost completely surrounded by a sixteen-acre parcel of property owned by the defendants. The defendant larger landowners began building structures and storing equipment in an escalating commercial use of their property. The plaintiff small landowners complained to county officials that the defendants' use of their property constituted a zoning violation. The ensuing dispute between the two landowners was marked by the defendants engaging in threatening and intimidating behavior and the plaintiffs repeatedly complaining to authorities and incessantly documenting and videotaping the defendants' activities. Finally, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for, among other things, malicious harassment, outrageous conduct, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs on the malicious prosecution claim but declined to award punitive damages. The trial court dismissed the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims of malicious harassment and civil conspiracy. We reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim for outrageous conduct, finding that the defendants' behavior rose to the level of outrageous conduct, and remand for an award of damages on this claim. Finally, we reverse the denial of an award of punitive damages on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Burton v. Barth Fine
Mrs. Burton and Mr. Fine had an automobile accident. Both sides claimed the accident was caused by the other's fault. Mr. Fine settled his claim with Mrs. Burton's liability carrier and gave Mrs. Burton a general release. Mrs. Burton's claim proceeded to trial and she asserted that the release waived Mr. Fine's defense of comparative fault. The trial judge held that it did not and approved the jury's verdict assessing the greater fault to Mrs. Burton. We affirm. We also affirm the amount of discretionary costs awarded to Mr. Fine. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Wilson, D/B/A M & M Auto Sales v. Shane Chapman
This case involves a question of whether a plaintiff who brings suit for a debt due him resulting from his agent’s business activities has standing as a real party in interest. The trial court found that the agent was acting on behalf of his employer, that the plaintiff had standing to sue as a real party in interest, and granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sam Spicer, et al. v. Stace Thompson, et al.
Appellant Don Pickard appeals the action of the trial court finding that he defamed Sergeant Sam Spicer in public statements to the news media. Spicer cross appeals from the action of the trial court in dismissing his malicious prosecution action against Don Pickard, Stace Thompson and Howard Morris. We affirm the action of the trial court in the defamation case and affirm the action of the trial court in the malicious prosecution case as to Howard Morris. The malicious prosecution case against Don Pickard and Stace Thompson is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Robert William Arndts, by Conservator, Carol Zeliff, Darrell R. Smith, v. Violet A Bonner and Tommy L. Raines
Action was filed by plaintiff's Conservator to recover assets transferred by his wife prior to her death. The Trial Judge awarded certain assets to plaintiff and plaintiff appealed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Wesley Evans v. Peggy Jane Evans
This case arises from a divorce action between the Appellant and Appellee. After a hearing, the trial court divided the marital property, granted Appellee alimony in futuro, and awarded Appellee her attorney's fees. After denying Appellant's motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court increased Appellee's award of attorney's fees. Appellant appeals to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we affirm in part, modify in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. K.L.K.
This appeal by K.L.K. (“Mother”) challenges the Juvenile Court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on three statutory grounds, and further challenges that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in her daughter’s best interest. We conclude there was no clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the Juvenile Court, but that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the third ground. However, we also conclude there was no clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, reversed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Johnson, et al. v. Duncan E. Ragsdale
This case involves the dismissal of Appellant’s legal malpractice claim against Appellee on the basis that Appellee, after the initial dismissal of Appellant’s medical malpractice claim, failed to file a County entered a judgment for Appellee. Appellant subsequently appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, which dismissed Appellant’s cause for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.M.T., Z.T.R. and K.W.T.
