Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co. M2002-01752-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Don R. Ash
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
On November 16, 1997, a fire destroyed a Chili's Restaurant ("Chili's") in Nashville, Tennessee. At the time of the fire, the premises were owned and operated by RMR Investments and Gower Center, Ltd. ("RMR/Gower") and leased to Chili's. Under a 20-year lease agreement, Chili's agreed to insure the improvements against loss or damage by fire and other casualties and to insure against property damage and public liability arising out of occurrences on the premises. RMR/Gower was to be named as a loss payee or additional insured under the insurance policies obtained by Chili's. According to the lease, in the event the premises and/or the improvements were destroyed by fire or other casualty, Chili's had the option to terminate the lease, and all insurance proceeds were to be paid to RMR/Gower, except for the portion payable to Chili's for loss of personal property. Pursuant to the lease agreement, Chili's obtained insurance coverage through Lexington Insurance Company ("Lexington"). The certificate of insurance dated December 5, 1997 listed RMR/Gower as certificate holder and named RMR/Gower as additional insured. After the fire, Chili's elected to terminate the lease agreement due to the condition of the premises. Lexington paid the proceeds for the loss of the building to RMR/Gower, less amounts paid to Chili's for loss of personal property. RMR/Gower submitted an additional claim for damages it incurred for the loss of rental income and other charges it would have otherwise collected from Chili's. This claim was denied by Lexington. RMR/Gower then submitted a claim to its insurer Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company ("Charter Oak") for the loss of rental income, which Charter Oak paid. After Lexington refused to reimburse Charter Oak for the amounts it paid RMR/Gower for the loss of rental income, Charter Oak filed suit against Lexington for breach of contract under the theory of third party beneficiary. Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On June 26, 2002, the trial court granted Lexington's summary judgment motion and denied Charter Oak's motion. Notice of this appeal soon followed. For the reasons set forth below, the order of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.
This case involves the alleged breach of an oral contract for the construction of a home. The trial court granted the builder summary judgment. Because some genuine issues of material fact exist, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Christopher S. Baker v. Middle Tn. Acoustics, Inc., et al. 01S01-9702-CH-00035
Authoring Judge: Robe R T S. Br Andt , Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff/appellant, Christopher Steven Baker, appeals from the trial court's decision holding that he failed to prove that he sustained an injury while working for the defendant/appellee, Middle Tennessee Acoustic, Inc. The outcome of the case hinges primarily on a determination of the plaintiff's credibility. While our review is de novo, it is accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the trial court's findings. Moreover, when the trial court has made a decision that hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is in the record clear, concrete, and convincing evidence to the contrary. And, too, considerable difference is to be accorded the trial court where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992), Airline Construction, Inc. v. Barr, 87 S.W.2d 247, 264 (Tenn. App. 199). The record is filled with contradictory and conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiff injured himself as he claims. The plaintiff, at trial, testified that he injured himself on Friday, June 2, 1995. Yet he alleges in his complaint that the injury was on June 5, a Monday. Records from Nashville's General Hospital reflect that he once gave June 3 as the date of his injury and later gave June 5 as the date. The plaintiff told Dr. David Gaw it was June 5. Confusion over the exact date of an injury is not unusual and failure for a worker to recall the exact date or recalling an incorrect date is usually immaterial to the outcome of the case. But the plaintiff himself emphasizes the exact date. It is important for him to prove it happened on a Friday. Wallace Harris, owner of the employer corporation, testified that the plaintiff told him he, the plaintiff, hurt himself while moving. This, of course, directly contradicts the plaintiff's testimony. But it also sheds some light on why the June 2 date surfaced at trail. By proving that he hurt himself on a Friday, the plaintiff proves that he did not hurt himself over the weekend when he moved. Ronnie Stroud was working with the plaintiff when the plaintiff says he injured himself. The plaintiff testified he told Stroud he hurt his back and that the two of them finished the work day with Stroud doing the overhead work with the plaintiff handing Stroud the materials. Stroud testified at trial that the plaintiff never complained about being hurt and that he, Stroud, never observed the plaintiff being hurt. The plaintiff had a previous work-related back injury. He denies that it was bothering him before June 2 or June 5, 1995. Yet he was scheduled for a Social Security disability examination with Dr. Gaw before June 2 or June 5. If he had no manifestation of disability - 2 -
Davidson
Workers Compensation Panel
Elsie Hopkins v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc. 01S01-9610-CH-00216
Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
This Workers' Compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 2, 1994, the plaintiff, Elsie Hopkins, fell at work and injured her right shoulder. At trial and on appeal the defendant, San Antonio Shoe, Inc., accepted the claim as compensable. The trial court awarded thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and assessed a bad faith penalty of twenty percent (2%) of the temporary total disability benefits due in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5- 6-225(k). The defendant employer contends on appeal the evidence preponderates against a vocational disability award of thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and any finding of bad faith. The plaintiff requests an award of post judgment interest. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The scope of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of evidence is otherwise. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded the trial court's factual findings. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1987). However, where the issues involve expert medical testimony which is contained in the record by deposition, as it is in this case, then all impressions of weight and credibility must be drawn from the contents of the depositions, and the reviewing court may draw its own impression as to weight and credibility from the contents of the depositions. Overman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Tenn. 1991). Plaintiff, Elsie Hopkins, is 48 years of age and has a tenth grade education . Her prior work history consists of repetitive work in the garment and shoe industry and she has no vocational training. She was employed by the defendant, San Antonio Shoe, Inc., for approximately 8 years when she injured her right shoulder on May 2, 1994. She reported the injury to her employer and was taken by her supervisor, Paul Darrow, to be seen by Dr. Jack Milam. Dr. Milam treated her conservatively and placed her arm in a sling for 6 to 8 weeks. 2