Two children were placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services because of the mother’s inability to provide stable and sanitary housing. The Department established permanency plans whereby the mother would obtain and maintain stable and sanitary housing, pay child support, attend parenting classes, work with Homemaker Services to learn how to keep the home clean, obtain a parenting assessment, and undergo counseling for her mental health issues. A third child was born while the mother’s other two children were in the Department’s custody. This child was born prematurely and required extensive hospitalization and was also placed in the Department’s custody. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to all three children, which the juvenile court granted on the grounds of abandonment due to failure to pay child support, failing to comply with the permanency plans and persistent conditions. We reverse the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment, but affirm the termination of parental rights based on persistent conditions and failure to comply with the permanency plan. We also affirm the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.M.T., Z.T.R. and K.W.T. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate her parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Blurton and wife, Virginia Blurton, v. Grange Insurance & Casualty Company
This is a declaratory judgment action to establish coverage under an insurance policy. The plaintiffs’ home was insured by a homeowners policy with the defendant insurance company. The insurance company canceled the policy for nonpayment of the premium and claimed that it mailed a notice of cancellation to the insureds at that time. Six months later, the plaintiffs’ home was damaged by fire, and they filed a claim on their policy. The insurance company denied the claim. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to recover on the policy, asserting that they never received the cancellation notice, and that the insurance company did not properly cancel the policy. At trial, the insurance company representative testified about the company’s customary routine of sending cancellation notices, and it was undisputed that the insurance agent and the mortgagees received notices. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs based on, among other things, its determination that the insurance company did not prove that it had mailed a cancellation notice to the plaintiffs. The insurance company now appeals. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the cancellation notice was mailed to the plaintiffs. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Robert Samuel Reed, Deceased, Richard Gossum, Administrator C.T.A., John R. Reed v. R. S. Reed and Sons, Inc.
This case arises from the Estate’s suit to recover a debt from defendant Corporation. The parties reached an agreement regarding payment of the debt, and the trial court entered a consent order reflecting the terms of this agreement. Appellant then filed a rule 60.02 motion for relief from the consent order. The lower court denied the motion, finding that Appellant was not a party of record in the suit and, accordingly, had no standing to challenge the judgment. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Nashville Lodging Co. v. Metric Partners Growth Suite Investors, L.P.
Nashville Lodging Company and G.P. Credit Company, LLC appeal the action of the trial court in which the trial judge having previously granted Appellants' motion for summary judgment as to liability in this breach of contract action decided all issues as to damages in favor of Appellees. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregor Nadler v. Mountain Valley Chapel Business Trust
Gregor Nadler ("the plaintiff") took a default judgment in the amount of $68,270.98 against Gerald H. Lucas ("Mr. Lucas") in a Florida proceeding. The judgment survived Mr. Lucas's subsequent bankruptcy filing. The plaintiff domesticated his judgment in Tennessee and then filed suit against, inter alia, the Mountain Valley Chapel Business Trust and Mr. Lucas, claiming (1) that Mr. Lucas had engaged in a fraudulent conveyance when he formed the trust and (2) that the trust was his alter ego. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. From this judgment, the plaintiff appeals, challenging the trial court's rulings with respect to his fraudulent conveyance and alter ego claims. In addition, the plaintiff raises an evidentiary issue. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Lynn Miller v. Jerry Ellison, et al
Plaintiff, a customer who was injured when assaulted on the premises, brought action for damages against the owners-lessors of the premises and others. The Circuit Court, Campbell County, Conrad Troutman, Judge, dismissed the action as to the owners-lessors for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Ruby Tuesday, Inc. v. Gerald Largen
This case started out as a dispute over the title to a twenty to thirty-five foot wide strip along a state highway. The Chancery Court of Roane County held that the defendant held the title, but that the plaintiff had an access easement over the property. The defendant asserts on appeal that the Court erred because the plaintiff never claimed an easement in its pleadings and that the Court simply created one. The plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in finding that the defendant held the title to the property. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Melanie Sue Gibson v. Ernestine W. Francis
This tort action arises out of a two-vehicle accident. At trial, the defendant Ernestine W. Francis admitted liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff Melanie Sue Gibson for property damage in the amount of $6,900; however, the jury declined to award her any damages on her claim for personal injuries. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court did not properly perform its role as thirteenth juror; that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence; and that the trial court erred when it re-instructed the jury in response to a question from that body. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |
